Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

A commercial air tour operator, who had previously conducted flights over Bandelier National Monument under interim authority, challenged a final order issued by the Federal Aviation Administration and the National Park Service. This order established an Air Tour Management Plan (ATMP) for Bandelier National Monument, prohibiting all commercial air tours over the site. The agencies’ process included public comment, environmental assessment, and extensive consultation with Native American tribes, who strongly objected to air tours due to cultural and privacy concerns. The operator argued that his flights were minimally intrusive, carefully routed, and brief, and that banning them would negatively impact safety and his business.The agencies initially considered various alternatives, including allowing limited air tours or maintaining previous operations, but ultimately concluded that any commercial air tour flights would create unacceptable impacts to Bandelier’s natural and cultural resources and visitor experience. The agencies’ environmental assessment under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) found no significant impacts for NEPA purposes, but their record of decision emphasized significant adverse impacts to tribal cultural resources under the National Parks Air Tour Management Act (NPATMA).Upon petition for review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act’s “arbitrary and capricious” standard and de novo for statutory interpretation, as required by recent Supreme Court precedent. The court held that NPATMA and NEPA use different significance standards, and that the agency’s path to finding significant adverse impacts under NPATMA was reasonably discernible in the record. The court also rejected the petitioner’s additional statutory and constitutional challenges, finding them either unexhausted or inadequately briefed. The Tenth Circuit denied the petition for review. View "Adams v. FAA" on Justia Law

The case concerns a challenge brought by an environmental non-profit against the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) relating to the agency’s 2016 national recommendations for allowable cadmium levels in water. The EPA, as required by the Clean Water Act (CWA), periodically issues nonbinding criteria for water pollutants, which states typically adopt as standards for their own waters. In 2016, the EPA updated its cadmium recommendations but did so without consulting the Fish and Wildlife Service or the National Marine Fisheries Service, as mandated under Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) for actions that may affect protected species.Previously, the United States District Court for the District of Arizona found that the Center for Biological Diversity (CBD) had standing to challenge the EPA’s failure to consult. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of CBD, holding that the EPA’s issuance of the cadmium recommendations constituted “agency action” under the ESA that “may affect” listed species, thus triggering the consultation requirement. The court vacated the less stringent chronic freshwater cadmium recommendation and remanded all four 2016 cadmium recommendations to the EPA for proper consultation.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that CBD had Article III standing, finding a concrete injury to its members’ interests in protected species, that the injury was fairly traceable to EPA’s recommendations due to predictable state adoption, and that the injury could be redressed by stricter recommendations resulting from consultation. On the merits, the court concluded that EPA’s publication of nationwide recommendations was “agency action” under the ESA and that such action “may affect” listed species, thus requiring prior consultation with the Services. The district court’s vacatur and remand were affirmed. View "CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY V. UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY" on Justia Law

Several cities in Idaho that hold junior ground water rights within the Eastern Snake Plain Aquifer (ESPA) challenged the methodology used by the Idaho Department of Water Resources (IDWR) to determine whether their groundwater pumping caused material injury to senior surface water right holders. The core factual dispute arose after the Director of IDWR issued a Fifth Amended Methodology Order in April 2023, updating the scientific models and data for evaluating material injury, followed by an order predicting a water shortfall for the senior rights holders. The cities requested a hearing, raising concerns about the methodology and specific factual determinations. After the hearing, the Director issued a Post-Hearing Order that modified and affirmed the Fifth Methodology Order and, simultaneously, a Sixth Methodology Order that expressly superseded all prior methodology orders.The cities then filed a petition for judicial review in the Snake River Basin Adjudication (SRBA) district court, challenging the Director’s Post-Hearing Order. The district court allowed intervention by senior water right holders and, after review, affirmed the Director’s findings and conclusions regarding the methodology and its application. The court found the agency’s factual determinations were supported by substantial evidence and that the Director’s legal standards were proper. The court’s judgment affirmed only the Post-Hearing Order and did not address the subsequently issued Sixth Methodology Order.On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court considered whether it had jurisdiction to address the cities’ claims. The Supreme Court held that because the cities failed to petition for judicial review of the operative, currently effective Sixth Methodology Order in the district court, it lacked jurisdiction to grant the relief sought. The court explained that under Idaho law, only the currently operative order may be challenged, and failure to timely appeal the correct order is jurisdictional. The appeal was therefore dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, and costs were awarded to IDWR and the intervenors. View "City of Idaho Falls v. Idaho Department of Water Resources" on Justia Law

