Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Two consumers challenged two rules issued by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) that imposed new water-use standards for residential dishwashers and clothes washers. Their argument was that the DOE exceeded its statutory authority under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA), which, they claimed, only authorized DOE to regulate four specific appliances (showerheads, faucets, water closets, and urinals). The DOE had issued direct final rules (DFRs) in 2024 that further reduced water-use limits and changed measurement schemes for dishwashers and clothes washers. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief in federal district court, asking it to invalidate the DOE’s rules and restore the standards set by Congress.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court found that EPCA’s statutory-review mechanism, specifically 42 U.S.C. § 6306(b), vested exclusive jurisdiction for challenges to rules prescribed under § 6295 in the circuit courts, not the district courts. The court rejected plaintiffs’ arguments for concurrent jurisdiction and their reliance on the EPCA’s “savings clause” in § 6306(b)(4), holding that neither provided a jurisdictional basis for their claims. The district court also denied a motion to alter or amend the judgment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit first determined that the plaintiffs had standing, as their alleged reduction in market choices constituted an injury in fact traceable to the challenged DOE rules. The Fifth Circuit then affirmed the district court’s dismissal, holding that the circuit courts have exclusive jurisdiction over challenges to DOE rules under EPCA and that the district court was properly stripped of jurisdiction. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Word v. Department of Energy" on Justia Law

The case involves challenges to a 2024 order issued by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regulating communications services provided to incarcerated individuals, following statutory amendments in 2022. The FCC's order imposed rate caps for intrastate, interstate, and international prison communications, regulated the reimbursement of facility costs, excluded site commission payments from rate calculations, prohibited service providers from paying site commissions, preempted state and local laws requiring such payments, allowed alternate pricing plans, and required clearer consumer disclosures. These actions prompted petitions for review from nonprofit organizations, service providers, and state governments, consolidated by the United States Multidistrict Judicial Panel on Litigation and transferred to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.In the lower proceedings, the FCC's imposition of rate caps and prohibition of site commissions were challenged, and the parties disputed whether the First Circuit was the proper venue. The FCC then issued a new order in late 2025, modifying certain aspects of the 2024 order, notably by increasing rate caps to include more safety and security costs. This led to supplemental briefing on mootness. Service providers requested voluntary dismissal of their petitions, state governments argued portions of their petitions were moot, and nonprofit organizations maintained some challenges remained live.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit granted the voluntary dismissal of service providers' petitions, dismissed portions of state governments' petitions as moot or for lack of jurisdiction (including constitutional challenges not raised before the FCC), and denied other state challenges to the FCC's authority and rulemaking. The court denied most nonprofit organizations’ challenges except for those related to the FCC’s treatment of certain costs in rate caps, which it held in abeyance pending review of the 2025 order. The court’s disposition was to dismiss, deny, or hold in abeyance the various petitions as appropriate. View "Direct Action for Rights and Equality v. FCC" on Justia Law

A licensed psychologist faced disciplinary action after being convicted in 2018 of insurance fraud related to a workers’ compensation claim. The Board of Psychology issued an accusation in 2019 based on the conviction and also alleged dishonesty in her 2007 license application for failing to disclose a 1984 conviction. Following a two-day evidentiary hearing in 2020, the Board found cause to discipline her solely for the insurance fraud conviction, dismissed the charge related to the 1984 conviction, and placed her on probation for five years with various conditions, holding the probation in abeyance during periods when she was not practicing in California.After moving out of state and returning, the psychologist petitioned the Board in 2023 for early termination of her probation. The Board held an evidentiary hearing in 2024, found she failed to provide clear and convincing evidence of rehabilitation—citing her lack of insight and responsibility for the insurance fraud conviction—and denied the petition. The Board noted her probation had been tolled due to her absence and non-practice. She then sought judicial review of both the 2021 probation decision and the 2024 denial of early termination in the Superior Court of Sacramento County.The Superior Court denied her petition, finding the challenge to the 2021 decision untimely and concluding the 2024 denial was supported by substantial evidence. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The Court held that the trial court properly applied the substantial evidence test to review the Board’s denial of early termination, as this was analogous to review of an agency’s decision on reinstatement rather than discipline. The Court found the Board did not abuse its discretion and rejected arguments regarding procedural unfairness and relevance of the 1984 conviction. The judgment was affirmed. View "Bombardini v. Board of Psychology" on Justia Law

