Municipalities sued other municipalities to recover revenue under the Use Tax Act (35 ILCS 105/1). Use tax is imposed on the privilege of using in Illinois tangible personal property purchased at retail from a retailer outside the state. Retailers who have a sufficient physical presence in Illinois and have out-of-state facilities from which Internet, telephone, and mail-order sales are made of tangible personal property to be used in Illinois must collect use tax from the purchaser and remit the tax to the Illinois Department of Revenue (IDOR) to prevent avoidance of sales tax. The general rate for both sales tax and use tax is 6.25% of the sale price with 5% allocated to the state. For sales tax, the remaining amount is distributed to the municipality and county where the sale occurred. For use tax, the remaining share is distributed to Chicago, the RTA Fund, the Madison County Mass Transit District, and the Build Illinois Fund. The balance is distributed to all other municipalities based on their proportionate share of the state population. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the dismissal of the suit. IDOR has been vested, for purposes of plaintiffs’ claims, with exclusive authority to audit the reported transactions that plaintiffs dispute and to redistribute the tax revenue due to an error. In addition, under Municipal Code section 8-11-21, the General Assembly must give a municipality the right to bring suit about missourcing or misreporting of use taxes. View "Chicago v. Kankakee" on Justia Law

Van Dyke is a licensed insurance producer, 215 ILCS 5/1, and registered with the Secretary of State Securities Department as an investment adviser, 815 ILCS 5/1. The Department received a complaint from the adult children of one of Van Dyke’s deceased clients, investigated, and held a hearing to determine whether Van Dyke’s registration should be retroactively revoked or suspended, alleging that Van Dyke had defrauded over 21 clients, all senior citizens. Van Dyke effectuated 31 purchase transactions involving the liquidation of the clients’ previously owned indexed annuities to purchase new indexed annuities. Van Dyke earned $316,278.56 in commissions; his clients lost $263,822.13 in surrender charges, penalties, and other fees. The Secretary of State found that Van Dyke had violated the Act, revoked his investment adviser registration, and ordered him to pay fines and costs. The appellate court reversed, holding that the Department had failed to prove that Van Dyke violated the Act. The Illinois Supreme Court agreed. Annuity contracts issued by authorized insurers are insurance products, not securities, because they fall within the exclusion from face amount certificates and are not investment contracts under section 2.1; Van Dyke’s recommendation that his clients purchase the indexed annuities cannot form the basis of a violation of sections 12(A), (F), (G), or (I) of the Act. The evidence failed to establish that Van Dyke violated the Act or perpetrated a fraud on his clients with regard to the replacement transactions at issue. View "Van Dyke v. White" on Justia Law

The City of Merced (City) participated in the normal due diligence review (DDR) process to review what, if any, monies had to be disgorged when its former RDA was statutorily dissolved. The City did not initiate a judicial challenge to the amounts the Department of Finance (DOF) ultimately found had to be repaid and the reasons therefor. The DOF filed what amounted to a collection action, seeking mandamus compelling the City to transfer certain money to the RDA’s successor agency, and compelling that agency to transfer money to the relevant county’s auditor-controller. The City answered with a general denial and boilerplate affirmative defenses. The City then tried to challenge the merits of the DDR determinations, and later filed a belated cross-petition seeking to challenge the merits.The trial court struck the cross-complaint, declined to consider the City’s challenges to the merits of the disputed amounts, and ordered a writ compelling the monetary transfers. The City then appealed. The Court of Appeal determined the trial court properly declined to consider the merits of the dispute. However, the Court directed the trial court to modify the judgment to clarify a particular monetary amount. View "CA Dept. of Finance v. City of Merced" on Justia Law

The district court found that a woman, "Linda M.," charged with several misdemeanors was incompetent to stand trial and committed her to a state hospital. The hospital later brought petitions in the superior court for civil commitment and involuntary medication. Linda moved to dismiss or stay the proceedings, contending that the superior court was an improper forum because of the criminal case pending in the district court. The superior court denied the motion, asserted its jurisdiction to hear the case, and granted the hospital’s petition for authority to administer medication. Linda appealed. The Alaska Supreme Court held the superior court properly asserted its jurisdiction over the civil commitment and involuntary medication petitions and that the superior court did not err in finding that involuntary medication was in Linda's best interests. View "In Re Hospitalization of Linda M." on Justia Law

