Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Gene Cleveland Battieste, a veteran, underwent surgery at a Veterans Affairs Medical Center in Jackson, Mississippi in 2006. Although he had consented to surgery on certain cervical vertebrae, an additional procedure was performed on his C2 vertebra without his knowledge or consent. Following the surgery, Mr. Battieste experienced post-operative complications, including infection and increased pain. He applied for VA disability benefits in 2008, which were ultimately approved in 2020. The 2020 decision by the VA Board of Veterans’ Appeals was the first time Mr. Battieste or his family learned of the unauthorized surgery and the VA’s failure to provide proper informed consent or adequate post-operative care. Mr. Battieste died in 2022.In November 2022, the administrator of Mr. Battieste’s estate filed an administrative claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), which the VA denied. In May 2024, a lawsuit for medical negligence was filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. The district court dismissed the case, finding that Mississippi’s medical malpractice statute barred any action brought more than seven years after the alleged negligence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court determined that Mississippi Code Annotated § 15-1-36(2)’s seven-year period is a statute of repose, not merely a statute of limitations. The court found that Mississippi’s intermediate appellate courts consistently interpret the seven-year provision as an absolute bar to claims, and the statute’s structure and language support this reading. Because the suit was filed more than seven years after the surgery, the court held the claim was time-barred and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. View "Battieste v. United States" on Justia Law

The case centers on a challenge to a provision in the Los Angeles Administrative Code, section 8.33, which grants the mayor special powers upon declaring a “local housing and/or homelessness emergency.” In July 2023, the mayor declared such an emergency, and the city council subsequently renewed it. The emergency declaration was later lifted in November 2025. During the period the declaration was in place, Fix the City, Inc. contended that section 8.33 was invalid because it conflicted with the California Emergency Services Act (CESA) and another provision in the city’s code, arguing that the city had acted illegally during the emergency.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed Fix the City’s claims for writ and declaratory relief, which sought to vacate the emergency declaration and any resulting directives, as well as a declaration that section 8.33 was void for conflicting with CESA and local law. The city responded with a demurrer, asserting that section 8.33 was a proper exercise of municipal authority and did not conflict with CESA or the city’s own code. The superior court agreed, finding that CESA did not apply to charter cities unless there was a clear legislative directive, and that section 8.33 was not inconsistent with other city code provisions. The court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, and Fix the City appealed.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the lower court’s judgment. The appellate court held that CESA does not preempt section 8.33 because the two do not conflict; section 8.33 is a valid exercise of the city’s home rule powers over municipal affairs. Additionally, section 8.33 did not violate other provisions of the city’s administrative code. The denial of leave to amend was also upheld. View "Fix the City, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a magistrate in the domestic-relations division of a county court, declared her candidacy for a judicial seat alongside a fellow magistrate, who was also a court administrator. During her campaign, the plaintiff distributed literature that criticized her opponent’s work schedule and duties, suggesting that the opponent performed trivial administrative tasks and questioning her competence based on personal circumstances. These campaign materials were perceived by the administrative judge as undermining the integrity of the court and casting both the court and its staff in an unfavorable light. After the plaintiff lost the primary election, the administrative judge terminated her employment as a magistrate.Prior to this appeal, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio dismissed the plaintiff’s suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which alleged a violation of her First Amendment free-speech rights. The district court ruled that the court itself was not a legally cognizable entity subject to suit, that sovereign immunity barred claims for money damages against the administrative judge in her official capacity, and that the plaintiff failed to state a plausible free-speech claim against the administrative judge. The plaintiff appealed only the dismissal of her free-speech claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. It held that, because the plaintiff occupied a confidential or policymaking position and her campaign speech addressed matters related to court policy and politics in a manner that undermined the loyalty and efficient functioning required by her employer, her termination did not violate the First Amendment. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, finding that the balancing test usually applied to public employee speech was unnecessary under these circumstances. The court also rejected the plaintiff’s arguments regarding insubordination, the scope of judicial candidate speech protections, and the applicability of strict scrutiny. View "Gaines v. Cross" on Justia Law

A company seeking to build a new skilled nursing facility in Anchorage applied to the Alaska Department of Health for a certificate of need, a prerequisite under state law for constructing such healthcare facilities. The Department’s regulations require applicants to demonstrate a need for at least 40 additional nursing beds using a specific formula called the composite age specific use (CASU) methodology. In this instance, the applicant’s calculations using the CASU method showed a need for fewer than 40 beds. However, the applicant provided additional quantitative and qualitative data, including evidence of facility overcapacity, Anchorage’s role as a healthcare hub, and plans to offer sub-acute care not available elsewhere in Alaska.A competitor that had previously received its own certificate of need challenged the Department’s decision to approve the new facility’s application. The competitor argued that the Department violated its regulations by issuing a certificate when the required methodology did not show the requisite need for 40 beds. The competitor also claimed that the Department effectively changed its regulatory interpretation without following formal rulemaking procedures required by the Alaska Administrative Procedure Act. The Department and the applicant responded that the regulations allow the Department to waive a review standard—such as the 40-bed requirement—if strict application would reduce the availability, quality, or accessibility of services, as long as the prescribed methodology is still used in the application process.The Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, affirmed the Department’s decision, finding that the regulations permit the Department to waive a review standard while still requiring use of the methodology. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska affirmed the superior court’s decision, holding that the Department’s interpretation was reasonable, consistent with statutory authority, and did not require formal rulemaking. The court concluded the Department acted within its discretion and on a reasonable basis. View "Maple Springs Management, LLC v. State" on Justia Law

