Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The 2019 Illinois Cannabis Regulation Act legalized the recreational use of cannabis and established a licensing system for cannabis dispensaries. Applications for the first licenses closed in 2020; by mid-2021 the Department had allocated 185 licenses using a lottery procedure. The issuance of licenses was stayed during state-court litigation. For a second group of licenses in 2022, the Department established a point system that heavily favored longtime Illinois residents. The plaintiffs want to invest in Illinois cannabis dispensaries but neither lived in Illinois.In March 2022, they filed suit raising a dormant Commerce Clause challenge to the residency provisions and sought a preliminary injunction halting the completion of the allocated 2021 licenses and enjoining the ongoing process for 2022 licenses. The district court denied the motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The denial of a preliminary injunction allowed the Department to issue the 2021 licenses; it did so, largely mooting the appeal. To the extent that unwinding the licenses remains possible, the judge weighed the equities and held that the plaintiffs waited too long to challenge the residency provisions; an injunction would severely harm reliance interests and disrupt the orderly completion of the first-round licensing process. At the time of the ruling, the Department had not finalized the criteria for the second group but a challenge was unripe because the Department might materially modify the criteria. The Department subsequently finalized the 2022 rules and deleted provisions favoring Illinois residents. View "Finch v. Treto" on Justia Law

This diversity suit involves personal injury and wrongful death claims arising from a collision between a sedan and a tour bus on a U.S. highway within the boundaries of the Navajo Nation reservation. Before trial, the district court held that Arizona law applies to the accident, and it therefore dismissed all claims based on Navajo law. At trial, the jury rejected all remaining claims asserted by the sedan’s surviving passengers and by the estate of the sedan’s driver, and the district court entered judgment in favor of the tour bus driver, the tour organizer, and other related corporations.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of Defendants to the extent that it dismissed all claims that had been asserted solely under Navajo law; reversed the district court’s judgment on the claims that were submitted for trial because the district court erroneously allowed the introduction of hearsay opinions of a non-testifying putative expert; and remanded for a new trial. The panel held that the district court abused its discretion in allowing, under the guise of impeachment evidence against Plaintiffs’ expert witnesses, Defendants’ counsel to elicit the opinions expressed in a police report prepared by the Arizona Department of Public Safety as to the cause of the accident. Next, the panel affirmed the district court’s conclusion that Arizona law applied and its resulting dismissal of all claims that were asserted only under Navajo law. View "JAMIEN JENSEN, ET AL V. EXC INCORPORATED, ET AL" on Justia Law

The Idaho Department of Health and Welfare’s (“the Department”) cited Grace at Fairview Lakes, LLC (“Grace”), a residential assisted living and memory care facility, for failing to provide a safe living environment for residents and for inadequate training in relation to COVID-19 infection control measures. Grace requested administrative review of the enforcement action, which was affirmed by a Department administrator. Grace then filed an administrative appeal challenging the action, which was affirmed by a hearing officer. Grace then filed a petition for judicial review to the district court. The district court denied all the relief sought by Grace. On appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, Grace argued the district court erred because the hearing officer’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. The Supreme Court found no error in the district court’s decision because there was substantial evidence in the record to support the hearing officer’s order. View "Grace at Fairview Lakes, LLC v. IDHW" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court’s affirmance of the Social Security Administration’s (SSA) denial of his claim for disability insurance benefits (DIB) and supplemental security income (SSI) following the Appeals Council’s remand. He argued that the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) erred on remand by reconsidering a prior finding of Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (RFC) after the prior decision had been vacated, in violation of the law-of-the-case doctrine and the mandate rule.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the mandate rule, which is “a specific application” of the law-of-the-case doctrine, binds a lower court to execute the mandate of the higher court without further examination or variance. The court wrote that even assuming the law-of-the-case doctrine and mandate rule apply, the ALJ was free to reconsider Plaintiff’s RFC because the 2018 Decision was vacated. The court reasoned that the district court order made no findings about how the ALJ erred in his determination on Plaintiff’s disability. Instead, the district court remanded the case on a motion from the Commissioner without making specific factual findings, including whether or not the ALJ properly determined Plaintiff’s RFC. As a result, the Appeals Council had no factual findings in the remand order from which it could deviate. Additionally, the Appeals Council explained that Plaintiff filed a new SSI claim in 2019, and it consolidated that claim with his initial claims, which stemmed from the same disabilities. The SSA regulations allow an ALJ to consider any issues relating to the claim, whether or not they were raised in earlier administrative proceedings. View "George Weidner, III v. Commissioner of Social Security" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from the Mississippi Legislature’s passing and the Governor’s signing of House Bill 1020. The catalyst for the Legislature’s passing of House Bill 1020 was described as the “sweltering, undisputed and suffocating” crime problem in Jackson, Mississippi—a problem that has “crippled the criminal justice system.” While political and social controversy surrounded this bill, the bulk of the bill’s provisions, which are aimed at improving public safety and bolstering judicial resources in Jackson, were not at issue. Section 1 of House Bill 1020, directed the Mississippi Supreme Court’s Chief Justice to appoint four additional (and unelected) circuit judges to the existing Seventh Circuit Court District—the district comprised of the City of Jackson and all of Hinds County—for a term ending December 31, 2026. The second challenged provision, Section 4 of House Bill 1020, was a more ambitious endeavor that created a new statutory inferior court, much like a municipal court, to serve the CCID. Petitioners, and Jackson residents, Ann Saunders, Sabreen Sharrief, and Dorothy Triplett (collectively, Saunders) claimed both provisions violated Mississippi’s Constitution. The Hinds County Chancellor J. Dewayne Thomas, who held hearings on Saunders’s challenges, disagreed and dismissed her complaint. Saunders appealed. After review, the Supreme Court agreed with the chancellor that the creation of the CCID inferior court in Section 4 of House Bill 1020 was constitutional. But the Court agreed with Saunders that Section 1’s creation of four new appointed “temporary special circuit judges” in the Seventh Circuit Court District for a specified, almost-four-year term violated the State Constitution’s requirement that circuit judges be elected for a four-year term. View "Saunders, et al. v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied a writ of mandamus ordering the Crawford County Board of Elections to certify Relator's name as a candidate for a seat on the Galion City Council on the November 7 general election ballot, holding that the Board properly invalidated a part-petition in its entirety.The Board notified Relator by letter that it would not certify her name as a candidate for a seat on the Galion City Council after determining that one of the part-petitions circulated by Relator contained two signatures that were signed by the same person and invalidating the part-petition in its entirety. Relator subsequently commenced this mandamus action, arguing that the Board should not have invalidated the entire part-petition containing the forged signature. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that the Board properly invalidated the part-petition on which one signatory signed both her name and her husband's name. View "State ex rel. Robinson v. Crawford County Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

