Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In this case addressing the General Assembly districting plan adopted by the Ohio Redistricting Commission in September 2023 the Supreme Court granted motions to dismiss brought by Petitioners, who filed motions for leave to file objections instanter to the plan and denied motions to vacate and for leave to file objections, holding that dismissal was warranted.The Commission adopted a new redistricting plan in September 2023 by a unanimous vote. Petitioners moved for leave to file objections. Respondents, members of the Commission, moved to dismiss the cases and to vacate the court's orders declaring the districting plan adopted by the General Assembly in September 2021 as unconstitutional. The Supreme Court granted the motions to dismiss, denied the motions to vacate as moot, and denied the motions for leave to file objections to the September 2023 plan, holding that now that the Commission has adopted a plan with bipartisan support, the facts before the Court bore no resemblance to the allegations in Petitioners' complaints. View "League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Comm'n" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the immigration judge's (IJ) denial of Petitioner's applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), holding that Petitioner was not entitled to relief.Petitioner, who was from Nepal, sought relief based on claims that she experienced past persecution and had a well-founded fear of future persecution at the hands of Maoist insurgents on account of political opinion and membership in a particular social group, in particular, her nuclear family. The IJ granted Petitioner's application for voluntary departure but denied her claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT. The BIA affirmed. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the lower agencies did not err in concluding that Petitioner failed to establish that the Nepali government was unwilling or unable to protect her. View "Singh v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Minnesota Tax Court affirming the assessment of the Commissioner of Revenue assessing tax on an apportioned share of Cities Management, Inc.'s (CMI) income from the sale of the S corporation, holding that the income from the corporation's sale was apportionable business income.CMI, which did business in Minnesota and Wisconsin, and its nonresidential partial owner filed Minnesota tax returns characterizing the sale of CMI's goodwill as income that was not subject to apportionment by the State under Minn. Stat. Ann. 290.17. The Commissioner disagreed and assessed tax on an apportioned share of the corporation's income from the sale. The tax court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that CMI's income did not constitute "nonbusiness" income under section 290.17, subd. 6 and may be constitutionally apportioned as business income. View "Cities Management, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue" on Justia Law

Lawrence Didier appealed an order and judgment denying his discharge from civil commitment. Between 1988 and 2008, Didier was convicted of gross sexual imposition and indecent exposure, and was twice convicted of sexual assault. After a State petition, the district court ordered Didier committed as a sexually dangerous individual in November 2010 under N.D.C.C. ch. 25-03.3. Didier petitioned for an annual review hearing under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-18 seeking discharge from commitment. Dr. Deirdre D’Orazio, Ph.D., a doctor of clinical and forensic psychology, submitted a report for the North Dakota State Hospital stating her expert opinion was that Didier remained a sexually dangerous individual. The district court held a hearing and subsequently issued an order and judgment denying Didier’s petition for discharge from civil commitment. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the trial court's finding by clear and convincing evidence that Didier had serious difficulty controlling his behavior based on both his past and present conduct was not clearly erroneous, and was supported by the record. Accordingly, the distric court's order and judgment were affirmed. View "Matter of Didier" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court ruling in favor of the Montana Environmental Information Center and Sierra Club (collectively, Conservation Groups) and vacating the Montana Department of Environmental Quality's (DEQ) permit for Westmoreland Rosebud Mining, LLC's proposed coal mine expansion, holding that the Board of Environmental Review (Board) made several errors when it upheld DEQ's findings.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court erred in concluding that reversal of the burden of proof was prejudicial error; (2) the Board committed reversible error in limiting the Conservation Groups' evidence and argument; (3) the district court erred in determining that it was reversible error to admit certain testimony as proper rebuttal; (4) the Board erred when it concluded that no water quality standard violation could occur; (5) the Board properly considered cumulative impact of mining activity in its analysis; (6) the Board properly relied on evidence regarding aquatic life; (7) the attorney fee award was improper; and (8) the district court erred in ruling that the Board was properly included as a party on judicial review. View "Mont. Environmental Information Center v. Westmoreland Rosebud Mining" on Justia Law

