Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Bidi Vapor LLC filed a premarket tobacco product application (PMTA) with the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in 2020 for its tobacco-flavored electronic nicotine delivery system (ENDS) product, the Bidi Stick – Classic. The FDA identified several deficiencies in the application, and despite Bidi Vapor submitting supplemental information, the FDA found the evidence insufficient. On January 22, 2024, the FDA issued a Marketing Denial Order (MDO) based on three independent grounds: high abuse liability of the product, incomplete study on leachable compounds, and lack of adequate comparison data on harmful constituents. This order prevented Bidi Vapor from marketing the Bidi Classic.Bidi Vapor appealed the FDA’s decision, arguing that the FDA violated the Tobacco Control Act and the Administrative Procedure Act, and acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner. The company contended that the FDA failed to conduct a balanced analysis of the product’s benefits and deficiencies, imposed product standards without proper rulemaking, and did not conduct a second cycle of toxicological review.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the FDA’s decision was reasonable and not arbitrary or capricious. The court found that the FDA had appropriately considered the relevant data and provided a satisfactory explanation for its actions, particularly regarding the high abuse liability of the Bidi Classic. The court noted that this deficiency alone was sufficient to support the MDO, and therefore did not address the other two grounds. The court denied Bidi Vapor’s petition for review, upholding the FDA’s Marketing Denial Order. View "Bidi Vapor LLC v. Food and Drug Administration" on Justia Law

Samuel and Peggy Edwards, residents of Rexburg, Idaho, refused to allow PacifiCorp, doing business as Rocky Mountain Power Company, to install a smart electrical meter on their property due to health concerns. Rocky Mountain considered this refusal a violation of its terms of service, which required access to electrical meter bases. After negotiations failed, Rocky Mountain informed the Edwards that their electrical service would be terminated unless they allowed the installation. The Edwards filed a formal complaint with the Idaho Public Utilities Commission (PUC), arguing they had not denied access and should be allowed to opt-out of the smart meter installation.The PUC consolidated the Edwards' complaint with similar complaints from other customers and granted Rocky Mountain's motion to dismiss, concluding that the Edwards had not provided evidence that smart meters presented a legitimate safety concern and that Rocky Mountain had the authority to access and replace meters. The Edwards' motion for reconsideration was also dismissed by the PUC, leading them to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court.The Idaho Supreme Court reviewed whether the PUC properly determined that Rocky Mountain had the authority to access the Edwards' property to replace the existing meter with a smart meter. The Court affirmed the PUC's decision, concluding that the tariff provisions allowed Rocky Mountain to access and replace meters. The Court also found that the Edwards' constitutional arguments were waived due to insufficient support and authority. The PUC's orders dismissing the Edwards' complaint and denying reconsideration were affirmed. View "Edwards v. IPUC" on Justia Law

The State of Wyoming, Board of Land Commissioners (State Board), granted Temporary Use Permits (TUPs) to permittees for the use of state land in Teton County. The Teton County Board of County Commissioners (County Board) issued abatement notices to the permittees, asserting violations of county land use regulations. The State Board sought a declaration that it and its permittees were not subject to these regulations. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the State Board, and the County Board appealed.The district court found that the State Board and its permittees were not subject to Teton County's land use and development regulations. The County Board argued that Wyoming statutes required compliance with local zoning laws for state lands under long-term leases and TUPs. The State Board countered that sovereign immunity protected it from such regulations and that the statutes did not apply to TUPs.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the State Board and its permittees operating under a TUP are not subject to county land use and development regulations. The court reasoned that while Wyoming statutes require compliance with local zoning laws for long-term leases of state lands, they do not impose the same requirement for TUPs. The court emphasized that the legislature's omission of TUPs from the statutory requirement for compliance with local zoning laws was intentional. Therefore, the County Board lacked the authority to enforce its land use regulations against the State Board and its permittees operating under a TUP. View "Teton County Board of County Commissioners v. State" on Justia Law

