Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The City and County of San Francisco and the San Francisco County Transportation Authority challenged a decision by the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) to issue a phase I driverless autonomous vehicle (AV) deployment permit to Waymo, LLC for fared passenger service in San Francisco and parts of San Mateo County. The petitioners argued that the PUC failed to follow the law and disregarded significant public safety issues. However, the record showed that the PUC considered and responded to the safety concerns raised by the petitioners, noting that few incidents involved Waymo driverless AVs, each was minor, and none involved injuries.The PUC had previously issued a decision establishing a pilot program for the regulation of AV passenger carriers, which included both drivered and driverless AVs. The petitioners participated in these proceedings but did not challenge the decision at that time. Waymo submitted an advice letter in December 2022 seeking a phase I driverless AV deployment permit, which was protested by the San Francisco entities. The PUC's Consumer Protection and Enforcement Division circulated a draft resolution authorizing Waymo's permit, and after considering comments and holding meetings, the PUC issued a final resolution in August 2023, authorizing Waymo to provide fared driverless AV service.The California Court of Appeal reviewed the case and found that the PUC acted within its authority and did not abuse its discretion. The court noted that the PUC's decision was supported by substantial evidence, including data showing that Waymo driverless AVs had not been involved in any collisions resulting in injuries. The court also upheld the PUC's use of the advice letter process, as it was authorized by the PUC's prior decision. The court denied the relief requested by the petitioners, affirming the PUC's decision to issue the phase I driverless AV deployment permit to Waymo. View "City and County of San Francisco v. Public Utilities Commission" on Justia Law

Petitioners sought review of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC) grant of an abandonment incentive to ITC Midwest, LLC (ITC). This incentive allows ITC to recover 100% of its prudently incurred costs if a planned transmission project is abandoned for reasons beyond its control. Petitioners, a group of organizations whose members purchase electricity, argued that ITC's ownership of the project was uncertain due to ongoing litigation challenging the Iowa Right of First Refusal statute.The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission approved ITC's request for the abandonment incentive, finding that the project met the necessary criteria, including enhancing reliability and reducing congestion. Petitioners filed a protest, which FERC rejected, stating that regulatory or litigation uncertainty does not preclude granting an abandonment incentive. Petitioners then sought rehearing, which FERC also denied, reiterating that the approval was consistent with its precedent.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court determined that petitioners lacked Article III standing because they failed to show imminent injury from FERC's orders. The court noted that petitioners' claims of potential future higher rates were speculative and not concrete or imminent. The court also found that petitioners' interest in the proper application of the law and potential collateral estoppel effects did not constitute a cognizable injury. Consequently, the court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. View "Industrial Energy Consumers of America v. FERC" on Justia Law

Aclara Meters LLC owned the license for the Somersworth Hydroelectric Project on the Salmon Falls River between New Hampshire and Maine from 2016 to 2023. In 2019, Aclara sought to surrender its license to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). After conducting an environmental assessment, FERC authorized the surrender in 2023. American Whitewater, a conservation organization, requested a rehearing, arguing that two dams from the Project should be removed as a condition of surrender. FERC denied the request, leading Whitewater to petition the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for relief, claiming that FERC acted arbitrarily and capriciously under the Federal Power Act (FPA) and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).The Commission's environmental assessment concluded that approving the surrender as proposed would not significantly affect the environment, thus an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) was unnecessary. FERC found that removing the dams was unfeasible due to the local municipalities' reliance on the reservoir for water supply and other needs. The Commission also determined that the benefits of keeping the dams outweighed the environmental and recreational benefits of their removal. FERC's decision was based on the public interest, considering the water supply, firefighting needs, and potential impacts on local infrastructure.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and denied Whitewater's petition for review. The court held that FERC's analysis was neither arbitrary nor capricious. The Commission reasonably determined that dam removal was unfeasible and appropriately assessed the public interest. The court found that FERC's decision to approve the license surrender without dam removal was supported by substantial evidence and consistent with its policies and precedents. View "American Whitewater v. FERC" on Justia Law

