Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Robert Saint, an attorney representing a whistleblower in a False Claims Act case, requested a legal memorandum (White Paper) from the Family & Social Services Administration (FSSA) under Indiana’s Access to Public Records Act (APRA). The White Paper was created by HealthNet, a private entity, and given to FSSA for use during Medicaid settlement negotiations. FSSA denied the request, claiming the document was protected by attorney-client privilege and the deliberative material exception.The Marion Superior Court ordered FSSA to disclose the White Paper, finding that FSSA failed to demonstrate an attorney-client relationship or that the document was deliberative material prepared for FSSA’s decision-making. The court also found that any privilege was waived when the document was tendered to FSSA. FSSA appealed, reasserting the deliberative material exception and arguing that the document was used for decision-making within the agency.The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, rejecting FSSA’s arguments and finding that the White Paper was neither intra-agency nor interagency material. The court also found that FSSA waived its private contractor and confidentiality arguments by not raising them earlier.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s order. The court held that the deliberative material exception did not apply because the White Paper was not intra-agency material. The court emphasized that intra-agency material must originate from and be communicated between employees of the same agency. Since the White Paper was created by HealthNet and not generated within FSSA, it did not qualify for the exception. The court concluded that FSSA failed to meet its burden of proof and ordered the disclosure of the White Paper. View "Family & Social Services Administration v. Saint" on Justia Law

Anthony Frank Romane, Jr. was arrested for driving under the influence after being found unconscious in his car. He exhibited signs of intoxication and failed field sobriety tests. At the police station, he refused to submit to a chemical test after being read the Chemical Test Admonition. The Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) initiated proceedings to suspend his license for one year due to his refusal to submit to testing. Romane requested an Administrative Per Se (APS) hearing to challenge the suspension.The APS hearing was conducted by a single hearing officer, Trena Leota, who introduced three documents into evidence: the arresting officer’s sworn DS 367 form, the unsworn arrest report, and Romane’s driving record. Romane’s counsel objected, arguing that the hearing officer was acting as an advocate, violating due process as explained in California DUI Lawyers Association v. Department of Motor Vehicles. The hearing officer overruled the objections and admitted the documents. Romane’s bodyworn camera footage was also admitted into evidence. The hearing officer ultimately sustained the suspension of Romane’s license.Romane filed a petition for writ of administrative mandate in the Superior Court of San Diego County, arguing that his due process rights were violated because the hearing officer acted as both advocate and adjudicator. The superior court agreed and ordered the DMV to set aside the suspension unless a new hearing was conducted with separate individuals acting as advocate and adjudicator.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case and reversed the superior court’s decision. The appellate court held that the hearing officer did not act as an advocate but merely collected and developed evidence, which is constitutionally permissible. The case was remanded to the superior court to consider Romane’s contention that the evidence did not support the hearing officer’s findings. View "Romane v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law

Enbridge Energy owns and operates a pipeline that runs from Wisconsin, through Michigan, and into Canada, crossing the Straits of Mackinac under a 1953 easement with the State of Michigan. In 2020, Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer informed Enbridge that the State was revoking the easement, alleging that Enbridge had violated it by creating an unreasonable risk of an oil spill. Enbridge responded by filing a federal lawsuit against Governor Whitmer and the Director of the Michigan Department of Natural Resources, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the State from interfering with the pipeline's operation.The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan rejected the defendants' argument that Enbridge’s claims were barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. The court held that Enbridge’s lawsuit fell within the Ex parte Young exception to sovereign immunity, which allows federal courts to hear cases seeking prospective relief against state officials for ongoing violations of federal law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Sixth Circuit held that Enbridge’s lawsuit was not barred by sovereign immunity because it sought prospective injunctive relief against state officials for alleged violations of federal law, fitting within the Ex parte Young doctrine. The court rejected the defendants' arguments that the suit was equivalent to a quiet title action or a request for specific performance of a state contract, finding that the relief sought would not divest the State of ownership or regulatory control over the land. Thus, the court concluded that Enbridge’s claims could proceed in federal court. View "Enbridge Energy, LP v. Whitmer" on Justia Law