In May 2023, Officers Jacob Ondich and Mathew Lougee of the Casper Police Department arrested Daniel Charles Hemmer at his home and transported him to the Natrona County Detention Center (NCDC). Hemmer was charged with felony theft and entered a no-contest plea in December 2023. Subsequently, Hemmer filed a civil suit against the officers, the Casper Police Department, and NCDC, alleging unlawful entry, arrest without probable cause or a warrant, and a strip search at NCDC. He claimed the officers' actions constituted kidnapping and sought $12 million in damages.The Natrona County District Court dismissed Hemmer's complaint. The court found that Hemmer did not allege facts showing NCDC's involvement in his arrest or provide legal authority for his claims against the detention center. The court also dismissed the claims against the Casper Police Department due to a lack of specific allegations. The kidnapping claim against the officers was dismissed because Hemmer did not support it with legal authority. Additionally, the court concluded that Hemmer failed to submit a timely notice of claim under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and summarily affirmed the district court's dismissal. The court noted that Hemmer's pro se brief did not comply with appellate rules, lacked a statement of issues, and failed to present cogent arguments supported by legal authority. The court emphasized that while pro se litigants are given some leniency, they must still reasonably comply with procedural rules. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision to dismiss Hemmer's complaint. View "Hemmer v. City of Casper Police Department" on Justia Law

Artur Skobodzinski was driving a commercial vehicle when he was stopped by a North Dakota Highway Patrol trooper for a safety inspection. The trooper detected an odor of alcohol and observed that Skobodzinski had bloodshot eyes. Skobodzinski denied recent alcohol consumption and refused field sobriety tests. He also refused an on-site screening test and a chemical breath test, leading to his arrest for driving under the influence. Skobodzinski requested to speak with an attorney but was only allowed to do so over an hour later at the law enforcement center.The Department of Transportation held an administrative hearing and found that Skobodzinski refused the chemical test and had a reasonable opportunity to contact an attorney. Consequently, his driving privileges were revoked for 180 days. The district court affirmed this decision.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the hearing officer did not err in finding that Skobodzinski refused the chemical test. However, the court found that the hearing officer erred in determining that Skobodzinski was given a reasonable opportunity to speak with an attorney. The court noted that the trooper could have allowed Skobodzinski to contact an attorney immediately after his request, rather than delaying it until they reached the law enforcement center. The court emphasized that the trooper's delay deprived Skobodzinski of a meaningful opportunity to consult with an attorney and potentially cure his refusal to take the chemical test.The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the district court’s judgment and the hearing officer’s decision, thereby reinstating Skobodzinski’s driving privileges. View "Skobodzinski v. NDDOT" on Justia Law

Robert Saint, an attorney representing a whistleblower in a False Claims Act case, requested a legal memorandum (White Paper) from the Family & Social Services Administration (FSSA) under Indiana’s Access to Public Records Act (APRA). The White Paper was created by HealthNet, a private entity, and given to FSSA for use during Medicaid settlement negotiations. FSSA denied the request, claiming the document was protected by attorney-client privilege and the deliberative material exception.The Marion Superior Court ordered FSSA to disclose the White Paper, finding that FSSA failed to demonstrate an attorney-client relationship or that the document was deliberative material prepared for FSSA’s decision-making. The court also found that any privilege was waived when the document was tendered to FSSA. FSSA appealed, reasserting the deliberative material exception and arguing that the document was used for decision-making within the agency.The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, rejecting FSSA’s arguments and finding that the White Paper was neither intra-agency nor interagency material. The court also found that FSSA waived its private contractor and confidentiality arguments by not raising them earlier.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s order. The court held that the deliberative material exception did not apply because the White Paper was not intra-agency material. The court emphasized that intra-agency material must originate from and be communicated between employees of the same agency. Since the White Paper was created by HealthNet and not generated within FSSA, it did not qualify for the exception. The court concluded that FSSA failed to meet its burden of proof and ordered the disclosure of the White Paper. View "Family & Social Services Administration v. Saint" on Justia Law

Anthony Frank Romane, Jr. was arrested for driving under the influence after being found unconscious in his car. He exhibited signs of intoxication and failed field sobriety tests. At the police station, he refused to submit to a chemical test after being read the Chemical Test Admonition. The Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) initiated proceedings to suspend his license for one year due to his refusal to submit to testing. Romane requested an Administrative Per Se (APS) hearing to challenge the suspension.The APS hearing was conducted by a single hearing officer, Trena Leota, who introduced three documents into evidence: the arresting officer’s sworn DS 367 form, the unsworn arrest report, and Romane’s driving record. Romane’s counsel objected, arguing that the hearing officer was acting as an advocate, violating due process as explained in California DUI Lawyers Association v. Department of Motor Vehicles. The hearing officer overruled the objections and admitted the documents. Romane’s bodyworn camera footage was also admitted into evidence. The hearing officer ultimately sustained the suspension of Romane’s license.Romane filed a petition for writ of administrative mandate in the Superior Court of San Diego County, arguing that his due process rights were violated because the hearing officer acted as both advocate and adjudicator. The superior court agreed and ordered the DMV to set aside the suspension unless a new hearing was conducted with separate individuals acting as advocate and adjudicator.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case and reversed the superior court’s decision. The appellate court held that the hearing officer did not act as an advocate but merely collected and developed evidence, which is constitutionally permissible. The case was remanded to the superior court to consider Romane’s contention that the evidence did not support the hearing officer’s findings. View "Romane v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law

