Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

A federal land exchange was mandated by the Southeast Arizona Land Exchange and Conservation Act, requiring the United States Forest Service to transfer approximately 2,500 acres of National Forest land, including Oak Flat—a site of religious significance to the Apache—to Resolution Copper Mining, LLC, in exchange for over 5,000 acres of private land. The legislation included requirements for tribal consultation, land appraisal, and the preparation of an environmental impact statement (EIS). Following the issuance of a revised Final EIS in 2025, several environmental and tribal groups, as well as individual Apache plaintiffs, challenged the exchange. Their claims spanned the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), and the Free Exercise Clause, alleging procedural and substantive deficiencies.Previously, the United States District Court for the District of Arizona denied the plaintiffs’ motions for a preliminary injunction, finding that they had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on any claims relating to the appraisal process, NEPA, consultation, or the National Forest Management Act. A separate group of Apache plaintiffs brought similar claims, including religious liberty challenges, which were also denied—particularly in light of circuit precedent established in Apache Stronghold v. United States. All plaintiff groups appealed and sought further injunctive relief pending appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial for abuse of discretion and affirmed. The court held that plaintiffs had standing and their claims were justiciable, but that none of their arguments were likely to succeed on the merits or raised serious questions. The court specifically found the appraisals and environmental review sufficient, the agency’s tribal consultation adequate, and the religious liberty claims foreclosed by circuit precedent. The denial of a preliminary injunction was affirmed, and all related motions for injunctive relief were denied as moot. View "ARIZONA MINING REFORM COALITION V. UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE" on Justia Law

The plaintiff owned a building in Corpus Christi, Texas, with significant cultural and historical importance, particularly within the Black community. Over several years, the City’s Code Enforcement Division cited the property for structural deficiencies and ultimately recommended its demolition. Despite the plaintiff’s efforts to preserve the building for historic purposes, the Building Standards Board voted to recommend demolition at a hearing that the plaintiff and her counsel could not attend. After the City temporarily suspended the demolition order, it imposed conditions on the plaintiff to secure the property, which the City later deemed unmet. The City then gave the plaintiff 30 days to demolish the building or face further action.The plaintiff filed suit in Texas state court against the City and two City employees, alleging that selective enforcement of building codes violated her rights under the Equal Protection Clause, asserting a “class of one” theory under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, finding that the plaintiff had not sufficiently pleaded a substantive constitutional violation and thus did not reach the question of municipal liability.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed only the claim against the City, as the plaintiff did not pursue claims against the individual defendants. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. The court held that the plaintiff’s allegations did not establish a municipal policy, custom, or pattern of selective enforcement sufficient to state a claim for municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services. The court found that a single cited instance of allegedly selective enforcement was insufficient to plead an official policy or custom. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the action. View "Cambric v. City of Corpus Christi" on Justia Law

After the Texas Legislature enacted a law banning certain medical treatments for minors for the purpose of gender transition, PFLAG, Inc., a nonprofit organization with Texas members, became involved in litigation challenging the law. During this litigation, PFLAG’s executive director submitted an affidavit describing, among other things, how families sought “alternative avenues to maintain care” for transgender youth in Texas. The Office of the Attorney General, suspecting that some medical providers might be concealing violations of the new law through deceptive billing practices, issued a civil investigative demand (CID) to PFLAG seeking documents underlying the affidavit and related information. PFLAG declined to produce the documents and instead petitioned the 261st Judicial District Court in Travis County to set aside or modify the CID. The Attorney General subsequently narrowed the scope of the CID to exclude identifying information of PFLAG’s members and focused the requests more closely on the affidavit’s content.The district court granted a temporary restraining order and, after a trial, issued a final declaratory judgment and injunction largely protecting PFLAG from producing the requested documents. The district court focused its analysis on the original, broader CID and found that the Attorney General lacked a valid basis to believe PFLAG possessed relevant information. The court also concluded that the CID infringed on constitutional rights and failed to comply with statutory requirements.On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Texas held that the district court erred in analyzing only the original CID and not the revised version. The Supreme Court clarified that the Attorney General’s statutory authority to issue a CID requires only a reasonable belief, not proof, that the recipient may have relevant material. The Court found the Attorney General’s belief reasonable given the content of the affidavit and ruled that PFLAG must produce most responsive documents, subject to privilege and redaction of identifying information. The district court’s order was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL v. PFLAG, INC." on Justia Law