A pilot employed by a cargo airline was on a personal trip abroad when his employer, Amerijet International, selected him for a random drug test and requested that he appear for testing in Seattle on the same day. The pilot was unable to comply due to his location and a medical issue. The airline determined that he had refused the test, reported this to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and subsequently terminated his employment. The FAA corresponded with the pilot, initially investigating the matter and ultimately informing him that, while it was not taking enforcement action against his certificates, he would be subject to return-to-duty requirements because of the refusal determination, and the test refusal would be reported to the Pilot Records Database.The pilot challenged these consequences, arguing that the FAA had not independently reviewed the employer’s determination that he refused the test. The FAA responded that test-refusal determinations were made solely by the employer, not by the agency, and that the FAA did not review such determinations. The case came before the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit on the pilot’s petition for review of the FAA’s actions.The Court of Appeals held that the FAA’s internal guidance, specifically its Drug and Alcohol Compliance and Enforcement Surveillance Handbook, plausibly requires the FAA to independently review an employer’s test-refusal determination. The court interpreted the Handbook to require such review, partly to avoid serious constitutional concerns that would arise if the FAA entirely delegated this authority to private employers without oversight. Because the FAA conceded that it did not conduct any review, the court found the agency’s actions to be arbitrary and capricious for departing from its own procedures. The court granted the petition in part, remanding the case to the FAA for further review consistent with its opinion. View "Paul v. FAA" on Justia Law

Jennifer Neal was employed by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) as a Field Examiner until her removal in August 2020 for alleged unacceptable performance. She challenged her removal before the Merit Systems Protection Board (the Board), arguing that the VA violated the terms of a master collective bargaining agreement by failing to provide her with a performance improvement plan (PIP) prior to removal, and that the performance standards applied to her were unreasonable. During the pendency of her appeal, a Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) decision confirmed the requirement for the VA to provide a PIP before removing bargaining unit employees, as established in a prior arbitration. The administrative judge (AJ) found that the VA's removal of Neal was not in accordance with law and set aside the removal.The VA petitioned for review of the AJ’s decision to the full Board, arguing that the FLRA decision was factually and legally distinguishable. While the petition was pending, the VA voluntarily reinstated Neal, provided her back pay, and otherwise made her whole, effectively granting her all the relief she sought. The Board dismissed the VA’s petition as moot, recognizing that Neal had obtained complete relief. Neal then moved for attorneys’ fees. The AJ granted her request, finding her to be the prevailing party. However, upon the VA’s further petition, the Board reversed, reasoning that because the case became moot before a final Board decision, Neal was not a prevailing party and thus not entitled to fees.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the Board’s decision. The court held that Neal was a prevailing party because the AJ’s merits decision conferred enduring judicial relief that materially altered the legal relationship between the parties, and the subsequent mootness resulting from the VA’s voluntary compliance did not negate her prevailing party status. The court reversed the Board’s denial of attorneys’ fees and awarded costs to Neal. View "NEAL v. DVA " on Justia Law

A group of small-business manufacturers of e-liquids and a trade association representing vapor product manufacturers challenged a rule issued by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) under the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009. The 2009 Act requires FDA authorization before new tobacco products—including electronic nicotine delivery systems—can be marketed, mandating that applications demonstrate the product is “appropriate for the protection of the public health.” The FDA’s 2016 “Deeming Rule” extended these requirements to e-liquids and vapor products, and in 2021, the FDA issued a Final Rule detailing requirements for premarket tobacco product applications (PMTAs). Plaintiffs argued the Final PMTA Rule violated the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) because the FDA’s certification that the rule would not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities was arbitrary and capricious.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas granted summary judgment in favor of the FDA. It found the agency satisfied the procedural requirements of the RFA by considering and certifying the economic impact of the Final PMTA Rule, and that plaintiffs’ objections were substantive disagreements with the factual basis rather than procedural defects.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. The Fifth Circuit applied a deferential standard, focusing on whether the FDA made a “reasonable, good-faith effort” to comply with the RFA’s procedural requirements. The court held that the FDA’s certification was supported by the factual record, including analysis in the 2016 Deeming Rule, and that the agency provided adequate consideration and reasoned rejection of regulatory alternatives. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that the FDA complied with the Regulatory Flexibility Act when promulgating the Final PMTA Rule. View "Kealani Distribution v. FDA" on Justia Law

