Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

A federal inmate, Dustin Rowland, developed a hernia after a pretrial detention fight. A physician deemed the hernia "reducible and stable," recommending non-surgical treatments. Rowland, desiring surgery, utilized the Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) Administrative Remedial Program, which involves a four-step grievance process. His initial requests were denied, but a later appeal led to approval for a surgical consultation. However, Rowland's final appeal was denied for procedural reasons, and he did not correct the deficiency. He eventually received surgery but filed a lawsuit claiming deliberate indifference to his medical needs, seeking damages under Bivens, injunctive relief for post-operative care, and a negligence claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).The United States District Court for the District of Colorado dismissed Rowland's Bivens claim, granted summary judgment against his injunctive relief claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and dismissed the FTCA claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to non-exhaustion. Rowland's motion for reconsideration was also denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the Bivens claim, noting that Rowland's case presented a new context not covered by previous Bivens cases and that the BOP's Administrative Remedial Program provided an adequate alternative remedy. The court also upheld the summary judgment on the injunctive relief claim, as Rowland failed to exhaust administrative remedies specifically for post-operative care. Lastly, the court affirmed the dismissal of the FTCA claim, emphasizing the jurisdictional requirement of exhausting administrative remedies before filing suit. The court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of Rowland's Rule 60(b) motion for reconsideration. View "Rowland v. Matevousian" on Justia Law

Robert J. Hall, an inmate in the Missouri Department of Corrections (MDOC), filed a lawsuit against MDOC and Corrections Officer Paul Woodruff, in his individual capacity, for injuries he sustained from an attack by a fellow inmate, Ahmad Townsend. Hall had previously submitted an "Enemy Listing/Protective Custody Declaration" form indicating he felt threatened by Townsend. Despite this, Woodruff placed Townsend in Hall's cell while Hall was asleep, leading to the attack and resulting in mental and physical injuries.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri denied Woodruff’s motion to dismiss based on official immunity. Woodruff appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo, accepting all factual allegations as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to Hall. The court examined whether Woodruff was entitled to official immunity under Missouri state law, which protects public officials from liability for discretionary acts performed during their official duties. The court found that the MDOC policies cited by Hall did not create a ministerial duty because they allowed for discretion in how and when enemy declarations were checked and safeguards implemented.The Eighth Circuit concluded that Woodruff's actions were discretionary, not ministerial, and thus he was entitled to official immunity. The court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Hall v. Woodruff" on Justia Law

Best Development Group, LLC proposed to develop a Grocery Outlet store in King City. The King City Planning Commission approved the project, determining it was exempt from the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) under the class 32 categorical exemption for infill development. Efrain Aguilera appealed this decision to the King City Council, which denied the appeal and upheld the exemption. Aguilera and Working Families of Monterey County then filed a petition for writ of mandate, arguing that the class 32 exemption did not apply because the project was not in an urbanized area and the environmental assessment was inadequate.The Monterey County Superior Court denied the petition, ruling that the class 32 exemption did not require the project to be in an urbanized area as defined by CEQA and that substantial evidence supported the City’s determination that the project met the exemption criteria. The court also found that the City was not required to conduct a formal environmental review.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the terms “infill development” and “substantially surrounded by urban uses” in CEQA Guidelines section 15332 should not be interpreted using the statutory definitions of “infill site,” “urbanized area,” and “qualified urban uses” from other sections of CEQA. The court found that the regulatory intent was to reduce sprawl by exempting development in already developed areas, typically but not exclusively in urban areas. The court also determined that substantial evidence supported the City’s finding that the project site was substantially surrounded by urban uses, based on the environmental assessment and aerial photographs.The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, upholding the application of the class 32 exemption and ruling that no further CEQA compliance was required. View "Working Families of Monterey County v. King City Planning Com." on Justia Law

Daniel Murillo, a registered sex offender, sought to modify his registry requirements under Iowa Code section 692A.128. Murillo had pleaded guilty to sexual abuse in the third degree in 2005 and was required to register as a sex offender. He completed a sex offender treatment program (SOTP) while incarcerated and received a certificate of completion in 2009. In 2022, Murillo applied to be removed from the sex offender registry, citing his completion of the SOTP and a low-risk assessment for recidivism.The Iowa District Court for Polk County denied Murillo's application, determining that he had not "successfully completed" the SOTP because he only admitted guilt to avoid a longer sentence. The court also found that Murillo posed an ongoing risk to the community. The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the district court erred in determining that Murillo had not successfully completed the SOTP, as he had a certificate of completion from the Department of Corrections. However, the Supreme Court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Murillo's application for modification. The court concluded that the district court properly considered relevant factors, including Murillo's inconsistent admissions of guilt and the need for further treatment, in determining that he posed an ongoing risk to the community.The Iowa Supreme Court vacated the decision of the Court of Appeals but affirmed the judgment of the district court, maintaining Murillo's registration requirements. View "Murillo v. State of Iowa" on Justia Law