The case involves Nadine Realme, who participated in a Thanksgiving “turkey trot” fun run organized by the City of San Antonio. While following the course through a public park, Realme tripped over a metal pole fragment and broke her arm. She sued the City, alleging negligent maintenance of the park. The City asserted that Texas’s Recreational Use Statute barred ordinary negligence liability for injuries occurring during recreational activities on government property, arguing that the turkey trot was a “recreational” activity under the statute.In the 216th District Court, Realme prevailed. The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that while an organized footrace is “recreation” in common parlance, the statute required activities to be “associated with enjoying nature or the outdoors.” The appellate court concluded that the turkey trot, as an organized human event focused on completing the race, was not sufficiently connected to enjoyment of nature to qualify as “recreation” under the statute. It further determined that Realme’s purpose—to have fun and capture a social media picture—did not establish she entered the premises to enjoy nature or the outdoors.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the statutory definition of “recreation,” emphasizing its nonexhaustive list and ordinary meaning. It held that a community fun run is “recreation” because it provides diversion, play, and enjoyment, fitting the statute’s scope. The Court ruled that the Recreational Use Statute immunizes the City from ordinary negligence liability, reversing the Fourth Court of Appeals’ judgment and rendering judgment for the City on that claim. The Court remanded the case to the Fourth Court of Appeals to address Realme’s gross negligence claim, which had not been considered previously. View "CITY OF SAN ANTONIO v. REALME" on Justia Law

A Texas-based company sold bunker fuel to primarily foreign-registered vessels at Texas ports, transferring possession and control of the fuel in Texas. The company initially paid franchise taxes on these sales, but later sought a refund, arguing that these transactions should not be attributed to Texas for franchise-tax purposes because the fuel was not used, sold, or consumed in Texas. The company contended that, under the relevant statute, sales should be sourced to the buyer’s ultimate destination or place of use, not merely the location where possession was transferred.After the Texas Comptroller denied the refund, the company exhausted administrative remedies and filed suit, also challenging the validity of regulations that sourced sales to Texas based on the point of delivery to the buyer. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment, focusing on whether the statutory phrase “delivered or shipped to a buyer in this state” refers to the place where the buyer takes delivery or to the location where the buyer uses or consumes the goods. The trial court ruled in favor of the Comptroller, upholding the regulations. On interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Third District of Texas affirmed, finding the statute unambiguously sources sales based on where the buyer receives the property.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case to resolve the statutory interpretation. The Court held that the statute sources receipts from sales of tangible personal property to Texas if the seller transfers possession and control to the buyer at a location in Texas, regardless of where the buyer ultimately uses or consumes the goods. The Court found that the Comptroller’s rules were consistent with this interpretation and thus valid. The judgment of the court of appeals was affirmed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "NUSTAR ENERGY, L.P. v. HANCOCK" on Justia Law

Cockrell Investment Partners, L.P., owns a pecan orchard in Pecos County, Texas, and relies on several wells to irrigate its trees using water from the Edwards–Trinity Aquifer. Its neighbor, Fort Stockton Holdings, L.P. (FSH), historically used water from the same aquifer for agricultural purposes and later started selling it to nearby cities. FSH sought to significantly increase its permitted water usage, leading Cockrell to object due to concerns about the aquifer’s finite supply. FSH pursued several permit applications and amendments, some of which involved Republic Water Company of Texas, LLC, and ultimately resulted in settlement agreements that altered FSH’s permit terms. Cockrell attempted to participate as a party in administrative proceedings regarding these permit applications but was denied party status by the Middle Pecos Groundwater Conservation District.The district court in one instance granted the District’s plea to the jurisdiction, and in another instance granted summary judgment in favor of the District after denying its plea to the jurisdiction. Cockrell appealed both decisions to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth District of Texas. The appellate court affirmed the lower court rulings, determining that Cockrell had not exhausted its administrative remedies because it filed suit before waiting the required 90 days after submitting reconsideration requests, as prescribed by Section 36.412 of the Texas Water Code.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed both consolidated cases. It held that the 90-day exhaustion requirement applies only to permit applicants or parties to the administrative proceeding, which Cockrell was not, since it was denied party status. The Court concluded that Cockrell met all statutory requirements for judicial review under Section 36.251 of the Water Code and properly exhausted its administrative remedies according to local Rule 4.9, which required only a 45-day waiting period. The Court reversed the judgments of the court of appeals and remanded the cases for further consideration. View "COCKRELL INVESTMENT PARTNERS, L.P. v. MIDDLE PECOS GROUNDWATER CONSERVATION DISTRICT" on Justia Law

