Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

A politically active resident of East Cleveland, Ohio, who had long used a sound truck to broadcast political messages, supported a challenger in a mayoral primary. After this involvement, city officials began enforcing rarely used parking and noise ordinances against him. The plaintiff was warned, cited, had his truck impounded, and was prosecuted for a noise violation. He alleged that these actions were motivated by his support for the challenger and criticism of the administration. The plaintiff, along with his company, brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the city, the mayor, the mayor’s chief of staff, and the police chief, asserting First Amendment retaliation and prior-restraint violations, as well as Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio resolved all claims in favor of the defendants. Some claims—including First Amendment retaliation claims against the mayor and chief of staff—were dismissed at the pleading stage, while others were resolved at summary judgment. The court found that the ordinances were facially valid and that the plaintiff had either failed to establish the required elements for his claims or had forfeited certain arguments on appeal.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit revived certain First Amendment retaliation claims. It held that the district court erred in applying the probable cause requirement to the retaliation claims against the mayor and chief of staff, reversing their dismissal. The court affirmed summary judgment for the police chief on qualified immunity grounds, finding no clearly established law that would make him liable as a conduit for another’s retaliatory motive. As to the city, the court vacated summary judgment on retaliation, remanding for further proceedings on whether municipal policy directly caused a constitutional violation. The court affirmed the district court on all other claims, including the prior-restraint and Fourth Amendment seizure claims, and noted that the plaintiff had forfeited his selective enforcement arguments on appeal. View "Fambrough v. City of E. Cleveland" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a cattle company, alleged that a state agency unconstitutionally took its water rights without compensation as part of the agency’s adjudication of water rights in the Klamath Basin. The agency began the adjudication in 1975 and completed the administrative phase in 2014, with judicial review ongoing in a separate proceeding. The plaintiff claims that administrative determinations prioritizing tribal water rights over its own resulted in a deprivation of its rights.Following the complaint, the plaintiff served discovery requests for documents related to the agency’s determination of tribal water rights. The agency produced a substantial number of records but withheld 446 documents on grounds of attorney-client privilege. The plaintiff moved to compel production of documents over 25 years old, arguing these should be disclosed under Oregon’s public records law. The Marion County Circuit Court ordered the agency to produce the documents, citing a perceived conflict between discovery rules and the public records law, and issued a protective order limiting their use.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the trial court’s discovery order in an original mandamus proceeding. It held that the public records law and civil discovery rules are independent avenues for obtaining records from a public body. The court determined that discovery in civil litigation is governed by procedural requirements and limitations, including the attorney-client privilege, and that courts may not compel production of privileged records in discovery merely because those records may be subject to disclosure under the public records law. The Supreme Court issued a peremptory writ of mandamus directing the trial court to vacate its discovery order. View "Sprague River Cattle Co. v. State of Oregon" on Justia Law

Brian Pyle sought a writ of mandamus to compel several South Dakota law enforcement agencies and officials to provide him with investigative records regarding the disappearance and death of his son, Ryan. Ryan was reported missing in August 2020, and his remains were found in November 2020 near the Snake Creek Recreation Area. Pyle alleged that he had made numerous requests for medical records and investigative reports, but had not received any documents. He cited Marsy’s Law in the South Dakota Constitution, asserting that as a victim or relative of a victim, he was entitled to these records.The Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit, Charles Mix County, initially issued a peremptory writ requiring the respondents to answer. The State, representing all respondents, moved to quash the writ, arguing that the requested records contained confidential criminal justice information exempt from disclosure by law, and that Pyle had not exhausted administrative remedies for accessing such records. The State also contended that, since law enforcement found no evidence of foul play and concluded no crime had occurred, Marsy’s Law did not apply. After a hearing, in which no testimony or evidence was presented, the circuit court granted the State's motion, quashed the writ, and denied Pyle's application, finding Pyle was not a victim under Marsy’s Law and that no mandatory duty existed to disclose the records.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the circuit court’s decision for abuse of discretion and questions of law de novo. The Supreme Court held that Marsy’s Law requires a crime to have occurred for someone to be considered a victim and to invoke its rights. Because law enforcement determined no crime had been committed, Pyle was not entitled to the records under Marsy’s Law. Further, the Supreme Court found that South Dakota statutes exempt criminal investigative records from mandatory disclosure. The circuit court’s decision was affirmed. View "Pyle v. S.D. Division Of Criminal Investigation" on Justia Law

