Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

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The East Side Highway District (the District) and Gregory and Ellen Delavan (the Delavans) disputed the location of their common boundary relating to a portion of a road, Boothe Park Road, which included a boat ramp located on the shore of Lake Coeur d’Alene. The District asserted a claim to the disputed property under two theories: (1) a boundary by agreement that was established by the location of a fence that was erected by the Delavans’ predecessor in interest; and (2) Boothe Park Road and the boat ramp at its termination was a public highway pursuant to Idaho Code section 40-202(3). In response, the Delavans claimed the boat ramp was on their property, and its use by the public has always been, and remained, permissive. Further, the Delavans claimed the fence which was erected by their predecessor in interest was intended to act as a barrier, not a boundary. After two bench trials, the trial court ruled in favor of the Delavans, finding that the public’s use of the boat ramp had been permissive. As a result, the trial court ruled that the District did not have a right to a public easement based on Idaho Code section 40-202(3). Further, the trial court found that the fence had been erected as a barrier, not a boundary. Instead, the trial court found that the intention of the parties at the time the disputed property was conveyed to the Delavans demonstrated that the Delavans owned the property in dispute. The District appealed. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court held there was substantial and competent evidence to support the trial court’s findings that there was no boundary by agreement and that the Delavans owned the property in dispute. However, the Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of the Delavans because there was no hostility requirement in Idaho Code section 40-202(3). Accordingly, the case was remanded to determine whether the District had a public easement under Idaho Code section 40-202(3). View "Eastside Hwy Dist v. Delavan" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs were the Plaquemines Parish Council and the St. James Parish School Board, each being designated as the single collector for sales and use taxes levied by all taxing authorities within their respective parishes. Plaintiffs filed a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Request for Preliminary and Permanent Injunction, and supplementing and amending petitions thereto, alleging that La.R.S. 47:337.102(I) violated La.Const. art. VI, section 29 and La.Const. art. VII, section 3. In 2010, Plaquemines Parish entered into an Agreement to Collect Local Taxes Due on the Sale or Use of Motor Vehicles and Factory Built Homes (“the agreement”) with the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections (“the Department”) on behalf of the Department and the Vehicle Commissioner (“OMV”) for the collection of sales and use taxes levied in the parish. The agreement contains a provision allowing OMV to collect the identified sales and use taxes and to retain 1% of the taxes levied. St. James Parish also entered into an agreement with OMV for the collection of sales and use taxes levied in the parish. Their agreement contains the identical provision allowing OMV to collect the sales and use taxes and to retain 1% of the taxes levied as payment for its collection duties. After de novo review, the Louisiana Supreme Court concurred that La.R.S. 47:337.102(I) was unconstitutional. Consequently, the judgment of the district court declaring La.R.S. 47:337.102(I) unconstitutional and permanently enjoining the State of Louisiana, Department of Public Safety and Corrections, Office of Motor Vehicles from withholding locally levied sales and use taxes under the authority of La.R.S. 47:337.102(I) and from disbursing any funds withheld to the Louisiana Uniform Local Sales Tax Board was affirmed. View "West Feliciana Parish Government v. Louisiana" on Justia Law

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The First Circuit denied the petition filed by Petitioner, a native and citizen of China, seeking review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying as untimely Petitioner's motion to reopen her earlier removal proceedings, holding that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner's motion. Petitioner sought to reopen her earlier removal proceedings alleging that changed country conditions in China regarding religious persecution would impact her given her recent conversion to Christianity. The BIA denied the motion to reopen, finding that it was time-barred and that the evidence did not support an exception to the time limits. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that Petitioner's motion to reopen removal proceedings was time-barred. View "Lin v. Barr" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court affirming the decision of the Administrative Hearing Commission (AHC), which found cause to discipline Appellant's license as a peace officer, and the subsequent order of the Missouri Director of the Department of Public Safety, which permanently revoked Appellant's license, holding that Mo. Rev. Stat. 590.080 is valid. On appeal, Appellant argued that section 590.080, under which the AHC may find that cause for discipline exists of the licensee has committed a criminal offense, whether or not a criminal charge has been filed, violates principles of separation of powers embodied in Mo. Const. art. II, 1. Appellant further argued that the order of the Director revoking his license was not supported by competent and substantial evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) nothing in section 590.080 violates the separation of powers provision; and (2) there was ample competent and substantial evidence for the Director to conclude that continuing to license Appellant as a peace officer would not adequately protect the public. View "O'Brien v. Department of Public Safety" on Justia Law

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Flat Wireless and NTCH challenged the FCC's order approving rates that Verizon offered to Flat Wireless for both voice and data roaming. The DC Circuit held that Flat Wireless' challenge runs counter to Commission rules that deliberately eschew cost-based regulation of roaming rates. The court rejected Flat Wireless' primary contention that the Commission should have required Verizon to offer roaming rates closer to its costs, and considered Flat Wireless' challenge as a collateral attack on the Voice and Data Roaming Rules. The court rejected Flat Wireless' remaining arguments in support of its claim and denied the petition for review. The court also held that it lacked jurisdiction over Flat Wireless' challenge to the 2015 Open Internet Rule because the rule was nonfinal as to Flat Wireless and was still subject to the Commission's revision. Finally, the court dismissed NTCH's petition for review because it was not properly before the court. View "Flat Wireless, LLC v. FCC" on Justia Law

