Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Owners of residential property in Indian Wells, California, challenged a city ordinance that placed a 29-night minimum stay requirement on short-term rentals (STRs), effectively banning them. In response to property owners in common interest developments (CIDs) who wanted to permit STRs, the city enacted an ordinance allowing CIDs to vote to opt out of the minimum stay requirement, provided certain conditions were met. The plaintiffs, who owned property in a CID, sought a permit to operate an STR after their CID certified an opt-out vote, but the city denied the permit. The plaintiffs argued the opt-out procedure conflicted with California Civil Code section 4740, part of the Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act, which protects owners from prohibitions on rentals adopted after they acquire title. They also asserted the city had unconstitutionally delegated legislative authority to private parties.The Superior Court of Riverside County found in favor of the plaintiffs, concluding that the city’s opt-out procedure was preempted by section 4740 and conflicted with statutory voting requirements for amending CID governing documents. The trial court ruled the city had a duty to issue an STR permit and awarded attorney fees to the plaintiffs. The city appealed, arguing that section 4740 was not implicated and the delegation was permissible.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. It held that the city’s opt-out provision was not preempted by section 4740, as a vote to opt out did not amend CID governing documents or prohibit rentals, and compliance with both laws was possible. The court further held that the delegation of authority to CID members was constitutional and did not violate due process. It also determined the city had not acted arbitrarily or capriciously in enacting the ordinance. The court reversed the judgment and the postjudgment award of attorney fees, ordering costs in favor of the city. View "Parsons v. City of Indian Wells" on Justia Law

The case involves the allocation of statutory royalties collected from cable television systems for the distant retransmission of broadcast programming between 2014 and 2017. Under Section 111 of the Copyright Act, cable providers pay fees into a pooled fund, which the Copyright Royalty Board (the Board) is tasked with distributing among copyright claimants based on the relative marketplace value of their programming. Six claimant groups participated, including the Joint Sports Claimants (JSC) and Public Television (PTV), both of whom challenged the Board’s methodology and the resulting allocation.The Copyright Royalty Board conducted adversarial proceedings, admitting evidence and expert testimony focused on two principal valuation methods: regression analysis and constant-sum surveys (specifically the Bortz Survey). After accounting for adjustments to correct for market changes and methodological limitations—such as the conversion of WGNA from broadcast to cable and the impact of must-carry rules—the Board issued a final determination in June 2024, allocating royalty shares among the groups. Both JSC and PTV appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, while other claimant groups intervened.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the Board’s decision under the Administrative Procedure Act’s arbitrary and capricious standard. The court rejected nearly all challenges to the Board’s use of regression and survey methodologies, finding them reasonable. However, the court found the Board failed to sufficiently explain how it merged the results of the two methodologies to arrive at the final allocation percentages. Because the decisive step in the allocation process lacked a clear and reasoned explanation, the court vacated the Board’s final determination and remanded for further proceedings and clarification. View "Office of the Commissioner of Baseball v. LOC" on Justia Law

A federal employee serving as a Presidential Innovation Fellow at the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) was assigned to work on an artificial intelligence tool intended to reduce the processing time for veterans’ disability benefits claims. After reviewing the performance of the tool (CAAPI), the employee determined and communicated to agency leadership that, contrary to the agency’s public claims, the tool was producing inaccurate predictions and actually increasing the average processing time for claims. These findings were shared internally in March 2021, discussed in a blog post in April 2021 (approved and published by the VA), and elevated to higher-level management in May 2021. Despite the disclosures, the agency continued to use the tool with minor modifications, and eventually, the employee’s contract was not renewed, and he was terminated from his position.After filing a complaint with the Office of Special Counsel, the employee brought an individual right of action appeal before the Merit Systems Protection Board (the Board), alleging that his removal was in retaliation for whistleblowing. The VA moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The Board’s administrative judge, and later the full Board, concluded that the employee had not made nonfrivolous allegations that his disclosures were protected under the Whistleblower Protection Act, finding he lacked a reasonable belief that his disclosures evidenced gross mismanagement or waste.Upon review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the employee had sufficiently raised nonfrivolous allegations that his communications constituted protected disclosures of gross mismanagement under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). The court found the employee’s allegations plausible and sufficiently specific to establish jurisdiction for his claim before the Board. The Federal Circuit reversed the Board’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. Costs were awarded to the petitioner. View "OGUNTADE v. MSPB " on Justia Law

