Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

A trade organization representing companies involved in a type of home-improvement loan, in which local governments finance property improvements for homeowners and collect repayment through property tax bills, challenged a new federal rule. For years, these loans were generally exempt from federal consumer credit regulations, as they were treated as tax assessments rather than credit. However, after Congress amended the Truth in Lending Act and directed the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) to regulate these loans and consider their unique features, the CFPB promulgated a rule classifying them as consumer credit transactions subject to federal disclosure, underwriting, and liability requirements.The case was first heard by the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. The district court denied the organization’s motion for a preliminary injunction to halt enforcement of the rule, and later granted summary judgment in favor of the CFPB, concluding that the Bureau acted within its statutory authority, did not act arbitrarily or capriciously, and did not violate the Tenth Amendment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment de novo. The appellate court held that the CFPB properly exercised its rulemaking authority, as the loans in question meet the statutory definition of consumer credit transactions. The court found the Bureau’s reliance on available data reasonable and determined that the rule did not interfere with states’ sovereign taxing powers or unlawfully commandeer state officials. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the CFPB and dismissed the appeal of the preliminary injunction denial as moot. View "Building Resilient Infrastructure & Developing Greater Equity, Inc. v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau" on Justia Law

The West Virginia Board of Education and the State Superintendent sought extraordinary relief after a legislative dispute over the Board’s rulemaking authority. The Board had historically promulgated rules for state schools without legislative pre-approval, but in 2025, the Legislature enacted House Bill 2755, requiring Board rules to be submitted for legislative approval before becoming effective. The Board opposed this, citing the West Virginia Constitution’s grant of “general supervision” of public schools to the Board, and asserting that HB 2755 was unconstitutional. When the Board submitted Policy 4334 directly to the Secretary of State for publication, the Secretary refused to accept it, citing the new statutory requirements.Previously, similar statutory provisions were challenged in 1988, leading to the West Virginia Supreme Court’s decision in West Virginia Board of Education v. Hechler, which held that legislative review requirements constituted unconstitutional interference with the Board’s rulemaking power. The Board’s current action was a petition for a writ of mandamus, arguing that Hechler controlled and rendered HB 2755 unconstitutional.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case under its original jurisdiction. The Court determined that the practical effect of HB 2755 was the same as the statutes struck down in Hechler, requiring legislative approval of Board rules and thus interfering with the Board’s constitutional authority. The Court reaffirmed Hechler and held that rulemaking by the State Board of Education is part of its “general supervision” under Article XII, Section 2 of the West Virginia Constitution, and any statutory provision interfering with such rulemaking is unconstitutional. Accordingly, the Court granted the writ of mandamus, declared HB 2755 unconstitutional, and ordered the Secretary of State to accept and publish Policy 4334. View "State ex rel. Board of Education v. Warner" on Justia Law

After winning both the Republican primary and the general election for the 91st Delegate District in West Virginia in 2024, Joseph A. de Soto was unable to take the oath of office due to his arrest for alleged threats against other delegates. He entered a bail agreement that restricted his contact with other legislators and put him on home confinement. Subsequently, the West Virginia House of Delegates adopted a resolution declaring his seat vacant, citing his failure to appear to take the oath and referencing his alleged misconduct. Both the Republican and Democratic Executive Committees submitted nominees to fill the vacancy, and the Governor appointed a Republican nominee, Ian Masters, who was seated as delegate.Several procedural missteps ensued, with the petitioners—Mike Pushkin, Stephen Willingham, and the West Virginia Democratic Party—filing multiple petitions for a writ of mandamus in the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. These petitions sought to compel the House Speaker to seat Mr. de Soto or, alternatively, to select a replacement from the Democratic nominees. Each petition encountered procedural hurdles, including the failure to provide timely pre-suit notice and to file a timely motion for expedited relief, resulting in dismissals or denials. The petitioners ultimately filed a third petition after attempting to correct notice issues.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the latest petition and denied the request for a writ of mandamus. The Court held that the petitioners lacked standing because their alleged injuries were not redressable by the Court. Specifically, the relief sought depended on actions beyond the respondents’ authority, and there was no vacancy to fill after the Governor’s appointment. Because the Court could not grant the relief requested, it found the petitioners failed to satisfy the redressability prong required for standing and denied the writ. View "State ex rel. Pushkin v. Morrisey" on Justia Law

