Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

A class of noncitizens with final removal orders challenged new Department of Homeland Security (DHS) policies issued in March and July 2025, which authorized their removal to “third countries”—countries neither designated in their removal orders nor identified in writing during prior proceedings. The plaintiffs alleged that DHS’s policy failed to provide effective notice or a meaningful opportunity to contest removal to these third countries based on reasonable fear of persecution or torture. The policies also relied on diplomatic assurances from receiving countries, sometimes removing individuals without further protective procedures.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts issued a temporary restraining order, granted class certification, and later a preliminary injunction requiring DHS to provide written notice and an opportunity for class members to assert fear-based claims before any third-country removal. After DHS appealed, the U.S. Supreme Court granted a stay pending appellate review. On remand, the district court dissolved the preliminary injunction and issued a final judgment, concluding that DHS’s guidance violated statutory requirements for sequencing removal destinations, and failed to provide notice and hearing for fear-based claims, including those under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court ordered declaratory relief and vacated the guidance as unlawful under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing on the “sequencing” claim and vacated the related declarations. However, the court affirmed the district court’s judgment that DHS must provide effective notice and a meaningful opportunity to contest removal to a third country based on fear-based claims, and upheld the vacatur of DHS guidance as unlawful under the APA. The court rejected DHS’s jurisdictional and remedy arguments, clarifying that declaratory and vacatur relief were permissible and not barred by statute. View "D.V.D. v. Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

A Puerto Rico limited liability company, Berkey International, LLC, manufactures water filters known as Black Berkey Filters, which contain silver—a substance recognized as a pesticide. Berkey distributed these filters without EPA registration, claiming the silver was intended only to protect the filters themselves, not for pesticidal purposes. Inspections by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) revealed that Berkey and associated distributors made claims on product labels and websites indicating the filters could remove viruses, bacteria, and other pathogens, suggesting pesticidal intent. As a result, the EPA issued a Stop Sale, Use, or Removal Order prohibiting Berkey and other distributors from selling or distributing these filters.Reviewing the matter, the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico considered Berkey’s request for a preliminary injunction to halt enforcement of the EPA’s order. The district court evaluated the administrative record, held hearings, and reviewed extensive briefing. The court found that Berkey had not substantiated its claims that the silver was not intended for pesticidal use and denied Berkey’s motion for preliminary injunctive relief. Berkey’s subsequent motion for reconsideration was also denied, prompting Berkey to file an interlocutory appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of preliminary injunctive relief for abuse of discretion. Applying a highly deferential standard to the EPA’s technical determinations, the appellate court concluded that Berkey had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits of its claims under the Administrative Procedure Act, including its assertions of arbitrary and capricious agency action and violations of notice-and-comment and due process requirements. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s order, holding that the EPA had reason to believe Berkey’s filters were unregistered and misbranded pesticidal products under federal law. View "Berkey International, LLC v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

Two individuals filed an initiative petition with Wilmington city officials, proposing a new ordinance to regulate data centers and their campuses. The ordinance would set standards for noise, lighting, emissions, generator-testing, water use, and heat generation, among other things. A key feature of the proposed ordinance was the creation of a “private right of action,” allowing residents within certain distances of a data center to sue its owner or operator for alleged violations of these standards, with the possibility of injunctive relief, penalties, and attorney’s fees.After the petition was filed and signatures validated, the Wilmington city auditor certified its sufficiency and validity, but did not opine on whether it was within the city’s initiative power. The Clinton County Board of Elections declined to certify the petition for the ballot, determining that the ordinance was not within the municipality’s power because it sought to create a new private cause of action. The board reaffirmed this decision after a hearing requested by one petitioner.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the mandamus action seeking to compel the board to certify the petition. The court held that the proposed ordinance was outside the municipal initiative power because it would create a new cause of action, which municipalities are not authorized to do. The court relied on its prior decisions, including State ex rel. Bolzenius v. Preisse and State ex rel. Flak v. Betras, and rejected arguments that the ordinance merely restated existing statutory remedies. The court also rejected a First Amendment challenge, finding no unconstitutional prior restraint. The Supreme Court of Ohio denied the writ of mandamus, upholding the board’s decision not to certify the initiative for the ballot. View "State ex rel. Kidd v. Clinton Cty. Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