A town and its select board challenged a state law enacted to address the Massachusetts housing crisis. The law requires municipalities served by the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority to have at least one district where multifamily housing is permitted as of right. The town attempted to adopt compliant zoning amendments, but town meeting voters rejected these proposals. The select board subsequently decided not to pursue further compliance steps. After being notified by the state agency responsible that it was noncompliant and at risk of losing state grant funding, the town and board filed a lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.The action was filed in the Superior Court Department. The Commonwealth and the Executive Office of Housing and Livable Communities moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The Superior Court judge granted the motion, finding the plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege that the law imposed an unfunded local mandate or unlawfully interfered with the town’s zoning authority. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts allowed direct appellate review.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed the dismissal. It held that the complaint did not sufficiently allege that the law imposed an unfunded local mandate because the costs described were either incidental local administration expenses or voluntarily incurred. The Court also held that the town and board lacked standing to assert constitutional voting rights claims on behalf of town meeting voters. Addressing the public importance of the issue, the Court concluded that the law is a valid general law and does not violate the Home Rule Amendment or conflict with the Zoning Act. The judgment dismissing the complaint was affirmed. View "Marshfield v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

A class of noncitizens with final removal orders challenged new Department of Homeland Security (DHS) policies issued in March and July 2025, which authorized their removal to “third countries”—countries neither designated in their removal orders nor identified in writing during prior proceedings. The plaintiffs alleged that DHS’s policy failed to provide effective notice or a meaningful opportunity to contest removal to these third countries based on reasonable fear of persecution or torture. The policies also relied on diplomatic assurances from receiving countries, sometimes removing individuals without further protective procedures.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts issued a temporary restraining order, granted class certification, and later a preliminary injunction requiring DHS to provide written notice and an opportunity for class members to assert fear-based claims before any third-country removal. After DHS appealed, the U.S. Supreme Court granted a stay pending appellate review. On remand, the district court dissolved the preliminary injunction and issued a final judgment, concluding that DHS’s guidance violated statutory requirements for sequencing removal destinations, and failed to provide notice and hearing for fear-based claims, including those under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court ordered declaratory relief and vacated the guidance as unlawful under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing on the “sequencing” claim and vacated the related declarations. However, the court affirmed the district court’s judgment that DHS must provide effective notice and a meaningful opportunity to contest removal to a third country based on fear-based claims, and upheld the vacatur of DHS guidance as unlawful under the APA. The court rejected DHS’s jurisdictional and remedy arguments, clarifying that declaratory and vacatur relief were permissible and not barred by statute. View "D.V.D. v. Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

A Puerto Rico limited liability company, Berkey International, LLC, manufactures water filters known as Black Berkey Filters, which contain silver—a substance recognized as a pesticide. Berkey distributed these filters without EPA registration, claiming the silver was intended only to protect the filters themselves, not for pesticidal purposes. Inspections by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) revealed that Berkey and associated distributors made claims on product labels and websites indicating the filters could remove viruses, bacteria, and other pathogens, suggesting pesticidal intent. As a result, the EPA issued a Stop Sale, Use, or Removal Order prohibiting Berkey and other distributors from selling or distributing these filters.Reviewing the matter, the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico considered Berkey’s request for a preliminary injunction to halt enforcement of the EPA’s order. The district court evaluated the administrative record, held hearings, and reviewed extensive briefing. The court found that Berkey had not substantiated its claims that the silver was not intended for pesticidal use and denied Berkey’s motion for preliminary injunctive relief. Berkey’s subsequent motion for reconsideration was also denied, prompting Berkey to file an interlocutory appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of preliminary injunctive relief for abuse of discretion. Applying a highly deferential standard to the EPA’s technical determinations, the appellate court concluded that Berkey had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits of its claims under the Administrative Procedure Act, including its assertions of arbitrary and capricious agency action and violations of notice-and-comment and due process requirements. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s order, holding that the EPA had reason to believe Berkey’s filters were unregistered and misbranded pesticidal products under federal law. View "Berkey International, LLC v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

Two individuals filed an initiative petition with Wilmington city officials, proposing a new ordinance to regulate data centers and their campuses. The ordinance would set standards for noise, lighting, emissions, generator-testing, water use, and heat generation, among other things. A key feature of the proposed ordinance was the creation of a “private right of action,” allowing residents within certain distances of a data center to sue its owner or operator for alleged violations of these standards, with the possibility of injunctive relief, penalties, and attorney’s fees.After the petition was filed and signatures validated, the Wilmington city auditor certified its sufficiency and validity, but did not opine on whether it was within the city’s initiative power. The Clinton County Board of Elections declined to certify the petition for the ballot, determining that the ordinance was not within the municipality’s power because it sought to create a new private cause of action. The board reaffirmed this decision after a hearing requested by one petitioner.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the mandamus action seeking to compel the board to certify the petition. The court held that the proposed ordinance was outside the municipal initiative power because it would create a new cause of action, which municipalities are not authorized to do. The court relied on its prior decisions, including State ex rel. Bolzenius v. Preisse and State ex rel. Flak v. Betras, and rejected arguments that the ordinance merely restated existing statutory remedies. The court also rejected a First Amendment challenge, finding no unconstitutional prior restraint. The Supreme Court of Ohio denied the writ of mandamus, upholding the board’s decision not to certify the initiative for the ballot. View "State ex rel. Kidd v. Clinton Cty. Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