Several individuals and organizations challenged a 2018 regulation issued by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) that classified rifles equipped with bump stocks as illegal machineguns. This rule departed from ATF’s previous position and was prompted by the 2017 Las Vegas shooting, where bump stocks were used to inflict mass casualties. The ATF’s rule gave owners 90 days to destroy or surrender such devices, threatening criminal penalties for noncompliance.In the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, the plaintiffs sought to enjoin enforcement of the rule. The district court denied a preliminary injunction, finding the statutory definition of “machinegun” ambiguous and deferring to the ATF’s interpretation under Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. On appeal, a Sixth Circuit panel disagreed, finding Chevron inapplicable to statutes with criminal penalties and holding the statutory definition unambiguously excluded bump stocks. However, after en banc review, the Sixth Circuit split evenly, resulting in an affirmation of the district court’s denial. Meanwhile, other circuits reached conflicting outcomes, and the Supreme Court ultimately held in Garland v. Cargill that the statutory definition of “machinegun” does not cover bump stocks.Following the Supreme Court’s decision, the district court declared the ATF’s rule unlawful but denied the plaintiffs’ request for attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, finding the government’s position “substantially justified” due to significant judicial disagreement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed this denial and affirmed the district court’s decision. It held that, while the government’s position was ultimately rejected, it was “substantially justified” given the novel statutory question, the division among courts, and the existence of reasonable arguments supporting the ATF’s interpretation. Thus, attorney’s fees were not awarded. View "Gun Owners of America, Inc. v. Bondi" on Justia Law

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) introduced new and revised air traffic procedures in the Southern California Metroplex as part of its Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) initiative in 2016, affecting airports including Los Angeles International Airport. These procedures, specifically the HUULL, IRNMN, and RYDRR routes, relied on satellite navigation and were subject to an environmental review, which concluded there would be no significant noise impacts. In 2018, the FAA amended these procedures, making minor changes to altitude and speed restrictions at certain waypoints, with no changes to flight paths, number of flights, or aircraft types. Only one amended waypoint affected Malibu, and none affected Culver City.Previously, Culver City and other parties challenged the FAA’s 2016 approval in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which upheld the FAA’s decision. After the 2018 amendments, the City of Los Angeles and Culver City (as intervenor) challenged the FAA’s actions in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which found violations of environmental statutes but remanded for further review without vacating the procedures. The FAA then conducted additional environmental consultations and issued a Record of Decision, concluding the amendments qualified for a categorical exclusion from further environmental review.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the petitions from Malibu and Culver City regarding the FAA’s 2018 amendments. The court held that only challenges to the 2018 amendments were timely, dismissing any challenge to the original 2016 procedures as untimely. The court determined that neither city demonstrated standing to challenge the 2018 amendments: Malibu’s evidence addressed only the 2016 procedures, and Culver City failed to provide evidence of injury. The petitions were dismissed for lack of standing. View "City of Culver City v. Federal Aviation Administration" on Justia Law

Gene Cleveland Battieste, a veteran, underwent surgery at a Veterans Affairs Medical Center in Jackson, Mississippi in 2006. Although he had consented to surgery on certain cervical vertebrae, an additional procedure was performed on his C2 vertebra without his knowledge or consent. Following the surgery, Mr. Battieste experienced post-operative complications, including infection and increased pain. He applied for VA disability benefits in 2008, which were ultimately approved in 2020. The 2020 decision by the VA Board of Veterans’ Appeals was the first time Mr. Battieste or his family learned of the unauthorized surgery and the VA’s failure to provide proper informed consent or adequate post-operative care. Mr. Battieste died in 2022.In November 2022, the administrator of Mr. Battieste’s estate filed an administrative claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), which the VA denied. In May 2024, a lawsuit for medical negligence was filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. The district court dismissed the case, finding that Mississippi’s medical malpractice statute barred any action brought more than seven years after the alleged negligence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court determined that Mississippi Code Annotated § 15-1-36(2)’s seven-year period is a statute of repose, not merely a statute of limitations. The court found that Mississippi’s intermediate appellate courts consistently interpret the seven-year provision as an absolute bar to claims, and the statute’s structure and language support this reading. Because the suit was filed more than seven years after the surgery, the court held the claim was time-barred and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. View "Battieste v. United States" on Justia Law