A juvenile dropped a sandbag from an overpass bridge undergoing reconstruction in Toledo, Ohio, resulting in the death of Marquise Shawndell Byrd, a vehicle passenger traveling on Interstate 75. At the time of the incident, the bridge's north side was closed for reconstruction, including removal of the existing vandal-protective fencing, while the south side remained open to pedestrian traffic with its fencing intact. The Ohio Department of Transportation (ODOT) managed the reconstruction, and the project contractor used sandbags to secure traffic barricades and signage. Prior to the incident, there had been no reported vandalism or safety concerns at the site.The estate of Byrd, represented by Patricia Wilkes, brought a wrongful death action against ODOT in the Ohio Court of Claims, alleging negligence in failing to mitigate dangerous conditions by allowing sandbags to remain accessible and not erecting temporary protective fencing. The Court of Claims denied ODOT’s motion for summary judgment on immunity grounds but ultimately found that the estate had not proven ODOT’s liability after trial. On appeal, the Tenth District Court of Appeals reversed, holding that ODOT was not immune and liable for Byrd’s death, remanding for a determination of damages.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and held that ODOT’s decision not to install temporary vandal-protective fencing on the bridge’s north side during reconstruction was a basic policy decision involving a high degree of discretion, granting ODOT discretionary immunity from the negligence suit under R.C. 2743.02. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the appellate court’s judgment and remanded the case to the Court of Claims with instructions to dismiss the action. View "Wilkes v. Ohio Dept. of Transp." on Justia Law

A non-verbal adult male with Down syndrome and autism, residing in Philadelphia with his mother and sister, receives care funded under Pennsylvania’s Consolidated Waiver program for home and community-based services. After the Department of Human Services imposed a “40/60 Rule” limiting compensation for care provided by relatives to 40 hours per week for one caretaker or 60 hours for multiple caretakers, his mother sought a permanent exception, citing religious grounds. She argued that Islamic law prohibits unrelated males from providing personal care and restricts her own interactions with unrelated male aides. Without an exception, she and her daughter would continue to provide care beyond the capped hours without compensation.The Department initially denied the exception, and an Administrative Law Judge dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. After a remand and settlement for reassessment, the Department again denied the request. The Bureau of Hearings and Appeals upheld the denial, and the mother appealed to the Commonwealth Court. During the COVID-19 pandemic, temporary exceptions permitted full compensation, but after resumption, the request for a permanent religious exemption was again denied. The Commonwealth Court affirmed, finding no substantial burden on religious exercise under the Free Exercise Clause or Pennsylvania’s Religious Freedom Protection Act (RFPA), and concluded that the mother failed to meet her burden of proof.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed whether a Free Exercise Clause claim requires evidence of a “substantial burden” on religious exercise. The Court held that only a “burden” is required, not a substantial burden, and that the Commonwealth Court erred by conflating RFPA’s statutory standard with the constitutional standard. The Court reversed the Commonwealth Court’s order and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this holding. View "Alsyrawan v. DHS" on Justia Law

A woman and her son, admitted as refugees to the United States in 2005, had their refugee status terminated by United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) after an investigation concluded that the woman had participated in the Rwandan genocide. This determination rendered her ineligible for refugee status under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), specifically due to the “persecutor bar.” Both were placed in removal proceedings. The woman denied the allegations, asserting they were politically motivated. In removal proceedings, an immigration court found her credible and granted her asylum, but denied asylum to her son, who had aged out of dependent eligibility. The Board of Immigration Appeals remanded the woman’s asylum grant and affirmed the denial for her son. The government’s appeal and the son’s petition for review were abated pending the outcome of related litigation.The pair then filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, challenging USCIS’s termination of refugee status under the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court dismissed the suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, relying on 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), which bars judicial review of actions specified to be in the agency’s discretion. The plaintiffs appealed, arguing the termination decision was not discretionary under the statute.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that termination of refugee status under 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(4) involves a two-step process: a mandatory, nondiscretionary determination whether the individual met the statutory definition of “refugee” at admission, followed by a discretionary decision whether to terminate status. Because the plaintiffs challenged only the nondiscretionary threshold determination, the court concluded that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) did not bar judicial review. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. View "Mukantagara v. Mullin" on Justia Law

In August 2021, a city implemented a COVID-19 vaccination policy for its employees, requiring them to either receive the vaccine or request a medical or religious exemption. Employees granted an exemption were required to undergo weekly COVID-19 testing and wear masks in shared spaces. One employee, a forensic specialist, requested and received a religious exemption but objected to the testing and masking requirements, claiming they revealed his unvaccinated status and created a hostile work environment. He was placed on unpaid leave for refusing to comply but eventually agreed to the requirements and returned to work. He continued to challenge the policy until it was rescinded in March 2022.The employee filed suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, asserting federal and state claims against the city and several employees related to the testing and masking requirements. The district court found that the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness (PREP) Act applied but initially did not grant immunity to all individual defendants for each claim. Ultimately, the court dismissed the complaints, denied the employee’s motion for reconsideration, and entered judgment for the defendants.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that both the city and individual defendants were “covered persons” under the PREP Act, and that COVID-19 tests and masks constituted “covered countermeasures” authorized for emergency use. The court clarified that the causation requirement for PREP Act immunity is satisfied if the injury alleged arises from the administration or use of a covered countermeasure, regardless of the legal theory. Because the employee’s alleged harms were directly linked to the city’s COVID-19 safety policy, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal and denial of reconsideration, holding that PREP Act immunity barred all claims. View "SCHMIDT V. CITY OF PASADENA" on Justia Law