A tenured professor at the University of Arizona, concerned about adherence to an anti-discrimination constitutional amendment in university hiring, submitted a series of public records requests to the university. These requests sought data and documents related to survey results used in hiring, as well as information about appointment and selection processes for certain positions. The university partially complied, providing some records, redacting or withholding others, and denying access to an audio recording of a committee meeting, citing confidentiality. The university later destroyed the recording after offering the professor a chance to listen without copying, which he declined. Following repeated, unsuccessful requests, the professor’s attorney sent a demand letter, prompting the university to release additional records, though some remained withheld or redacted.The professor filed a Special Action Complaint in the Superior Court in Pima County against the Arizona Board of Regents (ABOR), alleging wrongful denial of records and seeking damages and attorney fees. The Superior Court dismissed some counts as time-barred or for failure to state a claim, held a bench trial, and denied relief on remaining counts. The court found the university had eventually provided nearly all requested records and cured any prior abuse of discretion. It denied the professor’s request for attorney fees, reasoning that such fees could not be awarded if the public entity had complied before litigation commenced. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that destruction of requested records amounted to a denial, but the professor was not entitled to damages or fees absent a timely notice of claim and that the trial court’s review of withheld records should combine de novo and abuse-of-discretion standards.The Supreme Court of Arizona reversed, holding that courts must review de novo an agency’s determination of statutory exemptions and the withholding or redacting of specific documents. The Court also held that destruction of a record after a request constitutes denial of access under the Public Records Law. Finally, the Court determined that “substantially prevailed” for attorney fees includes the requester’s overall success throughout the dispute, not just post-litigation results. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these holdings. View "ABRAHAM v ARIZONA BOARD OF REGENTS" on Justia Law

A New Jersey car dealership, part of a group of businesses owned by the same individual, applied for and received a Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loan under the CARES Act. The dealership, along with other affiliated entities, collectively received PPP loans that exceeded the aggregate cap imposed by the Small Business Administration’s (SBA) Corporate Group Rule for second-draw loans. Despite acknowledging that it violated this rule, the dealership sought forgiveness for the portion of its loan that did not exceed the cap, arguing that it was entitled to partial forgiveness.After the dealership's loan forgiveness application was denied by the SBA—due to the loan exceeding the corporate cap—the dealership filed an administrative appeal, which was also denied. Subsequently, the dealership sued the SBA in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, asserting that the SBA’s denial was arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law under the Administrative Procedure Act. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the SBA, finding that the agency acted within its statutory and regulatory authority.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment de novo and evaluated the SBA’s decision for arbitrariness or abuse of discretion. The Third Circuit held that neither the CARES Act nor the implementing regulations required partial forgiveness where the corporate group loan cap was exceeded. Furthermore, the SBA did not abuse its discretion or act arbitrarily in denying forgiveness. The court affirmed the District Court’s summary judgment in favor of the SBA, confirming that loans obtained in violation of the Corporate Group Rule are not eligible for forgiveness, even in part. View "Celebrity of Springfield LLC v. SBA" on Justia Law

After the Snake River Basin Adjudication (SRBA) confirmed thousands of federal stockwater rights on federal land, Idaho enacted a series of statutes known as the “stockwater amendments.” These amendments altered water rights rules, including procedures for forfeiture and appurtenance, and imposed new requirements specifically affecting federal stockwater rights. The United States challenged several provisions, arguing that they were intended to divest it of SRBA-decreed stockwater rights and unlawfully discriminated against the federal government. Two groups—the Idaho Legislature and ranching interests—intervened as defendants.The United States District Court for the District of Idaho rejected jurisdictional challenges based on Rooker-Feldman, prior exclusive jurisdiction, Burford abstention, and claim preclusion, holding it could hear the case. On the merits, the district court found Idaho Code § 42-224 constitutional as applied to the United States, but held Idaho Code §§ 42-113(2)(b), 42-502, and 42-504 were facially unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause. The United States appealed the ruling on § 42-224, while the State Defendants and Ranchers cross-appealed the jurisdictional holdings and the ruling on § 42-113(2)(b).The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s jurisdictional holdings, concluding that neither the doctrine of prior exclusive jurisdiction nor Burford abstention applied. The panel reversed the district court’s finding that § 42-224 was constitutional as applied, holding that it is part of a statutory scheme that unlawfully discriminates against the United States and jeopardizes its SRBA-decreed rights. The panel affirmed the district court’s holding that § 42-113(2)(b) is facially unconstitutional because it singles out the United States for unfavorable treatment by changing appurtenance rules only for rights associated with federal land. Thus, the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, awarding costs to the United States. View "USA V. STATE OF IDAHO" on Justia Law