Three municipalities who use the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) to carry out their obligations under state law filed suit against the DOD and its constituent military departments, seeking to compel the department to more thoroughly comply with federal law requiring the department to provide records to the NICS. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the municipalities' claim and held that they lacked constitutional standing and failed to establish subject matter jurisdiction under the Administrative Procedure Act. The court explained that there was simply no basis in the APA's text for such a broad incursion into internal agency management. The court noted that the APA did not permit the municipalities' efforts to include judicial supervision of the myriad programmatic workings of the federal government. View "City of New York v. DOD" on Justia Law

Petitions for review of compensation orders arising under the Defense Base Act should be filed in the circuit where the relevant district director is located. The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review challenging the Benefits Review Board's decision concluding that a linguist who supported the military in Iraq was entitled to workers' compensation under the Defense Base Act. The panel held that substantial evidence supported the ALJ's determination that claimant met both the medical and the economic aspect of disability as defined by the statute; the ALJ applied the correct legal standard when considering the evidence in this case; and the ALJ correctly concluded that claimant met his burden to show that he was disabled. View "Global Linguist Solutions, LLC v. Abdelmeged" on Justia Law

The Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVPA) provides the court with discretionary authority to involuntarily medicate an incompetent person placed with the State Hospital pre-commitment. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's order finding that defendant lacked the capacity to refuse treatment and compelling him to undergo the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication by the State Department of State Hospitals. In this case, although defendant has not been committed to the State Hospital, the trial court had the discretionary authority under Welfare and Institutions Code section 6602.5 to order his involuntary medication upon a proper finding he was incompetent to refuse medical treatment. Defendant was represented by counsel, provided with a full evidentiary hearing on request, and the trial court expressly found that defendant lacked the capacity to refuse treatment. View "State Department of State Hospitals v. J.W." on Justia Law

E.S. appealed an order requiring involuntary treatment in which the district court found him to be mentally ill and a person requiring treatment. In late 2018, Dr. Katrina DeDona submitted an application for emergency admission for E.S. to be admitted to the North Dakota State Hospital after being paroled from James River Correctional Center for a charge of terrorizing. The application alleged E.S. was often agitated, preoccupied with a belief that there was a conspiracy against him, and, as a result, unable to participate in his own treatment and discharge planning. A petition for involuntary commitment was filed, claiming E.S. was mentally ill and there was a reasonable expectation of serious risk of harm if he was not treated. E.S. requested and was appointed an independent examiner. Three witnesses, qualified as experts, were called by the petitioner, including Dr. DeDona, and the independent medical examiner. E.S. testified on his own behalf. At the conclusion of the treatment hearing, the district court issued its order on the record, finding clear and convincing evidence establishing E.S. was mentally ill and a person requiring treatment. The court ordered E.S. be hospitalized for a period not to exceed 90 days, ending February 11, 2019. On appeal, E.S. argues the district court's order was not supported by clear and convincing evidence to show he was mentally ill and a person requiring treatment. Based upon the evidence, the North Dakota Supreme Court held the district court's finding that E.S. was a person requiring treatment was not clearly erroneous, and affirmed commitment. View "Interest of E.S." on Justia Law

Jane Doe appealed a district court order continuing her treatment at the North Dakota State Hospital. In July 2017 the North Dakota State Hospital petitioned for involuntary hospitalization of Jane Doe after police took her into custody for lying on the highway and refusing to cooperate with law enforcement and medical providers. Doe refused to provide identifying information or submit to photographs to aid in her identification. After her initial admission to the State Hospital, Doe refused to meet with hospital staff, take medications or shower. The district court initially ordered Doe to undergo treatment for fourteen days, at the end of which the district court found Doe a mentally ill patient requiring further treatment. The Supreme Court summarily affirmed the district court's ninety-day treatment order. After ninety days the State Hospital obtained an order continuing treatment for one year. The Supreme Court again summarily affirmed that decision in Interest of Jane Doe, 904 N.W.2d 40. On October 3, 2018, a psychologist at the State Hospital petitioned for continuing treatment, alleging Doe continued to be a mentally ill person requiring treatment. On October 22, 2018, the district court held a hearing and granted the State Hospital's petition, and ordered Doe to undergo treatment at the State Hospital for a period not exceeding one year. The district court found Doe mentally ill, a person requiring treatment, and that no alternative treatment was appropriate. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that under its standard of review that the finding Jane Doe was a mentally ill person requiring treatment was not clearly erroneous. The district court's order was therefore affirmed. View "Interest of Jane Doe" on Justia Law