HD Media Company, operating as a local newspaper, filed suit against the West Virginia University Board of Governors, alleging violations of the West Virginia Open Governmental Proceedings Act (WVOGPA). The complaint arose from several Board meetings held in summer 2020, during which the Board entered executive sessions to discuss topics including the university’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic, budget matters, social justice issues, athletics, business college affairs, emergency pay policy, Title IX regulations, tuition and fees, and capital projects. HD Media claimed that these closed sessions did not fall within the Act’s limited exceptions and sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as attorney fees.The Circuit Court of Monongalia County granted summary judgment in favor of the Board on all nine topics, finding that most discussions fell within the “commercial competition” and “confidential matters” exceptions of the WVOGPA. The court also found a technical violation in the Board’s meeting agenda notice but denied attorney fees, concluding the Board’s position was substantially justified. HD Media appealed, first to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, which declined direct review, then to the Intermediate Court of Appeals of West Virginia (ICA). The ICA affirmed the circuit court’s rulings, including the application of exceptions and the denial of attorney fees.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the ICA’s decision de novo. It held that most topics discussed in executive session fit the “commercial competition” exception, but reversed as to the social justice issues discussion, concluding that it did not meet any statutory exception. The court affirmed the ICA in part, reversed in part, and remanded for consideration of attorney fees related to the improper closure regarding social justice issues. View "HD Media Company, LLC v. West Virginia University Board of Governors" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Thomas Marshall, sought declaratory and injunctive relief against federal officials after being denied the ability to purchase a firearm due to prior Massachusetts convictions for driving under the influence, an offense punishable by more than one year in prison. Marshall alleged that the enforcement of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and related regulations violated his Second Amendment rights, as he wished to purchase and possess firearms for self-defense but feared prosecution under federal law.The United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire found that Marshall had Article III standing, since his requested relief would redress his inability to obtain a firearm. However, the District Court dismissed his complaint for failure to state a claim, reasoning that the First Circuit’s pre-Bruen precedent in United States v. Torres-Rosario remained binding and foreclosed as-applied Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1), except in cases involving particularly minor convictions. The court concluded that Marshall’s repeated DUI convictions did not fall within the exception and thus precluded his challenge.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that the District Court’s reliance on Torres-Rosario was no longer controlling in light of recent developments, including the Supreme Court's decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, which established a new framework for Second Amendment claims. The First Circuit vacated the District Court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, directing the lower court to apply the Bruen framework to Marshall’s as-applied Second Amendment challenge, taking into account recent regulatory changes affecting restoration of firearm rights for prohibited persons. View "Marshall v. Blanche" on Justia Law

Eight plaintiffs challenged Tennessee’s sex-offender-registration law, arguing it retroactively punished them for offenses committed before the registry’s enactment. The law assigns classifications based on offenses and imposes reporting and lifetime registration requirements, as well as geographical restrictions on where registrants may live, work, or be present. The Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (TBI) maintains the registry, classifies offenders, and publishes relevant information, including certain labels such as “violent sexual offender” and “offender against children.” Plaintiffs alleged these classifications and restrictions violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee initially granted summary judgment for plaintiffs, treating the Act as a whole and finding its combined effects punitive. The court issued a broad injunction, ordering plaintiffs’ removal from the registry and enjoining enforcement against them. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit vacated much of this relief, holding plaintiffs lacked standing to sue the Governor, and remanded for provision-specific analysis, instructing the district court to limit relief to provisions enforced by TBI.On remand, the district court found TBI responsible for both the classification and geographical claims, holding that the classifications and several geographical restrictions were punitive and unconstitutional. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that while TBI’s classifications operated retroactively, they did not impose punishment under the Ex Post Facto Clause, and thus reversed the classification judgment. For the geographical restrictions, the court found plaintiffs lacked Article III standing against TBI, as their injuries were not fairly traceable to Director Rausch and would not be redressed by relief against him. The court vacated the judgment and permanent injunction regarding the geographical claims and remanded with instructions to dismiss those claims without prejudice. View "John Doe #1 v. Lee" on Justia Law

The State of New York issued commercial driver’s licenses (CDLs) to noncitizens who were lawfully present in the United States, granting these licenses with validity periods of five years after initial issuance and eight years after renewal—the same as for residents. In 2026, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) determined that New York had failed to comply with federal regulations by not matching the expiration dates of non-domiciled CDLs to the expiration dates on drivers’ lawful presence documentation. FMCSA found that many licenses remained valid after the expiration of the holder’s lawful presence, and, as a penalty, withheld four percent of New York’s federal highway funding for the 2027 fiscal year.After FMCSA issued a preliminary determination and New York contested it, FMCSA issued a final determination upholding its position. The agency asserted that the expiration-matching requirement was not new and that New York’s failure to comply warranted the funding penalty. The final determination was based solely on New York’s alleged failure to match CDL validity periods to lawful presence documentation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the federal regulations in effect during the relevant period did not contain an expiration-matching requirement. The court reasoned that the plain text, structure, and regulatory history of the rules supported New York’s interpretation. Because the FMCSA’s determination relied on a requirement that did not exist at the time, the court held that the agency’s action was arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. The court therefore granted New York’s petition and set aside FMCSA’s final determination. View "New York v. Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

