Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Several individuals, all enthusiasts of distilling spirits, and a non-profit organization devoted to legalizing at-home hobby distilling, sought to challenge longstanding federal laws prohibiting the operation of home distilleries. The plaintiffs, who had experience with lawful alcohol production for fuel or other beverages, expressed clear intent to distill spirits for personal consumption at or near their residences. They faced explicit warnings from federal authorities that such activity was illegal and punishable by substantial penalties, and that no permits would be issued for home-based distillation of consumable spirits.After contacting the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau (TTB) and receiving confirmation that home distilling would not be permitted, the plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas against the TTB and the U.S. Department of Justice. The district court dismissed several individual plaintiffs for lack of standing but allowed the claims of one individual and the non-profit organization to proceed. On the merits, the district court determined that federal statutes barring home distilling for beverage purposes violated the Constitution’s Commerce, Taxation, and Necessary and Proper clauses. The government appealed, and the dismissed plaintiffs cross-appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that all individual plaintiffs and the non-profit organization had standing to sue. On the merits, the Fifth Circuit ruled that the statutory prohibition on home distilleries and associated criminal penalties exceeded Congress’s constitutional authority under both the Taxation Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause, as the prohibitions were not “plainly adapted” to raising revenue and represented an improper federal intrusion into matters reserved to the states. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and injunction against enforcement of the statutes, as modified. View "McNutt v. Dept of Justice" on Justia Law

In this matter, a member of the University of Alabama’s men’s basketball team, Kai Spears, brought suit against The New York Times Company after it published articles erroneously identifying him as the unidentified passenger in a car at the scene of a high-profile shooting. The Times based its reporting on information from two confidential sources. Spears, who was not in the car, alleges that The Times failed to use reasonable care in publishing false and damaging statements about him. During litigation in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, Spears sought discovery to uncover the identities of the sources and related information. The Times resisted, invoking Alabama’s “shield statute,” which protects journalists from being compelled to reveal confidential sources.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama certified two questions to the Supreme Court of Alabama concerning the scope of the state’s shield statute. The first question asked whether the statute protects the identity of a source when information is published online. However, as Spears conceded that the print publication of the article triggered the statute’s application, the Supreme Court of Alabama declined to answer this question, finding it irrelevant to the case.The Supreme Court of Alabama addressed the second certified question, which asked whether the shield statute protects any and all information that could reasonably lead to the identification of a protected source. The Court held that Alabama’s shield statute does not extend so broadly. Instead, it protects only information that would inevitably reveal the identity of a confidential source. Thus, information that could merely “reasonably lead” to the identification of a source is not covered. The Court declined to expand the statute’s protections beyond its plain language and expressly limited the privilege to “source-identifying” information whose disclosure would make identifying the source unavoidable. View "The New York Times Company v. Spears" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, three organizations representing millions of Americans, challenged the Social Security Administration’s (SSA) decision to grant personnel from the newly created U.S. DOGE Service access to non-anonymized, highly sensitive personal information held by the SSA. This access was authorized following an executive order charging DOGE with improving government technology. Career officials at the SSA resigned in protest, and a new acting administrator approved DOGE’s access. The plaintiffs argued that merely providing this access, regardless of actual misuse or disclosure, was itself unlawful and an intrusion upon the privacy of their members.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland conducted extensive hearings and granted a preliminary injunction blocking DOGE’s access to the data. The Supreme Court subsequently stayed this injunction, pending appellate and possible further Supreme Court review. The case came before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the plaintiffs had Article III standing, as the unauthorized access to their sensitive information closely resembled the common law tort of intrusion upon seclusion. However, the Fourth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction, holding that the plaintiffs had not established that they were likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, as required by the second factor of the Winter test for preliminary injunctions. The court reasoned that monetary damages and reparative permanent injunctions were potentially available remedies, and the record did not show that new or additional irreparable harm would occur during the litigation. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings. The main holding is that the preliminary injunction was vacated because the plaintiffs did not show likely irreparable harm. View "American Federation of State, County and Municipal v. Social Security Administration" on Justia Law

