Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Orange County Transportation Authority (OCTA) awarded a contract to OC 405 Partners Joint Venture (OC 405) for improvements to Interstate 405. OC 405 then awarded subcontracting work to Golden State Boring & Pipe Jacking, Inc. (GSB). However, the parties disagreed on the scope of the subcontract work and did not execute a written subcontract. OC 405 subsequently contracted with another subcontractor, leading GSB to file a lawsuit seeking benefit of the bargain damages, claiming OC 405 did not comply with Public Contract Code section 4107’s substitution procedures.The Superior Court of Orange County granted summary judgment in favor of OC 405 and other defendants, holding that GSB was not entitled to the protections of section 4107 because it did not meet the requirements of section 4100 et seq. Specifically, GSB was not a "listed subcontractor" in the original bid, and its proposed work did not exceed one-half of 1 percent of the prime contractor’s total bid, a threshold requirement under section 4104.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court’s decision, concluding that section 4107’s substitution procedures did not apply to OC 405’s substitution of GSB. The court emphasized that the protections of section 4100 et seq. only apply to subcontractors whose proposed work exceeds the one-half of 1 percent threshold of the prime contractor’s total bid. Since GSB’s bid did not meet this threshold, it was not entitled to the protections under section 4107. The court also noted that the contractual provisions in the prime contract did not alter this statutory requirement. Thus, the judgment in favor of the defendants was affirmed. View "Golden State Boring & Pipe Jacking, Inc. v. Astaldi Construction" on Justia Law

A landlord argued that a case brought by the Los Angeles City Attorney to enforce California's Public Nuisance Law (PNL) violated Government Code section 53165.1, which bars local governments from penalizing tenants or landlords solely due to contact with law enforcement. The case involved a 116-unit apartment complex in North Hollywood, where the People alleged a gang-related public nuisance. The complaint sought abatement of the nuisance, a permanent injunction, and civil penalties.The Los Angeles County Superior Court granted a preliminary injunction requiring the defendants to implement several security measures, including proper lighting, video monitoring, and private security. The court also ordered criminal background checks on tenants. Defendants appealed, and a different panel of the Court of Appeal affirmed the preliminary injunction but directed the trial court to consider modifying it in light of section 53165.1. On remand, the trial court modified the injunction to remove the background check requirements but confirmed the validity of the rest of the injunction.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and held that enforcing the PNL is not prohibited by section 53165.1 because the PNL is a state law, not a local ordinance, rule, policy, program, or regulation. The court also determined that the action brought by the city attorney on behalf of the People of the State of California is not an action by a "local government" within the meaning of section 53165.1. Additionally, the court found that the preliminary injunction did not penalize tenants or landlords solely due to contact with law enforcement. The order was affirmed. View "People ex rel. Soto v. Group IX BP Properties" on Justia Law

Jaime Vargas and Francis R. Alvarez, former employees of medical supplier Lincare, Inc., and its subsidiary Optigen, Inc., filed a qui tam complaint under the False Claims Act (FCA). They alleged that Optigen engaged in fraudulent practices, including systematic upcoding of durable medical equipment, improper kickback arrangements, waiver of co-pays, and shipment of unordered supplies. The relators claimed that Optigen billed CPAP batteries and accessories under codes designated for ventilator accessories, waived patient co-pays without assessing financial hardship, shipped CPAP supplies automatically without patient requests, and paid kickbacks to healthcare providers for referrals.The case was initially filed in the Eastern District of Virginia and later transferred to the Middle District of Florida. The United States declined to intervene, and the District Court unsealed the complaint. The relators filed multiple amended complaints, each of which was dismissed by the District Court for failing to meet the heightened pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). The District Court dismissed the fourth amended complaint, holding that it still failed to plead sufficient facts with the requisite specificity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the District Court's dismissal of the relators' claims regarding improper kickback arrangements, waiver of co-pays, and automatic shipment of supplies, finding that these allegations lacked the necessary specificity and failed to identify any actual false claims submitted to the government. However, the court reversed the dismissal of the upcoding claim, holding that the relators had pleaded sufficient facts with particularity to withstand a motion to dismiss. The court remanded the case for further proceedings limited to the upcoding issue. View "Vargas v. Lincare, Inc." on Justia Law

