Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Three former deputies of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department were discharged for alleged misconduct and subsequently appealed their terminations to the Los Angeles County Civil Service Commission. While their appeals were pending, each entered into a settlement agreement with department chiefs that purported to reinstate them to employment. The County of Los Angeles refused to honor these settlements, asserting that they lacked proper approval. The deputies, along with their union, sought enforcement of the settlements through claims for mandamus, breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and declaratory relief, arguing that the department had longstanding authority to settle such appeals without further county approval.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County sustained the county’s demurrers to these claims without leave to amend, finding the settlements void for lack of county counsel approval and insufficient authority for department chiefs to bind the county. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal previously reversed in part, directing the trial court to grant leave to amend so petitioners could specify the legal basis for the department’s alleged authority. Petitioners filed several amended complaints, but the trial court again sustained demurrers, ultimately dismissing the action when petitioners failed to allege adequate legal authority for the chiefs to settle commission appeals on the county’s behalf.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, treated petitioners’ arguably untimely appeal as a writ petition under the unusual procedural circumstances. On the merits, the court held that petitioners failed to demonstrate that the sheriff and his subordinates had authority to bind the county to settlements of civil service commission appeals without approval from the Board of Supervisors or authority conferred by law. The court denied the writ petition, upholding dismissal of all claims. View "Assn. for L.A. Deputy Sheriffs v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Two commissioners of a state elections oversight body sought a writ of mandamus to compel the agency they supervise to provide administrative support necessary for the commission to convene meetings. The commission had been unable to meet for several months due to the absence of a chairperson and lack of direct contact information among members. The agency, which maintains the commission’s mailing list and facilitates communications, refused to provide support unless requested by a chairperson or by majority vote at a public meeting. This deadlock prevented the commission from fulfilling its statutory duties, including selecting a new chairperson.The commissioners repeatedly asked the agency for staff support and access to the mailing list, but these requests were denied. They then filed a petition with the Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i, arguing that their inability to meet stemmed directly from the agency’s refusal to provide required administrative assistance. The agency argued that only a chairperson or a majority vote could trigger its duty to provide support, and later shifted its position to suggest that a joint request from five members outside a formal meeting would suffice.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i held that when the commission lacks a chairperson and cannot convene a meeting, any single member may request the agency’s staff support to schedule and notice a meeting. The agency must comply with such requests, enabling the commission to meet and select a chairperson pro tem by majority vote. The court granted the writ of mandamus, clarifying that this rule ensures the commission can carry out its duties and the public’s right to open government is protected. View "Cushnie v. Nago" on Justia Law

The judges of the Municipal and Traffic Court of New Orleans determined that new technological demands required the addition of a court technology officer, a position to be directly managed by the judges. After receiving approval from the City’s Chief Administrative Office, the judges requested that this new role be designated as “unclassified” and placed on the city’s unclassified payroll system. The Personnel Director for the City referred the matter to the Civil Service Commission, which denied the request, reasoning that similar positions existed in the classified service. The judges subsequently filed a petition for writ of mandamus and declaratory judgment, seeking a court order to compel entry of the technology officer position onto the unclassified payroll and to declare that the Civil Service Commission had no authority over such appointments.The Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans granted both the writ of mandamus and declaratory judgment in favor of the judges, finding that employees hired by the judges for the Municipal and Traffic Court were in the unclassified service under the Louisiana Constitution and that the Civil Service Commission lacked jurisdiction over the number or terms of such employees. On appeal, the Louisiana Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, reversed, holding for the Commission.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the case on writ of certiorari. The Court held that, under the Louisiana Constitution, employees of the Municipal and Traffic Court (other than those in the clerk’s office) are in the unclassified service, and the Civil Service Commission’s rulemaking authority does not extend to these unclassified positions. The Court determined that neither the Constitution nor the relevant statutes limit the number of unclassified employees the judges may appoint when acting collectively. As a result, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeal and reinstated the judgment of the trial court, granting relief to the judges. View "JONES VS. TREPAGNIER" on Justia Law