After Hurricane Ida struck Louisiana in August 2021, Terrebonne Parish, which operates Houma’s electric system, requested help from Lafayette Utilities Systems (LUS) to restore power. LUS, in turn, sought assistance from the City of Wilson, North Carolina, leading to mutual aid agreements signed by Terrebonne Parish, LUS, and the City of Wilson. As a result, thirteen City of Wilson employees, including Kevin Ray Worrell, traveled to Louisiana to assist with power restoration. These workers stayed in Lafayette and commuted daily to Houma. On September 10, 2021, while driving a City of Wilson vehicle back to the hotel after work, Worrell was involved in an accident, injuring the plaintiffs.The plaintiffs initially filed tort actions in the St. Mary Parish district court, which were consolidated and removed to the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana based on diversity jurisdiction. The defendants moved for dismissal or summary judgment, arguing that Mr. Worrell was entitled to immunity under the Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency Assistance and Disaster Act (LHSEADA). The district court agreed, finding that Worrell acted as a “representative” of Terrebonne Parish under the statute and thus was immune from liability. The district court also determined that commuting from the work site fell within emergency preparedness activities covered by the Act.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit certified questions to the Supreme Court of Louisiana regarding the definition of “representative” under the LHSEADA. The Supreme Court of Louisiana held that Worrell, as an employee of the City of Wilson, North Carolina, working pursuant to mutual aid agreements that explicitly preserved his status as a City of Wilson employee and independent contractor, was not a “representative” of the State of Louisiana or its subdivisions for purposes of LHSEADA immunity. Therefore, he was not entitled to statutory immunity. The Court found it unnecessary to reach the second certified question. View "BREAUX VS. WORRELL" on Justia Law

A municipally owned utility in San Antonio owns power poles used for distributing electricity. Since 1984, a telecommunications provider (and its predecessor) has attached its equipment to these poles under a written agreement. The contract set a per-pole attachment fee, allowed for annual rate increases, and included a clause requiring both parties to comply with all applicable laws affecting their rights and obligations under the agreement. Over time, the utility charged one telecommunications provider higher rates, while continuing to invoice another provider at the original rate, resulting in a disparity in charges. After amendments to the Public Utility Regulatory Act (PURA) in 2005 prohibited discriminatory pole attachment rates and required uniform and federally capped rates, the provider paying the higher fee sued, seeking relief for breach of contract and statutory violations.The trial court, after abating proceedings while the Public Utility Commission (PUC) considered the matter, granted partial summary judgment for the utility on statutory and unjust enrichment claims, but for the provider on the breach-of-contract claim. The utility appealed. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the agreement did not incorporate new statutes into its terms, and thus the provider could not base its contract claim on the utility’s alleged statutory violations.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case. It held that the parties’ contract—by its express terms—incorporated post-1984 legal changes affecting their rights and obligations, including the 2005 PURA amendments. The Court concluded that the provider could pursue its contract claim based on the utility’s alleged failure to comply with current law, including prohibitions on discriminatory and excessive pole attachment rates. The Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "SPECTRUM GULF COAST, LLC v. CITY OF SAN ANTONIO" on Justia Law

An Adams County elector challenged the voter registration of the county prosecuting attorney, alleging that the prosecutor did not actually reside at his registered address in Adams County but instead lived with his family in Hamilton County. The challenger, a qualified elector from Clermont County, submitted evidence including property records, water usage data, and vehicle registrations to support his claim that the prosecutor’s declared residence was not legitimate. The Adams County Board of Elections denied the challenge on two occasions, each time relying solely on its own records and declining to hold a hearing.After the initial challenge was denied, the challenger sought a writ of mandamus from the Supreme Court of Ohio to cancel the prosecutor’s voter registration. The court denied the writ, finding that the relief had not been properly pleaded and declining to address the alternative request for a hearing. In response, the challenger filed a new challenge with the board and, after a second denial without a hearing, again sought mandamus relief from the Supreme Court of Ohio, this time explicitly requesting an order compelling the board to conduct a hearing on his challenge.The Supreme Court of Ohio held that neither claim preclusion nor issue preclusion barred the action, as the new challenge and denial were distinct from the earlier proceeding and the factual question of residency had never been adjudicated in a quasi-judicial hearing. The court found that the challenger had standing under the statute and that the board abused its discretion by denying the challenge without a hearing when its own records were insufficient to resolve the dispute. The court granted a writ of mandamus ordering the Adams County Board of Elections to hold a hearing within ten days on the challenge. The court also denied the board’s request for sanctions against the challenger. View "State ex rel. Hicks v. Adams Cty. Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

Raunona Mays, an African American woman employed as a Sergeant with the Arkansas Highway Police, applied for four promotions between 2022 and 2023 but was denied each time. She alleges that less qualified Caucasian males or individuals with less experience and education received the positions. After filing an internal grievance regarding one promotion and receiving no relief, Mays filed an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) complaint alleging race and sex discrimination, as well as retaliation. The EEOC dismissed her charge and issued a right-to-sue letter, after which Mays brought suit seeking damages, a promotion, and injunctive relief.The Pulaski County Circuit Court denied the Arkansas Highway Police’s motion to dismiss, which was based on sovereign immunity. The agency argued that it could not be sued under the United States Constitution and federal statutes, as well as the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, because it is protected by sovereign immunity. The circuit court rejected this argument, allowing all claims to proceed.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the appeal and held that Mays’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act could not proceed against the state agency because the agency is not considered a “person” under these statutes and is protected by sovereign immunity. The court reversed and remanded those claims for dismissal. However, the court determined that claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are not barred by sovereign immunity when brought against a state agency, and that Mays had pleaded sufficient facts to state a Title VII claim. The decision of the Pulaski County Circuit Court was affirmed as to the Title VII claim but reversed and remanded for dismissal of the other claims. View "ARKANSAS HIGHWAY POLICE v. MAYS" on Justia Law