Several members of a family brought suit against a court-appointed receiver and his company, alleging breach of fiduciary duty. The dispute arose when the State of California, in the course of a criminal insurance fraud prosecution against one of the plaintiffs, obtained a court order freezing certain assets and appointing the receiver to manage them. The court later ordered the receiver to liquidate specified stock holdings "as soon as practicable." The plaintiffs alleged that the receiver failed to do so, resulting in a significant loss in the value of the accounts during the period before he was replaced by a successor. They claimed damages of over $1.1 million due to the alleged failure to comply with the liquidation order.After the plaintiffs filed their complaint in the Superior Court of Orange County, the defendants responded with an anti-SLAPP motion, arguing that the claims arose from protected conduct and that the receiver was immune from liability under the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity. The trial court granted the motion, finding that the claims were based on acts performed in the receiver’s official capacity and that plaintiffs failed to show a probability of prevailing because the receiver’s conduct was protected by both the litigation privilege and quasi-judicial immunity.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the trial court’s order. The appellate court held that a court-appointed receiver is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for discretionary acts and decisions made in that capacity. The court determined that the plaintiffs’ claims arose from the receiver’s exercise of discretion regarding when liquidation was "practicable," and such discretionary conduct is protected. Because the claims were subject to anti-SLAPP procedures and the plaintiffs failed to establish minimal merit, the appellate court affirmed the order striking the complaint. The court also rejected arguments based on statutory immunities for public employees, clarifying its decision was grounded in common law quasi-judicial immunity. View "Semaan v. Mosier" on Justia Law

An employee suffered a severe workplace injury in 2013 while working for a construction company, resulting in permanent and total disability with ongoing medical needs. The employee brought a third-party tort action against entities other than his employer involved in the accident and settled for $5 million. From the settlement, over $2.1 million was used to pay attorney fees and litigation expenses, with the remainder placed in trust. By the time of settlement, the employer and its workers’ compensation carrier had already paid over $1.5 million in benefits but stopped payments after the settlement, leaving the employee responsible for his ongoing care. The value of anticipated future medical costs was estimated at over $7 million.The administrative law judge (ALJ) initially found that only past benefits paid by the employer should be included in calculating the employer’s proportionate share of the legal expenses associated with the third-party settlement, setting that share at 31.6%. On review, the Commissioner disagreed, concluding that future anticipated benefits should also be included, as the employer’s interest in the recovery included the right to offset future benefits. The ALJ recalculated, finding the employer’s proportional share exceeded the total legal expenses, and ordered reimbursement to the employee for expenses already paid. The Appeals Board of the Labor Commission affirmed this decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah reviewed these decisions. It held that when an employer or insurance carrier seeks both reimbursement for past payments and an offset against future workers’ compensation liability from a third-party recovery, both past-paid and future-anticipated benefits must be considered in calculating the employer’s proportionate share of the legal expenses associated with that recovery. The court also held that the employer must reimburse the employee for its share of legal expenses before offsetting future benefits. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the Labor Commission. View "Auto Owners Insurance v. Labor Commission" on Justia Law

Egger Enterprises, LLC acquired a ranch in Humboldt County, Nevada, which had previously shifted from flood to center pivot irrigation systems. This conversion left portions of water rights unused, and Egger sought to use the leftover water by acquiring adjacent public land through federal Desert Land Entry applications. Administrative delays between the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and Nevada’s Division of Water Resources (NDWR) prolonged this process. Meanwhile, a nonparty challenged Egger’s applications, asserting that Egger had not used portions of its water rights for over 16 years, and thus, those rights were forfeited.The State Engineer found, by clear and convincing evidence, that certain water rights had not been put to beneficial use for five or more consecutive years and declared them forfeited. Egger petitioned for judicial review in the Sixth Judicial District Court, which initially reversed and remanded for lack of proper notice. Once proper notice was sent and Egger requested extensions of time, the State Engineer granted one extension but denied a subsequent request, ultimately issuing a declaration of forfeiture. Egger again sought judicial review, but the district court denied relief, finding the State Engineer’s decision supported by substantial evidence and holding that Egger was not entitled to equitable relief.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s denial of Egger’s petition. The court held that the State Engineer is not required to make findings on every statutory factor when considering an extension request under NRS 534.090(3)—only those relevant to the case. The court also found that substantial evidence supported the forfeiture decision and that Egger was not entitled to equitable relief, as there was no beneficial use of the water within the statutory period, nor any estoppel or error by the State Engineer. View "EGGER ENTER., LLC VS. STATE ENGINEER" on Justia Law