The case involves the review of final orders by the Public Service Commission (PSC) approving proposals from four electric utility companies to enhance the power grid's resilience against extreme weather. These proposals were submitted under section 366.96, Florida Statutes, enacted in 2019. The Office of Public Counsel (OPC) challenged the PSC's orders, arguing that the PSC misinterpreted the statute and compromised the fairness of the proceedings by striking portions of an expert's testimony.Previously, the PSC approved the initial Storm Protection Plans (SPPs) submitted by the utilities in 2020, following settlements that allowed for future challenges to the prudence of the projects. In 2022, the utilities submitted updated SPPs for the 2023-2032 period. The PSC issued final orders approving the SPPs, with some modifications, and the OPC appealed these orders.The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed the case and held that the PSC correctly interpreted the statute and acted within its authority. The Court found that the PSC's determination of the public interest did not require a prudence review of the SPPs at the plan approval stage. Instead, the prudence review is to be conducted during the cost recovery proceedings. The Court also held that the PSC did not abuse its discretion in striking the expert testimony, as it contained impermissible legal opinions.The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the PSC's final orders, concluding that the PSC properly considered the statutory factors and provided adequate support for its public interest determination. The Court also found that the exclusion of the expert testimony did not impair the fairness of the proceedings. View "Citizens of the State of Florida v. Fay" on Justia Law

The case involves the West Virginia Department of Human Services (DHS) and allegations of negligence in handling child protective services (CPS) investigations. DHS received multiple referrals regarding potential child abuse involving J.F.L., a registered sex offender living with J.M.K. and her children. DHS conducted investigations in 2015 and 2018, concluding there was no evidence of abuse or neglect. However, in 2020, another referral led to the discovery of sexual abuse by J.F.L., resulting in his indictment and conviction on numerous charges.The plaintiffs, representing the children, sued DHS, claiming negligence, gross negligence, and other wrongful acts, asserting that DHS failed to follow its internal policies, which they argued created clearly established statutory rights. They also claimed negligent training and supervision by DHS. DHS sought summary judgment based on qualified immunity, arguing that its internal policies did not constitute clearly established law.The Circuit Court of Kanawha County denied DHS's motion for summary judgment, stating that a jury should decide whether DHS's actions were oppressive and whether mandatory duties were not followed. The court also denied summary judgment on the negligent supervision and training claims.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and concluded that DHS's internal policies, not being legislatively approved, could not create clearly established statutory rights. The court held that DHS was entitled to qualified immunity as the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that DHS violated any clearly established statutory or constitutional rights. Additionally, the plaintiffs did not provide evidence of improper motive or oppressive conduct by DHS employees. Consequently, the court reversed the circuit court's decision and remanded the case with directions to grant summary judgment in favor of DHS and dismiss the action. View "West Virginia Department of Human Services v. David B., Guardian ad Litem and Next Friend of J.B. and M.B., and S.M., Individually" on Justia Law

A Monongalia County deputy sheriff responded to a domestic dispute involving John D. Stewart, Jr., who suffered from mental illness. The deputy, after advising against backup, pursued Mr. Stewart, who allegedly threatened with a knife. The deputy shot Mr. Stewart, fatally wounding him. Amanda F. Stewart, Mr. Stewart’s daughter, filed a wrongful death action against the Monongalia County Commission and the deputy, alleging excessive force and negligence.The Circuit Court of Monongalia County dismissed claims against the Commission for direct liability but allowed claims for vicarious liability and against the deputy to proceed. The court also denied the motion to dismiss the demand for punitive damages, stating it was premature.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case. It affirmed the lower court’s decision to deny the motion to dismiss the vicarious liability claim against the Commission, finding the Commission is not immune from vicarious liability for the deputy’s negligence. The court also affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss the negligence claim against the deputy, as the complaint sufficiently alleged facts to suggest the deputy acted with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner.However, the court reversed the lower court’s decision regarding punitive damages. It held that the Tort Claims Act prohibits punitive damages against the Commission and the deputy, as the deputy was sued in his official capacity. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Monongalia County Commission A/K/A Monongalia County Sheriff's Department and John Doe Deputy v. Amanda F. Stewart, Individually and/or as Administrator of the Estate of John D. Stewart, Jr." on Justia Law