A tenured professor at the University of Arizona, concerned about adherence to an anti-discrimination constitutional amendment in university hiring, submitted a series of public records requests to the university. These requests sought data and documents related to survey results used in hiring, as well as information about appointment and selection processes for certain positions. The university partially complied, providing some records, redacting or withholding others, and denying access to an audio recording of a committee meeting, citing confidentiality. The university later destroyed the recording after offering the professor a chance to listen without copying, which he declined. Following repeated, unsuccessful requests, the professor’s attorney sent a demand letter, prompting the university to release additional records, though some remained withheld or redacted.The professor filed a Special Action Complaint in the Superior Court in Pima County against the Arizona Board of Regents (ABOR), alleging wrongful denial of records and seeking damages and attorney fees. The Superior Court dismissed some counts as time-barred or for failure to state a claim, held a bench trial, and denied relief on remaining counts. The court found the university had eventually provided nearly all requested records and cured any prior abuse of discretion. It denied the professor’s request for attorney fees, reasoning that such fees could not be awarded if the public entity had complied before litigation commenced. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that destruction of requested records amounted to a denial, but the professor was not entitled to damages or fees absent a timely notice of claim and that the trial court’s review of withheld records should combine de novo and abuse-of-discretion standards.The Supreme Court of Arizona reversed, holding that courts must review de novo an agency’s determination of statutory exemptions and the withholding or redacting of specific documents. The Court also held that destruction of a record after a request constitutes denial of access under the Public Records Law. Finally, the Court determined that “substantially prevailed” for attorney fees includes the requester’s overall success throughout the dispute, not just post-litigation results. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these holdings. View "ABRAHAM v ARIZONA BOARD OF REGENTS" on Justia Law

A New Jersey car dealership, part of a group of businesses owned by the same individual, applied for and received a Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loan under the CARES Act. The dealership, along with other affiliated entities, collectively received PPP loans that exceeded the aggregate cap imposed by the Small Business Administration’s (SBA) Corporate Group Rule for second-draw loans. Despite acknowledging that it violated this rule, the dealership sought forgiveness for the portion of its loan that did not exceed the cap, arguing that it was entitled to partial forgiveness.After the dealership's loan forgiveness application was denied by the SBA—due to the loan exceeding the corporate cap—the dealership filed an administrative appeal, which was also denied. Subsequently, the dealership sued the SBA in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, asserting that the SBA’s denial was arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law under the Administrative Procedure Act. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the SBA, finding that the agency acted within its statutory and regulatory authority.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment de novo and evaluated the SBA’s decision for arbitrariness or abuse of discretion. The Third Circuit held that neither the CARES Act nor the implementing regulations required partial forgiveness where the corporate group loan cap was exceeded. Furthermore, the SBA did not abuse its discretion or act arbitrarily in denying forgiveness. The court affirmed the District Court’s summary judgment in favor of the SBA, confirming that loans obtained in violation of the Corporate Group Rule are not eligible for forgiveness, even in part. View "Celebrity of Springfield LLC v. SBA" on Justia Law

After the Snake River Basin Adjudication (SRBA) confirmed thousands of federal stockwater rights on federal land, Idaho enacted a series of statutes known as the “stockwater amendments.” These amendments altered water rights rules, including procedures for forfeiture and appurtenance, and imposed new requirements specifically affecting federal stockwater rights. The United States challenged several provisions, arguing that they were intended to divest it of SRBA-decreed stockwater rights and unlawfully discriminated against the federal government. Two groups—the Idaho Legislature and ranching interests—intervened as defendants.The United States District Court for the District of Idaho rejected jurisdictional challenges based on Rooker-Feldman, prior exclusive jurisdiction, Burford abstention, and claim preclusion, holding it could hear the case. On the merits, the district court found Idaho Code § 42-224 constitutional as applied to the United States, but held Idaho Code §§ 42-113(2)(b), 42-502, and 42-504 were facially unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause. The United States appealed the ruling on § 42-224, while the State Defendants and Ranchers cross-appealed the jurisdictional holdings and the ruling on § 42-113(2)(b).The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s jurisdictional holdings, concluding that neither the doctrine of prior exclusive jurisdiction nor Burford abstention applied. The panel reversed the district court’s finding that § 42-224 was constitutional as applied, holding that it is part of a statutory scheme that unlawfully discriminates against the United States and jeopardizes its SRBA-decreed rights. The panel affirmed the district court’s holding that § 42-113(2)(b) is facially unconstitutional because it singles out the United States for unfavorable treatment by changing appurtenance rules only for rights associated with federal land. Thus, the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, awarding costs to the United States. View "USA V. STATE OF IDAHO" on Justia Law

A group of domestic producers and a union petitioned the Department of Commerce to investigate whether steel pipes imported from Argentina were being sold in the United States at less than fair value. The petitioners supplied production data and estimates to demonstrate that their petition met statutory thresholds for industry support, using 2020 shipment figures as a proxy for domestic production. Tenaris Bay City, Inc., a major domestic producer with ties to foreign producers, opposed the petition, arguing that the industry support calculations were unreliable, particularly due to potential double counting of pipes both produced and finished domestically.After receiving comments from Tenaris, Commerce determined that the petition met the statutory requirements for industry support and initiated an antidumping investigation. Tenaris challenged this determination in the United States Court of International Trade (CIT), which remanded the issue to Commerce for further explanation specifically regarding potential double counting in the industry support calculations. On remand, Commerce found no evidence of double counting and addressed concerns about particular companies flagged by Tenaris. The CIT subsequently affirmed Commerce’s remand results, concluding the agency’s calculations were reasonable and supported by substantial evidence, and found that Tenaris’s new arguments concerning undercounting and overcounting were unexhausted because they were not timely raised during the administrative process.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the CIT’s decision de novo and applied a deferential standard to Commerce’s findings, overturning only if unsupported by substantial evidence or not in accordance with law. The court affirmed the CIT, holding that Commerce’s determination of industry support was reasonable and supported by the record, that Tenaris’s concerns about double counting were unsubstantiated, and that the CIT did not abuse its discretion in finding Tenaris’s additional arguments unexhausted. The CIT’s decision was affirmed. View "TENARIS BAY CITY, INC. v. US " on Justia Law

