Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

An 18-year-old driver, Elijah Henry, collided with Melanie Gilliland’s vehicle after running a red light, causing her severe injuries. At the time of the accident, Henry was being followed by Officer Matthew Harvey of the City of Pleasanton Police Department. Officer Harvey had entered a parking lot to investigate possible vehicle break-ins and, upon seeing Henry’s car leave the lot, made a U-turn to follow it. Henry, who had smoked marijuana earlier, accelerated away, fearing police interaction but denying any belief that he was being pursued for arrest. Officer Harvey did not activate his lights or siren and testified that he did not initiate a pursuit under the City’s vehicular pursuit policy.Gilliland sued both Henry and the City for negligence. The City asserted immunity under California Vehicle Code section 17004.7, which protects public entities from liability for damages caused by fleeing suspects if the entity has a compliant vehicular pursuit policy and provides regular training. The Alameda County Superior Court initially denied the City’s motion for summary judgment, finding that neither an actual nor perceived pursuit occurred under the City’s policy definition. However, after a bench trial before a different judge, the court found the City immune, interpreting “pursued” in the statute according to its ordinary meaning rather than the policy’s definition, and concluded Henry believed he was being pursued.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case and held that the definition of “pursuit” in the public entity’s vehicular pursuit policy governs both actual and perceived pursuits under section 17004.7. The court found the trial court erred by applying the ordinary meaning of “pursued” and reversed the judgment, remanding for further proceedings using the correct legal standard. The main holding is that statutory immunity under section 17004.7 depends on the policy’s definition of pursuit, not the word’s general meaning. View "Gilliland v. City of Pleasanton" on Justia Law

A Concord police officer discovered her firearm missing from the station’s lockers in 2013. Investigation revealed that another officer, the plaintiff, had mistakenly taken the firearm while transporting a prisoner to a hospital. The plaintiff gave inconsistent accounts about when she realized the mistake, telling supervisors she noticed it at the station, while her partner reported she only realized it at the hospital. An internal affairs investigation found the plaintiff’s statements lacked credibility and concluded she had lied to colleagues and supervisors about the incident. The police chief sustained these findings, terminated her employment, and submitted her name for inclusion on the Exculpatory Evidence Schedule (EES), formerly known as the “Laurie List.”The plaintiff appealed her termination to the City of Concord’s Personnel Appeals Board, which upheld the decision, finding her lacked credibility. She then filed a complaint in the Superior Court alleging gender discrimination and wrongful termination, which was settled. The settlement required the City to remove documents related to the incident from her personnel file and maintain them in a separate investigative file, and to report her departure as a negotiated resignation.Years later, the plaintiff sued the City and the New Hampshire Department of Justice in Superior Court, seeking removal of her name from the EES under RSA 105:13-d. She argued the alleged misconduct was immaterial, the records were no longer in her personnel file, and her inclusion on the EES was unwarranted given the passage of time. The Superior Court granted summary judgment for the defendants.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed, holding that RSA 105:13-d governs EES inclusion and applies to “personnel information,” not just personnel files. The court found the plaintiff’s untruthfulness constituted potentially exculpatory evidence and that it was reasonably foreseeable her misconduct could be admissible to impeach her credibility if she were called as a witness in a future case. View "Doe v. Concord Police Department" on Justia Law

A man brought a civil lawsuit against the Philadelphia District Attorney and several assistant district attorneys, alleging they violated Pennsylvania’s Wiretap Act by using and disclosing surreptitiously recorded conversations between him and his ex-wife during a criminal prosecution. The recordings, made by his ex-wife without his knowledge during their marriage, were provided to the police and used by prosecutors in their attempt to bring criminal charges against him. The criminal court ultimately found the recordings were obtained in violation of the Wiretap Act and barred their use as evidence, leading to the dismissal or withdrawal of all charges.In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, the prosecutors raised the defense of high public official immunity in response to the civil suit for damages under the Wiretap Act. The trial court agreed, holding that the General Assembly had only waived sovereign immunity in the Wiretap Act, not high public official immunity, and dismissed the claims with prejudice. On appeal, the Commonwealth Court affirmed, reasoning that high public official immunity is a broad, absolute bar to civil suits for damages arising from actions taken within the scope of official duties, and that the Wiretap Act did not expressly waive this immunity for district attorneys or their assistants.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed whether law enforcement officers, specifically district attorneys and assistant district attorneys, are immune from civil suits for damages under Section 5725 of the Wiretap Act. The court held that, while the Act expressly waives sovereign immunity, it does not specifically and explicitly waive high public official immunity. Therefore, district attorneys and assistant district attorneys retain high public official immunity from civil suits for damages under the Wiretap Act when acting within the scope of their official duties. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the order of the Commonwealth Court. View "Winig v. Office of DA of Philadelphia" on Justia Law

