Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed a decision by the Maryland Public Service Commission ("Commission") that approved a rate increase for the Washington Gas and Light Company ("Washington Gas"). The rate increase came after the Commission approved the acquisition of Washington Gas by AltaGas Limited ("AltaGas"). The Commission had imposed conditions on the merger, including a condition that required Washington Gas customer rates to reflect "merger-related savings" of "not less than $800,000 per year over the five years" following the merger’s closing. The Office of People’s Counsel ("OPC") objected to the Commission's interpretation of this condition and the approved rate increase.The court held that the appropriate standard of review for the Commission’s interpretation of its own prior order is the arbitrary or capricious standard. Using this standard, the court found that the Commission’s interpretation of the merger-related savings condition was not arbitrary or capricious. The court determined that the Commission had reasonably explained the inclusion of the condition in the merger order and OPC had not shown that this explanation was arbitrary or capricious. Therefore, the court affirmed the Commission's decision to approve the rate increase for Washington Gas. View "Petition of the Off. Of People's Counsel" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) allowing a new auction rule to apply retroactively to a pending auction. This auction was administered by PJM Interconnection L.L.C., an entity responsible for running the auction. The petitioners, electric suppliers and their trade associations, contended that FERC's orders violated the filed rate doctrine, which forbids retroactive rates.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found that the Tariff Amendment was retroactive because it altered the legal consequence attached to a past action when it allowed PJM to use a different Locational Deliverability Area (LDA) Reliability Requirement than the one it had calculated and posted. The court noted that the Tariff Amendment, therefore, violated the filed rate doctrine.The court ruled that the doctrine's predictability is crucial because electricity markets depend on it. FERC’s disregard of the filed rate doctrine created unpredictability in the markets, potentially eroding confidence in the markets and ultimately harming consumers who buy electricity in those markets.The court granted the petitions for review and vacated the portion of FERC’s orders that allowed PJM to apply the Tariff Amendment to the 2024/25 capacity auction. View "Constellation Energy Generation LLC v. FERC" on Justia Law

In this case, a group of electricity suppliers and their trade associations challenged orders of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) that permitted PJM Interconnection L.L.C., a wholesale market operator, to apply a new auction rule retroactively to a pending auction. The petitioners argued that FERC's orders violated the filed rate doctrine, which prohibits retroactive rates. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit agreed and granted the petitions, vacating the relevant parts of the orders.The central issue revolved around the Locational Deliverability Area (LDA) Reliability Requirement, a key parameter in PJM's auction process. Prior to the auction, PJM had miscalculated the LDA Reliability Requirement, which led to a potential price increase for a specific region. To correct this, PJM sought FERC's permission to amend the tariff to allow for a downward adjustment of the LDA Reliability Requirement. FERC granted this permission, allowing the new rule to apply to the ongoing auction, which the petitioners argued was a retroactive change in violation of the filed rate doctrine.The court found that the tariff amendment was indeed retroactive as it altered the legal consequence attached to a past action, specifically, PJM's calculation and posting of the LDA Reliability Requirement. The court held that the filed rate doctrine did not yield to equities and that the tariff amendment's retroactivity created instability in the electricity market. Consequently, the court vacated the portion of FERC's orders that allowed PJM to apply the tariff amendment to the 2024/25 capacity auction. View "NRG Business Marketing LLC v. FERC" on Justia Law