A former employee of a pharmaceutical manufacturer brought a qui tam lawsuit under the False Claims Act, alleging that the company improperly calculated and reported its “Best Price” for certain drugs to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), as required under the Medicaid Rebate Statute. The plaintiff claimed that, during a period from 2005 to 2014, the company failed to aggregate multiple rebates and discounts given to different entities on the same drug, resulting in inflated “Best Price” reports and underpayment of rebates owed to Medicaid. The complaint asserted that the company was subjectively aware that CMS interpreted the statute to require aggregation of all such discounts, especially after the company’s communications with CMS during a 2006–2007 rulemaking process and the company’s subsequent internal audit.After the government and several states declined to intervene, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland dismissed the amended complaint, finding that, even under the subjective scienter standard established in United States ex rel. Schutte v. SuperValu Inc., the plaintiff had not plausibly alleged that the company acted with actual knowledge, deliberate ignorance, or reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity of its reports. The district court also suggested that ambiguity in the statute precluded a finding of falsity.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The Fourth Circuit held that the plaintiff’s allegations—including the company’s awareness of CMS’s interpretation of the rule, its targeted audit and compliance efforts, and its continued use of non-aggregated reporting—plausibly alleged the requisite subjective scienter under the False Claims Act. The court clarified that statutory ambiguity does not, at the pleading stage, negate scienter or falsity, and remanded for the district court to address other elements, including falsity, in the first instance. The Fourth Circuit reversed the dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States ex rel. Sheldon v. Allergan Sales, LLC" on Justia Law

Dr. John Peterson, a pain-management physician employed at a Veterans Affairs healthcare facility in Illinois, was placed on summary suspension in 2020 due to concerns about his patient care, particularly relating to the management of opioid and benzodiazepine prescriptions. He was notified of the suspension, informed of his right to respond, and told a comprehensive review would follow. After several extensions—largely due to the COVID-19 pandemic—a review concluded that Peterson should be removed for failing to provide appropriate medical care and for failing to follow instructions during his suspension. Peterson was given notice of the charges, access to the evidence against him, and the right to respond, but did not submit a timely reply. He was subsequently removed from his position.Peterson appealed his removal to the Veterans Administration Disciplinary Appeals Board, which held a hearing and allowed him multiple postponements to secure an expert witness. Ultimately, Peterson submitted a lengthy rebuttal the night before the hearing, which the Appeals Board excluded as untimely. After questioning Peterson directly, the Appeals Board sustained most charges and upheld his removal. The decision was reviewed and approved by the Deputy to the VA Undersecretary for Health. Peterson then filed suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois, challenging the procedures and alleging due process violations. The district court found the procedures adequate, the evidentiary exclusion justified, and the agency’s actions not arbitrary or capricious, granting summary judgment for the defendants.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo and held that the procedures Peterson received were adequate under due process and agency law. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, finding no basis to disturb the agency’s decision. View "Peterson v. Collins" on Justia Law

Lieutenant Ernest Mitchell, a U.S. Navy officer, was serving as the Command Duty Officer aboard the USS Howard when he left the ship without authorization to move his car prior to the ship’s relocation. He failed to inform his commanding officer or transfer his duties to another qualified person during his absence. This incident, along with prior documented deficiencies in communication and adherence to standards, led to a series of disciplinary actions. These included his detachment from the ship for cause, findings by a Board of Inquiry of violations under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, delay and eventual removal from a promotion list, and denial of his efforts to remove adverse records and secure his promotion.After exhausting administrative remedies, Mitchell filed suit against the Secretary of the Navy in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging that the Navy’s actions violated the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary, determining that the Navy’s actions were reasonable and supported by a satisfactory explanation.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo, applying a highly deferential standard to the military’s factfinding. The appellate court rejected Mitchell’s argument that he was entitled to promotion by operation of law under 10 U.S.C. § 624(d), holding that the statute does not mandate automatic appointment if the Executive decides against it. The court also found that the Board for Correction of Naval Records did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in concluding Mitchell demonstrated substandard performance over an extended period. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of the Secretary of the Navy. View "Mitchell v. Phelan" on Justia Law

The case concerns a challenge brought by two renewable fuel industry groups to a 2020 rule issued by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under the Clean Air Act’s Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) Program. The challenged rule established the percentage of renewable fuel that refiners and importers must include in their annual fuel output. The groups objected to EPA’s refusal to adjust the 2020 standard to account for renewable fuel shortfalls resulting from past retroactive small refinery exemptions. While the case was pending, EPA issued a new rule in 2022 that recalculated the 2020 standards and reaffirmed its approach of not making up for past exemptions. In addition, Congress altered the statutory framework, granting EPA broader discretion in setting future renewable fuel volumes.Following the issuance of the 2022 rule, most petitioners dismissed their challenges, and the two remaining groups shifted their focus, no longer seeking to set aside the 2020 rule but instead seeking a ruling that would require EPA to change its policy in future rulemakings. They did not challenge the 2022 rule, nor did they request its invalidation.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the case was moot. The court reasoned that the 2022 rule superseded the 2020 rule, eliminating any live controversy over that agency action. The court further explained that the legal landscape had changed due to statutory amendments, so the original dispute no longer presented the same question. Because petitioners were not seeking to overturn any concrete, current agency action, their challenge amounted to a request for an impermissible advisory opinion. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petitions as moot. View "Clean Fuels Alliance America v. EPA" on Justia Law