Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In September 2020, George Fluitt was indicted on three counts of fraud and offering kickbacks related to genetic testing services that his company, Specialty Drug Testing LLC, provided to Medicare beneficiaries. As part of a nationwide investigation into genetic testing fraud, the Government executed search warrants at laboratories referred to as the Hurricane Shoals Entities (“HSE”), allegedly operated by Khalid Satary. The Government copied several terabytes of data from HSE, some of which were later determined to be material to Fluitt’s defense.In the lower courts, the Government established a “Filter Team” to review materials seized in its investigation and identify any that might be privileged. The Filter Team’s review was governed in part by a Protocol Order, which established a multi-step process for notifying a third party that it might have a claim of privilege and then adjudicating that claim. HSE and Satary provided privilege logs to the Filter Team, asserting thousands of claims of privilege. Both Fluitt and the Filter Team found these privilege logs to be facially deficient as they made only threadbare assertions of privilege, without any accompanying explanation.In the United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit, the court affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the appellants failed to establish their claims of privilege. The court also found that the appellants' argument that they are not bound by the Protocol Order was a red herring, as the magistrate judge evaluated the appellants’ privilege logs under the standards established by federal caselaw. The court also rejected the appellants' argument that Fluitt “has not shown a need for the documents” and has not “demonstrated any kind of relevancy.” The court found that the record suggests that Fluitt “has a need” for the potentially privileged documents, as the Government determined that the potentially privileged materials were material to preparing Fluitt’s defense. View "United States v. Fluitt" on Justia Law

The case involves a professional photographer who sexually exploited a minor. The defendant initially contacted the victim through a social networking site and began communicating with her through various means, eventually soliciting and receiving explicit images of the victim. The defendant also met the victim in person and sexually abused her. After the victim's parents reported the exploitation to the police, an investigation was launched. The police seized a computer tower, an external hard drive, and other items from the defendant's former residence. A forensic examination of the hard drives revealed explicit images of the victim, communications between the defendant and the victim, and hundreds of images of unidentified females in various stages of undress.The defendant was indicted on multiple counts, including aggravated rape of a child and enticement of a minor. He pleaded guilty to all charges, except for the eight counts of aggravated rape of a child, where he pleaded guilty to the lesser included offense of statutory rape. After being sentenced, the defendant filed a motion for the return of the seized property. The Commonwealth opposed the return of the property, arguing that it was in the "public interest" to destroy the devices. The Superior Court denied the defendant's request for the return of certain property.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts granted an application for direct appellate review. The court concluded that the procedural requirements set forth in G. L. c. 276, §§ 4 to 8, must be followed before a forfeiture decree may be issued under G. L. c. 276, § 3. The court vacated the Superior Court orders denying the return of certain property to the defendant and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Commonwealth v. James" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Carlos Rubén Boyrie-Laboy, a Puerto Rico Police officer, who was convicted under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951, 371, and 641 for his involvement in a conspiracy to commit robbery and theft of government property. Boyrie-Laboy was part of the Humacao Drugs Division, responsible for seizing illegal weapons, drugs, and other contraband. In 2015, Officer Gabriel Maldonado-Martínez joined the division and began working with Boyrie-Laboy. Maldonado-Martínez later became an undercover FBI informant to identify corrupt police officers. Boyrie-Laboy was involved in two thefts of fireworks and was present during two FBI operations designed to catch corrupt officers. However, he did not accept any stolen goods or money from these operations.The government indicted Boyrie-Laboy and three other officers based on these activities. Boyrie-Laboy was charged with conspiracy to commit robbery, conspiracy to steal and convert government property, and theft and conversion of government property. He proceeded to a five-day jury trial, where the jury found him guilty on all counts. Boyrie-Laboy appealed the convictions, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support them.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. Boyrie-Laboy's counsel had declined the opportunity to move for a judgment of acquittal twice during the trial and did not make a post-trial motion for judgment of acquittal. As a result, the court applied the "clear and gross injustice" standard of review. The court found that the evidence sufficiently supported the jury's findings and that upholding Boyrie-Laboy's convictions did not result in a clear and gross injustice. Therefore, the court affirmed the convictions. View "United States v. Boyrie-Laboy" on Justia Law

