Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Jamesway Construction, Inc. was involved in a dispute with the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (TDEC) regarding the alleged unauthorized filling of wetlands in Coffee County. After a citizen complaint and subsequent investigation, TDEC issued an order in 2018 assessing damages and penalties against Jamesway, alleging violations under the Water Quality Control Act. Jamesway contested these allegations in a contested case hearing before an administrative law judge. The judge found TDEC failed to prove its case regarding wetland filling and dismissed most damages but imposed a civil penalty for failing to obtain a stormwater permit.Following the initial administrative decision, TDEC appealed to the Board of Water Quality, Oil, and Gas. Jamesway moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing TDEC’s notice of appeal was untimely under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act’s 15-day deadline, and the Board lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The administrative law judge denied the motion, finding a 30-day deadline applied. Jamesway then filed a petition for judicial review in the Davidson County Chancery Court, seeking immediate review of this procedural ruling. The chancery court, and subsequently the Tennessee Court of Appeals, ruled in Jamesway’s favor, finding the appeal deadline was 15 days and the Board lacked jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed whether the chancery court had subject matter jurisdiction under Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-5-322(a)(1) to review a preliminary agency decision. The Court held that the chancery court lacked jurisdiction because Jamesway had not shown judicial review of the final agency decision would be inadequate. The Supreme Court vacated the judgments of the lower courts and remanded the case to the Board of Water Quality, Oil, and Gas for further proceedings, clarifying that only review of a final agency decision is permitted absent a showing of inadequate remedy. View "Jamesway Construction, Inc. v. Salyers" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to Proposition M, a San Francisco measure approved by voters in 2022 that imposed an annual “Empty Homes Tax” on owners of certain residential units kept vacant for more than 182 days in buildings with more than two units. The stated aim was to discourage prolonged vacancies and increase available housing. Plaintiffs included individuals and associations representing property owners, who argued that Proposition M violated statutory and constitutional protections, including property rights and familial relations, and was preempted by the Ellis Act, which protects property owners’ right to withdraw accommodations from the rental market.The San Francisco City & County Superior Court reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment. Plaintiffs submitted declarations detailing how Proposition M would force them to either rent out units against their wishes or pay substantial taxes, potentially resulting in financial hardship or effective eviction. The City argued plaintiffs lacked standing and that their legal claims failed as a matter of law. After briefing and a hearing, the Superior Court granted summary judgment for plaintiffs, holding that Proposition M violated the Takings Clause, was preempted by the Ellis Act, burdened fundamental liberty interests in familial relations, violated equal protection, and infringed upon the constitutional right to privacy. The court entered judgment prohibiting the City from administering or enforcing Proposition M.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the City’s appeal. The appellate court analyzed the measure’s conflict with the Ellis Act and concluded that Proposition M imposed a “prohibitive price” on owners’ right not to offer property for rent, directly contravening the Act’s protections. The court found that the Ellis Act preempts Proposition M and affirmed the trial court’s judgment, without reaching additional constitutional claims. The judgment prohibiting enforcement of Proposition M was thus upheld. View "Debbane v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

Federal and state agencies enacted a rule listing two distinct population segments of the lesser prairie-chicken as "endangered" and "threatened" under the Endangered Species Act. The rule divided the bird’s range into Northern and Southern segments, based on habitat and genetic differences. Conservation groups, including one that originally petitioned for the listing, were active throughout the process. After a change in presidential administration in 2025, the federal government signaled a shift in environmental policy and, in ongoing litigation, ultimately conceded error in applying the "distinct population segment" policy. The government and various state and industry plaintiffs sought to settle by vacating the listing rule.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas consolidated the lawsuits challenging the listing. Conservation groups moved to intervene twice: the first motion was denied because the court found the government would adequately represent their interests, and the second was denied as untimely and for failure to rebut that presumption. Meanwhile, the district court granted the government’s motion for voluntary vacatur and remand, finding the listing rule unlawful due to the agency’s conceded error.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of intervention de novo and the timeliness determination for abuse of discretion. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion in finding the second motion to intervene untimely, as the conservation groups acted promptly after government conduct revealed a divergence of interests. The court found all requirements for intervention of right satisfied and reversed the denial of intervention. However, the Fifth Circuit determined the conservation groups lacked appellate standing to challenge the vacatur and remand of the listing rule, so it did not reach the merits of the district court’s substantive ruling. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Texas v. Dept of the Interior" on Justia Law