The owner of a long-standing hamburger restaurant in Salina, Kansas hired an artist to paint a large, UFO-themed display on the exterior wall of the business. The display included playful imagery related to the restaurant and a slogan. Shortly after painting began, city officials determined the display was a "sign" under Salina's sign code, not an unregulated mural, because it referenced the restaurant's products. They concluded the display was too large to qualify for a permit, informed the owner to pause work, and instructed him to submit a permit application. The city later placed the application on indefinite hold, citing a review of the sign regulations. The owner disputed consenting to this hold and subsequently filed suit challenging the sign code and the city's enforcement.The United States District Court for the District of Kansas granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs on their First Amendment claims. The court found Salina's sign code failed intermediate scrutiny because there was insufficient evidence connecting the city’s distinction between signs and murals to its stated interests of safety, aesthetics, and property values. Declaratory relief was granted, but a permanent injunction was denied. Salina appealed.Reviewing the case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that Salina did not produce evidence demonstrating that regulated signs—as defined by the city—posed greater risks to its interests than unregulated murals. Therefore, the sign code failed intermediate scrutiny. The court further held that placing the permit application on indefinite hold constituted an impermissible prior restraint on speech, as the city did not show the applicant consented to the hold or that it complied with required time limits. The district court’s judgment was affirmed. View "Cozy Inn, Incorporated v. City of Salina, Kansas" on Justia Law

Green Cross of MS, LLC applied for a medical cannabis dispensary license for a location in Oxford, Mississippi. The Mississippi Medical Cannabis Act prohibits dispensaries from operating within one thousand feet of schools, churches, or childcare facilities unless certain waivers are obtained, and only for locations between five hundred and one thousand feet from these entities. Green Cross obtained a waiver from a nearby childcare facility and verified, through a survey and public records, that no church owned property within the restricted area. However, the Alcoholic Beverage Control division of the Mississippi Department of Revenue discovered that Wellspring Church was operating services within ninety-nine feet of the proposed dispensary, although the church did not own the property.After ABC denied the license application due to proximity to Wellspring Church, it refunded Green Cross’s $25,000 annual license fee but not the $15,000 application fee. Green Cross appealed to the Panola County Circuit Court, arguing that the church did not qualify under the Act’s definition since it lacked a property interest. The circuit court affirmed the denial of the license but ordered ABC to refund the application fee, reasoning that not doing so in these circumstances would be arbitrary.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed both appeals. The Court affirmed the circuit court’s decision to uphold the denial of the dispensary license, holding that the Act does not require a church to own the property for the restriction to apply. However, it reversed the circuit court’s order requiring ABC to refund the application fee, concluding that the Act only allows refunds in cases where a denial is based on proximity to another dispensary and not for proximity to churches. The Court’s disposition was reversed on direct appeal and affirmed on cross-appeal. View "Mississippi Alcoholic Beverage Control v. Green Cross of MS, LLC" on Justia Law

A group of immigration attorneys, a law firm, and a legal services organization challenged practices by the Department of Homeland Security and its component agencies involved in immigration enforcement and adjudication. They alleged that the agencies routinely require noncitizens and their counsel to obtain key records through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), rather than providing them directly during immigration proceedings. The plaintiffs claimed this so-called “Nondisclosure Policy” causes delays, omissions, and additional burdens that impede their ability to represent clients effectively and limit their capacity to take on more cases.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts reviewed the case in multiple stages. Initially, the court dismissed claims related to removal proceedings and due process violations, but allowed the APA claim regarding asylum proceedings to proceed. After the plaintiffs amended their complaint to add allegations about ICE’s practices following Dent v. Holder, the court again dismissed the removal-related claims, finding no disclosure obligation in those proceedings. The surviving claim then proceeded to summary judgment, where the district court found insufficient evidence of a formal agency-wide policy and ruled that the government’s use of FOIA did not violate relevant regulations or the APA, granting summary judgment for the government.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit examined whether the plaintiffs had Article III standing to bring their claims. The court determined that the plaintiffs failed to establish the existence of a uniform, agency-wide Nondisclosure Policy, and concluded their alleged injuries were too speculative and were not sufficiently concrete to confer standing. The court distinguished this case from precedents like Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman and Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, holding that voluntary expenditures and increased burdens do not, by themselves, amount to an injury in fact. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment for the government on the basis of lack of standing. View "Greater Boston Legal Services v. Dep't of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

The case concerns two ranching entities in Nevada that challenged plans issued by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) to gather and remove excess wild horses from specified areas—the Little Fish Lake Joint Management Area and the Stone Cabin Complex. After BLM determined that the populations of wild horses in these areas significantly exceeded the established Appropriate Management Levels (AML), it developed multi-year Gather Plans that detailed procedures for removal, population control, and subsequent maintenance actions. The plaintiffs asserted that these plans failed to satisfy the requirement of the Wild Free Roaming Horses and Burros Act, which directs BLM to “immediately remove excess animals from the range so as to achieve appropriate management levels.”The United States District Court for the District of Nevada consolidated the plaintiffs’ challenges and reviewed them under the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the government officials, concluding that the Gather Plans did not violate the immediacy requirement of the Wild Horses Act. The plaintiffs timely appealed the district court’s decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. The Ninth Circuit interpreted the statutory language “immediately remove excess animals” to mean removal as promptly as logistically and reasonably possible, taking into account humane treatment and other statutory considerations. The court held that the Act does not require BLM to set a specific timeframe for removal nor prohibit BLM from considering practical constraints in its maintenance actions. The Ninth Circuit found that both Gather Plans complied with the Act’s immediacy requirement and rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments. The court affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "COLVIN AND SON, LLC V. BURGUM" on Justia Law

