Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In this case, the central issue arose during a countervailing duty investigation into phosphate fertilizers imported from Morocco and Russia. The International Trade Commission (Commission) collected information through questionnaires sent to various parties, including domestic and foreign producers. The Commission’s longstanding practice was to automatically designate all questionnaire responses as confidential, regardless of whether the submitting party requested confidentiality or whether the information would qualify for such treatment under the relevant statute. This led to heavy redactions in the administrative record when the investigation was challenged in court.A Moroccan producer, OCP S.A., sought review of the Commission’s injury determination in the United States Court of International Trade (CIT). The CIT initially remanded the injury determination due to insufficient evidentiary support. When the remand record again included substantial redactions, the CIT held a hearing to scrutinize the Commission’s confidentiality designations. After reviewing arguments from the Commission and affected parties, the CIT concluded that the Commission’s practice of automatically treating all questionnaire responses as confidential was unauthorized by law. The CIT found that much of the redacted information was either publicly available, generalized, or outdated, and thus not entitled to confidential treatment, with only a small portion warranting protection.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the CIT’s Confidentiality Opinion and Order. The Federal Circuit held that the governing statute does not abrogate the common law right of public access to judicial records and that the Commission’s blanket confidentiality rule conflicts with statutory requirements, which demand public disclosure of non-confidential information and proper justification for confidentiality. The Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s order that required the Commission to comply with statutory standards for confidentiality and to cease automatic confidential designation of questionnaire responses. View "In re United States" on Justia Law

In a dispute concerning antidumping and countervailing duties on mattresses imported from several countries, the U.S. International Trade Commission determined that domestic industry suffered material injury from imports sold at less than fair value and from subsidized imports. The Commission treated certain information submitted in response to its questionnaires as confidential. After the Court of International Trade issued a public opinion sustaining the Commission’s injury determination, it did not redact information the Commission had deemed confidential. The Commission requested retraction of the public opinion and sought redactions for specific company names and numerical data, arguing these deserved confidential treatment.The parties jointly moved for redaction, relying on the Commission’s practice of treating questionnaire data as confidential and citing statutory provisions. The Court of International Trade denied the motion, reasoning that the information was either publicly available or not linked to specific entities, and that some claims of confidentiality had been waived due to procedural oversight. The court also emphasized the common law right of access and transparency, but did not specifically address the statutory authority for disclosure.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the denial of the joint motion. The court found the case moot because the allegedly confidential information had already been publicly disclosed more than two years earlier, rendering any relief unavailable. The Federal Circuit held that the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to mootness did not apply, as the companion case decided that day resolved the same confidentiality issues. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed, and no costs were awarded. View "In re United States" on Justia Law

Several newly elected members joined a school district’s board of education in late 2021. Their priority was to make Merit Academy a charter school within the district. After previous unsuccessful attempts, the board moved forward with a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to streamline the process. The agenda for the January 26, 2022, meeting where the MOU was discussed did not clearly indicate this topic, being labeled only as "BOARD HOUSEKEEPING." The board approved the MOU at this meeting. Subsequent meetings in February and April further addressed the MOU, with the April meeting involving a detailed discussion and statements from each board member.After the January meeting, a community member, Erin O’Connell, filed suit alleging a violation of Colorado’s Open Meetings Law (COML) due to insufficient public notice. The District Court initially granted an injunction requiring the board to provide clearer agendas. Later, upon summary judgment, the District Court found that the board cured the COML violation at the April meeting, which was properly noticed and involved substantive reconsideration. The court held O’Connell was not a prevailing party and denied her request for attorney fees.On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed most of the district court’s rulings. It upheld the “cure doctrine,” allowing public bodies to remedy prior open meetings violations by holding a subsequent compliant meeting, provided it is not a mere “rubber stamp.” The Court of Appeals also found that the doctrine does not distinguish between intentional and unintentional violations and that the April meeting cured the earlier violation. It denied O’Connell costs and attorney fees.The Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed that the cure doctrine is consistent with the COML and longstanding precedent, and applies regardless of the violation’s intent. However, it reversed regarding attorney fees, holding that because O’Connell proved a violation that was not cured until after suit was filed, she is the prevailing party and entitled to costs and reasonable attorney fees. The case was remanded for determination and award of such fees. View "O'Connell v. Woodland Park Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