Linda Grina appealed a district court judgment affirming the denial of her unemployment benefits. Grina started coaching at Bismarck Gymnastics Academy in 1992. In 2015 or 2016 she was appointed interim executive director/program director with retained coaching duties. When a new executive director was hired, Grina was instructed to assist the executive director in acclimating to the gym and working environment. In July 2017 the employer informed Grina she was placed on probation for failure to assist the new executive director as instructed. A week later Grina sent a letter to the gym's board of directors relinquishing the interim program director title and job duties and expressing her desire to stay employed as a coach. In August 2017 Grina met with the gym board of directors. The board informed Grina her duties as interim program director were not separable from her coaching duties, and if she chose to resign as interim program director she also would be resigning from coaching. Grina indicated she would not continue performing the duties of interim program director. The board then issued a termination letter. Grina filed for unemployment benefits through Job Service. Job Service granted Grina benefits in October 2017 after finding the employer did not show her termination was due to misconduct. The employer appealed and a Job Service appeals referee conducted a hearing in December 2017. The referee reversed the initial decision and found Grina voluntarily left her employment without good cause attributable to the employer. Grina appealed the referee's decision to the Job Service North Dakota Bureau and sought to introduce new evidence, including emails and a text message referencing Grina being "let go" or "terminated." The Bureau added the documents to the claim file but did not consider the information in its decision affirming the referee's determination. Grina appealed to the district court. The district court affirmed the Bureau's decision denying Grina unemployment benefits. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, concluding under its standard of review, a reasoning mind could have determined Grina left her employment voluntarily and without good cause attributable to the employer. View "Grina v. Job Service" on Justia Law

San Diegans for Open Government (SDOG) appealed judgment against it in a lawsuit challenging an amended and restated lease that the City of San Diego (City) entered into with Symphony Asset Pool XVI, LLC (Symphony) to lease City-owned land containing an oceanfront amusement park in San Diego's Mission Beach neighborhood, and potentially extending the term of a prior lease of the premises for a significant additional period. Specifically, SDOG argued: (1) the City's approval of the amended and restated lease violated a proposition to limit commercial development on the premises; (2) the City improperly concluded that its decision to enter into the amended and restated lease was exempt from the requirements of the California Environmental Quality Act because it concerned an existing facility; and (3) the City violated section 99 of its charter (as it existed at the time) by failing to publish notice in the official City newspaper and pass an ordinance prior to entering into the amended and restated lease. Finding no merit to any of these arguments, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "San Diegans for Open Govt. v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

Mittelstadt’s Richland County, Wisconsin land was enrolled in the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), administered by the Department of Agriculture (USDA), from 1987-2006. CRP participants agree to remove environmentally sensitive land from agricultural production in return for annual rental payments from the USDA. In 2006, the agency denied Mittelstadt’s application to re-enroll. After exhausting his administrative appeals, he sued under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 701, and asserting a breach of contract. The district court entered judgment in favor of the agency. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Under the regulations governing the CRP, the USDA has broad discretion to evaluate offers of enrollment in the program on a competitive basis by considering the environmental benefits of a producer’s land relative to its costs. Given the agency’s wide latitude, the Farm Services Agency did not abuse its discretion when it denied re-enrollment of Mittelstadt’s land under a new definition of “mixed hardwoods.” Because he never entered a new contract with the agency, there was no breach of contract. View "Mittelstadt v. Perdue" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the administrative hearing commission finding Myron Green Corporation liable for sales tax on food sold to employees of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City in the bank’s on-site cafeteria, holding that the cafeteria regularly served food to the public within the context of Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.020.1(6) and that the bank’s sales tax exemption did not extend to its individual employees. The primary issue on appeal was whether a third-party operator of a company cafeteria is liable for sales tax on food purchased by employees of a tax-exempt organization in that cafeteria when the organization sets the cafeteria’s hours, influences pricing, and subsidizes the cost of food in the cafeteria. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment below, holding that there was substantial and competent evidence supporting the commission’s finding that (1) Myron Green’s sales in the bank’s cafeteria were taxable because the cafeteria regularly served meals and drinks to the public, and (2) Myron Green sold food to individual customers instead of to the bank. View "Myron Green Corp. v. Director of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision Board of Equalization (Board) reversing the determination of the Department of Revenue (Department) that use of camp spots at the Johnson County Fairgrounds for use during the annual Johnson County Fair and Rodeo was subject to sales and lodging taxation, holding that the Board correctly determined that the campsites and rent received therefrom were not subject to taxation because the Johnson County Fair Board (Fair Board) was not a “vendor” as defined by Wyo. Stat. Ann. 39-15-101(a)(xv). For each of the campsites at issue, the County charged $25 per week and did not collect sales or lodging taxes. The Department concluded that the Fair Board was a non-exempt lodging vendor statutorily obligated to collect sales and lodging taxes for the campsite rentals. The Board reversed, concluding that the Fair Board was not a vendor and therefore not obligated to impose a tax on the fees charges for the use of the campsites. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Board’s determination that the Fair Board was not a vendor and was therefore not required to impose an excise tax was supported by the record. View "State, Department of Revenue v. Board of County Commissioners of Johnson County" on Justia Law