Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs alleged that the City of Berkeley violated the Ralph M. Brown Act during three city council meetings in late 2023 and early 2024. At each meeting, disruptions from attendees prevented the council from conducting business. The mayor determined that order could not be restored by removing disruptive individuals but did not order the meeting room cleared. Instead, the meetings were recessed and reconvened in a different, smaller room. The press was allowed to attend in person, while the public could join by video, but the new location could not accommodate all nondisruptive members of the public. No attempt was made to restore order by removing disruptive individuals, nor was the meeting room ordered cleared.The Alameda County Superior Court sustained the defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend, holding that section 54957.9 of the Brown Act does not require the city council to first attempt to remove disruptive individuals before determining that order cannot be restored. The trial court further found that the city council complied with the statute by recessing and reconvening the meetings in a different room with press attendance. The case was dismissed with prejudice, and plaintiffs appealed.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. It held that, under section 54957.9, a legislative body may order the meeting room cleared and continue in session, but the statute does not authorize relocating the meeting to another room. The court found that recessing and reconvening in a new location is not equivalent to ordering the original meeting room cleared. Plaintiffs stated a claim for relief by alleging that the city council failed to order the meeting room cleared and instead moved the meetings. The judgment was reversed. View "Berkeley People's Alliance v. City of Berkeley" on Justia Law

The case concerns a dispute between a nonprofit legal services organization and a city over the city's handling of requests for public records related to law enforcement activities. The nonprofit submitted several requests seeking information and body-worn camera footage from police encounters with homeless individuals. The city released some records but withheld others, invoking statutory exemptions for law enforcement investigations. The nonprofit later learned that some older bodycam footage had been destroyed pursuant to the city's retention policy, which required footage to be kept for only one year. This prompted the nonprofit to file suit, alleging inadequate searches, improper withholding, untimely responses, and destruction of records while requests were pending.Reviewing the matter, the Santa Clara County Superior Court granted partial declaratory relief, finding the city violated the California Public Records Act (CPRA) in its response to certain requests, but declined to issue a writ of mandate or find a records retention requirement under the CPRA. The Sixth Appellate District Court of Appeal affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding the matter moot because all responsive, nonexempt records had been disclosed, and further concluding that the CPRA does not require agencies to preserve records withheld as exempt for three years after an exemption is claimed.The California Supreme Court reviewed two key issues. First, it held that declaratory relief under the CPRA is available even when all existing responsive, nonexempt records have been disclosed, at least where such relief would resolve ongoing disputes that could affect future records requests or conduct. Second, the court affirmed that the CPRA does not impose a duty on public agencies to preserve documents responsive to public records requests that have been withheld as exempt, rejecting the argument for a three-year retention period. The judgment was reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings consistent with these holdings. View "City of Gilroy v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Keeling Grubb, acting as president and CEO of Eureka Gun and Pawn, LLC, sought a conditional-use permit (CUP) from the City of Eureka Springs to operate the business as a gun and pawn shop. Grubb submitted the application in May 2023, but the City’s Planning Commission denied it at a special meeting, and the denial was subsequently upheld by the Eureka Springs City Council. After these denials, Grubb and Eureka Gun filed a complaint in Carroll County Circuit Court, challenging the City’s actions and advancing multiple constitutional and statutory claims related to due process, equal protection, property rights, freedom of association and speech, as well as the right to bear arms.In Carroll County Circuit Court, the bench trial was expressly limited to count one of the complaint: an appeal of the City Council’s administrative decision denying the CUP. The remaining claims were reserved for future resolution. During trial, evidence was presented on the nature of the business and community views, but the primary issue was whether Eureka Gun was entitled to a CUP under the City's ordinance. The circuit court denied the appellants’ motion for partial summary judgment and granted the City’s motion for directed verdict, finding that Eureka Gun was not entitled to the permit. Additionally, the court ruled that Arkansas Code Annotated § 14-16-504(b)(1)(A) did not apply to the commercial sale of firearms.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the appeal. It held that the orders appealed from were not final because the circuit court had only adjudicated one of multiple claims, leaving the others pending, and no Rule 54(b) certificate was issued to permit an immediate appeal. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal without prejudice for lack of a final order and declined to address the merits. View "EUREKA GUN AND PAWN, LLC V. THE CITY OF EUREKA SPRINGS" on Justia Law

