Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

After the Missouri General Assembly enacted Senate Bill No. 22 (SB 22) in 2025, which made several changes to statutes governing ballot summaries and judicial proceedings, a Missouri resident and taxpayer challenged its constitutionality. SB 22 as introduced focused solely on amending the process for judicial review of ballot summary statements. During the legislative process, SB 22 was amended to include provisions expanding the attorney general’s authority to appeal certain preliminary injunctions, a subject unrelated to ballot summaries, and the bill’s title was changed from “relating to ballot summaries” to “relating to judicial proceedings.” After passage by both legislative chambers and the Governor’s signature, the bill became law.The Circuit Court of Cole County reviewed the case after the plaintiff alleged SB 22 violated the Missouri Constitution’s original purpose, single subject, and clear title requirements, as well as equal protection guarantees. The circuit court found the bill did not violate the procedural constitutional provisions, but it did find that the amendment to section 526.010 (concerning the attorney general’s appellate rights) violated equal protection and was severable from the rest of the bill. The court allowed the remaining portions, primarily those addressing ballot summaries, to stand. The plaintiff appealed, challenging the findings on the procedural requirements, while the State cross-appealed on standing and equal protection.The Supreme Court of Missouri heard the case and held that the plaintiff had taxpayer standing because SB 22’s provisions resulted in a direct expenditure of public funds. Upon de novo review, the Supreme Court found that SB 22 violated the original purpose requirement of article III, section 21 of the Missouri Constitution because the added provision regarding the attorney general’s appellate rights was not germane to the bill’s original purpose. The Court further held that the offending provision could not be severed, and therefore invalidated SB 22 in its entirety, reversing the judgment of the circuit court. View "Nicholson v. State" on Justia Law

Ten nonprofit organizations that received federal grants through the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services’ “Citizenship and Integration Grant Program” filed suit after the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) froze and subsequently terminated their grant funding. The freeze and termination followed an executive order issued by the incoming President in January 2025 directing DHS to pause and review grants that funded services to undocumented immigrants, with the aim of ensuring compliance with law and preventing waste, fraud, or abuse. DHS notified grantees of the freeze in February 2025 and terminated the grants in March 2025, prompting the plaintiffs to seek a preliminary injunction to restore the program and funding.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. The court determined that the plaintiffs’ claims were essentially contractual—seeking disbursement of funds based on grant agreements—and thus fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States Court of Federal Claims pursuant to the Tucker Act. The court also found that the plaintiffs had not identified a reviewable “final agency action” under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Additionally, it concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to provide adequate legal authority for their ultra vires and separation-of-powers claims.Reviewing the appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Fourth Circuit held that the relief sought by the plaintiffs was materially indistinguishable from relief denied in recent Supreme Court cases, Department of Education v. California and National Institutes of Health v. Public Health Association. It concluded that claims seeking to enforce contractual obligations to pay money must be brought in the Court of Federal Claims and that the plaintiffs had not shown a likelihood of success on their alternative constitutional or statutory claims. The district court’s denial of the preliminary injunction was therefore affirmed. View "Solutions in Hometown Connections v. Noem" on Justia Law

The case centers on the Trans Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS), which transports crude oil from Alaska’s North Slope, with oil from different shippers being commingled in the pipeline. To address variations in oil quality, a “Quality Bank” compensates shippers who inject higher-quality oil and charges those with lower-quality oil. The valuation of one particular oil component, Resid—the heaviest and least valuable cut—has been disputed for decades. Petro Star, a shipper whose refineries lack specialized units to further process Resid, argued that Resid was undervalued, while ConocoPhillips contended it was overvalued. The TAPS owners, who administer the Quality Bank, also challenged a Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) finding that the Bank’s administrator violated tariff provisions.Following a 2013 FERC investigation into the Resid valuation formula, both Petro Star and ConocoPhillips intervened, seeking changes. After initial FERC findings were remanded for further explanation by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, FERC held additional hearings. An administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded the formula was just and reasonable, and FERC largely affirmed this result, also finding a tariff violation by the Quality Bank administrator for failing to update formula yields based on monthly Resid testing.On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that FERC’s formula for valuing Resid remains just and reasonable, as neither Petro Star nor ConocoPhillips demonstrated the formula to be unjust or unreasonable. The court also upheld FERC’s finding that the Quality Bank administrator violated the tariff by not updating formula yields with each test, but found FERC’s prospective remedy—requiring monthly testing and annual yield updates—was appropriate. The court denied all three petitions. View "Petro Star Inc. v. FERC" on Justia Law