Johnnie Fuson, a registered member of the Navajo Tribe, was forced to relocate from his family’s home following the partition of the Joint Use Area (JUA) under the Navajo-Hopi Settlement Act. Fuson applied for relocation assistance benefits, but his application was denied by the Office of Navajo and Hopi Indian Relocation (ONHIR). On appeal, the Independent Hearing Officer (IHO) also deemed Fuson ineligible for benefits, citing adverse credibility findings and determining that Fuson was not a resident of the Hopi Partitioned Lands (HPL) on the relevant date.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona upheld the IHO’s decision, granting summary judgment in favor of ONHIR and denying Fuson’s motion for summary judgment. The district court found that substantial evidence supported the IHO’s adverse credibility findings and that the IHO’s decision was not arbitrary and capricious.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the IHO’s adverse credibility findings were not supported by substantial evidence. The IHO had found every witness not credible due to inconsistencies with other witnesses, creating a circular reasoning that guaranteed adverse credibility findings for all witnesses. The Ninth Circuit also found that the IHO’s finding that Fuson was not a resident of the HPL homesite was arbitrary and capricious. The IHO relied almost exclusively on the Bureau of Indian Affairs enumeration roster without adequately considering contrary testimony about the roster’s reliability.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "FUSON V. OFFICE OF NAVAJO AND HOPI INDIAN RELOCATION" on Justia Law

In December 2020, Raymond Felts' wife was struck and injured by a motor vehicle while walking across North Main Street in Rochester within a painted crosswalk that lacked warning signs or signals. She later died from her injuries. Felts, individually and as executor of his wife's estate, filed a lawsuit in January 2022, alleging negligence and violation of RSA 231:90-:92 by the City of Rochester for failing to design, monitor, and maintain the crosswalk safely, including the absence of warning signs or signals. The City moved to dismiss the claims, arguing limited liability under RSA 231:92 for injuries arising from the construction, maintenance, or repair of public highways.The Superior Court partially granted and denied the City's motion to dismiss. The court ruled that "highway" under RSA 231:92 includes crosswalks but not pedestrian warning signs or signals, thus dismissing the negligence claim related to the crosswalk itself but allowing the claim regarding the City's failure to install warning signs or signals to proceed. The City moved for reconsideration, which was denied, leading to this interlocutory appeal.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case de novo, focusing on statutory interpretation. The court concluded that "highways" under RSA 231:92 includes pedestrian warning signs, crossing signals, and other traffic controls. The court reasoned that the statutory language and legislative intent support a broad interpretation of "highways" to include these elements, which are integral to the safe use of public roads. Consequently, the court vacated the trial court's ruling that RSA 231:92 does not apply to the plaintiff's claim regarding the City's failure to install pedestrian warning signs and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Felts v. City of Rochester" on Justia Law

J.D., a juvenile defendant, faced multiple charges and challenged his competency to proceed. The juvenile court ordered the Department of Human Services (the "Department") to conduct an in-custody competency evaluation, which found J.D. incompetent but restorable. The court then ordered outpatient restoration services. Subsequently, J.D. was charged with additional delinquent acts, and the court extended its incompetency finding to all cases, ordering the Department to oversee inpatient restoration services and provide periodic status reports.The Department later reassessed J.D.'s competency without a court order and concluded that he had been restored to competency. J.D. moved to strike the Department's report, arguing that the Department lacked the authority to conduct the evaluation without a court order under section 19-2.5-704(2)(c). The juvenile court denied the motion, finding that the Department had the authority to conduct restoration evaluations as part of its responsibility to provide restoration services.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and held that the Department's responsibility to provide restoration services under section 19-2.5-704(2)(b) includes the authority to perform restoration evaluations without a court order. The court concluded that restoration evaluations are part of the "services necessary to competency restoration." Therefore, the juvenile court properly accepted and considered the Department's evaluation in finding J.D. restored to competency. The order to show cause was discharged. View "In re People ex rel. J.D." on Justia Law