A tavern operating in Washington, D.C., was required to maintain a security plan as a condition of its liquor license. The plan, approved by the District’s Alcoholic Beverage and Cannabis Board, included a statement that “[p]olice and/or EMS are called for any emergency situation” under a section describing the training provided to security personnel. In May 2023, after a physical altercation occurred between a patron and the tavern’s security guards outside the establishment, the tavern did not contact the police, although the patron later filed a police report.Following the incident, the District of Columbia Alcoholic Beverage and Cannabis Board initiated a show-cause proceeding to determine whether the tavern violated D.C. Code § 25-823(a)(6) by failing to adhere to its security plan. After a hearing, the Board found that the tavern was required by its plan to call the police during “any emergency situation,” determined that the incident qualified as such, and imposed a $1,000 fine alongside other sanctions. The Board interpreted the security plan in a manner akin to contract interpretation, concluding that the relevant provision imposed an affirmative obligation to contact the authorities during emergencies.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the Board’s order. The court held that, when read in context, the security plan provision in question described the content of the training provided to security personnel rather than imposing a standalone requirement that the tavern call the police in every emergency situation. There was no evidence presented that the required training had not been provided. Thus, the court ruled that the tavern did not violate its security plan and consequently did not violate D.C. Code § 25-823(a)(6). The court reversed the Board’s order. View "2461 Corporation T/A Madam's Organ v. District of Columbia Alcoholic Beverage and Cannabis Board" on Justia Law

Several skilled nursing facilities providing long-term care to Medicaid recipients challenged the Pennsylvania Department of Human Services’ methodology for calculating Medical Assistance reimbursement rates. The dispute centered on the “Inflation Factor” used in the annual rate-setting process, specifically whether the Department should adjust costs from the end-point of each cost report year to the mid-point of the rate year (the Department’s method), or from the mid-point of the cost report year to the mid-point of the rate year (as the providers argued, based on federal Medicare principles).After the Department issued rate notices using its chosen methodology, the providers requested hearings before the Bureau of Hearings and Appeals (BHA). An Administrative Law Judge found the Department’s interpretation reasonable and consistent with its regulations, noting the Department had used this method since the inception of the case-mix payment system. The BHA adopted these findings, and the Commonwealth Court affirmed, applying agency deference and holding the regulation was ambiguous and the Department’s interpretation was not clearly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Middle District, reviewed whether Pennsylvania courts should follow the “genuinely ambiguous” standard for agency deference articulated in Kisor v. Wilkie and whether the Department’s methodology was correct. The Court declined to adopt Kisor’s framework, instead clarifying that Pennsylvania courts must use the Statutory Construction Act to interpret ambiguous regulations, considering agency interpretations as one factor among many. The Court held that, although the relevant regulation was ambiguous regarding the starting point for inflation, the Department’s longstanding end-point to mid-point methodology was correct based on the factors in the Statutory Construction Act. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court’s decision. View "Lutheran Home v. DHS" on Justia Law

During the COVID-19 pandemic, federal relief programs such as the EIDL and PPP were implemented to assist small businesses. In Puerto Rico, a scheme led by Manfred Pentzke-Lemus fraudulently obtained such loans using fabricated documents and kickbacks. Jayson Pastrana-Román, owner of a food kiosk, became involved after Pentzke contacted him and assisted with loan applications. Pastrana allowed co-conspirators to alter his documents and apply for loans in his name, resulting in approved loans and kickbacks paid to Pentzke. Pastrana also recruited his brother and friends into the scheme, relaying instructions and collecting their kickback payments, though he did not retain these funds.A federal grand jury indicted Pastrana on ten counts, including wire fraud, money laundering, and conspiracy. He initially planned to go to trial but later pleaded guilty to all counts. At sentencing in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, the court determined Pastrana acted as a "manager" in the conspiracy, applying a three-level upward adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b). The court declined to grant a reduction for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, finding his acceptance was not timely and he had not admitted to his full role as recruiter and intermediary. The court imposed a 33-month concurrent sentence for all counts, below the calculated Guidelines range.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, Pastrana challenged the sentencing enhancements and denial of the acceptance reduction. The First Circuit held the district court did not err in applying the managerial role adjustment but did clearly err in denying the reduction for acceptance of responsibility, as Pastrana had admitted relevant conduct and timely notified the government of his intent to plead guilty. The court vacated Pastrana’s sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "US v. Pastrana-Roman" on Justia Law