A member of the Pottawattamie County Board of Supervisors, serving as chair, organized a public town hall meeting and designated himself as the emcee. Prior to the event, he consumed alcohol at a local bar, and various witnesses observed that he appeared intoxicated both at the bar and at the meeting. During the town hall, his behavior included slurred speech, incoherent remarks, physical instability, and disruptive conduct, prompting attendees and other officials to intervene and eventually escort him home. News coverage and subsequent complaints led to an investigation, revealing additional allegations of intoxication at other public events, though not all were pursued.The Pottawattamie County Attorney filed a petition to remove the supervisor from office under Iowa Code section 66.1A(6), citing intoxication. The Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County held a two-day trial, during which numerous witnesses testified about the town hall incident and other alleged episodes. The district court found, by clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence, that the supervisor was voluntarily intoxicated and acting in his official capacity at the town hall. The court determined this single instance was sufficient for removal and dismissed the other allegations for lack of evidence. The supervisor appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the legal interpretation of the statute, and the exercise of judicial discretion.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo, giving weight to the district court’s findings but examining the record anew. The court held that Iowa Code section 66.1A(6) allows for removal of an elected official for intoxication without requiring that the conduct occur while performing official duties. The Supreme Court found sufficient evidence of intoxication and concluded the district court properly exercised its discretion. The judgment removing the supervisor from office was affirmed. View "State of Iowa v. Belt" on Justia Law

A politically active resident of East Cleveland, Ohio, who had long used a sound truck to broadcast political messages, supported a challenger in a mayoral primary. After this involvement, city officials began enforcing rarely used parking and noise ordinances against him. The plaintiff was warned, cited, had his truck impounded, and was prosecuted for a noise violation. He alleged that these actions were motivated by his support for the challenger and criticism of the administration. The plaintiff, along with his company, brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the city, the mayor, the mayor’s chief of staff, and the police chief, asserting First Amendment retaliation and prior-restraint violations, as well as Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio resolved all claims in favor of the defendants. Some claims—including First Amendment retaliation claims against the mayor and chief of staff—were dismissed at the pleading stage, while others were resolved at summary judgment. The court found that the ordinances were facially valid and that the plaintiff had either failed to establish the required elements for his claims or had forfeited certain arguments on appeal.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit revived certain First Amendment retaliation claims. It held that the district court erred in applying the probable cause requirement to the retaliation claims against the mayor and chief of staff, reversing their dismissal. The court affirmed summary judgment for the police chief on qualified immunity grounds, finding no clearly established law that would make him liable as a conduit for another’s retaliatory motive. As to the city, the court vacated summary judgment on retaliation, remanding for further proceedings on whether municipal policy directly caused a constitutional violation. The court affirmed the district court on all other claims, including the prior-restraint and Fourth Amendment seizure claims, and noted that the plaintiff had forfeited his selective enforcement arguments on appeal. View "Fambrough v. City of E. Cleveland" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a cattle company, alleged that a state agency unconstitutionally took its water rights without compensation as part of the agency’s adjudication of water rights in the Klamath Basin. The agency began the adjudication in 1975 and completed the administrative phase in 2014, with judicial review ongoing in a separate proceeding. The plaintiff claims that administrative determinations prioritizing tribal water rights over its own resulted in a deprivation of its rights.Following the complaint, the plaintiff served discovery requests for documents related to the agency’s determination of tribal water rights. The agency produced a substantial number of records but withheld 446 documents on grounds of attorney-client privilege. The plaintiff moved to compel production of documents over 25 years old, arguing these should be disclosed under Oregon’s public records law. The Marion County Circuit Court ordered the agency to produce the documents, citing a perceived conflict between discovery rules and the public records law, and issued a protective order limiting their use.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the trial court’s discovery order in an original mandamus proceeding. It held that the public records law and civil discovery rules are independent avenues for obtaining records from a public body. The court determined that discovery in civil litigation is governed by procedural requirements and limitations, including the attorney-client privilege, and that courts may not compel production of privileged records in discovery merely because those records may be subject to disclosure under the public records law. The Supreme Court issued a peremptory writ of mandamus directing the trial court to vacate its discovery order. View "Sprague River Cattle Co. v. State of Oregon" on Justia Law