Two companies that operate platforms connecting app-based workers with customers, primarily for delivery services, challenged a Seattle city ordinance that restricts “unwarranted deactivations” of worker accounts. The ordinance requires network companies to provide written notice to workers about their deactivation policies and mandates that these policies be “reasonably related” to safe and efficient operations. The companies argued that these requirements violate their First Amendment rights by compelling speech and that the ordinance is unconstitutionally vague.After the ordinance was enacted, the companies sought a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. The district court concluded that the ordinance primarily regulated conduct and any impact on speech was incidental. It also held that the term “reasonable” was not unconstitutionally vague and that the companies had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm, or a balance of equities in their favor. Accordingly, the district court denied the request for injunctive relief.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction. Assuming, without deciding, that the ordinance regulates speech, the court determined that any regulated speech was commercial in nature. Applying the standard from Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, the court found the ordinance’s disclosure and policy requirements to be reasonably related to substantial governmental interests and not unduly burdensome or controversial. The court also rejected the companies’ vagueness challenge, holding the ordinance provided adequate notice of what conduct was required. Because the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits, the court affirmed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction. View "UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. V. CITY OF SEATTLE" on Justia Law

In 1994, the petitioner was convicted of aggravated murder and first-degree robbery following a fatal shooting during a robbery. He received a life sentence with a mandatory minimum of 30 years for aggravated murder and a consecutive 72-month sentence for robbery, with additional consecutive sentences for later in-prison offenses. After nearly 27 years, he became eligible to seek release from his aggravated murder sentence under Oregon’s three-step process: a murder-review hearing, a determination of a projected release date, and an exit interview. The petitioner successfully completed these steps; the Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision affirmed his release date following the exit interview.The Oregon Board of Parole first set the petitioner’s projected release date as January 5, 2022, but after applying some earned-time credits, adjusted it to November 18, 2021, the date of the exit interview. The petitioner argued that the Board should have adjusted his release date further back, to September 23, 2017, based on all available earned-time credits calculated by the Department of Corrections. The Board believed it could not set a release date before the exit interview, relying on prior Oregon Supreme Court cases. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the Board’s approach, holding that earned-time credits could not be applied to adjust the release date to a time before the exit interview, reasoning that the term of incarceration is not set until after the Board schedules and affirms the release date.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reversed the Court of Appeals and the Board’s final order. The court held that, for inmates serving consecutive sentences, once the Board affirms release after the statutory three-step process, the Board must fully apply all available earned-time credits under ORS 421.121, even if that results in a release date before the exit interview. The case was remanded to the Board for further proceedings. View "Barrett v. Board of Parole" on Justia Law

An architect licensed in California, through his firm, provided architectural services and held himself out as an architect in Nevada without obtaining a Nevada license. The Nevada State Board of Architecture, Interior Design and Residential Design regulates such activities in Nevada. The Board issued charges against the architect for violating statutes prohibiting unlicensed practice and advertising as an architect without a Nevada license. Following an administrative hearing, the Board found violations and imposed a $20,000 civil penalty.After the Board’s decision, the architect petitioned for judicial review in the Eighth Judicial District Court. The district court remanded the matter to the Board to determine whether the violations implicated any common law issue entitling him to a jury trial. The Board held a second hearing and determined no such right existed. Upon renewed petition for judicial review, the district court denied the architect's petition, prompting an appeal.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada considered whether Article 1, Section 3 of the Nevada Constitution guarantees a right to a jury trial in administrative agency proceedings involving civil penalties where the statutory violations lack a common law analog. The Court held that the constitutional right to a jury trial does not apply to administrative proceedings imposing civil penalties for statutory violations that are not sufficiently analogous to common law actions for which a jury trial was historically available. The Court concluded that none of the statutes violated—regarding unlicensed practice, misrepresentation, or civil penalties—was sufficiently analogous to common law causes of action such as fraudulent misrepresentation, professional negligence, or action in debt. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the district court’s order denying the petition for judicial review. View "HAGEN VS. HARRISON" on Justia Law