High Maine, LLC, challenged the Town of Kittery's issuance of a marijuana retail store license and approval of a change of use and modified site plan for GTF Kittery 8, LLC, to operate a marijuana retail store in the Town’s C-2 zone. High Maine argued that the Town's actions violated local and state regulations, particularly concerning the proximity of the proposed store to a nursery school.The Superior Court (York County) dismissed High Maine's complaint for lack of standing, reasoning that High Maine, as a pre-applicant on the waiting list for a marijuana retail store license, did not suffer a particularized injury. The court concluded that High Maine's status as a prospective license-holder was unchanged by the Town's decisions, and thus, it was not directly affected.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and determined that High Maine had alleged a particularized injury sufficient to establish standing. The court noted that High Maine's opportunity to obtain the single license available in the C-2 zone was directly and negatively affected by the alleged defects in the licensing process. The court found that High Maine's complaint suggested that GTF Kittery 8 obtained an unfair advantage in the lottery by submitting multiple applications for the same building, which was within 1,000 feet of a school, in violation of state law.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court vacated the Superior Court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that High Maine's allegations were sufficient at the motion to dismiss stage to demonstrate its standing to challenge the Town's actions. View "High Maine, LLC v. Town of Kittery" on Justia Law

In this case, Appalachian Power Company and Wheeling Power Company sought to recover approximately $552.9 million in under-recovered costs for the period from March 1, 2021, through February 28, 2023. The Public Service Commission of West Virginia disallowed $231.8 million of the requested amount, concluding that the companies had made imprudent and unreasonable decisions regarding their coal stockpiling, which led to higher costs from purchasing energy rather than generating it themselves. The Commission allowed the recovery of the remaining $321.1 million over a ten-year period with a 4% carrying charge.The Commission's decision followed a series of proceedings, including the 2021 and 2022 ENEC cases, where it had expressed concerns about the companies' reliance on purchased power and their failure to maintain adequate coal supplies. The Commission had previously ordered the companies to increase self-generation and maintain a minimum 69% capacity factor for their coal-fired plants. Despite these directives, the companies continued to rely heavily on purchased power, leading to significant under-recoveries.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and affirmed the Commission's finding that the companies acted imprudently and unreasonably. However, the Court reversed the Commission's disallowance of $231.8 million, finding that the Commission had relied on extra-record evidence (coal reports) without giving the companies notice or an opportunity to address this evidence, thus violating their due process rights. The Court remanded the case to the Commission to allow the companies to address the coal reports and the calculation of the disallowance. View "Appalachian Power Company and Wheeling Power Company v. Public Service Commission of West Virginia" on Justia Law

Laura Marie Obert, a former Broadwater County Commissioner, was investigated by the Montana Department of Justice Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI) in 2015 for allegedly receiving unlawful overtime pay and potential ethics violations. In 2016, Obert entered a deferred prosecution agreement with the Assistant Attorney General, agreeing to repay the excess wages and abstain from voting on matters where she had a conflict of interest. In 2019, based on new allegations of violating the agreement, Obert was charged with felony theft and misdemeanor official misconduct. The district court dismissed these charges in 2021, finding Obert had complied with the agreement and there was insufficient evidence for the misconduct charge.Obert then sued the State of Montana and Broadwater County Attorney Cory Swanson, alleging breach of contract, bad faith, due process violations, and malicious prosecution. The First Judicial District Court dismissed her claims, leading to this appeal.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and made several determinations. It reversed the lower court's dismissal of Obert's breach of contract and good faith and fair dealing claims, holding that these claims were not time-barred and did not accrue until the criminal charges were dismissed. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of Obert's bad faith claim, finding no special relationship existed between Obert and the State that would support such a claim. The court also upheld the dismissal of the malicious prosecution claim, ruling that Swanson was protected by prosecutorial immunity as he acted within his statutory duties. Lastly, the court affirmed the dismissal of the due process claim, concluding that Obert's procedural due process rights were not violated as the State followed proper procedures in charging her and the district court provided an appropriate forum to address the alleged breach of the agreement. View "Obert v State" on Justia Law