Intellectual Capitol, Inc., JMI Sports, and JMIS College, LLC (Appellants) obtained contracts through the state procurement process with the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission (WCC) and Clemson University (Respondents). Disputes arose under these contracts, leading Respondents to file Requests for Resolution of Contract Controversy with the Chief Procurement Officer (CPO) for the State of South Carolina. Appellants then filed separate declaratory judgment actions in circuit court, challenging the constitutionality of section 11-35-4230 of the South Carolina Code, which grants the CPO exclusive jurisdiction over state contract disputes.The circuit court granted Respondents' motions to dismiss the declaratory judgment actions, ruling that section 11-35-4230 placed exclusive jurisdiction over the State's contract disputes with the CPO. The court also dismissed Appellants' constitutional claims as premature due to their failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Appellants appealed this decision.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of the declaratory judgment actions, but modified the reasoning. The Supreme Court held that the contracts between Appellants and Respondents contained a clear choice-of-forum provision, which unambiguously gave the CPO exclusive authority to resolve disputes. By agreeing to this provision, Appellants waived their right to have their disputes decided by a court of the unified judicial system. Consequently, there was no justiciable controversy, rendering the constitutional challenge to section 11-35-4230 a purely academic exercise. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of the declaratory judgment actions, as there were no legal rights at issue. View "Intellectual Capital, Inc. v. Chief Procurement Officer" on Justia Law

Petitioners, Choteau Acantha Publishing and Montana Free Press, claimed that the closure of the Governor’s Advisory Council meeting with judicial applicants violated open meeting laws. The Advisory Council, appointed by Governor Greg Gianforte, was tasked with interviewing applicants for a judicial vacancy in Montana’s Ninth Judicial District. The meeting was closed to the public by the Chair, Jennifer Stutz, after the applicants asserted their privacy rights.The District Court of the First Judicial District, Lewis and Clark County, presided by Judge Mike Menahan, granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of the Petitioners. The court determined that the Advisory Council’s closure of the meeting violated open meeting laws, as the applicants for a judicial position do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding their qualifications. The court also found that the meeting was improperly closed for its entirety without identifying specific privacy interests, thus failing to perform the required balancing test.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court affirmed the District Court’s decision, holding that the Advisory Council’s blanket closure of the meeting was overbroad and violated the statutory procedure for closing meetings. The court emphasized that the closure should be limited to the time when the discussion relates to individual privacy matters and that the presiding officer must articulate a rationale for closure. The court did not address the broader constitutional issue of whether judicial applicants have a reasonable expectation of privacy, as the statutory violation was sufficient to resolve the case. The dismissal of Petitioners’ claim to void the Advisory Council’s actions was also affirmed. View "Choteau Acantha Publishing v. Gianforte" on Justia Law

Marmen Inc., Marmen Énergie Inc., and Marmen Energy Co. (collectively, “Marmen”) appealed the U.S. Court of International Trade’s (CIT) decision that sustained the U.S. Department of Commerce’s (Commerce) final determination of a 4.94% dumping margin for utility-scale wind towers from Canada. Commerce had initiated an antidumping (AD) investigation in July 2019, and in June 2020, issued its final AD determination. Marmen challenged Commerce’s decision on three grounds: the weight-averaging of steel plate costs, the rejection of a USD-to-CAD cost reconciliation, and the use of the average-to-transaction (A-to-T) methodology based on Cohen’s d test.The CIT affirmed Commerce’s weight-averaging of Marmen’s steel plate costs but remanded the case on the other two issues. Commerce again rejected the USD-to-CAD cost reconciliation on remand, arguing it would double count an exchange-rate adjustment. Commerce also maintained its use of Cohen’s d test, despite concerns raised by the Federal Circuit in Stupp Corp. v. United States. The CIT sustained Commerce’s determination on both issues, leading to Marmen’s appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that Commerce’s rejection of the USD-to-CAD cost reconciliation was not supported by substantial evidence, as the proposed adjustment did not duplicate other adjustments and was reliable. The court also concluded that Commerce’s use of Cohen’s d test was unreasonable because the data did not meet the necessary assumptions of normal distribution, equal variability, and sufficient size. The court vacated Commerce’s calculated dumping margin and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "MARMEN INC. v. US " on Justia Law