Connor J. was living at a shelter for homeless youth, when his psychiatric condition allegedly began to deteriorate. A social worker filed a petition in superior court seeking authority to hospitalize Connor for evaluation. The petition noted Connor had a history of suicidal thoughts; that he had been diagnosed at various times with depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder, and oppositional defiant disorder; and that he had been treated for mental illness in the past at a hospital and several counseling centers. Connor was transported to Alaska Psychiatric Institute (API) for an evaluation. A few days later API filed a petition for 30-day commitment and a proceedings were initiated that lead to his commitment. The superior court issued a 30-day involuntary commitment order after finding that Connor was "gravely disabled" and there were no less restrictive alternatives to hospitalization. The respondent appealed, arguing that it was plain error to find he waived his statutory right to be present at the commitment hearing, that it was clear error to find there were no less restrictive alternatives, and that the commitment order should be amended to omit a finding that he posed a danger to others, a finding the superior court meant to reject. The Alaska Supreme Court concluded it was not plain error to find that the respondent waived his presence at the hearing. We further conclude that it was not clear error to find that there were no less restrictive alternatives to a 30-day hospital commitment. However, because there was no dispute that the “danger to others” finding should not have been included in the commitment order, the case was remanded for issuance of a corrected order. View "In Re Hospitalization of Connor J." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the rulings of the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Court determining what constitutes the term “employer” under Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-116 of the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Act, in imposing liability on CMR Construction & Roofing of Texas, LLC (CMR), and in finding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Texas Mutual Insurance Co., holding that the court did not err. The compensation court concluded that CMR was a statutory employer under section 48-116, thus requiring CMR to compensate Juan Martinez for injuries he sustained while acting as an employee of a CMR subcontractor. The court further found that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Texas Mutual, a workers’ compensation insurance company domiciled and having its principal place of business in Texas. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the compensation court did not err in finding that CMR was the statutory employer of Martinez and in imposing liability; (2) the compensation court lacked personal jurisdiction over Texas Mutual; and (3) the court did not err in awarding Martinez attorney fees and future medical care and in determining that Martinez had sustained an eighty-percent loss of earning capacity. View "Martinez v. CMR Construction & Roofing of Texas, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing Plaintiffs’ claims seeking a declaratory judgment that a redevelopment project in the City of Falls City was not planned or adopted in accordance with the Community Development Law, Neb. Rev. Stat. 18-2101 to 18-2144, and requesting a permanent injunction to prevent the project from proceeding, holding that all of Plaintiffs’ assignments of error were without merit. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) all of Plaintiffs’ claims challenging the procedure by which the redevelopment project was adopted and the validity and enforceability of the redevelopment agreement and bond were foreclosed by sections 18-2129 and 18-2042.01; and (2) two meetings challenged in this suit did not violate Nebraska’s Open Meetings Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. 84-1407 to 84-1414. View "Salem Grain Co. v. City of Falls City" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that the determination of the New York State Authorities Budget Office (ABO) denying the request of Petitioners - Madison County Industrial Development Agency (MCIDA) and Madison Grant Facilitation Corporation (MGFC) - to file consolidated audit reports was not irrational, arbitrary and capricious, or contrary to law. ABO informed MCFC that it must comply with the reporting requirements of the Public Authorities Accountability Act (PAAA) as a corporation legally affiliated with MCIDA, an industrial development agency (IDA) and a “local authority” subject to the PAAA. MCIDA asked that the ABO treat MGFC as its subsidiary and allow the two entities to file consolidated reports. The ABO denied MCIDA’s request after the Attorney General issued a formal opinion concluding that an IDA is not authorized to create a subsidiary. Petitioners then commenced this N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 proceeding challenging the ABO’s determination. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the ABO’s narrow record-keeping determination was not contrary to law, nor was it irrational or arbitrary and capricious. View "Madison County Industrial Development Agency v. State Authorities Budget Office" on Justia Law

The Retired Oakland Police Officers Association obtained a writ of mandate against the Oakland Police and Fire Retirement System directing that master police officer-terrorism pay (MPO pay) be included in the calculation of pension benefits. Under the retirement system, a retiree’s pension is a fixed percentage of the compensation currently “attached to the average rank” held by the retiree at the time of retirement. The court of appeal reversed. The trial court erred in concluding that MPO pay is “compensation attached to . . . rank” as required by the Oakland City Charter for inclusion in pension benefits. In 2009-2015, MPO pay was paid to all officers who had completed 20 years of service in the Department; maintained fully effective overall performance appraisals during the assignment; attended and completed an approved anti-terrorism/law enforcement response course; and been assigned to the patrol division. The requirement that an officer be assigned to the patrol division to receive MPO pay compels the conclusion that MPO pay is not attached to the officer’s rank. The agreement that added MPO pay did not restructure the relevant ranks or create an additional step within an existing rank. View "Retired Oakland Police Officers Association v. Oakland Police and Fire Retirement System" on Justia Law

This appeal focused on circumstances in which local water and irrigation districts were entitled to subvention for unfunded state mandates. The Commission on State Mandates (Commission). The Commission denied consolidated test claims for subvention by appellants Paradise Irrigation District (Paradise), South Feather Water & Power Agency (South Feather), Richvale Irrigation District (Richvale), Biggs-West Gridley Water District (Biggs), Oakdale Irrigation District (Oakdale), and Glenn-Colusa Irrigation District (Glenn-Colusa). The Commission determined the Water and Irrigation Districts had sufficient legal authority to levy fees to pay for any water service improvements mandated by the Water Conservation Act of 2009. The trial court agreed and denied a petition for writ of mandate brought by the Water and Irrigation Districts. On appeal, the Water and Irrigation Districts presented a question left open by the Court of Appeal’s decision in Connell v. Superior Court, 59 Cal.App.4th 382 (1997). Based on the statutory language, Connell held local water districts were precluded from subvention for state mandates to increase water purity levels insofar as the water districts have legal authority to recover the costs of the state-mandated program. In so holding, Connell rejected an argument by the Santa Margarita Water District and three other water districts that they did not have the “practical ability in light of surrounding economic circumstances.” This appeal considered whether the passage of Proposition 218 changed the authority of water and irrigation districts to recover costs from their ratepayers so that unfunded state mandates for water service had to be reimbursed by the state. The Court of Appeal affirmed, finding the Water and Irrigation Districts possessed statutory authority to collect fees necessary to comply with the Water Conservation Act. Thus, under Government Code section 17556(d), subvention was not available to the Water and Irrigation Districts. The Commission properly denied the reimbursement claims at issue in this case because the Water and Irrigation Districts continued to have legal authority to levy fees even if subject to majority protest of water and irrigation district customers. View "Paradise Irrigation Dist. v. Commission on State Mandates" on Justia Law