In a case before the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, the Montana Environmental Information Center sued the Montana Department of Public Service Regulation, Public Service Commission, and Northwestern Corporation, also known as Northwestern Energy. The plaintiff contested Northwestern's failure to purchase energy from Community Renewable Energy Project (CREP) resources in 2015 and 2016. Northwestern, which is a public utility, had obtained waivers from the Commission for these obligations. The plaintiff claimed that Northwestern’s waivers were granted erroneously and sought penalties for Northwestern’s non-compliance.The District Court reversed the Commission's decision, concluding that Northwestern hadn't taken all reasonable steps to procure CREP resources for the years in question. The court also assessed a $2,519,800 penalty against Northwestern. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana held that the District Court correctly reversed the Commission's waiver for 2015, but made an error in assessing the penalty. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision in part, vacated it in part, and remanded the case to the District Court for further proceedings. The court directed the District Court to remand the case to the Commission to assess the penalty against Northwestern for its non-compliance in 2015 and, if applicable, 2016. View "Montana Environmental Information Center v. Northwestern Energy" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment for the Orange County Transportation Authority (OCTA) in a case brought by two utilities, Southern California Edison Company and Southern California Gas Company. The utilities claimed they were entitled to compensation under the Takings Clause or under state law for having to relocate their equipment from public streets to allow for the construction of a streetcar line.The court held that the utilities did not have a property interest under California law in maintaining their facilities at their specific locations in the face of OCTA’s efforts to construct a streetcar line. The California Supreme Court recognized in a previous case that a public utility accepts franchise rights in public streets subject to an implied obligation to relocate its facilities therein at its own expense when necessary to make way for a proper governmental use of the streets.The court rejected the utilities’ argument that constructing rail lines is per se a proprietary activity, not a governmental one. California common law has traditionally required utilities to bear relocation costs when governments construct subways, and there is no reason why above-ground rail lines should be treated differently.Finally, the court rejected the utilities’ supplemental state-law claim that California Public Utilities Code section 40162 places the costs of relocation on OCTA. That provision says nothing about imposing the costs of relocation on OCTA. Thus, section 40162 does not apply to OCTA’s project. View "SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY V. ORANGE COUNTY TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY" on Justia Law

In the case, GenConn Energy, LLC, an electricity supplier, appealed to the Supreme Court of Connecticut, arguing that the Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (PURA) overstepped its authority by reducing GenConn's proposed return on capital for two of its peaking generation facilities. These facilities provide additional electricity to Connecticut consumers during times of increased demand. GenConn claimed that PURA was not allowed to lower GenConn's debt rate or to use the general rate-making principles found in a different statute when making its decision.However, the court rejected these arguments. It held that PURA acted within its statutory authority under § 16-243u when it reviewed GenConn's recovery of costs in line with the general rate-making principles of § 16-19e. The court highlighted the interrelated nature of cost recovery and rate setting, and deduced that PURA must be able to protect the interests of ratepayers if it determines that a company is overrecovering. The court also rejected GenConn's argument that PURA's decision was arbitrary and capricious. The court found substantial evidence in the record to support PURA's final decision and concluded that the decision did not constitute an arbitrary and capricious one. Thus, the court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of GenConn's appeal.The court's ruling implies that PURA has the authority to review a peaking generation facility's recoverable costs to ensure that the rates are "sufficient, but no more than sufficient," to cover the facility's operating costs. The decision also emphasizes the importance of PURA’s regulatory authority and the necessity of protecting ratepayers from bearing the financial burden of a company's overrecovery. View "GenConn Energy, LLC v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority" on Justia Law

In a dispute regarding a Maryland Public Service Commission (PSC) decision to approve a rate increase for Washington Gas and Light Company (Washington Gas), the Supreme Court of Maryland held that a reviewing court must apply an arbitrary or capricious standard of review to the Commission’s interpretation of its own prior order. The issue arose from the interpretation of Condition 44, a provision in the merger order which mandated a certain level of savings for customers following the merger. The Public Service Commission interpreted this condition to mean that Washington Gas’s post-merger costs must be $800,000 per year less than they would have been without the merger. The Maryland Office of People’s Counsel (OPC) disagreed, arguing that the condition required Washington Gas’s post-merger costs to be $800,000 per year less than they were the year before the merger. The court found the Commission’s interpretation was not arbitrary or capricious, affirming the decisions of the lower courts. View "Petition of the Off. Of People's Counsel" on Justia Law