Petitioner Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) sought extraordinary writ relief for the second time arising out of the parties’ ongoing efforts to clarify the standard of proof to be applied at trial on South San Joaquin Irrigation District’s (the District) right to take part of PG&E’s electric distribution system under the Eminent Domain Law. PG&E emphasized that it did not challenge the validity of the resolution of necessity adopted by the District. PG&E did challenge the District’s right to take its property on grounds that conflicted with various findings the District made in its resolution. Because these challenges were authorized by statute, PG&E could succeed at trial by essentially disproving one of these findings by a preponderance of the evidence. Further, the Court of Appeal agreed with PG&E that the superior court’s September 6, 2017 and November 28, 2022 orders erred in concluding that PG&E also needed to demonstrate the District abused its discretion in adopting its resolution of necessity. Therefore, the Court of Appeal issued a peremptory writ of mandate compelling the superior court to vacate its September 6, 2017 and November 28, 2022 orders, and enter a new order. View "Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Appellant, a former employee of the City of La Habra Heights (City), pled no contest to a felony that arose out of the performance of her official duties. Under the terms of Appellant’s plea agreement, the conviction was later reduced to a misdemeanor under Penal Code section 17 and then dismissed under Penal Code section 1203.4. After Respondent California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) determined that Appellant forfeited a portion of her retirement benefits as a result of her felony conviction, she filed a petition for writ of administrative mandate. The trial court denied her petition.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court concluded the trial court did not err in denying the petition because, consistent with the language and purpose of section 7522.72, Appellant’s retirement benefits were subject to forfeiture upon her no-contest plea to a job-related felony, notwithstanding the subsequent reduction to a misdemeanor and dismissal of the charge. Further, the court explained that Appellant asserts that section 7522.72 is unconstitutional, but she fails to present any cognizable argument or legal authority to support her claim. View "Estrada v. Public Employees' Retirement System" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs’ neighbor petitioned for a civil harassment restraining order against Plaintiffs and was granted a temporary restraining order. As a result of the TRO, Plaintiff was ordered to surrender his firearms to a California licensed firearms dealer. Certain California laws make it unlawful for any person subject to a “civil restraining order” issued by a California state court (including temporary restraining orders) to possess firearms or ammunition. Plaintiffs claim these laws violate the Second Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution as applied to them. Though Plaintiffs were subject to civil restraining orders when they filed their suit, the orders against them have expired, and in January 2023, a California court denied the latest request to extend them.   The Ninth Circuit dismissed Plaintiffs’ action as moot. The panel rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that, although they were no longer subject to any firearm restrictions, the case fell within the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to mootness. The panel noted that this doctrine is to be used sparingly, in exceptional situations, and generally only where (1) the challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to cessation or expiration, and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subject to the same action again. The panel held that this case was moot because the relevant restraining orders have expired, a three-year-long restraining order is not too brief to be litigated on the merits, and there was no reasonable expectation that Plaintiffs will be subject to the same action again View "MIRANDA WALLINGFORD, ET AL V. ROBERT BONTA, ET AL" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the determination of the circuit court that the Day County Board of Adjustment could reconsider and modify a previously-granted variance, holding that the Board of Adjustment no longer had the authority to reconsider the variance when it did so.Appellants were informed that their property violated the Day County Planning and Zoning Ordinance because they altered the grading and added rocks. Appellant subsequently sought a variance from the ordinance allowing the existing grading and rocks to remain. The Board of Adjustment unanimously approved the application. The Board subsequently reconsidered the variance and modified it. Appellants later applied for a permit to build a house on their property. The Board of Adjustment denied the application because Appellants had not complied with the modified variance. The circuit court denied Appellants' request for relief and dismissed their complaint. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the Board of Adjustment did not reconsider the variance before the appeal time expired, Appellants were entitled to a declaration of their rights under the variance the Board granted. View "Gonsor v. Day County Planning Commission" on Justia Law