Texas LNG, a company seeking to construct a liquid natural gas terminal in Brownsville, Texas, received a permit from the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) to build its facility. The company faced delays due to litigation and the COVID-19 pandemic, resulting in three successive extensions of its construction deadline granted by TCEQ’s executive director. The South Texas Environmental Justice Network (STEJN), an environmental advocacy group, moved to overturn the third extension, arguing that Texas LNG did not meet the requirements under Texas law to receive it and that the executive director lacked authority to grant the extension.Prior to the current appeal, both federal and state agencies reviewed Texas LNG’s permit. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and TCEQ initially granted the necessary permits, but subsequent legal challenges led to a remand by the D.C. Circuit to FERC (which ultimately reaffirmed the permit) and a dismissal by the Third Court of Appeals in Austin for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction regarding the TCEQ permit. TCEQ’s Office of Public Interest recommended granting the motion to overturn on the basis of updated air quality standards, but TCEQ did not issue a decision, resulting in a denial of STEJN’s motion by operation of law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed STEJN’s direct petition for review of TCEQ’s denial. Applying de novo review under the Texas Administrative Procedure Act, the Fifth Circuit held that STEJN had standing but found that TCEQ’s executive director had the authority under section 116.120 of the Texas Administrative Code to grant the third extension. The court determined that Texas LNG met the regulatory requirements for a third extension, and substantial evidence supported TCEQ’s decision. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit denied STEJN’s petition for review. View "S Texas Environmental Justice v. Commission on Environmental Quality" on Justia Law

A Mississippi retail pharmacy, Rx Solutions, Inc., sought to join the pharmacy benefit management (PBM) network operated by Caremark, LLC, which is associated with CVS Pharmacy, Inc. Caremark denied Rx Solutions’ application, citing inconsistencies in ownership information and affiliations with Quest Pharmacy, owned by Harold Ted Cain, who Caremark claimed was previously found guilty of violating the False Claims Act. Rx Solutions disputed these reasons, noting acceptance by other PBM networks and asserting that Harold Ted Cain lacked operational control over Rx Solutions and had not been convicted of any relevant criminal offense.Rx Solutions filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, alleging two federal antitrust violations under the Sherman Act and three state law claims: violation of Mississippi’s “any willing provider” statute, violation of the state antitrust statute, and tortious interference with business relations. The district court dismissed the federal antitrust and state statutory claims, concluding that Rx Solutions failed to adequately define relevant product and geographic markets and did not allege antitrust injury. The court also determined there was no diversity jurisdiction to support the remaining state law claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the federal antitrust and Mississippi state antitrust claims, holding that Rx Solutions did not sufficiently plead a relevant market or antitrust injury. However, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s finding regarding diversity jurisdiction, based on admissions by Caremark and CVS establishing complete diversity between the parties. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the state antitrust claim and remanded the claims under Mississippi’s “any willing provider” statute and for tortious interference with business relations for further proceedings. View "Rx Solutions v. Caremark" on Justia Law

Two Venezuelan sisters, both recipients of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) in the United States, submitted affirmative applications for asylum, alleging past persecution and fear of future persecution in Venezuela. After interviews with asylum officers, they were denied asylum by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), which concluded that they had not shown a reasonable possibility of persecution. The denial letters stated that, due to their TPS, there would be no referral to an immigration judge for removal proceedings, and that the determinations could not be appealed at that time.Following delays in adjudication, each sister filed suit against various federal officials in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, seeking to overturn the asylum denials under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) as arbitrary and capricious. The district court in one case dismissed the suit without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), finding no final agency action; the other district court dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), also citing lack of final agency action. The sisters appealed, and the cases were consolidated.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the USCIS denial letters were not final agency actions under the APA because the administrative process was not complete. The sisters could still seek asylum defensively in future removal proceedings once their TPS ended. The court concluded that, since the agency’s decision did not fix legal rights or obligations or trigger legal consequences, the district courts lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. The Fifth Circuit affirmed both dismissals and modified the dismissal in the case that had been with prejudice to be without prejudice. View "Sayegh de Kewayfati v. Bondi" on Justia Law

The case centers on the United States Bureau of Land Management’s decision to approve a contract with JS Livestock for a new off-range corral on private land near Winnemucca, Nevada, intended to house and care for up to 4,000 wild horses and burros removed from public lands. Friends of Animals, an advocacy group, challenged this decision, arguing that the Bureau’s actions violated both the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act and the National Environmental Policy Act. The group raised concerns about the adequacy of animal welfare protections and environmental impacts, including the facility’s design, animal density, disease management, and mitigation of adverse effects on soil and groundwater.Prior to this appeal, the United States District Court for the District of Nevada reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court found no statutory violations, holding that the Bureau had complied with both the Wild Horses Act and NEPA. Specifically, the court determined that the Bureau’s reliance on its established animal welfare standards and contract requirements was reasonable and that the environmental assessment sufficiently considered the project’s impacts as required by law. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the Bureau and denied Friends of Animals’ motion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The appellate court affirmed the lower court’s ruling, holding that Friends of Animals had representational standing to bring the case. The court found that the Bureau did not abuse its discretion or act contrary to law: it properly ensured humane treatment of the animals, took a “hard look” at environmental impacts as required by NEPA, reasonably relied on compliance with state permits, considered appropriate project alternatives, and adequately explained why the facility’s impacts would not be significant. The summary judgment for the Bureau was affirmed. View "FRIENDS OF ANIMALS V. BURGUM" on Justia Law