In this case, Fred Zackery sought access to confidential settlement agreements between the Water Works and Sewer Board of the City of Gadsden ("the Board") and various carpet and chemical manufacturers. Zackery requested these agreements under the Open Records Act. The Board had sued the manufacturers, alleging they contaminated the Board's raw water intake. The Board settled with all the manufacturers and planned to use the settlement funds to build and maintain a new water-treatment facility.Zackery, a citizen of Gadsden and a local radio station manager, intervened in the lawsuit specifically to request disclosure of the settlement agreements. The trial court granted his intervention but ruled that the Board didn't have to disclose the agreements until it had accepted a bid for the construction of the water-treatment facility. This decision was grounded in Alabama's Competitive Bid Law, which is designed to guard against corruption and favoritism in awarding contracts for public projects.The Supreme Court of Alabama upheld the trial court's decision, affirming that the immediate disclosure of the settlements could interfere with the competitive bid process, potentially driving bids upwards and leaving fewer funds for the long-term operation and maintenance of the new facility. This situation, the court reasoned, could cause rate hikes for the Board's customers. Therefore, the court concluded that an exception to the Open Records Act justified nondisclosure of the settlement agreements until the competitive-bid process was complete. View "Zackery v. Water Works and Sewer Board of the City of Gadsden" on Justia Law

In this case before the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, the Office of the Public Advocate (OPA) contested an order by the Public Utilities Commission (Commission) that extended the waiver of the standard depreciation rate for the Maine Water Company - Millinocket Division (MWC). The OPA raised three claims: (1) the Commission erred in applying Chapter 110 of its rules to waive the depreciation rate set in Chapter 68, which according to the OPA already contained a waiver provision; (2) the Commission abused its discretion and set unjust and unreasonable rates by approving an arbitrarily low depreciation expense; and (3) the Commission relied on information that was not included in the evidentiary record.The court disagreed with all three claims raised by the OPA. Regarding the first claim, the court stated that Chapter 68 did not contain a waiver provision and that the Commission rightly applied the general waiver provision contained in Chapter 110. Concerning the second claim, the court found that the Commission did not abuse its discretion when it extended the waiver in anticipation of a gradual return to full depreciation expenses. The court determined that the Commission's decision aligned with the statutory rate-setting goal and prevented rate shock. Lastly, the court determined that the OPA waived its third claim by not raising the issue about the lack of an evidentiary record earlier in the proceedings. As such, the court affirmed the Commission's order. View "Office of the Public Advocte v. Public Utilities Commission" on Justia Law

In this case, the Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District reviewed a decision by the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) to adopt a new net energy metering (NEM) tariff. The PUC was required by the Legislature to create a successor tariff to the existing NEM scheme, which utilities argued overcompensated owners of renewable energy systems for their exported energy, raising electricity costs for customers without such systems.The petitioners, Center for Biological Diversity, Inc., Environmental Working Group, and The Protect our Communities Foundation, contended that the successor tariff did not comply with various requirements of section 2827.1 of the Public Utilities Code. The petitioners argued that the tariff failed to consider the social benefits of customer-generated power, improperly favored the interests of utility customers who did not own renewable systems, failed to promote sustainable growth of renewable energy, and neglected alternatives to promote the growth of renewable systems among customers in disadvantaged communities.The court affirmed the PUC's decision. It held that the PUC had appropriately balanced the various objectives set out by the Legislature in section 2827.1. The court found that the successor tariff was designed to reduce the financial advantage previously given to owners of renewable energy systems under the NEM tariff, which the court said was consistent with the Legislature's aim of balancing costs and benefits to all customers. The court also noted that the PUC had adopted programs to make renewable energy systems more accessible to low-income customers, satisfying the requirement to ensure growth among residential customers in disadvantaged communities.Lastly, the court concluded that the PUC's decision to apply the same tariff to both residential and nonresidential customers was justified, as the nonresidential NEM 2.0 tariff, while cost-effective for the electrical system as a whole, did not balance costs and benefits among all customers. View "Center for Biological Diversity v. Public Utilities Com." on Justia Law