An Irish company leased two airplanes to an Indian airline under agreements designating English courts as the forum for resolving disputes. After the airline failed to keep up with lease payments, the lessor sued in England and secured a monetary judgment. Seeking to enforce that judgment in Washington, the lessor filed a recognition action in King County Superior Court, claiming the airline had interests in personal property within the state but did not identify specific assets.The airline challenged the action in King County Superior Court, arguing that the court lacked personal jurisdiction because it had no contacts, assets, or business in Washington. The superior court denied the airline’s motion to dismiss, holding that jurisdiction was not required to recognize a foreign-country judgment under Washington’s Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act. The court ultimately entered summary judgment recognizing the English judgment and ordering payment. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that neither statute nor constitutional law required the creditor to show personal jurisdiction or a property nexus for recognition of such a judgment.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington granted review and reversed the lower courts. The court held that, under chapter 6.40A RCW, a judgment creditor must establish either general or specific jurisdiction over the debtor or, in the absence of such jurisdiction, demonstrate that the debtor has property within Washington before a foreign-country money judgment may be recognized. The court found that recognition actions under the Act are not purely ministerial and require adjudicative jurisdiction. The Supreme Court remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether the debtor has property in Washington sufficient to support jurisdiction. View "Alterna Aircraft V B Ltd. v. SpiceJet Ltd." on Justia Law

A group of environmental organizations, Native tribes, and individual plaintiffs sought to prevent a land exchange in Southeast Arizona’s Tonto National Forest, mandated by the Southeast Arizona Land Exchange and Conservation Act. This exchange would transfer nearly 2,500 acres of federal land, including Oak Flat—a site of religious significance to the Apache—and a large copper deposit to Resolution Copper Mining LLC. In return, the company would provide over 5,000 acres of equally appraised land to the federal government. Plaintiffs raised concerns under several statutes, including the Land Exchange Act, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), and the Free Exercise Clause, alleging procedural and substantive flaws in the exchange.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona denied motions for preliminary injunctions, finding that plaintiffs failed to show likely success or serious questions on the merits of their claims relating to appraisal, NEPA compliance, tribal consultation, and religious liberty. In a related case, Apache Stronghold v. United States, the district court’s denial of an injunction on religious liberty grounds was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit and not disturbed by the Supreme Court.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction. The court held that plaintiffs had Article III standing and that their NEPA claims were justiciable as “final agency action.” However, it concluded that plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on the merits of their appraisal, NEPA, consultation, or religious liberty claims. The court further determined that existing precedent foreclosed the RFRA and Free Exercise arguments. The court did not address other injunction factors and dissolved the administrative stay. View "BROWN LOPEZ V. USA" on Justia Law

A sitting circuit court judge was the subject of an impeachment petition submitted to the Kentucky House of Representatives by a former legislator who was not a party to any of the cases he cited. The petition alleged that the judge abused her discretion in six cases; five of these cases were still pending in the judicial system at the time. The petition did not include an affidavit, as required by Kentucky statute. The House referred the matter to its Impeachment Committee, which held a hearing and ultimately issued articles of impeachment against the judge. The Kentucky Senate scheduled a trial on these articles.The judge sought a temporary injunction in Franklin Circuit Court to stop the impeachment proceedings. The Franklin Circuit Court denied the injunction. She then sought emergency relief and review from the Kentucky Court of Appeals, which also denied relief. The judge subsequently filed emergency motions and a petition for a supervisory writ with the Supreme Court of Kentucky, seeking a declaration that the impeachment articles and proceedings violated the separation of powers and her due process rights, and requesting that they be declared void from the outset.The Supreme Court of Kentucky granted the petition for a supervisory writ. The Court held that the impeachment petition was invalid because it was not verified by affidavit, as required by statute. The Court further held that the allegations concerned discretionary judicial acts subject to correction through the appellate process or Judicial Conduct Commission proceedings, not impeachment, and that the Legislature’s actions violated the separation of powers. The Court also found that the impeachment process denied the judge due process, and that further proceedings would cause her irreparable harm. The Court enjoined the General Assembly from continuing the impeachment proceedings and ordered dismissal of the pending articles. View "GOODMAN V. NEMES" on Justia Law