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The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment sustaining the Tobacco Control Act and its application to e-cigarettes. The court held that e-cigarettes are indisputably highly addictive and pose health risks, especially to youth, that are not well understood. Therefore, the court held that it is entirely rational and nonarbitrary to apply to e-cigarettes the Act's baseline requirement that, before any new tobacco product may be marketed, its manufacturer show the FDA that selling it is consistent with the public health. Furthermore, the First Amendment does not bar the FDA from preventing the sale of e-cigarettes as safer than existing tobacco products until their manufacturers have shown that they actually are safer as claimed. The court explained that this conclusion was amply supported by nicotine's addictiveness, the complex health risks tobacco products pose, and a history of the public being misled by claims that certain tobacco products are safer, despite disclaimers and disclosures. Finally, the court held that nothing about the Act's ban on distributing free e-cigarette samples runs afoul of the First Amendment where free samples are not expressive conduct and, in any event, the government's interest in preventing their distribution is unrelated to the suppression of expression. View "Nicopure Labs, LLC v. FDA" on Justia Law

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The Fifth Circuit granted the petition for panel rehearing, withdrew its prior opinion, and substituted the following opinion. Walmart filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against the TABC, challenging Texas statutes that govern the issuance of permits allowing for the retail sale of liquor in Texas (package store permits). Section 22.16 of the Texas Alcohol Beverage Code prohibits public corporations from obtaining package store permits in Texas. TPSA later intervened as a matter of right in defense of the statutes. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court erred in its findings regarding the public corporation ban’s discriminatory purpose. The court held that, although the district court correctly cited the Arlington framework, some of its discriminatory purpose findings were infirm. In this case, the record did not support only one resolution of the factual issue, because there was evidence that could support the district court's finding of a purpose to discriminate. Therefore, the court vacated and remanded in part for a reweighing of the evidence. The court also held that the district court committed clear error in finding that Section 22.16 was enacted with a purpose to discriminate against interstate commerce, and the facially neutral ban did not have a discriminatory effect. The court vacated the district court's judgment that the public corporation ban violated the dormant Commerce Clause, and remanded for reconsideration of whether the ban was enacted with a discriminatory purpose. The court also held that the district court erred in its analysis when it determined that section 22.16 violates the dormant Commerce Clause under the Pike test. Therefore, the court rendered judgment in favor of defendants on the claim that an impermissible burden existed under the Pike test. The court affirmed in part the district court's judgment rejecting Walmart's Equal Protection challenge to the public corporation ban, and held that the ban was rationally related to the state's legitimate purpose of reducing the availability and consumption of liquor throughout Texas. Finally, Walmart's challenges to section 22.04 and 22.05 are withdrawn in light of House Bill 1545. View "Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Texas Alcohol Beverage Commission" on Justia Law

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The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's order denying the Board's petition to enforce five requests issued by the Board in subpoenas following an explosion and chemical release at an ExxonMobile refinery. The panel held that, although the district court did an admirable job, it erred in finding these five requests unenforceable. In this case, the five subpoena requests relating to the alkylation unit and the modified hydrofluoric acid stored there were relevant to the February 2015 explosion and accidental release of modified hydrofluoric acid. The panel held that a review of the specific disputed requests confirmed that each sought material that might cast light on the Board's investigation into the February 2015 release. View "United States v. Exxon Mobil Corp." on Justia Law

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Defendant Adam Provost appealed a civil division determination that plaintiff Burlington School District could disclose, in response to a newspaper’s public records request, an unredacted copy of a Resignation Agreement reached by the District and Provost concerning his employment with the District. Provost argued the civil division: (1) lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the District’s request for declaratory relief regarding a matter within the exclusive purview of the Public Records Act (PRA); and (2) erred by granting the District’s request for declaratory relief based on its conclusion that Provost had waived any objection to release of the agreement, even assuming it had jurisdiction to consider the request. The Vermont Supreme Court determined the District and Provost entered into a contract acknowledging the obligation of the District, as a public entity subject to the PRA, to release the Resignation Agreement "under the provisions of applicable law." The District and Provost had reached a legal stalemate over whether release of an unredacted copy of the Agreement would violate not only the PRA, but also their Agreement, which would expose the District to a breach-of-contract claim. Under these circumstances, it was entirely appropriate for the superior court to exercise its general jurisdiction to adjudicate the District’s request for declaratory relief. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Burlington School District v. Provost" on Justia Law

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Sturgell was a commercial fisher for 48 years. He held Dungeness crab permits in Washington, Oregon, and California. During the 2012–2013 season, Sturgell landed 203,045 pounds of crab in California. Sturgell’s taking of crab in California before the delayed opening of the Oregon crab fishery meant he was required to wait until January 30, 2013, before taking, possessing, or landing that crab in Oregon. He could take crab in Washington on January 24. On January 29, Sturgell arrived in Astoria, Oregon to offload the crabs he had taken in Washington. He began to offload crabs at 6:15 p.m and offloaded 38,295 pounds; the balance of the 64,694 total offload was completed by 4:00 a.m. on January 30. A “Receiving Ticket,” indicating the “date of landing” as January 29, 2013, was signed by Sturgell and the buyer. The buyer later stated that this was “in error” as the ticket was actually written, “between 4[:00] a.m. and 5[:00] a.m. on January 30, 2013, after the offload was completed.” Pursuant to Fish and Game Code section 8043, a landing receipt “shall be completed at the time of the receipt, purchase, or transfer of fish.” Sturgell’s permit was revoked. The trial court ordered the permit reinstated. The court of appeal dismissed the agency’s appeal as moot, with instructions that the trial court vacate its decision. Sturgill had retired and sold his permit for over $500,000. The Department approved the transfer. View "Sturgell v. Department of Fish and Wildlife" on Justia Law