Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Sponsors of a ballot initiative in Nebraska sought to have their proposed constitutional amendment, which would protect the powers of initiative and referendum, placed on the November 2026 general election ballot. The initiative aimed to require a four-fifths vote of the Legislature to amend, repeal, or impair laws enacted by initiative after November 2, 2004, and to similarly restrict the Legislature’s authority over laws affecting the initiative and referendum process itself. It also imposed a requirement that any laws facilitating or safeguarding the process advance a compelling state interest by the least restrictive means and prohibited legislative acts that would condition, restrict, burden, or impair these reserved powers.After the sponsors collected sufficient signatures, the Nebraska Secretary of State reviewed the measure. Following an objection by a current and a former state senator, the Secretary determined that the initiative violated Nebraska’s constitutional single subject rule and announced that he would not place it on the ballot.The sponsors filed an emergency application for a writ of mandamus directly with the Nebraska Supreme Court, asking the court to compel the Secretary to certify the initiative for the ballot. The Secretary argued that he was obligated to withhold ballot placement because the initiative contained more than one subject, contrary to the Nebraska Constitution. The Nebraska Supreme Court, exercising original jurisdiction, reviewed the matter de novo as a question of law.The Nebraska Supreme Court held that the proposed initiative violated the single subject rule because it addressed at least two distinct subjects: limiting legislative power over both the initiative process and the substance of laws enacted by initiative. The court concluded that these subjects were not naturally and necessarily connected. Accordingly, the court denied the writ of mandamus and dissolved its alternative writ, holding that the Secretary had no duty to place the initiative on the ballot. View "State ex rel. Davis v. Evnen" on Justia Law

A coalition composed of individuals, corporations, trade associations, labor unions, nonprofits, and public utilities brought suit in the Western District of Washington seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Their claims challenged the Washington State Energy Code, arguing that it is preempted by federal law and restricts the installation and maintenance of natural gas appliances, impacting their energy preferences and causing economic harm. The plaintiffs named as defendants the individual members of the Washington State Building Code Council, who had adopted the Energy Code, as well as the Washington Attorney General, all in their official capacities.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington reviewed the case first. All defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, citing sovereign immunity and standing. The district court granted the motion to dismiss solely on the basis of sovereign immunity, dismissing the plaintiffs’ complaint without prejudice and denying leave to amend. Plaintiffs then appealed the dismissal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the appeal. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal, holding that Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity barred the plaintiffs’ suit. The court determined that the named defendants did not have a sufficient connection with the enforcement of the Energy Code to be subject to suit under the Ex parte Young exception. The Councilmembers’ promulgation of the Energy Code and their issuance of non-binding advisory opinions did not constitute enforcement, and the Attorney General’s role did not exceed a generalized duty to enforce state law. Thus, all defendants were shielded by sovereign immunity, and the district court’s judgment was affirmed. View "RIVERA V. ANDERSON" on Justia Law

Twin brothers, both Black international students, were enrolled as doctoral candidates at the University of Mississippi’s Department of Pharmacy Administration. One brother, Bennard, disagreed with changes to his faculty mentorship arrangement, objected to mandatory in-person meetings, and declined to complete a required program assessment called the Abilities Transcript. After being repeatedly warned and given extensions, he was placed on provisional status for failing to complete the requirement, which also caused the loss of his graduate assistantship. Bennard and his brother each filed lawsuits against the University and several faculty members, alleging constitutional, statutory, and contract violations related to academic sanctions and alleged discriminatory treatment.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi consolidated the brothers’ cases. It dismissed Bennard’s claims against the University on sovereign-immunity grounds, dismissed his remaining federal claims under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his individual-capacity state contract claims. Bennard appealed, while his brother’s appeal was dismissed for failure to prosecute.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed Bennard’s remaining claims. The court held that sovereign immunity barred claims against the University, claims against one defendant in her official capacity, and official-capacity state-law contract claims; those dismissals must be without prejudice. The court further found that Bennard failed to plausibly allege First or Fourteenth Amendment violations, and that the faculty defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on individual-capacity claims. The court affirmed the district court’s refusal to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining contract claims and upheld consolidation of the cases and dismissal of moot preliminary injunction motions. The judgment was affirmed as modified to clarify the proper form of dismissal for sovereign-immunity-barred claims. View "Eriakha v. University of MS" on Justia Law

