Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

A group of qualified electors and residents of Sidney sought to amend the city charter to establish a procedure for recalling elected officials. They filed a petition with the city clerk containing 561 signatures, which they believed met the threshold for submission to the voters. Their proposal was submitted under a provision in the Sidney Charter allowing amendments as provided by the Ohio Constitution. However, the city clerk rejected the petition, citing noncompliance with Ohio Revised Code section 731.32, which she interpreted as requiring a certified copy of the proposed amendment to be filed before circulating the petition.Following this rejection, the electors initiated a mandamus action in the Supreme Court of Ohio. They requested an order compelling the city council to certify the petition to the county board of elections and further sought to have the board verify the signatures and place the amendment on the ballot if sufficient. They also sought attorney fees and court costs. The respondents argued that the petition was invalid for procedural reasons, including the application of R.C. 731.32. The board of elections had not yet reviewed the petition, as it had not been transmitted by the city clerk.The Supreme Court of Ohio found that R.C. 731.32 does not apply to proposed amendments to a city charter unless the municipal charter incorporates that statute into its amendment process; the Sidney Charter does not do so. Thus, the city clerk erred in rejecting the petition on this basis. The court granted a limited writ of mandamus, ordering the city clerk to transmit the petition to the county board of elections for a determination of sufficiency. If the petition is found sufficient, the city council must provide by ordinance for submission of the proposed amendment to the voters within the constitutional timeframe. The requests for attorney fees and court costs, and relief against the law director and board of elections, were denied. View "State ex rel. Turner v. Barhorst" on Justia Law

The petitioner challenged the validity of an administrative rule issued by the Oregon Department of Corrections (DOC), which governs how credit for time served is calculated when an inmate is serving consecutive sentences. Specifically, the rule in question, OAR 291-100-0080(3)(c), directs that an inmate receives credit for time served against only the first of multiple consecutive sentences, unless different dates are indicated. The petitioner argued that this rule exceeded the DOC's statutory authority and was inconsistent with the relevant governing statutes.The Oregon Court of Appeals previously reviewed this case under ORS 183.400(1), a statute that allows any person to petition for a determination of the validity of an administrative rule. The Court of Appeals interpreted the relevant statutes as directing the same method of computation as the DOC rule and concluded that the rule was valid. The court's analysis was based on the statutes as they existed at the time of its decision.After the Supreme Court of Oregon allowed review, the parties informed the court that the legislature had amended the governing statutes, specifically ORS 137.370, to address the computation of credit for time served for consecutive sentences imposed after March 5, 2026. The Supreme Court of Oregon recognized that the Court of Appeals did not have an opportunity to consider the effect of these statutory amendments on the rule challenge. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of the amendments to Oregon Laws 2026, chapter 14. The main holding is that the Court of Appeals must determine whether the statutory amendments bear on the validity of the DOC rule. View "Lewis v. Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

A woman was fatally shot by a police officer during an attempt to execute an arrest warrant for a passenger in her car. Her mother brought suit against the officers involved and the city employing them, alleging that one officer acted negligently and that the city was vicariously liable for his actions because he acted within the scope of his employment. After the discovery phase, the plaintiff learned of prior domestic violence allegations against the second officer, which led her to add claims that his actions also contributed to the fatality and that the city negligently retained him despite knowing he was unfit for duty.The Pierce County Superior Court allowed the plaintiff to amend her complaint to include a negligent retention claim and reopened discovery. The City of Tacoma challenged that decision. The trial court certified the question to the Washington Court of Appeals, which held that because the city conceded the officers were acting within the scope of employment, the negligent retention claim was superfluous and could not be brought alongside the vicarious liability claim. The plaintiff then sought review of this decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case. It held that negligent retention and vicarious liability are distinct causes of action that may be pleaded together, even when an employer concedes its employee acted within the scope of employment. The court clarified that a scope of employment inquiry is not part of negligent retention analysis and overruled lower appellate cases to the extent they held otherwise. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision and remanded the case for further proceedings in the trial court. View "Earl v. Campbell" on Justia Law

After serving twenty years in the United States Air Force, the claimant sought educational assistance benefits from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to pay for a flight training course at MidCoast Aviation Services, LLC. He needed this pilot certification to qualify for a job as a sensor operator with General Atomics. Although he supported his application with a certificate from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) confirming MidCoast’s status as an approved pilot school, his application was denied.The VA initially denied the benefits, and the Board of Veterans’ Appeals affirmed the denial. The Board found that while the claimant had basic entitlement to educational assistance, the law did not permit benefits for the MidCoast course because the school was not an educational institution of higher learning (IHL), and the course was not part of a college degree program. The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims also affirmed the Board’s decision. The majority held that the claimant was ineligible for benefits because MidCoast was not affiliated with an IHL, relying on 38 U.S.C. § 3680A(b). A dissenting judge argued that FAA-approved flight training courses should be eligible regardless of IHL affiliation, based on 38 U.S.C. § 3672(b)(2)(A)(ii).On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed how to reconcile the two statutes. It held that while FAA-approved courses at certified pilot schools are “deemed approved,” veterans are only eligible for benefits if the flight training course is provided by an IHL and counts toward a college degree, per 38 U.S.C. § 3680A(b). Since the claimant’s course did not meet this requirement, the court affirmed his ineligibility for benefits. The court further concluded that any challenge to related VA regulations was moot, as statutory ineligibility foreclosed relief. View "LOOMIS v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