The case centers on a challenge to a provision in the Los Angeles Administrative Code, section 8.33, which grants the mayor special powers upon declaring a “local housing and/or homelessness emergency.” In July 2023, the mayor declared such an emergency, and the city council subsequently renewed it. The emergency declaration was later lifted in November 2025. During the period the declaration was in place, Fix the City, Inc. contended that section 8.33 was invalid because it conflicted with the California Emergency Services Act (CESA) and another provision in the city’s code, arguing that the city had acted illegally during the emergency.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed Fix the City’s claims for writ and declaratory relief, which sought to vacate the emergency declaration and any resulting directives, as well as a declaration that section 8.33 was void for conflicting with CESA and local law. The city responded with a demurrer, asserting that section 8.33 was a proper exercise of municipal authority and did not conflict with CESA or the city’s own code. The superior court agreed, finding that CESA did not apply to charter cities unless there was a clear legislative directive, and that section 8.33 was not inconsistent with other city code provisions. The court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, and Fix the City appealed.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the lower court’s judgment. The appellate court held that CESA does not preempt section 8.33 because the two do not conflict; section 8.33 is a valid exercise of the city’s home rule powers over municipal affairs. Additionally, section 8.33 did not violate other provisions of the city’s administrative code. The denial of leave to amend was also upheld. View "Fix the City, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a magistrate in the domestic-relations division of a county court, declared her candidacy for a judicial seat alongside a fellow magistrate, who was also a court administrator. During her campaign, the plaintiff distributed literature that criticized her opponent’s work schedule and duties, suggesting that the opponent performed trivial administrative tasks and questioning her competence based on personal circumstances. These campaign materials were perceived by the administrative judge as undermining the integrity of the court and casting both the court and its staff in an unfavorable light. After the plaintiff lost the primary election, the administrative judge terminated her employment as a magistrate.Prior to this appeal, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio dismissed the plaintiff’s suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which alleged a violation of her First Amendment free-speech rights. The district court ruled that the court itself was not a legally cognizable entity subject to suit, that sovereign immunity barred claims for money damages against the administrative judge in her official capacity, and that the plaintiff failed to state a plausible free-speech claim against the administrative judge. The plaintiff appealed only the dismissal of her free-speech claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. It held that, because the plaintiff occupied a confidential or policymaking position and her campaign speech addressed matters related to court policy and politics in a manner that undermined the loyalty and efficient functioning required by her employer, her termination did not violate the First Amendment. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, finding that the balancing test usually applied to public employee speech was unnecessary under these circumstances. The court also rejected the plaintiff’s arguments regarding insubordination, the scope of judicial candidate speech protections, and the applicability of strict scrutiny. View "Gaines v. Cross" on Justia Law

A company seeking to build a new skilled nursing facility in Anchorage applied to the Alaska Department of Health for a certificate of need, a prerequisite under state law for constructing such healthcare facilities. The Department’s regulations require applicants to demonstrate a need for at least 40 additional nursing beds using a specific formula called the composite age specific use (CASU) methodology. In this instance, the applicant’s calculations using the CASU method showed a need for fewer than 40 beds. However, the applicant provided additional quantitative and qualitative data, including evidence of facility overcapacity, Anchorage’s role as a healthcare hub, and plans to offer sub-acute care not available elsewhere in Alaska.A competitor that had previously received its own certificate of need challenged the Department’s decision to approve the new facility’s application. The competitor argued that the Department violated its regulations by issuing a certificate when the required methodology did not show the requisite need for 40 beds. The competitor also claimed that the Department effectively changed its regulatory interpretation without following formal rulemaking procedures required by the Alaska Administrative Procedure Act. The Department and the applicant responded that the regulations allow the Department to waive a review standard—such as the 40-bed requirement—if strict application would reduce the availability, quality, or accessibility of services, as long as the prescribed methodology is still used in the application process.The Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, affirmed the Department’s decision, finding that the regulations permit the Department to waive a review standard while still requiring use of the methodology. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska affirmed the superior court’s decision, holding that the Department’s interpretation was reasonable, consistent with statutory authority, and did not require formal rulemaking. The court concluded the Department acted within its discretion and on a reasonable basis. View "Maple Springs Management, LLC v. State" on Justia Law

A pilot employed by a cargo airline was on a personal trip abroad when his employer, Amerijet International, selected him for a random drug test and requested that he appear for testing in Seattle on the same day. The pilot was unable to comply due to his location and a medical issue. The airline determined that he had refused the test, reported this to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and subsequently terminated his employment. The FAA corresponded with the pilot, initially investigating the matter and ultimately informing him that, while it was not taking enforcement action against his certificates, he would be subject to return-to-duty requirements because of the refusal determination, and the test refusal would be reported to the Pilot Records Database.The pilot challenged these consequences, arguing that the FAA had not independently reviewed the employer’s determination that he refused the test. The FAA responded that test-refusal determinations were made solely by the employer, not by the agency, and that the FAA did not review such determinations. The case came before the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit on the pilot’s petition for review of the FAA’s actions.The Court of Appeals held that the FAA’s internal guidance, specifically its Drug and Alcohol Compliance and Enforcement Surveillance Handbook, plausibly requires the FAA to independently review an employer’s test-refusal determination. The court interpreted the Handbook to require such review, partly to avoid serious constitutional concerns that would arise if the FAA entirely delegated this authority to private employers without oversight. Because the FAA conceded that it did not conduct any review, the court found the agency’s actions to be arbitrary and capricious for departing from its own procedures. The court granted the petition in part, remanding the case to the FAA for further review consistent with its opinion. View "Paul v. FAA" on Justia Law