A driver was injured after his vehicle struck a pothole on a busy street in Topeka, Kansas, causing the car to flip and eject him. He brought a negligence claim against the city, alleging that it had failed to keep the street in a reasonably safe condition, neglected to repair a large and dangerous pothole despite knowing about it, and did not use reasonable care in maintaining the roadway for regular traffic.The District Court of Shawnee County granted summary judgment in favor of the city, finding that the public-duty doctrine barred the claim because any duty owed by the city was to the public at large, not to any specific individual. The court also found that the city had no actual or constructive notice of the pothole and that, even if there was a duty, it was shielded by discretionary-function immunity under the Kansas Tort Claims Act. The Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed, agreeing that the public-duty doctrine applied and that discretionary-function immunity protected the city’s conduct. However, the appellate panel found the district court had improperly resolved some disputed facts.The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas reversed both lower courts. The court held that the Kansas Tort Claims Act waives sovereign immunity but does not abolish the public-duty doctrine. However, the court clarified that a city’s duty to keep its streets reasonably safe is owed to the class of persons invited to travel on those streets, not to the public at large; therefore, the public-duty doctrine does not bar such claims. It further held that whether the city breached its duty, and whether the discretionary-function exception to liability applies, are fact questions inappropriate for summary judgment on the present record. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Martin v. City of Topeka " on Justia Law

Consumers Energy Company, a private utility in Michigan, planned to retire the J.H. Campbell Generating Plant, a decades-old coal facility, and replace it with newer, cleaner, and more reliable energy sources. The proposed closure and replacement plan underwent extensive review by the Michigan Public Service Commission and the Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO), both of which ultimately approved it after finding that the substitute resources would meet reliability standards and improve affordability and environmental outcomes. As the retirement date neared, the Department of Energy (DOE) issued an order under section 202(c) of the Federal Power Act, compelling Consumers Energy to keep the Campbell plant operational, citing an energy emergency in the region.The Michigan Public Service Commission approved the integrated resource plan after a contested case proceeding, finding that it would enhance resource adequacy. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, concluding that substantial evidence supported the Commission’s approval. MISO also determined that Campbell’s retirement, as planned, would not threaten reliability. Consumers Energy documented sufficient capacity to meet projected demand, and MISO’s resource auction confirmed adequate supply and reserve margins for the relevant period. No state or regional entity requested FERC intervention, nor did the Michigan governor declare an energy emergency.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the DOE’s order. The court held that section 202(c) grants DOE limited, emergency authority to intervene only when an electricity shortage creates an acute risk that cannot be timely addressed by state or regional planning, and immediate federal action is necessary. The court found that DOE’s asserted circumstances did not constitute such an emergency, as reasonable alternatives existed and the state had adequately planned for resource adequacy. Accordingly, the court granted the petitions for review and vacated DOE’s order. View "People of the State of Michigan v. DOE" on Justia Law

An individual Nebraska resident, voter, and taxpayer sought declaratory and injunctive relief challenging the constitutionality of two medical cannabis laws enacted by voter-approved initiatives in the November 2024 general election. He named as defendants the Governor, other state officials, members of the Nebraska Medical Cannabis Commission, and the sponsors of the initiatives. The plaintiff alleged the laws violated the federal Supremacy Clause, improperly delegated regulatory authority in violation of Nebraska’s separation of powers, and were otherwise unconstitutional. He further claimed public officials and agencies would expend state funds and resources to implement these laws, and that this expenditure was unlawful.Previously, before the laws passed, the same individual brought a preelection challenge to the legal sufficiency of the initiative petitions in the District Court for Lancaster County. That challenge was rejected, and the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed. After the election, he filed a new action in the same district court, seeking to enjoin the Governor from certifying the measures. The district court denied his request for a temporary restraining order. Once the laws were certified and enacted, he amended his complaint several times, ultimately alleging taxpayer standing, standing for a matter of great public concern, and standing under a Nebraska statute governing initiative challenges. The defendants moved to dismiss, contending he lacked standing.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff lacked standing to bring the suit. Specifically, it concluded he did not have taxpayer standing, as his allegations of incidental expenditures and government employee time spent implementing the laws did not amount to illegal expenditures sufficient to confer standing under Nebraska law. The Court also found he did not qualify for any exception for matters of great public concern. The order dismissing his complaint without prejudice was affirmed. View "Kuehn v. Pillen" on Justia Law

Sponsors of a ballot initiative in Nebraska sought to have their proposed constitutional amendment, which would protect the powers of initiative and referendum, placed on the November 2026 general election ballot. The initiative aimed to require a four-fifths vote of the Legislature to amend, repeal, or impair laws enacted by initiative after November 2, 2004, and to similarly restrict the Legislature’s authority over laws affecting the initiative and referendum process itself. It also imposed a requirement that any laws facilitating or safeguarding the process advance a compelling state interest by the least restrictive means and prohibited legislative acts that would condition, restrict, burden, or impair these reserved powers.After the sponsors collected sufficient signatures, the Nebraska Secretary of State reviewed the measure. Following an objection by a current and a former state senator, the Secretary determined that the initiative violated Nebraska’s constitutional single subject rule and announced that he would not place it on the ballot.The sponsors filed an emergency application for a writ of mandamus directly with the Nebraska Supreme Court, asking the court to compel the Secretary to certify the initiative for the ballot. The Secretary argued that he was obligated to withhold ballot placement because the initiative contained more than one subject, contrary to the Nebraska Constitution. The Nebraska Supreme Court, exercising original jurisdiction, reviewed the matter de novo as a question of law.The Nebraska Supreme Court held that the proposed initiative violated the single subject rule because it addressed at least two distinct subjects: limiting legislative power over both the initiative process and the substance of laws enacted by initiative. The court concluded that these subjects were not naturally and necessarily connected. Accordingly, the court denied the writ of mandamus and dissolved its alternative writ, holding that the Secretary had no duty to place the initiative on the ballot. View "State ex rel. Davis v. Evnen" on Justia Law