A family that inherited a renowned art collection in Hungary prior to World War II sought to recover dozens of valuable artworks seized by the Hungarian government and its Nazi collaborators during the Holocaust. The heirs, who became citizens of the United States and other countries, alleged that the majority of the collection was confiscated during the Nazi occupation and dispersed across Europe and later deposited at Hungarian institutions. Some pieces were returned to the family after the war, only to be retaken by the government under various circumstances, including criminal forfeiture and postwar policies.The heirs initially pursued their claims in Hungarian courts without success. In 2010, they sued the Republic of Hungary and several Hungarian museums in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, invoking the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) expropriation and commercial activity exceptions. The district court partly dismissed the claims on international comity grounds but retained jurisdiction over most artworks. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the comity dismissal and affirmed jurisdiction on different grounds. Subsequent rulings narrowed the scope of claims, particularly after the Supreme Court’s decision in Federal Republic of Germany v. Philipp, which clarified the FSIA’s expropriation exception and incorporated the domestic-takings rule, limiting jurisdiction over property taken from a sovereign’s own nationals.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit concluded that U.S. courts lack jurisdiction over the family’s claims. The court held that plaintiffs failed to establish that the seizure of their artwork violated the international law of expropriation, as required by the FSIA. It found no international authority supporting jurisdiction for wartime or stateless-person takings, and that treaties and the domestic-takings rule further barred the claims. The court affirmed the district court’s complete dismissal of the litigation. View "De Csepel v. Republic of Hungary" on Justia Law

A company sought approval from the Illinois Commerce Commission (ICC) to construct and operate a high-voltage transmission line for renewable energy, running from Kansas through parts of Illinois to Indiana. The applicant, a special purpose entity owned by Invenergy, did not have existing utility assets in Illinois and planned to use a common energy industry “project finance” model—securing long-term contracts and commercial agreements after regulatory approval to finance construction through a combination of debt and equity. The applicant presented testimony regarding its management’s extensive experience with large-scale energy projects and relationships with major lenders, but did not submit traditional financial statements.The ICC reviewed the application, accepted evidence about the applicant’s financing strategy and experience, and imposed a condition that required the applicant to secure full financing for the entire project before beginning any construction on Illinois easement property. The ICC found that the applicant satisfied the statutory requirement to be “capable of financing the proposed construction without significant adverse financial consequences” for the utility or its customers, and issued the certificate of public convenience and necessity (CPCN).On direct administrative review, the Appellate Court of Illinois, Fifth District, reversed the ICC’s grant of the CPCN. The appellate court concluded that the applicant failed to show it could currently finance the project at the time of the certificate’s issuance, and characterized the project finance method as speculative. It held that section 8-406.1(f)(3) of the Public Utilities Act required proof of present financing capability as a condition precedent to granting a CPCN.The Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the appellate court’s judgment and affirmed the ICC’s decision. The court held that section 8-406.1(f)(3) does not require an applicant to prove current, present financing capability at the time of certificate issuance. Instead, it requires a showing of capacity to finance without significant adverse financial consequences, which may be established by substantial evidence of future financing ability and industry practices. The case was remanded to the appellate court for further proceedings on unaddressed issues. View "Concerned Citizens & Property Owners v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n" on Justia Law

Jackson County Heart ASC, LLC submitted an application to the Mississippi State Department of Health (MSDH) seeking a certificate of need (CON) to establish a joint venture cardiac ambulatory surgical facility (JV-CASF) in Gautier, Mississippi. The proposed facility would provide outpatient cardiac catheterization services and was to be jointly owned by an acute care hospital and licensed cardiologists, as defined by the Mississippi State Health Plan. The application included supporting affidavits from cardiologists and financial projections, indicating that this would be the only freestanding outpatient JV-CASF in the Gulf Coast service area.MSDH staff recommended approval of the application, finding substantial compliance with relevant criteria. Following Singing River Health System’s request for a hearing, a hearing officer considered testimony and evidence from both sides, including expert witnesses and financial analyses. Although one supporting physician withdrew his endorsement at the hearing, the hearing officer ultimately recommended approval based on the entirety of the evidence. MSDH’s state health officer adopted these findings and issued a final order approving the CON. Singing River appealed to the Hinds County Chancery Court, which affirmed the approval after oral argument. Singing River then appealed to the Supreme Court of Mississippi.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed arguments regarding the adequacy of the application, economic viability, and potential adverse impacts on Singing River’s services and charitable care. Applying a highly deferential standard, the Court found substantial evidence supporting MSDH’s decision. The Court held that the application met the requirements of the State Health Plan and CON Review Manual, satisfied economic viability, and would not have a significant adverse impact on Singing River or its ability to provide charitable care. The Supreme Court affirmed MSDH’s approval of the CON. View "Singing River Health System v. Mississippi State Department of Health" on Justia Law

A federal employee working at a Veterans Affairs healthcare facility discovered that a nurse practitioner was improperly receiving overtime pay that was not actually earned and not related to COVID, contrary to requirements. The employee’s supervisors allegedly created and signed a false waiver to justify these payments, resulting in significant unearned compensation. When the employee refused to participate in the scheme and reported the conduct to the VA Office of Inspector General, he claimed to have been subjected to workplace retaliation, including a reprimand and demotion.The employee filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Maine, asserting a qui tam false claims action against his supervisors and a retaliation claim under the False Claims Act (FCA) against the Secretary of the Department of Veterans Affairs, in his official capacity. The government intervened and successfully moved to dismiss the false claims and conspiracy counts against the supervisors. The government also sought dismissal of the retaliation claim, arguing that the employee’s exclusive remedies lay under the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA), not the FCA. The district court, however, dismissed the retaliation claim on the ground that the FCA does not contain an express waiver of the federal government’s sovereign immunity for such claims, and thus federal courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that Congress has not expressly waived the federal government’s sovereign immunity to permit retaliation suits against federal employers under Section 3730(h) of the FCA. The court found that neither the FCA’s text nor its structure provided the required clear waiver of sovereign immunity, distinguishing such waivers present in other statutes. Accordingly, the First Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. View "US ex rel. Sargent v. Collins" on Justia Law