The defendant, Noe Lezama, was initially charged with murder but later entered a plea to voluntary manslaughter in 2019. In 2022, he filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, arguing that the timing and factual basis of his plea should not preclude him from being eligible for resentencing. The trial court summarily denied his petition, concluding that legislative history confirmed that those who pled guilty to manslaughter after statutory amendments eliminated imputed malice theories of murder liability are not eligible for resentencing as a matter of law.Previously, the trial court had sentenced Lezama to a total of 13 years in prison for voluntary manslaughter and a gang enhancement. The prosecution had initially charged Lezama and another individual with murder and conspiracy to commit murder, alleging that they had killed a man with malice aforethought. However, in 2019, the prosecution and Lezama reached a plea agreement, and the original information was amended to add a count of voluntary manslaughter and modify a criminal street gang enhancement.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Three affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court found that the statutory language and defendant’s record of conviction confirmed that Lezama was not eligible for resentencing. The court noted that Senate Bill 1437, which took effect in 2019, amended the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life. However, the court concluded that this did not apply to Lezama, who pled guilty to manslaughter after such theories had been eliminated by Senate Bill 1437. View "P. v. Lezama" on Justia Law

The case involves James Fejes, a pilot who held a certificate issued by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) under 49 U.S.C. § 44703. Fejes used his aircraft to transport and distribute marijuana to retail stores within Alaska, an activity that is legal under state law but illegal under federal law. After an investigation, the FAA revoked Fejes's pilot certificate under 49 U.S.C. § 44710(b)(2), which mandates revocation when a pilot knowingly uses an aircraft for an activity punishable by more than a year's imprisonment under a federal or state controlled substance law.Fejes appealed the FAA's decision to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who affirmed the revocation. He then appealed the ALJ's decision to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), which also affirmed the ALJ. Throughout the agency proceedings, Fejes admitted that he piloted an aircraft to distribute marijuana within Alaska, but argued that his conduct fell outside of § 44710(b)(2)'s reach.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied Fejes's petition for review of the NTSB's order affirming the FAA's revocation of his pilot certificate. The court rejected Fejes's argument that the FAA lacked jurisdiction to revoke his pilot certificate because Congress cannot authorize an administrative agency to regulate purely intrastate commerce like marijuana delivery within Alaska. The court held that airspace is a channel of commerce squarely within congressional authority, and therefore, Congress can regulate Fejes's conduct. The court also rejected Fejes's argument that his conduct was exempt under FAA regulation 14 C.F.R. § 91.19, and that the FAA misinterpreted § 44710(b)(2). The court concluded that the FAA's revocation of Fejes's pilot certificate was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. View "FEJES V. FAA" on Justia Law

Shana L. Jarmer was arrested for driving under the influence (DUI) after failing a breath alcohol test. At the time of the arrest, Jarmer was in the driver's seat of a vehicle stuck in a muddy ditch. Despite her efforts to move the vehicle, it remained stationary due to the muddy conditions. Following her arrest, Jarmer was notified that her driving privileges would be suspended by the Kansas Department of Revenue (KDR) under K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 8-1014. Jarmer challenged the suspension, arguing that she was merely attempting to operate the vehicle, not actually operating it, as the vehicle was not moving.The KDR upheld the suspension, finding that Jarmer was operating the vehicle. Jarmer sought judicial review of this decision in Sumner County District Court, which denied her petition, agreeing with the KDR that Jarmer was operating the vehicle since the engine was running, she was behind the wheel, and the tires were spinning. On appeal, the Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, concluding that Jarmer operated the vehicle because she caused it to function or work when she engaged the transmission and pressed the gas pedal.The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas reversed the decisions of the lower courts. The Supreme Court held that to "operate" a vehicle means to "drive" it, which requires motion on the part of the vehicle. The court found that while Jarmer unquestionably attempted to operate the vehicle, her car did not move, despite her best efforts. Therefore, it was factually impossible for Jarmer to "move"—and, under the court's precedent, "operate"—the vehicle. The court concluded that Jarmer's unsuccessful effort to drive her car out of a muddy ditch fails to satisfy K.S.A. 8-1002(a)(2)(A)'s requirement that she was "operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or both." The court reversed the suspension of Jarmer's driver's license and remanded the matter to the KDR for further proceedings. View "Jarmer v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law