Several plaintiffs, who own downstream water rights on the Baker-Lehman Creeks in Nevada, alleged that activities by Great Basin National Park—including water diversion and vegetation planting—reduced water flow and threatened their ability to use water as determined by a 1934 Nevada state court decree. This decree (the Baker-Lehman Decree) set out the rights of all claimants to water from these creeks, which now originate and flow through federally managed land. The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the United States from activities that interfered with their water rights.The case began in Nevada state court, where plaintiffs filed to enforce their rights under the 1934 decree. The United States removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Nevada and asserted sovereign immunity from suit. The district court found that sovereign immunity was not waived, reasoning that the McCarran Amendment did not apply because the United States did not participate in the original adjudication and thus the decree was not “comprehensive.” It dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The appellate court held that the McCarran Amendment retroactively waives the United States’ sovereign immunity for suits seeking administration of water rights determined in a comprehensive state adjudication. The court found that the Baker-Lehman Adjudication was comprehensive under Nevada’s statutory system, regardless of the United States’ prior participation. The plaintiffs’ suit to enforce their adjudicated water rights constitutes administration under the McCarran Amendment. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case, holding that the United States’ sovereign immunity was waived for this suit. View "BAKER RANCHES, INC. V. BURGUM" on Justia Law

An incarcerated individual submitted two separate public records requests to a police department in Ohio, one in March 2024 and another in March 2025. The first request, sent from an email account not in his own name and using a contraband cellphone from prison, sought ten categories of documents, including personnel records, budget materials, and complaints against officers. This email was inadvertently diverted to the department’s spam folder and went unnoticed for over a year. The second request, allegedly sent from an account in his own name, sought five items, including records of administrative leave, budget reports, payroll information, and complaints. Shortly after sending the second request, the individual initiated an action seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the department to produce records responsive to both requests.Upon receiving the mandamus complaint, the Put-in-Bay Police Department investigated and discovered the March 2024 email in its spam folder, then promptly responded to both requests, providing available records and written explanations for items that did not exist. The department stated that some requested records, such as use-of-force reports and booking-and-release policies, were not maintained. The department also challenged the applicability of recent statutory amendments barring inmates from receiving statutory damages, but the Supreme Court of Ohio determined those amendments did not apply to this action because it was filed before their effective dates.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and held that the relator failed to rebut the department’s attestations that all responsive records had been produced. The court found no clear or convincing evidence that additional records existed or that the department unreasonably delayed its responses, particularly given the circumstances surrounding the March 2024 request. Thus, the court denied the writ of mandamus, statutory damages, and court costs. View "State ex rel. Harris v. Put-in-Bay Police Dept." on Justia Law

Three transgender individuals sought to amend the sex designations on their Oklahoma birth certificates to align with their gender identities. They obtained state court orders directing these changes, but when presented to the Oklahoma State Department of Health, the applications were denied. The denial was based on an executive order issued by the Governor, which instructed the agency to cease amending birth certificates in ways not explicitly permitted by Oklahoma law.Plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, raising equal protection and due process claims against state officials. The District Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, and plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. The Tenth Circuit affirmed dismissal of the due process claim but reversed on the equal protection claim. Defendants sought certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, which issued a Grant, Vacate, Remand order directing the Tenth Circuit to reconsider in light of United States v. Skrmetti, 605 U.S. 495 (2025). Subsequently, the Tenth Circuit certified three questions of Oklahoma law to the Supreme Court of Oklahoma.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma held that Oklahoma Statute 63 O.S. § 1-321, as amended by § 1-321(H), prohibits changes to the sex designation on an Oklahoma birth certificate. The court further determined that neither current nor prior versions of the statute have ever permitted such changes, whether based on gender identity or otherwise. The answers to the certified questions were: 1) yes, the statute prohibits changes; 2) no, it has never permitted such changes; and 3) no, it does not now nor has ever permitted changes based on gender identity. View "FOWLER v. STITT" on Justia Law

An incarcerated individual submitted 73 public-records requests over ten days to various offices and employees within a state corrections department, a privately managed prison facility, and a food services provider. The requests sought records-retention schedules, records-retention policies, and public-records policies for the years 2023 or 2024, including department-specific documents from areas such as laundry, dental care, religious services, commissary, and education. After not receiving the documents he believed responsive, the requester filed a lawsuit seeking a writ of mandamus to compel production, statutory damages totaling $73,000, and court costs.The Supreme Court of Ohio previously dismissed claims against individual employees of the prison but allowed claims against the corrections department, the private prison manager, the facility, the food services provider, and certain employees. The corrections department and the private prison manager subsequently provided general records-retention and public-records policies, as well as a records-retention schedule. The requester argued these were insufficient, insisting he sought department-specific policies and schedules. Additional motions filed by the requester, including for default judgment and injunctive relief, were also considered.The Supreme Court of Ohio held that the requester failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the department-specific records he sought existed. The court found that the general policies provided applied to all departments and that separate department-specific policies did not exist. As such, the requester could not establish a clear legal right to relief or that any respondent failed to comply with obligations under the Public Records Act. The court also held that the private food-services provider was presumed not subject to the Public Records Act, and the requester failed to rebut that presumption. The court denied the writ, statutory damages, court costs, and all other motions. View "State ex rel. Ellis v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr." on Justia Law