A group called Montanans for Nonpartisan Courts (MNC) submitted a proposed constitutional initiative, CI-132, which would add a section to the Montana Constitution stating that judicial elections shall remain nonpartisan. MNC also submitted a proposed ballot statement: “CI-132 amends the Montana Constitution to require that judicial elections remain nonpartisan.” After the initiative and statement were submitted to the Secretary of State and reviewed by the Legislative Services Division, the Montana Attorney General conducted a legal sufficiency review. The Attorney General found the initiative legally sufficient but rejected MNC’s proposed statement, arguing it did not accurately reflect the current constitutional text and failed to define “nonpartisan.” The Attorney General then issued a revised statement, which MNC challenged as misleading and prejudicial.MNC filed an original proceeding in the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, seeking a declaratory judgment that the Attorney General’s revised statement violated statutory requirements and asking the Court to certify its own proposed statement. The Attorney General responded, defending his revised statement and criticizing MNC’s version for not reflecting the constitutional status quo and lacking a definition of “nonpartisan.”The Supreme Court of the State of Montana held that the Attorney General’s revised statement was misleading because it implied CI-132 would change the status quo, when in fact judicial elections in Montana are already nonpartisan by statute. The Court also found that a definition of “nonpartisan” was unnecessary, given voters’ familiarity with the term and the absence of a statutory definition. The Court concluded that MNC’s proposed statement was a true and impartial explanation of the initiative in plain language, meeting statutory requirements. The Court certified MNC’s statement to the Secretary of State and granted the petition for declaratory judgment. View "Montanans for Nonpartisan Courts v. Knudsen" on Justia Law

Anton’s Services Inc. was a subcontractor on two public works projects in San Diego: the Torrey Pines Road Project and the Voltaire Street Project. On both projects, Anton’s classified its workers under the “Tree Maintenance” prevailing wage category, paying them accordingly. The Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE) investigated and determined that Anton’s work was construction-related and should have been classified under the “Laborer (Engineering Construction)” category, which carries a higher prevailing wage. Additionally, Anton’s failed to comply with apprenticeship requirements, including submitting contract award information, employing the required ratio of apprentices, and requesting apprentices from local committees.After the DLSE issued civil wage and penalty assessments for both projects, Anton’s challenged these findings in administrative proceedings before the Director of Industrial Relations. The parties submitted stipulated facts and documentary evidence. The Director affirmed the DLSE’s assessments, finding Anton’s had misclassified workers, underpaid prevailing wages, failed to comply with apprenticeship requirements, and was liable for penalties and liquidated damages. The Director also found Anton’s violations were willful, given its prior record and lack of prompt correction.Anton’s then sought judicial review in the Superior Court of San Diego County through a petition for writ of administrative mandamus. The trial court, applying the substantial evidence standard, upheld the Director’s decision and rejected Anton’s attempt to introduce extra-record evidence.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the administrative record for substantial evidence. The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, holding that Anton’s misclassified workers, underpaid prevailing wages, failed to comply with apprenticeship requirements, and was properly assessed penalties and liquidated damages. The court clarified that liquidated damages are owed until wages are actually paid to workers, not merely withheld by a contractor. The judgment was affirmed. View "Anton's Services v. Hagen" on Justia Law

A group of Maine lobstermen challenged a state rule requiring all federally permitted lobster fishers to install electronic tracking devices on their vessels, which transmit GPS location data whenever the vessels are in the water. This rule was adopted by the Maine Department of Marine Resources (MDMR) to comply with an addendum to the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission’s American Lobster Fishery Management Plan. The addendum aimed to reduce risks to North Atlantic right whales, improve fishery data, and support regulatory enforcement. The tracking devices must remain powered and transmit data at all times, including when vessels are docked or used for personal purposes.The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Maine, arguing that the MDMR Rule violated their rights under the Fourth Amendment, as well as equal protection and state administrative law. The district court granted the state’s motion to dismiss, holding that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the Fourth Amendment because the lobster fishery is a closely regulated industry and the rule was not unreasonably invasive. The court noted several concessions by the parties, including that the GPS tracking constituted a search, that the lobster industry is closely regulated, and that the search was administrative in nature.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that the lobster industry is a closely regulated industry and that the administrative search exception, as articulated in New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987), applied. The court found that the MDMR Rule satisfied the Burger test: it served a substantial government interest, warrantless searches were necessary to the regulatory scheme, and the rule provided a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. View "Thompson v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Elliott Land Developments LLC sought to rezone approximately 31.8 acres of property owned by Michael and Winona Aguzin in Jackson County, Mississippi, from agricultural (A-1) to single-family residential (R-1) in order to develop a subdivision. The Jackson County Planning Commission held a hearing, where both supporters and opponents presented evidence and arguments. Elliott Land relied on a Land Use Report showing recent development, improved infrastructure, and a purported public need for more housing. Several residents opposed the rezoning, citing concerns about drainage, traffic, and a desire to maintain the rural character of the area. The Planning Commission recommended approval of the rezoning.An adjacent property owner, Marisa Lamey, appealed the Planning Commission’s recommendation to the Jackson County Board of Supervisors. Elliott Land challenged the sufficiency and timeliness of Lamey’s notice of appeal, but the Board chose to hear the appeal. After a hearing with testimony from multiple residents, the Board of Supervisors voted four-to-one to deny the rezoning application, finding insufficient evidence of a change in the character of the neighborhood or a public need for rezoning. Elliott Land appealed to the Jackson County Circuit Court, arguing the Board’s decision was arbitrary and capricious and that the appeal was not properly before the Board. The circuit court affirmed the Board’s decision, finding it was supported by substantial evidence and not arbitrary or capricious.On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Mississippi held that the appeal was properly before the Board of Supervisors, that the question of whether Elliott Land met its burden was fairly debatable based on substantial evidence from both sides, and that the Board’s denial was not arbitrary or capricious. The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the circuit court’s judgment. View "Elliott Land Developments, LLC v. Board of Supervisors of Jackson County, Mississippi" on Justia Law