Wyoming’s Constitution requires the legislature to provide a thorough and efficient education for all students. Historically, public education was funded by local property taxes, resulting in significant disparities between districts. Decades of litigation and legislative reform led to a statewide, cost-based funding model for school operations and facilities. This model, known as the legislative model (LM), was intended to ensure equal educational opportunities by using a block grant system based on the estimated cost of an adequate education (the “basket of goods and services”). Periodic recalibrations and annual adjustments for inflation were required to keep the model current.The plaintiffs, including the Wyoming Education Association and several school districts, sued in 2022, alleging that the legislature’s funding model was no longer cost-based, wasn’t properly adjusted for inflation, and lacked funding for certain innovations such as elementary school counselors, nutrition services, and school resource officers. They also claimed the State’s facilities oversight was inadequate. The District Court of Laramie County, after a bench trial, found in favor of the plaintiffs on all issues, concluding that the legislature failed to fund actual costs, address inflation, and include necessary innovations, and that the State’s facilities process was constitutionally deficient.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the case. The Court affirmed the district court’s findings that the legislature violated students’ equal protection rights by failing to fund the true cost of teacher salaries and by not properly adjusting for inflation. However, it reversed the requirement to fund a one-to-one technology ratio, nutrition services, and school resource officers, finding insufficient evidence that these innovations required statewide funding. The Court also reversed the order requiring statewide assessment of educational suitability for facilities, holding the State’s administrative process was constitutionally adequate. The Court ended the lower court’s retention of jurisdiction, assuming the legislature would act in good faith to comply with constitutional requirements. View "The State of Wyoming v. Wyoming Education Association" on Justia Law

Berwick Solar, LLC entered into an interconnection agreement with Central Maine Power Company (CMP) in March 2020 to connect its solar generation facility to CMP’s electric distribution system. The agreement estimated costs, but Berwick Solar opted not to obtain a detailed facilities study. After the project became operational in May 2021, CMP failed to issue cost reconciliation statements within the deadlines set by both the governing regulation and the agreement. CMP eventually sent a series of reconciliation statements, each seeking progressively lower amounts, but Berwick Solar disputed their timeliness and contended that CMP was required to provide further documentation for the costs.The dispute was not resolved through informal procedures, so Berwick Solar sought formal adjudication before the Maine Public Utilities Commission. After receiving testimony and briefs, the Commission dismissed Berwick Solar’s complaint, concluding that the regulation required Berwick Solar to pay the actual interconnection costs regardless of CMP’s untimely statements. The Commission also found that CMP was not obliged to provide original purchase orders or invoices, and Berwick Solar had not been prejudiced by the delay since the costs decreased over time. The Commission further declined to address Berwick Solar’s arguments about pooled overhead costs, noting those were not central to the dispute and had resulted in reduced costs for Berwick.Upon appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the Commission’s order. The Court held that CMP’s failure to issue reconciliation statements within the prescribed sixty-day period did not relieve Berwick Solar of its obligation to pay actual interconnection costs, including pooled overhead costs. CMP is not required to provide purchase orders or invoices unless requested through formal discovery. The Court also found competent evidence supporting the Commission’s finding that Berwick Solar was not prejudiced by the delay. Judgment was affirmed. View "Berwick Solar, LLC v. Public Utilities Commission" on Justia Law

Methylene chloride is a chemical used in various commercial applications, including paint removal and manufacturing of products like air conditioner coolants and EV batteries. While useful, over-exposure to methylene chloride can cause serious health risks, including injury and death. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), determined that nearly all uses of methylene chloride posed an “unreasonable risk of injury to health” and issued a rule severely limiting its manufacture, processing, distribution, and use, allowing only thirteen conditions of use under strict exposure limits.Prior to this rule, EPA had completed risk evaluations for methylene chloride, first in 2020 and then revised in 2022. The revised evaluation adopted a “whole chemical” determination, finding all but one use posed unreasonable risk, and assumed workers did not use personal protective equipment (PPE), contrary to prior practice and OSHA standards. Industry petitioners, including manufacturers and the American Chemistry Council, filed for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, arguing that EPA’s determinations and rule were arbitrary, capricious, and unsupported by substantial evidence. Sierra Club also challenged the rule, asserting EPA did not go far enough to protect vulnerable populations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that EPA’s “whole chemical” risk determination violated TSCA, which requires separate evaluations for each condition of use. The court also held that EPA’s assumption of no PPE use was unsupported by substantial evidence and contrary to law. EPA’s exposure limits for methylene chloride were deemed excessively conservative and not supported by the record. The court granted the industry petitioners’ review, vacated EPA’s rule and associated risk determination, denied Sierra Club’s petition, and remanded to EPA for further proceedings. View "East Fork Enterprises v. EPA" on Justia Law