Justin and Jared Brackett own and operate two restaurants in Harwich, Massachusetts: Ember Pizza, Inc. and The Port Restaurant and Bar, Inc. Both establishments held liquor and entertainment licenses issued by the town. Allegedly, they violated Harwich's noise ordinance and Massachusetts COVID-19 restrictions, leading to suspensions and restrictions on their permits. In response, they sued Harwich, several town officials, and other individuals in federal district court, asserting various federal and state claims.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts largely granted the defendants' dispositive motions, rejecting all of Ember and The Port's claims. The court also denied their request for leave to amend their complaint, finding that an amendment would be futile. Ember and The Port then appealed the district court's decisions.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's rulings. The appellate court held that Ember and The Port failed to state a plausible claim for relief under federal law, including their First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and procedural due process claims. The court also found that the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act claims and common law claims, including civil conspiracy and defamation, were inadequately pleaded. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request for leave to amend the complaint, as the proposed amendments would not have cured the deficiencies in the original complaint. View "3137, LLC v. Town of Harwich" on Justia Law

Oak Reile, a delivery driver for Core Mark International, Inc., suffered a cervical spine fracture after falling off a loading ramp at work. He underwent surgery and rehabilitation, resulting in quadriplegia and other severe conditions. Reile later sought workers' compensation benefits for a psychological condition, specifically adjustment disorder with depressed mood, which he claimed was caused by his physical injury. Workforce Safety and Insurance (WSI) denied his claim, leading Reile to request reconsideration and an independent medical review.The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) affirmed WSI's denial, concluding that while Reile's psychological condition resulted from his work injury, it did not meet the requirements of the North Dakota Administrative Code § 92-01-02-02.5. This regulation required the psychological condition to be the "physiological product" of the physical injury. The ALJ found that Reile's condition was compensable under the statute but not under the administrative rule. The district court upheld the ALJ's decision, leading to Reile's appeal.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that WSI exceeded its statutory authority in promulgating N.D. Admin. Code § 92-01-02-02.5. The court held that the regulation was invalid because it imposed additional burdens not present in the statute, such as requiring proof of a physiological nexus and excluding certain aspects of physical injuries from consideration. The court found that the ALJ's decision to deny benefits based on the invalid regulation was not in accordance with the law. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's judgment, holding that Reile was entitled to benefits under the applicable statute. View "Reile v. WSI" on Justia Law

Coinbase Global, Inc., a trading platform for digital assets, petitioned the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to create rules clarifying the application of federal securities laws to digital assets like cryptocurrencies and tokens. Coinbase argued that the current securities-law framework does not account for the unique attributes of digital assets, making compliance economically and technically infeasible. The SEC denied Coinbase’s rulemaking petition, stating that it disagreed with the petition’s concerns and had higher-priority agenda items. Coinbase’s U.S. subsidiary, Coinbase, Inc., then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit to review the SEC’s denial.The SEC’s denial of Coinbase’s petition was challenged on the grounds that it was arbitrary and capricious. Coinbase argued that the SEC’s decision to apply securities laws to digital assets through enforcement actions constituted a significant policy change that required rulemaking. Coinbase also contended that the emergence of digital assets represented a fundamental change in the factual premises underlying existing securities regulations, necessitating new rules. Additionally, Coinbase claimed that the SEC’s explanation for its decision was conclusory and insufficiently reasoned.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and found that the SEC’s order was conclusory and insufficiently reasoned, making it arbitrary and capricious. The court granted Coinbase’s petition in part and remanded the case to the SEC for a more complete explanation. However, the court declined to order the SEC to institute rulemaking proceedings at this stage. The court emphasized that the SEC must provide a reasoned explanation for its decision, considering all relevant factors and providing a discernible path for judicial review. View "Coinbase Inc v. Securities and Exchange Commission" on Justia Law

Jennifer Harmon’s son, N.J., died by suicide while residing at the Bruce Normile Juvenile Justice Center (BNJJC) under the care of the Second Judicial Circuit of Missouri. Harmon filed a lawsuit seeking damages for her son’s death, including various 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state wrongful death claims against the Second Circuit, several named defendants from both the Second Circuit and BNJJC, Preferred Family Healthcare (PFH), and several named defendants from PFH. All defendants filed motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granted the Second Circuit and Government Defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court found that the claims against the Second Circuit were barred by the Eleventh Amendment, the § 1983 claims against the Government Defendants were barred by qualified immunity, and the state tort claims against the Government Defendants were barred by official immunity. Harmon appealed these immunity judgments.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Harmon’s claims against the Second Circuit, holding that the Second Circuit is not a “person” amenable to suit under § 1983 and is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, which Missouri has not waived. The court also affirmed the dismissal of Harmon’s § 1983 claims against the Government Defendants, concluding that the Government Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because Harmon failed to show that any constitutional violation was clearly established. Lastly, the court affirmed the dismissal of Harmon’s state tort claims against the Government Defendants, holding that the Government Defendants were entitled to official immunity under Missouri law because Harmon failed to plead both the existence of a department-mandated policy and a breach of that policy. View "Harmon v. Second Judicial Circuit of the State of Missouri" on Justia Law