Two private-citizen members of a federally created commission, along with several federal officials, were involved in planning the United States’ 250th anniversary celebrations. The commission was established by Congress and included both federal officials and private citizens appointed by congressional leaders. After a dispute over leadership and the selection of an administrative secretariat, three commission members made public statements criticizing the commission’s Chairperson and Executive Director, alleging mismanagement and other misconduct. The Chairperson and Executive Director claimed these statements damaged their reputations and led to their removal, prompting them to file a tort action—including defamation and related claims—against the three members in Pennsylvania state court.After the complaint was filed, the Attorney General certified that the defendants were acting within the scope of their federal employment, removed the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and substituted the United States as the defendant under the Westfall Act. The District Court determined that the commission members qualified as federal employees, that their statements were made within the scope of their employment, and that discovery was unnecessary. The court granted the government’s motion to dismiss, as the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) does not waive sovereign immunity for defamation claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment. The Third Circuit held that the commission is a federal agency under the FTCA and Westfall Act, and that its private-citizen members are “employees of the government” for purposes of those statutes. The court further held that the defendants’ statements were made within the scope of their employment and that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying discovery. The dismissal was affirmed because sovereign immunity barred the plaintiffs’ claims. View "Giordano v. Hohns" on Justia Law

A nonprofit corporation purchased a 192-unit apartment complex from a government agency in 1994 at a significant discount. In exchange, the purchaser agreed by contract to rent all units at below-market rates to low-income families for 40 years and to comply with annual reporting and administrative fee requirements. Around 2016, the purchaser stopped fulfilling these obligations, including the reporting and fee provisions. The government’s successor agency, through its monitoring agent, notified the purchaser of the breach and initiated legal action seeking remedies under the contract.The purchaser counterclaimed in state court, seeking a declaration that the agreement was no longer enforceable and an injunction against further enforcement. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), as successor to the original government agency, intervened, removed the case to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, and moved to dismiss the counterclaim. The purchaser argued that the contract’s obligations ended when Congress repealed the statute that created the original agency and authorized such agreements. The district court rejected this argument, holding that the contract remained enforceable, dismissed the counterclaim with prejudice, and remanded the case to state court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the contract’s plain language required the purchaser to comply with its obligations for the full 40-year term, regardless of the repeal of the underlying statute. The court found that the FDIC, as successor, retained both contractual and statutory authority to enforce the agreement. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the counterclaim, concluding that the agreement remains enforceable and the purchaser is still bound by its terms. View "Affordable Housing Group, Inc. v. Florida Housing Affordability, Inc." on Justia Law

Turkish steel producers, including Kaptan Demir Celik Endustrisi ve Ticaret A.S., were subject to a countervailing duty (CVD) order after the U.S. Department of Commerce determined that the Turkish government subsidized steel rebar exports. During an administrative review, Commerce found that Kaptan sourced steel scrap, a key input for rebar, from several affiliates, including Nur, a shipbuilder. Commerce initially determined that Nur’s steel scrap was primarily dedicated to Kaptan’s rebar production, making Nur a cross-owned input supplier whose subsidies should be attributed to Kaptan, thereby increasing Kaptan’s CVD rate.The United States Court of International Trade (CIT) reviewed Commerce’s decision after Kaptan challenged the cross-attribution of Nur’s subsidies. The CIT found that Commerce had not adequately explained whether steel scrap was merely a link in the rebar production chain or addressed prior cases treating steel scrap as a byproduct. The CIT remanded the case for further explanation. On remand, Commerce developed a multi-factor analysis and ultimately reversed its position, finding that Nur’s steel scrap was a common, unprocessed input used in various products and industries, and that Nur’s primary business activity—shipbuilding—was not dedicated almost exclusively to producing rebar. As a result, Commerce concluded that Nur was not a cross-owned input supplier, and Kaptan’s CVD rate was reduced to a de minimis level. The CIT sustained Commerce’s remand decision.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the CIT’s decision for abuse of discretion and Commerce’s remand findings for substantial evidence. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that Commerce’s determination that Nur’s steel scrap was not primarily dedicated to Kaptan’s rebar production was adequately explained, supported by substantial evidence, and consistent with the applicable regulation. View "KAPTAN DEMIR CELIK ENDUSTRISI VE TICARET A.S. v. US " on Justia Law