In April 2017 and June 2017, Appellant Diane Zilka filed petitions with the Philadelphia Department of Revenue (the “Department”), seeking refunds for the Philadelphia Tax she paid from 2013 to 2015, and in 2016, respectively. During the relevant tax years, Appellant resided in the City, but worked exclusively in Wilmington, Delaware. Thus, she was subject to four income taxes (and tax rates) during that time: the Philadelphia Tax; the Pennsylvania Income Tax (“PIT”); the Wilmington Earned Income Tax (“Wilmington Tax”); and the Delaware Income Tax (“DIT”). The Commonwealth granted Appellant credit for her DIT liability to completely offset the PIT she paid for the tax years 2013 through 2016; because of the respective tax rates in Pennsylvania versus Delaware, after this offsetting, Appellant paid the remaining 1.93% in DIT. Although the City similarly credited against Appellant’s Philadelphia Tax liability the amount she paid in the Wilmington Tax — specifically, the City credited Appellant 1.25% against her Philadelphia Tax liability of 3.922%, leaving her with a remainder of 2.672% owed to the City — Appellant claimed that the City was required to afford her an additional credit of 1.93% against the Philadelphia Tax, representing the remainder of the DIT she owed after the Commonwealth credited Appellant for her PIT. After the City refused to permit her this credit against her Philadelphia Tax liability, Appellant appealed to the City’s Tax Review Board (the “Board”). The issue this case presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review as whether, for purposes of the dormant Commerce Clause analysis implicated here, state and local taxes had to be considered in the aggregate. The Court concluded state and local taxes did not need be aggregated in conducting a dormant Commerce Clause analysis, and that, ultimately, the City’s tax scheme did not discriminate against interstate commerce. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court order. View "Zilka v. Tax Review Bd. City of Phila." on Justia Law

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation; Yassmin Gramian, individually; Michael Carroll, in his capacity as Acting Secretary of the Department of Transportation; and Melissa Batula, P.E., individually and in her capacity as Acting Executive Deputy Secretary for the Department of Transportation (collectively, PennDOT) appealed a Commonwealth Court order that denied, in part, and granted, in part, a “Motion for Adjudication of Civil Contempt or in the Alternative . . . Motion for a Preliminary Injunction” (PI Motion) filed by Glenn O. Hawbaker, Inc. (Hawbaker). Pertinent here, the Commonwealth Court’s order preliminarily enjoined PennDOT from proceeding with any action for the debarment of Hawbaker as a prequalified bidder on PennDOT construction contracts based upon criminal charges filed against Hawbaker or Hawbaker’s subsequent entry of a corporate nolo contendere plea to those criminal charges. After review, the Supreme Court agreed with PennDOT that the Commonwealth Court erred in exercising equitable jurisdiction to award Hawbaker preliminary injunctive relief in this matter. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Commonwealth Court order, and remand the matter for further proceedings. View "Glenn Hawbaker, Inc. v. PennDOT" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying Appellant's complaint for a writ of mandamus requiring the Industrial Commission of Ohio to award him a scheduled award of permanent partial disability (PPD) compensation under Ohio Rev. Code 4123.57(B) for the loss of the use of his right hand, holding that the court of appeals correctly denied the writ.Appellant was injured during the course of his employment as a laborer when he fell from a roof onto concrete below. A district hearing officer granted Appellant's request for scheduled-loss compensation, but a staff hearing officer vacated that order on appeal. The court of appeals denied Appellant's ensuing complaint for a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that some evidence supported the commission's decision denying Appellant's request for compensation for the loss of the use of his right hand, and the commission did not abuse its discretion. View "State ex rel. Block v. Industrial Commission of Ohio" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus ordering the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction to produce a copy of a kite that he alleged he had exchanged with the "cashier" of the North Central Correctional Complex (NCCC), where Relator was incarcerated, holding that Relator was entitled to the writ.According to Relator, an NCCC inspector denied Relator's kite request on the ground that she was not responsible for printing kites. After the department denied Relator's grievance Relator brought this mandamus action seeking production of the kite. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding (1) Relator showed that he had a clear legal right to the requested relief and that the department had a clear legal duty to provide it; and (2) Relator was not entitled to statutory damages. View "State ex rel. Clark v. Ohio Dep't of Rehabilitation & Correction" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the final award of the labor and industrial relations commission affirming and adopting an administrative law judge's award of permanent total disability benefits to Jannie Harper under the Missouri Workers' Compensation Law, holding that the commission's decision was supported by competent and substantial evidence.Harper filed a claim for workers compensation against Springfield Rehab and Health Center and Premier Group Insurance Company Corvel Enterprise Company (collectively, Springfield Rehab). The commission awarded Harper permanent and total disability benefits, finding that Harper suffered a compensable injury arising from a workplace accident. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that competent and substantial evidence supported the commission's final award of permanent total disability compensation and future medical care. View "Harper v. Springfield Rehab & Health Care Center" on Justia Law