Karen Ashley, the former Chief Nursing Officer of Clay County Memorial Hospital (CCMH), raised concerns about patient safety issues, including missing fentanyl and procedural errors in blood transfusions. She reported these issues internally and publicly at a CCMH Board meeting. Ashley also advocated for CCMH to terminate its contract with Concord Medical Group PLLC and partner with ACPHealth. Following this advocacy, Ashley alleges that the County, CCMH, and the Foundation retaliated against her by terminating her employment, violating her First Amendment rights.Ashley filed suit against the County and Concord Medical Group, alleging retaliation under the Texas Occupations Code and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The County moved to dismiss, asserting it was not Ashley’s employer and had taken no adverse actions against her. Ashley amended her complaint to add CCMH as a defendant and narrowed her claims against the County. The County maintained it was not Ashley’s employer and moved to dismiss on governmental immunity grounds. CCMH invoked an arbitration clause in Ashley’s employment agreement and moved to compel arbitration. The district court compelled the County to arbitration alongside CCMH and denied the County’s motion to dismiss as moot.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court erred by not addressing the County’s governmental immunity defense before compelling arbitration. The appellate court reversed the district court’s order compelling arbitration and remanded the case with instructions for the district court to resolve the issue of governmental immunity as it pertains to the County’s motion to dismiss before ruling on the motion to compel arbitration. View "Ashley v. Clay County" on Justia Law

The case involves the fate of the Frank J. Wood Bridge, a historic bridge in Maine connecting Topsham and Brunswick. Built in 1932, the bridge is no longer safe without substantial rehabilitation or replacement. The Maine Department of Transportation (MDOT) decided that replacing the bridge was more sensible than rehabilitating it. Since federal funds would be used, MDOT needed approval from the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) and compliance with federal statutes, including Section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act, due to the bridge's historic status.The FHWA approved MDOT's plan to replace the bridge, despite objections from preservation groups. The plaintiffs challenged this decision in the United States District Court for the District of Maine, which rejected their challenges. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated the FHWA's decision in part, remanding the case to determine whether a 53% price differential between rehabilitation and replacement constituted a cost of extraordinary magnitude under Section 4(f).On remand, the FHWA concluded that the 53% differential was indeed a cost of extraordinary magnitude. Plaintiffs argued that updated cost estimates showed that rehabilitation would now be cheaper than replacement. The FHWA, however, found the plaintiffs' updated estimates flawed and did not recalculate the differential. The plaintiffs then sued again, and the district court granted summary judgment for the agencies, finding that the FHWA had complied with the remand instructions.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the FHWA acted within the scope of the remand by deciding whether the 53% price differential was a cost of extraordinary magnitude and was not required to reopen the record to consider new cost information. View "National Trust for Historic Preservation v. Buttigieg" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Curtis Hier requested records from the Slate Valley Unified School District related to incidents of restraint and seclusion of students at Fair Haven Grade School. Specifically, he sought redacted copies of "Rule 4500 forms" from January to April 2021, documents related to the use of certain rooms between 2015 and 2022, and any redacted restraint and seclusion documents concerning the assistant principal. The school district denied the requests, claiming the records were student records and thus exempt from disclosure under the Public Records Act.The Superior Court, Rutland Unit, Civil Division, denied the school district's motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment to the plaintiff. The court found that the Rule 4500 forms were not student records but were meant for monitoring the use of restraint and seclusion in schools. It ordered the school district to disclose the forms with specific redactions to protect student privacy. The court also denied the plaintiff's motion to amend the judgment to remove certain redactions.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the trial court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the Rule 4500 forms are categorically exempt from disclosure as student records under the Public Records Act. The court emphasized that the language of the student records exception is broad and unqualified, similar to its previous ruling in Caledonian-Record Publishing Co. v. Vermont State Colleges. The court concluded that the forms, which contain information related to specific students and incidents, fall squarely within the statutory exception for student records and are not subject to redaction or disclosure. View "Hier v. Slate Valley Unified School District" on Justia Law