Ronald L. Green, a revenue agent employed by the Internal Revenue Service in Las Vegas, was indefinitely suspended in August 2006 on suspicion of filing fraudulent tax returns. Shortly before the suspension took effect, he applied for immediate disability retirement, citing medical conditions and workplace stress. After his suspension, he initiated arbitration to challenge the agency’s action and alleged discrimination through an EEO complaint. The Office of Personnel Management approved his retirement in January 2007. In March 2007, an arbitrator reversed his suspension but denied his discrimination claims. The agency retroactively dated his retirement to his last day of pay and removed references to other adverse actions from his record.Mr. Green’s subsequent legal efforts included appeals to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and district court, both of which ruled against him, with the Ninth Circuit affirming. In May 2023, he appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board, asserting that his 2006 retirement was involuntary due to agency actions and discrimination. The administrative judge dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding that Mr. Green failed to nonfrivolously allege involuntariness. The decision became the Board’s final determination.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed Mr. Green’s petition. It first determined jurisdiction, concluding that Mr. Green’s explicit waiver of discrimination claims allowed the court to review the non-discrimination aspects. The court found that Mr. Green had forfeited arguments about agency failure to restore his employment after arbitration because these were not properly raised before the Board. On the remaining issue, the court held that Mr. Green failed to nonfrivolously allege that his retirement was involuntary, either through coercion or misinformation, and affirmed the Board’s decision. View "Green v. Merit Systems Protection Board" on Justia Law

The petitioner, a Transportation Specialist employed by the Department of the Army, was suspended for ten days based on alleged misconduct. On the same day the suspension was proposed, she filed a whistleblower complaint with the Office of Special Counsel. The agency implemented the suspension several months later. The Special Counsel subsequently notified her that its investigation was terminated and that it would not seek corrective action on her behalf.After receiving the Special Counsel’s notice, the petitioner filed an individual right of action (IRA) appeal with the Merit Systems Protection Board (Board) nearly three weeks after the statutory deadline. An administrative judge for the Board issued a timeliness order, to which the petitioner responded by arguing her appeal was timely under the relevant statute and that equitable tolling did not apply. The administrative judge dismissed the appeal as untimely, finding it was filed 24 days after the 60-day deadline triggered by the Special Counsel’s notice. The petitioner sought review by the full Board, but due to a lack of quorum, the initial decision became the final decision of the Board.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that when the Special Counsel issues notification terminating an investigation—even if this occurs more than 120 days after the initial complaint—the federal employee has 60 days from the date of notification to file an IRA appeal with the Board. The court rejected the petitioner’s argument that the 60-day deadline did not apply if the Special Counsel’s notice came after the 120-day period. Concluding that the appeal was untimely, the court affirmed the Board’s dismissal. View "Walker v. Merit Systems Protection Board" on Justia Law

A Turkish steel producer, Kaptan, was subject to an administrative review by the U.S. Department of Commerce concerning antidumping duties imposed on rebar exported from Turkey to the United States. During the review period, Turkey experienced significant inflation. Kaptan argued that the relevant “date of sale” for calculating duty rates should be the date contracts were signed, claiming that material terms were fixed then and that using the later invoice date unfairly reflected price increases caused by inflation. Kaptan further maintained that its internal policies ensured contract terms could not be changed after signing without board approval.The Department of Commerce determined that the invoice date, not the contract date, was the appropriate “date of sale,” as Kaptan’s own responses indicated that certain material terms, including size breakdowns and quantities, could be modified until shipment or invoicing. Commerce issued a final antidumping duty rate using the invoice date, and the U.S. Court of International Trade upheld this decision. The Trade Court found that Commerce’s reliance on the invoice date was supported by substantial evidence, including Kaptan’s questionnaire responses and contract documentation, and declined to address whether Commerce exceeded its regulatory authority, as there was no statutory ambiguity at issue.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Kaptan argued that Commerce’s regulation was an unlawful presumption and that its application was unsupported by substantial evidence. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Trade Court’s judgment, holding that Commerce’s regulation establishes a starting point rather than a presumption, and that substantial evidence supported Commerce’s finding that material terms were not fixed until the invoice date. The court further held that Commerce had acted within its statutory authority and rejected Kaptan’s remaining arguments. View "KAPTAN DEMIR CELIK ENDUSTRISI VE TICARET A.S. v. US " on Justia Law