Two commercial fishermen and their family business challenged federal regulations that reduced catch limits for gag grouper in the Gulf of Mexico, a fish central to their livelihood. The fishermen argued that the Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council, which played a key role in proposing the catch limits and regulatory framework, was unconstitutionally composed and shielded from removal, violating the Appointments Clause and other constitutional provisions. Their complaint alleged significant financial harm resulting from the reduced catch limits.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama found that certain powers granted to the Council—specifically, three statutory “veto” provisions that allow the Council to block actions by the Secretary of Commerce—rendered Councilmembers “officers” wielding significant federal authority. It determined their appointments violated the Appointments Clause because they were not properly appointed as principal officers. However, instead of vacating the catch limit rule, the district court severed the unconstitutional veto provisions from the governing statute and entered judgment for the plaintiffs.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit largely agreed that the Council’s veto powers confer significant authority, so Councilmembers’ appointments as currently structured are constitutionally deficient. However, the Eleventh Circuit held that the remedy should be limited to invalidating actions taken with those veto powers. Because the gag grouper rule was not promulgated using the Council’s unconstitutional veto authority but rather through an advisory process ratified by the Secretary, the rule itself was not tainted. The court vacated the district court’s judgment for the plaintiffs and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of the government, concluding that vacatur of the challenged rule was unwarranted. View "Russo v. Secretary, U.S. Department of Commerce" on Justia Law

An applicant for a public sector web developer position was initially offered employment by a state agency, Minnesota IT Services (MNIT), contingent upon a background check. The background investigation revealed the applicant’s 2017 conviction for possession of child pornography. In compliance with the Criminal Offenders Rehabilitation Act (CORA), MNIT determined the conviction directly related to the position and requested evidence of rehabilitation and present fitness from the applicant. The applicant submitted documentation, including an early discharge from probation, evidence of law-abiding behavior since release, a description of the offense’s circumstances, and several reference letters. Despite this, MNIT concluded the conviction disqualified the applicant from employment and imposed a ten-year bar on reapplying.The applicant challenged the disqualification through the Minnesota Administrative Procedure Act. After both parties sought summary disposition, an administrative law judge (ALJ) found the applicant had provided sufficient evidence of rehabilitation and recommended the disqualification be rescinded. The Commissioner of MNIT, however, rejected the ALJ’s legal conclusions and recommendation, and remanded the matter for a contested case hearing. Following a related Minnesota Supreme Court decision clarifying that agencies lacked authority to remand to ALJs under the relevant administrative statute, the ALJ determined he lacked jurisdiction to proceed. The Commissioner then issued a final order affirming the disqualification, allowing the applicant to reapply in 2027. The applicant appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, which reversed the Commissioner’s decision, holding that MNIT lacked discretion to disqualify the applicant after competent evidence of rehabilitation was provided.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case. It held that the ALJ’s recommendation was not the final decision, as the Commissioner timely rejected it within statutory limits. On the substantive question, the Court found that a public employer retains discretion under CORA to determine whether an applicant has demonstrated sufficient rehabilitation and present fitness after the applicant submits competent evidence. The Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "McNitt vs. Minnesota IT Services" on Justia Law

South Carolina enacted a statute designed to protect the identities of individuals involved in the planning or carrying out of executions, including execution team members and suppliers of lethal injection drugs. The statute imposes civil and criminal penalties for the knowing disclosure of "identifying information" about such persons. A recent amendment expanded the statute's scope and reinforced its confidentiality provisions. The American Civil Liberties Union of South Carolina Foundation initiated legal proceedings, raising questions about whether publicly available information could be classified as "identifying information" under the statute and whether disclosing such information could trigger liability.The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina reviewed the matter and certified two questions to the Supreme Court of South Carolina for clarification: whether publicly available information qualifies as “identifying information” under subsection 24-3-580(A)(2), and whether a person can “knowingly disclose” publicly available information under subsection 24-3-580(C). These certified questions were presented for interpretation of state law, rather than resolution of factual disputes or application of federal law.The Supreme Court of South Carolina, upon examination of the statutory language and legislative intent, held that publicly available or nonconfidential information is not “identifying information” within the meaning of the statute. The Court reasoned that the statute’s use of “reveal” and “disclose” indicated an intent to protect previously confidential information, not information already known to the public. Therefore, the statute does not apply to the disclosure of information that is already publicly available. The Court answered both certified questions in the negative, clarifying that only the initial disclosure of confidential information is subject to liability under the statute. View "ACLU v. Wilson" on Justia Law