Several residents and a public interest foundation sought to block a county’s implementation of an ordinance that authorized the issuance of $25 million in general revenue bonds. The bonds were intended to fund the final phase of a sewer and wastewater treatment project serving only the southernmost part of the county. The ordinance provided for an annual ad valorem tax on all taxable property in the county to support repayment. The plaintiffs argued the ordinance violated the state constitution by levying a county-wide tax for a benefit limited to a specific geographic area.The Oconee County Circuit Court considered the county’s motion to dismiss, which argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing, that the action was untimely, and that the ordinance was constitutional. The circuit court rejected the county’s arguments on standing and timeliness but granted the motion to dismiss by concluding the ordinance was constitutional. The plaintiffs appealed, and the county cross-appealed, asserting the action should be barred as untimely.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the case. It held that the plaintiffs’ action was barred by the twenty-day statute of limitations in South Carolina Code section 11-15-30, which requires any action challenging the issuance of bonds to be filed within twenty days of filing the official record of bond proceedings. The Court determined the plaintiffs’ challenge was “on account of” the bond issuance, as the ordinance authorizing the bonds and their use were inseparable. Because the plaintiffs filed their action more than four months after the required record was filed with the clerk of court, the Supreme Court held the action was untimely. The judgment of the circuit court was affirmed as modified, with the Supreme Court declining to address other issues, including standing and constitutionality. View "SC Public Interest Foundation v. Oconee County" on Justia Law

The case concerns a hemp farm operated by Blue 42 Organics, LLC, which was damaged during a drug interdiction operation conducted by the Georgia Department of Public Safety (DPS). Blue 42, a properly registered hemp grower, alleged that in July 2021, DPS flew helicopters and a fixed-wing aircraft at low altitude over its property, destroying two rows of crops valued at approximately $37,000. Blue 42 also claimed that the operation jeopardized future land leases due to cattle being harassed by the aircraft. Blue 42 filed a claim for inverse condemnation, asserting that its property was damaged for a public purpose without just compensation as required by the Georgia Constitution.The Superior Court (trial court) granted DPS’s motion to dismiss, agreeing with DPS’s argument that the damage occurred during the exercise of the State’s police powers and was therefore barred by sovereign immunity. The Court of Appeals of Georgia affirmed, holding that all exercises of the police power were categorically exempt from the constitutional requirement to pay just and adequate compensation for property taken or damaged for public purposes.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and held that there is no categorical exemption from the Just Compensation Clause of the Georgia Constitution for all exercises of the police power. The court clarified that while limited exceptions exist—namely, destruction of property due to abatement of nuisances or in cases of urgent necessity—these did not apply categorically to all police power activities. The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, concluding that the lower courts erred by dismissing Blue 42’s complaint on the basis of a broad police power exemption. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this holding. View "BLUE 42 ORGANICS, LLC v. GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY" on Justia Law

Federal tax privacy law prohibits the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) from sharing taxpayer return information with other federal agencies unless strict statutory requirements are met. In 2025, after a request from Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the IRS developed and implemented a new protocol, known as the Data-Exchange Procedure, for responding to ICE’s mass requests for the addresses of over a million undocumented individuals. This streamlined process did not ensure that ICE’s requests satisfied the statutory prerequisites, such as providing a taxpayer’s actual address or identifying an appropriate point of contact personally involved in a criminal investigation. Using this flawed procedure, the IRS disclosed over 47,000 taxpayer records to ICE.The Center for Taxpayer Rights, joined by other organizations, sued in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, arguing the IRS’s actions violated federal law and harmed their missions by eroding trust in the tax system, deterring immigrant engagement, and diverting resources. The district court found that the IRS had, in fact, adopted a new policy, concluded plaintiffs were likely to prevail on the merits, and issued a preliminary injunction halting further disclosures under the new procedure unless statutory requirements were strictly followed and the court was notified of any future requests.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s order. The appellate court held that the IRS’s Data-Exchange Procedure constituted final agency action reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), did not comply with statutory requirements, and that the relief available under the Internal Revenue Code did not preclude APA review. The court found plaintiffs likely to succeed on the merits, likely to suffer irreparable harm, and that the balance of equities and public interest favored preliminary relief. The preliminary injunction was affirmed. View "Center for Taxpayer Rights v. IRS" on Justia Law

A dispute arose regarding the statements to be included on the November 3, 2026, Idaho general election ballot describing the effect of a “yes” or “no” vote on Proposition One, the Reproductive Freedom and Privacy Act. After qualifying for the ballot, Idahoans United for Women and Families objected to the ballot statements jointly prepared by the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, arguing they mischaracterized both the initiative and existing law, and failed to clearly and concisely convey the effect of each vote as required by Idaho Code section 34-1810(1)(b). The challenged statements had already been distributed for printing and to county clerks, prompting Idahoans United to seek expedited judicial relief.Previously, in Idahoans United for Women & Families v. Labrador (Idahoans United I), the Idaho Supreme Court reviewed related ballot materials for the same initiative, directing revisions to the short ballot title and fiscal impact statement, and later approving the revised materials. After the initiative qualified for the ballot, Idahoans United objected to the Yes/No Effect Statements, but Respondents declined to revise them. Unable to resolve the dispute, Idahoans United filed an original action in the Idaho Supreme Court seeking writs of mandamus, prohibition, and certiorari.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and granted writs of prohibition and mandamus, holding that the Yes/No Effect Statements failed to substantially comply with section 34-1810(1)(b) because they did not accurately and concisely convey the effect of a “yes” or “no” vote. The court prohibited use of the challenged statements and directed Respondents to prepare revised statements. Upon review, the court found the revised statements substantially complied with statutory requirements and allowed them to appear on the ballot. The request for a writ of certiorari was denied as duplicative, and no party was awarded costs or attorney fees. View "Idahoans United v. McGrane/Labrador" on Justia Law