An inmate at the Hancock County Jail, Monica J. Johnson, died by suicide after being incarcerated from September 21 to September 29, 2018. Her estate and surviving spouse filed a medical malpractice notice of claim against Hancock County and several county officials and employees, alleging negligence in her care. The County and its employees, along with Jail Housing Officer Kayla Dumond, appealed the Superior Court's denial of their motions for summary judgment.The Superior Court (Penobscot County) denied the motions for summary judgment, determining that it lacked jurisdiction to decide whether the Maine Health Security Act (MHSA) applied to the defendants and that the defendants had not demonstrated immunity under the Maine Tort Claims Act (MTCA). The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the interlocutory appeal.The court concluded that the issue of whether the defendants are "health care providers" under the MHSA is not immediately appealable. Additionally, the court decided to defer to the federal court on the issue of immunity under the MTCA, as the federal court is handling a related case involving the same parties and facts. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, allowing the MHSA screening process to proceed, with the understanding that the federal court will continue with the litigation once the screening process is completed. View "Carney v. Hancock County" on Justia Law

The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) filed a petition in the Wayne Circuit Court to take jurisdiction over a minor, DVL, from the respondent-mother under MCL 712A.2(b)(1) or (2). DVL, who had a history of mental illness, was taken to St. John Hospital after attempting to start a fire and threatening suicide. The hospital cleared DVL for discharge without treatment, recommending intensive outpatient services. The respondent refused to pick up DVL, citing safety concerns for her other children and herself. The trial court denied the petition, finding no evidence of neglect or abuse by the respondent, who had made numerous efforts to seek help for DVL.The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision in a split unpublished decision, holding that jurisdiction was appropriate under both MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (2). The majority found that the respondent's actions rendered the home environment dangerous for DVL and her other children, making it statutorily unfit. The respondent sought leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court.The Michigan Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, held that the trial court did not clearly err by refusing to take jurisdiction of DVL under MCL 712A.2(b)(1) or (2). The Court found that the respondent was not "able" to provide necessary care and support for DVL at home due to the danger he posed to himself and others. Additionally, the respondent's refusal to take DVL home was not considered neglectful, as she acted as a reasonably prudent person would under the circumstances. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals decision and remanded the case to the trial court for reinstatement of its order denying DHHS's petition. View "In Re Lange" on Justia Law

James Stefanski, a former employee of Saginaw County 911 Communications Center Authority, alleged that he was constructively discharged in retaliation for reporting his supervisor's gross negligence. The incident in question involved a 911 call where the supervisor coded the call as "shots fired" instead of "someone shot," resulting in a delayed emergency medical response and the subsequent death of a woman. Stefanski reported his concerns to the director, who dismissed them as a judgment call. Following this, Stefanski experienced increased stress, missed work, and eventually resigned after being suspended for excessive absences, which he believed was a pretext for retaliation.The Saginaw Circuit Court granted summary disposition to the defendant, ruling that reporting gross negligence, a common law violation, was not protected under the Whistleblowers' Protection Act (WPA). The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, relying on a precedent that reporting common law violations, such as malpractice, does not fall under the WPA's protections.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the term "law" in the WPA includes the common law. The court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case to determine whether gross negligence is a violation of "a" law under the WPA and whether Stefanski's actions constituted a report under the statute. The Supreme Court emphasized that the WPA should be liberally construed to protect whistleblowers and that excluding common law from its scope would undermine its purpose. View "Stefanski v. Saginaw County 911 Communications Center Authority" on Justia Law

Steven Gomes filed a lawsuit to invalidate ordinances regulating groundwater use in Mendocino, adopted by the Mendocino City Community Services District (the district). The district argued that Gomes’s claims were barred by res judicata due to a prior case, Gomes v. Mendocino City Community Services Dist. (2019) (Gomes I), which challenged the district’s groundwater management program. The trial court found the ordinances contained an invalid attorney’s fee provision but rejected Gomes’s other claims.In Gomes I, the trial court denied Gomes’s petition challenging the district’s 2007 groundwater measures, but the judgment was reversed on appeal. The appellate court found the district had authority to limit groundwater extraction and that the 2007 measures were invalid due to non-compliance with statutory procedures. The district subsequently adopted new ordinances in 2020, which Gomes challenged in the present case.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. Gomes argued the ordinances imposed fees for groundwater extraction that required voter approval, which the district did not obtain. The court concluded that the claim was not barred by Gomes I, as it involved different ordinances and provisions. The court held that the fees imposed by the district were not for the extraction of groundwater and thus did not require voter approval under section 10710. The judgment was affirmed, except for the invalid attorney’s fee provision. View "Gomes v. Mendocino City Community Services Dist." on Justia Law