A completed driver reexamination request was submitted to the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) by a confidential reporter, prompting the DMV to initiate a review of Richard Louis Brown’s driving qualifications. Brown was notified that he must submit a medical evaluation. His physician, a new provider to Brown, recommended a driving test but did not advise against driving. Following a reexamination, Brown failed a driving test, and his license was suspended. A second hearing officer later reinstated his license, finding no medical basis for the initial suspension and stating that Brown should not have been required to take the tests.Brown filed a petition for writ of mandate in the Superior Court of Sacramento County, seeking disclosure of the reporter’s identity and criminal sanctions against the reporter for alleged false information. The DMV opposed, explaining the confidentiality policy for reporters is intended to promote road safety and prevent retaliatory actions. The trial court denied the petition, applying a public interest balancing test and finding that the interest in maintaining reporter confidentiality outweighed the interest in disclosure. Judgment was entered against Brown, who then appealed.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, held that due process was not violated by the DMV’s nondisclosure of the reporter’s identity. The court found that the risk of erroneous deprivation was low because the suspension was based on Brown’s failed driving test, not the reporter’s complaint, and Brown received notice and two hearings. The court concluded that neither federal nor California constitutional due process required disclosure of the reporter’s identity under the circumstances and affirmed the superior court’s judgment denying Brown’s petition. View "Brown v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law

After Volkswagen AG became the subject of a criminal investigation by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) for its use of defeat device software to evade emissions standards—a scandal widely known as “Dieselgate”—the company agreed to a plea deal with the DOJ. As part of the investigation, Volkswagen, through its law firm Jones Day, produced approximately six million documents to federal prosecutors in response to a grand jury subpoena. Lawrence Kalbers, a university professor, subsequently filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request seeking all documents Volkswagen provided to the DOJ during the investigation, specifically referencing materials described in Volkswagen’s 2017 Annual Report.The DOJ denied the FOIA request, citing exemptions for law enforcement records and information protected by statute, including Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e), which safeguards grand jury materials. Kalbers challenged this denial in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. The district court ordered the DOJ to produce all responsive documents and a Vaughn index, later appointing a special master due to the volume of records. The special master recommended disclosure, reasoning the documents did not clearly reveal grand jury deliberations. The district court overruled DOJ and Volkswagen’s objections and ordered disclosure, prompting both parties to appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that nearly all the requested documents are exempt from FOIA disclosure under Exemption 3 because they were obtained solely via a grand jury subpoena and their release would reveal matters occurring before the grand jury, thus compromising grand jury secrecy protected by Rule 6(e). The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order requiring disclosure of these documents, but vacated and remanded as to four documents not marked as grand jury materials, instructing further review to determine their status. View "Kalbers v. Department of Justice" on Justia Law

Two sisters, aged twelve and nine, were sexually abused by their tutor during sessions at public libraries owned by two Alabama municipalities in 2017. The abuse was witnessed by library employees who allegedly failed to intervene or report the misconduct. The sisters disclosed the abuse to their mother later that year, prompting a police report. In 2023, the tutor was convicted of sexual abuse. In 2024, the sisters and their mother sued the municipalities, asserting negligence in failing to respond to the abuse.The initial complaint named nonprofit corporations associated with the libraries as defendants but was amended to substitute the municipalities themselves. Prior to filing the amended complaint, the plaintiffs served notices of claim to each municipality, but these were submitted more than six years after the alleged tortious conduct. Both the City of Irondale and the City of Birmingham moved to dismiss, arguing noncompliance with Alabama Code § 11-47-23, which requires notice of claim against a municipality within six months of claim accrual. The Jefferson Circuit Court granted their motions, dismissing the claims.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama considered whether minors are exempt from the six-month notice requirement under § 11-47-23. The plaintiffs argued that minority status should toll the notice period, referencing statutory provisions that extend the time for filing suit by minors. The Supreme Court of Alabama held that § 11-47-23 contains no exception for minors and that the statutory tolling provision applies only to statutes of limitations, not notice-of-claim statutes. The court affirmed the Jefferson Circuit Court's dismissal of the claims against both municipalities, holding that minors are subject to the same notice requirements as adults under Alabama law. View "A.G.R. v. The City of Irondale" on Justia Law

Several residents of Estherville, Iowa, sued a former police officer, the police chief, the City of Estherville, and its insurance company, alleging that the officer repeatedly accessed and disseminated their confidential criminal history and intelligence data for improper purposes between 2015 and his resignation on May 3, 2019. The officer used this data for personal gain, including assisting with vehicle repossessions and harassing certain plaintiffs. Complaints about his conduct were made to the police chief, who ultimately placed the officer on administrative leave and accepted his resignation. Criminal charges were later brought against the officer in 2022 for his actions.After learning of the wrongful data access between 2021 and 2022, the plaintiffs filed suit on July 7, 2023, in the Iowa District Court for Emmet County, asserting statutory and common law claims, including invasion of privacy and conspiracy, and seeking damages under Iowa Code section 692.6. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing the two-year statute of limitations under the Iowa Municipal Tort Claims Act (IMTCA) barred the claims, since all alleged misconduct ended by May 3, 2019. The district court denied dismissal, holding that the statutory claim under section 692.6 was subject to a five-year limitation with a discovery rule, and that the remaining claims accrued when plaintiffs discovered the wrongdoing.On appeal, the Iowa Court of Appeals reversed the district court and ordered dismissal, concluding that all claims were governed by the IMTCA’s two-year statute of limitations and that the date of injury was when the data was accessed or disseminated, not when plaintiffs learned of it. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court, holding that the IMTCA’s statute of limitations applied to all claims and began at the time of the wrongful acts, regardless of later discovery or emotional harm. The case was remanded for dismissal. View "Abrahamson v. Scheevel" on Justia Law