A coalition composed of individuals, corporations, trade associations, labor unions, nonprofits, and public utilities brought suit in the Western District of Washington seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Their claims challenged the Washington State Energy Code, arguing that it is preempted by federal law and restricts the installation and maintenance of natural gas appliances, impacting their energy preferences and causing economic harm. The plaintiffs named as defendants the individual members of the Washington State Building Code Council, who had adopted the Energy Code, as well as the Washington Attorney General, all in their official capacities.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington reviewed the case first. All defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, citing sovereign immunity and standing. The district court granted the motion to dismiss solely on the basis of sovereign immunity, dismissing the plaintiffs’ complaint without prejudice and denying leave to amend. Plaintiffs then appealed the dismissal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the appeal. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal, holding that Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity barred the plaintiffs’ suit. The court determined that the named defendants did not have a sufficient connection with the enforcement of the Energy Code to be subject to suit under the Ex parte Young exception. The Councilmembers’ promulgation of the Energy Code and their issuance of non-binding advisory opinions did not constitute enforcement, and the Attorney General’s role did not exceed a generalized duty to enforce state law. Thus, all defendants were shielded by sovereign immunity, and the district court’s judgment was affirmed. View "RIVERA V. ANDERSON" on Justia Law

Twin brothers, both Black international students, were enrolled as doctoral candidates at the University of Mississippi’s Department of Pharmacy Administration. One brother, Bennard, disagreed with changes to his faculty mentorship arrangement, objected to mandatory in-person meetings, and declined to complete a required program assessment called the Abilities Transcript. After being repeatedly warned and given extensions, he was placed on provisional status for failing to complete the requirement, which also caused the loss of his graduate assistantship. Bennard and his brother each filed lawsuits against the University and several faculty members, alleging constitutional, statutory, and contract violations related to academic sanctions and alleged discriminatory treatment.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi consolidated the brothers’ cases. It dismissed Bennard’s claims against the University on sovereign-immunity grounds, dismissed his remaining federal claims under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his individual-capacity state contract claims. Bennard appealed, while his brother’s appeal was dismissed for failure to prosecute.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed Bennard’s remaining claims. The court held that sovereign immunity barred claims against the University, claims against one defendant in her official capacity, and official-capacity state-law contract claims; those dismissals must be without prejudice. The court further found that Bennard failed to plausibly allege First or Fourteenth Amendment violations, and that the faculty defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on individual-capacity claims. The court affirmed the district court’s refusal to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining contract claims and upheld consolidation of the cases and dismissal of moot preliminary injunction motions. The judgment was affirmed as modified to clarify the proper form of dismissal for sovereign-immunity-barred claims. View "Eriakha v. University of MS" on Justia Law

Several residents and a public interest foundation sought to block a county’s implementation of an ordinance that authorized the issuance of $25 million in general revenue bonds. The bonds were intended to fund the final phase of a sewer and wastewater treatment project serving only the southernmost part of the county. The ordinance provided for an annual ad valorem tax on all taxable property in the county to support repayment. The plaintiffs argued the ordinance violated the state constitution by levying a county-wide tax for a benefit limited to a specific geographic area.The Oconee County Circuit Court considered the county’s motion to dismiss, which argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing, that the action was untimely, and that the ordinance was constitutional. The circuit court rejected the county’s arguments on standing and timeliness but granted the motion to dismiss by concluding the ordinance was constitutional. The plaintiffs appealed, and the county cross-appealed, asserting the action should be barred as untimely.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the case. It held that the plaintiffs’ action was barred by the twenty-day statute of limitations in South Carolina Code section 11-15-30, which requires any action challenging the issuance of bonds to be filed within twenty days of filing the official record of bond proceedings. The Court determined the plaintiffs’ challenge was “on account of” the bond issuance, as the ordinance authorizing the bonds and their use were inseparable. Because the plaintiffs filed their action more than four months after the required record was filed with the clerk of court, the Supreme Court held the action was untimely. The judgment of the circuit court was affirmed as modified, with the Supreme Court declining to address other issues, including standing and constitutionality. View "SC Public Interest Foundation v. Oconee County" on Justia Law