A citizens’ group challenged the official ballot statements prepared by the Idaho Secretary of State and Attorney General for the 2026 general election, which would accompany Proposition One, the Reproductive Freedom and Privacy Act. The group argued that the statements describing the effect of a “yes” or “no” vote were unclear, misleading, and exceeded the statutory authority given to the officials, as they characterized both the proposed law and existing Idaho law rather than simply stating the effect of each vote.Previously, the Idaho Supreme Court had considered similar issues regarding other ballot materials for the same initiative in Idahoans United for Women & Families v. Labrador, 175 Idaho 708, 570 P.3d 1137 (2025), where it directed revisions to the short ballot title and the fiscal impact statement to ensure substantial compliance with statutory requirements. After the initiative qualified for the ballot, the officials prepared the contested Yes/No Effect Statements and distributed them to county clerks. The group’s objections were not resolved through negotiation, leading to the current original action before the Idaho Supreme Court.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho concluded that the group had standing under its relaxed standing doctrine, found it had original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus and prohibition, and applied the standard of substantial compliance to the ballot statements. The court held that both the “yes” and “no” statements failed to clearly and concisely communicate the effect of a vote, as required by Idaho Code section 34-1810(1)(b). The court granted writs of prohibition and mandamus, prohibited use of the challenged statements, and ordered the officials to prepare new, compliant statements by a set deadline. The request for a writ of certiorari was denied as duplicative, and no attorney fees were awarded. View "Idahoans United v. McGrane" on Justia Law

A biotechnology company developed a gene therapy for two hereditary blood disorders, which may negatively affect patients’ fertility. To address potential deterrence due to fertility concerns, the company created a program offering up to $70,000 for fertility services to patients receiving the therapy. The program was initially limited to privately insured patients, as the company was concerned it might violate federal healthcare statutes if extended to federally insured patients. To clarify the legality, the company requested an advisory opinion from the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), arguing that the program did not violate relevant statutes and, alternatively, qualified for statutory exceptions.After significant delays and exchanges, HHS issued an unfavorable advisory opinion, concluding the program violated both the Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS) and the Beneficiary Inducement Statute (BIS), and denied immunity from enforcement. The company sued HHS and its officials in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, challenging both the advisory opinion and the regulations governing timing for advisory opinions. The district court granted summary judgment to HHS, finding that the program violated the AKS and deferring to HHS’s reasoning regarding the BIS exception, while dismissing the challenge to the timing regulations as moot after the opinion was issued.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The court affirmed summary judgment for HHS regarding the AKS, holding that the program constituted prohibited remuneration intended to induce patients to purchase the therapy. However, it reversed as to the BIS, finding HHS’s determination arbitrary and capricious due to its failure to explain why the statutory exception did not apply. The court also held that the company had standing to challenge HHS’s timing regulations and that those regulations unlawfully evaded the statutory deadline. The judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Vertex Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. HHS" on Justia Law

In 1989, Sean Worrell was murdered in a Bronx movie theater. The police investigation initially focused on Ricardo Jimenez after he was identified by teenager Esco Blaylock, allegedly through a suggestive photo procedure. The official reports linked Jimenez to the nickname “Leon,” though evidence later suggested this identification process was flawed and possibly fabricated. The case remained dormant for a decade. Around 1999, Detective Wendell Stradford reopened the investigation, securing incriminating testimony from witnesses, including Andrew O’Brien, a federal inmate, and Blaylock, who had ceased cooperating years earlier. O’Brien’s cooperation was allegedly induced by the promise of a sentence reduction, and additional testimony came from a jailhouse informant with a history of unreliability. In 2007, Jimenez was convicted of murder based solely on these witnesses’ testimony and was sentenced to 22 years to life.Jimenez appealed his conviction through the New York State courts without success. He then sought federal habeas relief. In 2022, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York vacated his conviction, finding that the prosecutor had committed Brady violations by suppressing exculpatory and impeachment evidence regarding the key witnesses. The charges were dismissed in 2023.Jimenez then sued for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law, alleging malicious prosecution, denial of fair trial rights, failure to intervene by the officers, and Monell liability against the City and the District Attorney’s Office. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed all claims, finding, among other reasons, that Jimenez failed to overcome the presumption of probable cause from the grand jury indictment and that the pleadings were insufficient.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the malicious prosecution claims, the fair trial claims against the original investigating officers, the failure to intervene claims, and the Monell claim against the District Attorney’s Office. However, it vacated the dismissal of the fair trial claim against Detective Stradford, the Monell claim against the City of New York, and the negligence claim against the City, remanding those issues for further proceedings. The court held that Jimenez plausibly alleged fabrication and forwarding of false evidence by Detective Stradford and that the Monell and negligence claims warranted further consideration. View "Jimenez v. City of New York" on Justia Law