The case involves an action filed by Spokane County Prosecuting Attorney Lawrence Haskell against Jilma Meneses, the secretary of the Washington State Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS). The Prosecutor sought a writ of mandamus directing Meneses to comply with statutory duties under chapter 10.77 RCW and timely provide competency services in criminal proceedings. The case specifically concerned three categories of Spokane County defendants in felony criminal proceedings ordered to receive competency services from DSHS.Previously, a class action was filed in federal court, challenging DSHS's delays in providing competency services to criminal defendants in pretrial custody. The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington held these delays violated the class members’ due process rights and issued a permanent injunction against DSHS. The injunction set strict time limits for providing competency services to defendants in pretrial custody, appointed a special court monitor, and began oversight of DSHS’s efforts to comply with the injunction.In the Supreme Court of the State of Washington, DSHS argued that the court must dismiss the petition for lack of original jurisdiction because the secretary is not a state officer within the meaning of the state constitution. The court agreed with DSHS, concluding that the secretary is not a state officer. The court reasoned that a state officer must be elected, subject to impeachment, and granted a State sovereign power, none of which applied to the secretary. Therefore, the court dismissed the petition for writ of mandamus. View "Spokane County v. Meneses" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Joshua Aldridge, who was found guilty of conspiracy to sex traffic an adult by force, threats of force, fraud, or coercion, among other charges. Aldridge and his girlfriend, Kathy, were both addicted to painkillers and sought out higher-dosage pills from Larry Dean Porter. When they could not afford to purchase pills with money, Porter would allow them to have the pills as long as they agreed to pay him later. Eventually, Kathy was informed that she could “work off” the debt by “cleaning and doing sexual favors.” Aldridge would regularly drive Kathy to Porter’s house, take his pill, leave Kathy at the house, and return to pick her up when she was finished.The district court denied Aldridge's Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal on the adult-sex-trafficking-by-force conspiracy charge. The court reasoned that a jury could find that Aldridge had personally coerced Kathy to buy pills in exchange for sex acts. The jury found Aldridge guilty on all three counts. At sentencing, the district judge applied two enhancements over Aldridge’s objections: the enhancement for use of a computer to entice or offer and the vulnerable-victim enhancement.In the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Aldridge challenged the district court’s denial of his Rule 29 motion and the district court’s application of two sentencing enhancements. The court affirmed the district court's decision, stating that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Aldridge knowingly and voluntarily joined the conspiracy with intent to further its objective. The court also found that the district court properly applied the sentencing enhancements. View "United States v. Aldridge" on Justia Law

The case involves Katrina Robinson, founder and director of The Healthcare Institute (THI), a for-profit company in Memphis, Tennessee, that provided certified nursing assistant training. THI received a federal grant from the Geriatrics Workforce Enhancement Program (GWEP), administered by the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), from 2015 to 2019. The grant provided scholarships for eligible THI students. Robinson was convicted of four counts of wire fraud for actions she took in administering the grant. The district court granted Robinson's post-verdict motion for a judgment of acquittal on two of the counts, and Robinson appealed the denial of acquittal on the remaining two counts.The district court's decision was based on a federal investigation that raised concerns about Robinson's use of HRSA grant funds for personal expenses and discrepancies in Annual Performance Reports (APRs) that Robinson had submitted on THI’s behalf. The APRs contained inaccurate information on the number of students who graduated from the program, the number of students who received grant-funded scholarships, and the unique numerical identifiers assigned to students. The government argued that these "errors" were intentional manipulations by Robinson to ensure THI’s continued receipt of grant funds.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. The court found that there was sufficient evidence to prove that Robinson's submission of false information in the APRs constituted a course of conduct intended to deprive the government of money. The court also found that Robinson's intent to defraud was demonstrated by her direct involvement in preparing and submitting the APRs, and her direction to charge personal wedding expenses to the grant. The court reversed the district court's grant of acquittal on one of the counts, finding that a rational juror could conclude that Robinson's transmission of materially false information was done to induce HRSA to continue funding the grant. The court affirmed the district court's denial of acquittal on the remaining two counts. View "United States v. Robinson" on Justia Law

The case involves Carl Hubbard, who was convicted of first-degree murder in Michigan state court in 1992. Over two decades later, Hubbard filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, arguing that he is entitled to an equitable exception to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996’s (AEDPA) time bar based on a credible showing of actual innocence. The district court dismissed the petition as untimely.The district court's decision was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Hubbard argued that he had new evidence that impeached the State’s case against him, but he failed to present evidence affirmatively demonstrating his actual innocence. The court held that AEDPA does not permit him to file an untimely habeas petition. The court affirmed the district court's decision, stating that Hubbard's new evidence did not meet the burden of showing that the State had imprisoned an innocent person. Therefore, Hubbard must comply with the same law with which all other habeas petitioners must comply. View "Hubbard v. Rewerts" on Justia Law