Enbridge Energy owns and operates a pipeline that runs from Wisconsin, through Michigan, and into Canada, crossing the Straits of Mackinac under a 1953 easement with the State of Michigan. In 2020, Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer informed Enbridge that the State was revoking the easement, alleging that Enbridge had violated it by creating an unreasonable risk of an oil spill. Enbridge responded by filing a federal lawsuit against Governor Whitmer and the Director of the Michigan Department of Natural Resources, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the State from interfering with the pipeline's operation.The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan rejected the defendants' argument that Enbridge’s claims were barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. The court held that Enbridge’s lawsuit fell within the Ex parte Young exception to sovereign immunity, which allows federal courts to hear cases seeking prospective relief against state officials for ongoing violations of federal law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Sixth Circuit held that Enbridge’s lawsuit was not barred by sovereign immunity because it sought prospective injunctive relief against state officials for alleged violations of federal law, fitting within the Ex parte Young doctrine. The court rejected the defendants' arguments that the suit was equivalent to a quiet title action or a request for specific performance of a state contract, finding that the relief sought would not divest the State of ownership or regulatory control over the land. Thus, the court concluded that Enbridge’s claims could proceed in federal court. View "Enbridge Energy, LP v. Whitmer" on Justia Law

Intellectual Capitol, Inc., JMI Sports, and JMIS College, LLC (Appellants) obtained contracts through the state procurement process with the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission (WCC) and Clemson University (Respondents). Disputes arose under these contracts, leading Respondents to file Requests for Resolution of Contract Controversy with the Chief Procurement Officer (CPO) for the State of South Carolina. Appellants then filed separate declaratory judgment actions in circuit court, challenging the constitutionality of section 11-35-4230 of the South Carolina Code, which grants the CPO exclusive jurisdiction over state contract disputes.The circuit court granted Respondents' motions to dismiss the declaratory judgment actions, ruling that section 11-35-4230 placed exclusive jurisdiction over the State's contract disputes with the CPO. The court also dismissed Appellants' constitutional claims as premature due to their failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Appellants appealed this decision.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of the declaratory judgment actions, but modified the reasoning. The Supreme Court held that the contracts between Appellants and Respondents contained a clear choice-of-forum provision, which unambiguously gave the CPO exclusive authority to resolve disputes. By agreeing to this provision, Appellants waived their right to have their disputes decided by a court of the unified judicial system. Consequently, there was no justiciable controversy, rendering the constitutional challenge to section 11-35-4230 a purely academic exercise. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of the declaratory judgment actions, as there were no legal rights at issue. View "Intellectual Capital, Inc. v. Chief Procurement Officer" on Justia Law

Petitioners, Choteau Acantha Publishing and Montana Free Press, claimed that the closure of the Governor’s Advisory Council meeting with judicial applicants violated open meeting laws. The Advisory Council, appointed by Governor Greg Gianforte, was tasked with interviewing applicants for a judicial vacancy in Montana’s Ninth Judicial District. The meeting was closed to the public by the Chair, Jennifer Stutz, after the applicants asserted their privacy rights.The District Court of the First Judicial District, Lewis and Clark County, presided by Judge Mike Menahan, granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of the Petitioners. The court determined that the Advisory Council’s closure of the meeting violated open meeting laws, as the applicants for a judicial position do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding their qualifications. The court also found that the meeting was improperly closed for its entirety without identifying specific privacy interests, thus failing to perform the required balancing test.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court affirmed the District Court’s decision, holding that the Advisory Council’s blanket closure of the meeting was overbroad and violated the statutory procedure for closing meetings. The court emphasized that the closure should be limited to the time when the discussion relates to individual privacy matters and that the presiding officer must articulate a rationale for closure. The court did not address the broader constitutional issue of whether judicial applicants have a reasonable expectation of privacy, as the statutory violation was sufficient to resolve the case. The dismissal of Petitioners’ claim to void the Advisory Council’s actions was also affirmed. View "Choteau Acantha Publishing v. Gianforte" on Justia Law