A dispute arose regarding the National Labor Relations Board’s (NLRB) rule on when one entity is considered a joint employer of another entity’s employees. The NLRB determined that Google was a joint employer of Cognizant employees working on Google’s YouTube Music platform and ordered both companies to bargain with the employees’ union, the Alphabet Workers Union-Communication Workers of America, Local 9009 (AWU). Google and Cognizant refused to bargain, leading the NLRB to conclude that this refusal violated the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The employers petitioned for review, arguing they were not joint employers, but the contract under which the employees provided services to Google expired, rendering the petitions and the Board’s cross-applications for enforcement moot. The Union also petitioned for review, contending that the NLRB’s remedies were insufficient.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the expiry of the Google-Cognizant contract meant there was no longer any relationship to support the joint-employer finding, making the case moot. The court dismissed Google’s and Cognizant’s petitions and the Board’s cross-applications as moot and vacated the order below. The court also dismissed as jurisdictionally barred the part of AWU’s petition seeking review of the NLRB’s decision to sever the issue of a make-whole remedy for employees and dismissed as moot those parts of AWU’s petition seeking prospective remedies.The court denied the remainder of AWU’s petition, concluding that the NLRB did not abuse its discretion by ordering only the customary remedies. The court emphasized that the Board’s choice of remedies is primarily within its province and subject to very limited judicial review. View "Alphabet Workers Union-Communication Workers v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Two environmental organizations challenged a July 2020 Final Environmental Assessment (EA) and Decision and Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) issued by Wildlife Services, an agency within the U.S. Department of Agriculture. The EA and FONSI authorized a predator damage and conflict management program in Wilderness Areas and Wilderness Study Areas in Nevada. The plaintiffs argued that the program violated the Wilderness Act and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).The United States District Court for the District of Nevada granted summary judgment in favor of Wildlife Services. The court concluded that predator control in Wilderness Areas to support pre-existing grazing operations was permissible under the Wilderness Act. The court also found that the agency's statewide analysis of the environmental impacts was reasonable and that the agency had adequately considered the potential impacts on public health, Wilderness Areas, and the scientific uncertainty regarding lethal predator damage management (PDM).The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment on the Wilderness Act claim, holding that lethal PDM is permissible in Wilderness Areas when conducted in support of pre-existing grazing operations. However, the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's summary judgment on the NEPA claim. The court found that the EA failed to take the required "hard look" at the environmental impacts, particularly regarding the geographic scope of the PDM program, the potential impacts on public health, the unique characteristics of Wilderness Areas, and the scientific uncertainty surrounding lethal PDM. The court remanded the case to the district court to direct the agency to reconsider whether an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) is required and to produce either a revised EA or an EIS. View "WILDEARTH GUARDIANS V. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION WILDLIFE SERVICES" on Justia Law

Target Corporation (Target) imported goods subject to an antidumping duty order and paid duties at a lower rate than specified in a final judgment. The United States Customs and Border Protection (Customs) later realized the error but did not correct it within the statutory 90-day window. The United States Court of International Trade (CIT) ordered Customs to reliquidate the entries at the correct rate, despite the statutory finality provisions.In the lower court, the CIT granted the government's motion to dismiss Target's challenge to the reliquidation, relying on its previous decision in Home Products International, Inc. v. United States. The CIT held that it had the authority to enforce its judgments and that the principle of finality in 19 U.S.C. § 1514 did not bar correcting Customs' errors in liquidating entries covered by a trade action.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the CIT's decision. The Federal Circuit held that the case was governed by its precedent in Cemex, S.A. v. United States, which established that Customs' liquidation decisions, even if erroneous, are final and conclusive under 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a) unless specific statutory exceptions apply. The court rejected the CIT's interpretation that it could use its equitable powers to override the statutory finality provisions. The Federal Circuit emphasized that Congress has carefully crafted a statutory scheme for finality and that any remedy for the harshness of the statute should come from Congress, not the courts. View "TARGET CORPORATION v. US " on Justia Law

K.A. and C.P. were married and had three daughters. Their marriage ended in divorce, and the Arapahoe County Department of Human Services (ACDHS) initiated actions against K.A. regarding her relationships with her children, leading to the termination of her parental rights and several contempt judgments. K.A. attempted to appeal the termination, but the Colorado Court of Appeals denied it as untimely, and the Colorado Supreme Court declined review. She also sought to appeal a contempt sentence, but it was again deemed untimely.K.A. filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado against Michelle Barnes, Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Human Services (CDHS), in her official capacity; ACDHS; and Michelle Dossey, Manager of the ACDHS Division of Child and Adult Protective Services, in her official capacity. The Arapahoe County Board of Commissioners was initially named but later dismissed by K.A. The district court dismissed K.A.'s claims and denied her motion to amend her complaint. K.A. filed a timely appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear K.A.'s claims due to sovereign immunity, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and lack of standing. The court found that K.A.'s claims for damages were barred by sovereign immunity, and her requests to reverse the termination of her parental rights and order a new hearing were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Additionally, her requests for declaratory relief were either barred by sovereign immunity or lacked standing. The court also upheld the district court's denial of K.A.'s motion to amend her complaint, as she failed to explain how the amendments would cure the jurisdictional defects. View "K.A. v. Barnes" on Justia Law