A veteran who suffered a traumatic brain injury from an improvised explosive device while deployed sought financial assistance under the Traumatic Servicemembers’ Group Life Insurance (TSGLI) program after experiencing a stroke within two years of the injury. The Army denied his claim, determining the stroke was a physical illness or disease, not a qualifying traumatic injury as defined by the relevant statute and regulations. The veteran then petitioned the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to amend its rules to include coverage for illnesses or diseases caused by explosive ordnance, arguing these conditions are analogous to those already covered under existing exceptions for injuries resulting from chemical, biological, or radiological weapons.The VA initially denied the rulemaking petition but agreed to further review as part of a program-wide assessment. After several years, extensive consultation with medical experts, and consideration of the petition and supporting materials, the VA issued a final denial. It concluded that expanding coverage to delayed illnesses or diseases linked to explosive ordnance would be inconsistent with TSGLI’s purpose, which focuses on immediate injuries, would deviate from the insurance model underlying the program, and could threaten its financial stability. The VA also found insufficient evidence of a direct causal relationship between explosive ordnance, traumatic brain injury, and downstream illnesses like stroke.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the VA’s denial under the highly deferential “arbitrary and capricious” standard of the Administrative Procedure Act. The court held that the VA provided a reasoned explanation addressing the petitioner’s arguments and the record, and did not act arbitrarily or capriciously. The petition for review was therefore denied. View "MCKINNEY v. SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS " on Justia Law

The petitioner is an inmate serving an indeterminate sentence of 45 years to life for first degree murder, who challenged the timing of his initial youth offender parole hearing under Penal Code section 3051. His main contention was that, under regulations adopted by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) following Proposition 57 and Assembly Bill 965, only educational merit credits are counted toward advancing his youth parole eligible date (YPED), whereas a wider range of credits—including good conduct, milestone completion, rehabilitative achievement, and extraordinary conduct credits—may be applied to advance the minimum eligible parole date (MEPD) for other indeterminately sentenced inmates. The petitioner claimed this distinction deprived him of thousands of days of credit and delayed his parole hearing compared to similarly situated inmates.Previously, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District summarily denied the petitioner’s habeas corpus petition. The California Supreme Court then granted review, transferring the case back to the Court of Appeal with instructions to issue an order to show cause and reconsider the petitioner’s claims.Upon review, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District considered both statutory and constitutional arguments, including equal protection and due process claims. The court applied rational basis review to the equal protection claim, emphasizing the deferential standard and the need for a rational relationship between the regulatory distinction and a legitimate state interest. The court concluded that limiting credits for youth offender parole hearings to educational merit credits serves administrative and operational needs, promoting certainty and stability in scheduling, and is rationally related to legitimate governmental objectives. The court found no merit to the statutory, equal protection, or due process challenges and denied habeas corpus relief, discharging the petition. View "In re Thai" on Justia Law

The appellant was convicted in North Dakota for misdemeanor Sexual Assault after entering a guilty plea to having inappropriate contact with a person and having reasonable cause to believe the contact was offensive. He was originally charged with a more serious felony, but the plea agreement stipulated a lesser offense and specifically stated he was not required to register as a sex offender under North Dakota law. After relocating to Montana, the Department of Justice informed him that, based on Montana’s interpretation of his conviction and the age of the victim alleged in the charging documents, he was required to register as a sex offender under Montana law.The Nineteenth Judicial District Court of Montana reviewed his petition for a writ of prohibition seeking to prevent the Montana DOJ from requiring registration. The court denied his petition, reasoning that the proper remedy was to register and then later petition for removal under Montana Code Annotated § 46-23-506. The District Court also concluded that the facts alleged in the North Dakota charging document, though not proved beyond a reasonable doubt or admitted by the appellant, were sufficient to impose the registration duty.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana reversed the District Court. The Supreme Court held that a writ of prohibition was an appropriate remedy because there was no statutory or administrative process for contesting the DOJ’s determination, and registration requirements under Montana law are punitive. The Court further held that Montana courts may not rely on facts not proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt or admitted by the defendant when determining registration duties. Finally, the Court concluded that the North Dakota misdemeanor Sexual Assault statute is not reasonably equivalent to the Montana sexual offense statute that triggers registration, due to the lack of an age element in the North Dakota statute. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Cooper v. Department of Justice" on Justia Law