A licensed sidewalk vendor who had operated outside Petco Park in San Diego since 2009 was cited multiple times in mid-2024 under newly enacted city ordinances regulating sidewalk vending. On two occasions, city officials also impounded his merchandise and, in one instance, his sales proceeds. The vendor, who holds a valid city vending permit, alleged that the new ordinances, particularly those related to impoundment and restrictions on vending during certain hours and events, conflicted with state law enacted in 2018 designed to protect the rights of sidewalk vendors. He sought a writ of mandate, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent enforcement of these local provisions.The Superior Court of San Diego County denied the vendor’s motion for a preliminary injunction. The court acknowledged the negative impact on the vendor’s livelihood but found there was a minimal probability of success on the merits, reasoning that the city’s restrictions were permissible under the state law’s allowance for regulations related to health, safety, or welfare. The court concluded that the balance of harms favored the city, given public interest considerations, and thus refused to enjoin enforcement of the challenged ordinances.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, examined both the factual record and the legal questions concerning the interplay between the municipal code and state law. The appellate court held that the city’s ordinances authorizing impoundment of vending equipment and restricting vending hours in nonresidential areas more stringently than for other businesses are in direct conflict with state law. The court found the trial court erred by not adequately considering these conflicts. The appellate court reversed the denial of the preliminary injunction and remanded for further proceedings, instructing the lower court to apply the correct legal standards and further develop the record as needed. View "Mustaqeem v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

A worker was severely injured while operating a bulldozer during a nighttime firefighting operation on a fire line managed by the Oregon Department of Forestry. At the time, he was employed by a private company under contract with the state and received workers’ compensation benefits for his injuries. He also filed a lawsuit alleging that two state employees supervising the site had negligently directed operations, resulting in his injuries. The complaint sought damages from the employees and the State of Oregon, which was alleged to be vicariously liable.The Jackson County Circuit Court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims against the individual state employees based on a provision of the Oregon Tort Claims Act, ORS 30.265(3), making the state the sole defendant. The court also dismissed the claims against the state under ORS 30.265(6)(a), which grants immunity to public bodies and their employees against tort claims when the injured party is covered by workers’ compensation. However, the court allowed the plaintiff’s wife’s loss of consortium claim to proceed. On appeal, the Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, holding that the statutory immunity barred the plaintiff’s claims and did not violate the remedy clause of the Oregon Constitution.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the case and reversed the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the circuit court. The court held that the statutory immunity provision in ORS 30.265(6)(a), which entirely bars a common-law negligence action by a privately employed worker injured by a negligent state employee, exceeds the limits imposed by Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution. The court concluded that this statutory immunity unconstitutionally denies such injured persons a substantive right to a remedy by due course of law and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Crandall v. State of Oregon" on Justia Law

A federally recognized tribe, which operates casinos under a tribal-state compact allowing video games of chance, objected when the Minnesota Racing Commission approved a 2023 amendment to a racetrack’s card club plan. This amendment allowed Running Aces Casino, Hotel & Racetrack to add an additional dealer table and 11 player stations featuring electronic table games. These electronic games use a live dealer and transmit images of physical cards to player stations, where patrons interact via video screens. Minnesota law limits commercial operation of such gambling devices and video games of chance to tribes and restricts the number of card tables at racetrack card clubs. The tribe argued that the Commission’s approval constituted an unlawful expansion of gambling, infringing upon its statutorily protected competitive environment.After the Racing Commission approved Running Aces’s request, the tribe petitioned the Minnesota Court of Appeals for review. The tribe contended that the Commission erred by permitting racetracks to operate devices reserved for tribes, by exceeding the statutory table limit, and by applying an unpromulgated rule. The Racing Commission and Running Aces challenged the tribe’s standing. The Minnesota Court of Appeals concluded that the tribe had standing due to its legally protected market-restricted interest, but rejected its arguments on the merits, affirming the Commission’s decision.On further appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the issue of standing de novo and held that the tribe does have standing to challenge the Commission’s decision, as the statutory scheme creates a competition-restricted environment protecting the tribe’s interest in operating video games of chance. However, because the Supreme Court was evenly divided on the merits of the tribe’s challenge to the Commission’s decision, it affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision without expressing an opinion on those merits. View "In the Matter of the Minnesota Racing Commission's Approval of Running Aces Casino, Hotel & Racetrack's Request to Amend its Plan of Operation" on Justia Law