A group of individuals traveling through Kansas were stopped by Kansas Highway Patrol (KHP) troopers while driving on interstate highways, primarily I-70. In each instance, the drivers and passengers were from out of state, often driving to or from Colorado, and were stopped for alleged traffic violations. After the initial traffic stop was concluded, troopers used a tactic known as the “Kansas Two-Step”—they would briefly disengage, then reinitiate conversation in an attempt to gain consent for further questioning or searches. These stops often led to extended detentions and searches, but no contraband was discovered. The troopers testified that they considered the drivers’ out-of-state status, travel to or from Colorado, and other factors in developing reasonable suspicion.The individuals sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas, alleging violations of their Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures and their constitutional right to travel. Some plaintiffs also brought damages claims, resulting in jury verdicts in their favor. For their claims for injunctive relief, the district court conducted a bench trial and found that KHP had a pattern and practice of targeting out-of-state drivers and using the Two-Step in a manner violating the Fourth Amendment. The court granted a permanent injunction, requiring changes in KHP’s training, documentation, consent procedures, and supervision.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed whether the plaintiffs had standing for injunctive relief and whether the district court abused its discretion in issuing the injunction. The Tenth Circuit held that the plaintiffs had standing because there was a substantial risk they would be stopped again and that KHP had a pattern of unconstitutional conduct. However, the Tenth Circuit found that the injunction was overly broad regarding the use of a driver’s state of origin and the Two-Step tactic. The court affirmed the injunction in part, reversed it in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Shaw v. Smith" on Justia Law

A political action committee comprised of residents and registered voters in Richland, Washington, submitted a valid petition in October 2024 to amend the city charter. The proposed amendment would change the composition of the city council to be partly elected by district and partly at large. The Benton County Auditor, upon receiving the petition, scheduled the proposed amendment for the November 2025 general election ballot. The committee, however, sought to have the measure placed on a special election ballot in either February or April 2025.The committee filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in Benton County Superior Court, seeking an order to compel the auditor to place the amendment on the special election ballot. The superior court judge denied the writ, ruling that the amendment would appear on the November 2025 general election ballot instead. The committee obtained direct review of this decision by the Supreme Court of the State of Washington.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington unanimously concluded that the case was moot because the relevant special election dates had passed. Nonetheless, the court exercised its discretion to address the issue as one of continuing and substantial public interest. The majority of justices held that the phrase “next regular municipal election” in RCW 35.22.120 includes both special and general elections. However, a majority also agreed that mandamus was not appropriate in this case because the petitioner did not establish a nondiscretionary duty requiring the auditor to call a special election. The court affirmed the superior court’s dismissal of the writ of mandamus. View "A Better Richland v. Chilton" on Justia Law

A female custodian employed by a public university filed a Title IX complaint alleging physical assault and a pattern of sexual harassment by a male co-worker, both of whom were members of the same union. The university, which receives federal funding, initiated a Title IX grievance process compliant with 2020 federal Title IX Regulations. After an investigation and hearing in which both parties participated, university decision-makers found the accused violated university policy and determined there was just cause for his termination. The accused’s appeal within the Title IX process was unsuccessful, and he was terminated.The union representing the accused employee filed a grievance under its 2019 collective negotiation agreement (CNA) with the university, seeking arbitration to determine whether the termination was for just cause. The university denied the grievance, arguing that the federal Title IX Regulations preempted the CNA’s grievance procedure. The union sought arbitration through the New Jersey Public Employment Relations Commission (PERC), which denied the university’s request to restrain arbitration and held, applying state preemption law, that the Title IX Regulations did not preempt arbitration. The Superior Court, Appellate Division, affirmed, finding no conflict precluding the union’s grievance procedure.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and reversed the lower courts. The Court held that the CNA’s grievance procedure is preempted by the 2020 federal Title IX Regulations because those regulations require that any grievance or appeal process must apply equally to both complainant and respondent. The CNA’s arbitration process excluded the alleged victim from participation, granting rights only to the accused. The Court concluded that this inequality creates a direct conflict with federal law, which therefore preempts the CNA’s arbitration provision in this context. The decision is limited to this particular CNA and does not preempt all union grievance procedures. View "In the Matter of Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey v. AFSCME Local 888" on Justia Law