A group of employees at the Starbucks Reserve Roastery in New York City wore shirts displaying the name and logo of the Starbucks Workers United union during a national campaign to negotiate a first union contract. Following this, Starbucks asked the employees to change into attire compliant with the company’s dress code, which included policies limiting union-related and other insignia on clothing. Workers United responded by filing an unfair labor practice charge, alleging that Starbucks’ dress code policies violated employees’ rights under the National Labor Relations Act by restricting union expression.The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) initiated administrative proceedings against Starbucks, focusing on three dress code policies: the One-Pin Policy (limiting employees to one union button), the Issue-Pin Policy (prohibiting buttons or pins advocating political, religious, or personal issues), and the Logo-Shirt Policy (restricting shirts with non-approved logos or writings). An Administrative Law Judge sided with Starbucks regarding the One-Pin Policy—relying on Second Circuit precedent from NLRB v. Starbucks Corp. (“Starbucks I”)—but found Starbucks violated the NLRA with its other policies, applying the Board’s more recent Tesla, Inc. standard. The NLRB reversed the ALJ’s One-Pin Policy finding and concluded all three dress code policies violated the NLRA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case, granting Starbucks’ petition for review and denying enforcement of the NLRB’s decision invalidating the dress code policies. The court held that the Board’s Tesla test failed to properly balance employer and employee interests, as required by Supreme Court precedent, and that the One-Pin Policy was not an unfair labor practice under binding circuit precedent. The case was remanded to the NLRB for further analysis of the Issue-Pin and Logo-Shirt rules under a more balanced legal standard. View "Siren Retail Corp. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a limited partnership, initiated an action in 2019 against the State of Connecticut and its Commissioner of Energy and Environmental Protection, alleging unreasonable delays in processing applications for reimbursement under the underground storage tank petroleum clean-up program. The plaintiff sought a writ of mandamus to compel payment for approved claims and adjudication of pending claims, as well as damages for alleged constitutional violations and unlawful taking of property.The Superior Court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, citing sovereign immunity. On appeal, the Connecticut Appellate Court reversed the dismissal as to the mandamus claim and remanded for further proceedings, but affirmed dismissal of the damages claims. Following remand, the plaintiff amended its complaint to seek only a writ of mandamus for payment of approved claims. The trial court denied this request, finding the plaintiff did not show a complete and immediate right to payment. The Appellate Court affirmed, and the plaintiff was granted certification to appeal to the Supreme Court of Connecticut.After certification was granted, the legislature enacted Public Act 25-168, which cancelled all applications under the program, transferred remaining funds to the state’s general fund, and repealed the statutory scheme governing the program. The Supreme Court of Connecticut concluded that these legislative actions rendered the plaintiff’s appeal moot, as no practical relief could be granted. The court dismissed the appeal and vacated the judgments of the Appellate Court and the trial court pertaining to the writ of mandamus, but declined to vacate prior judgments in unrelated claims from earlier proceedings. View "Aldin Associates Ltd. Partnership v. State" on Justia Law

During Winter Storm Uri in February 2021, El Paso Electric Company (EPE) relied on the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 3 (PV3) to supply uninterrupted electricity to its New Mexico customers amid extreme weather and soaring natural gas prices. EPE used a Commission-approved proxy price formula, based on natural gas market index prices, to calculate the incremental costs associated with PV3-generated energy during the storm. The City of Las Cruces challenged EPE’s entitlement to recover these increased costs at the proxy price rate, focusing on whether the proxy price mechanism was appropriately applied.EPE sought a variance from the New Mexico Public Regulation Commission (NMPRC) to amortize the extraordinary cost increases over twelve months, which was not contested. Instead, intervenors raised legal objections to the use of the PV3 proxy price. The NMPRC conducted administrative proceedings, during which it found that the proxy price formula established in prior cases—including the 2009 Credit Suisse Agreement—remained valid and had been reaffirmed in subsequent orders. The Commission determined that PV3 was the most cost-effective resource during the storm and that EPE’s use of the proxy pricing formula was appropriate. The Commission’s final orders authorized EPE to recover the costs for PV3 energy based on the proxy price.The Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico reviewed the Commission’s orders. It adopted a highly deferential standard to the NMPRC’s interpretation of its own prior orders and found the Commission’s actions reasonable, supported by substantial evidence, and not arbitrary or capricious. The Court held that the City had not demonstrated that EPE’s use of PV3 at the proxy price or the Commission’s orders were unlawful or unreasonable, and it affirmed the Commission’s orders in full. View "City of Las Cruces v. Public Regulation Commission" on Justia Law