Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Brown is the sole owner and operator of a credit-monitoring service. Brown’s websites used a “negative option feature” to attract customers, offering a “free credit report and score” while obscuring in much smaller text that applying for this “free” information automatically enrolled customers in a $29.94 monthly “membership” subscription for Brown’s credit-monitoring service. Customers learned this information only when he sent them a letter after they were automatically enrolled. Brown’s most successful contractor capitalized on the confusion by posting Craigslist advertisements for fake rental properties and telling applicants to get a “free” credit score from Brown’s websites. The FRC sued Brown under the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 53(b). The district judge found that Brown was a principal for his contractor’s fraudulent scheme and that the websites failed to meet certain disclosure requirements in the Restore Online Shopper Confidence Act (ROSCA), 15 U.S.C. 8403. The judge entered a permanent injunction and ordered Brown to pay more than $5 million in restitution to the Commission. The Seventh Circuit affirmed as to liability and the issuance of a permanent injunction but, overruling precedent, vacated the restitution award. Section 13(b) authorizes only restraining orders and injunctions. The FTCA has two detailed remedial provisions that expressly authorize restitution if the Commission follows certain procedures. Adherence yp stare decisis should not allow the Commission to circumvent these elaborate enforcement provisions. View "Federal Trade Commission v. Credit Bureau Center, LLC" on Justia Law

The Clean Air Act directs the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to establish National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for certain air pollutants, 42 U.S.C. 7409. Each state must propose a state implementation plan (SIP) that “specif[ies] the manner in which national . . . ambient air quality standards will be achieved and maintained” for approval by the EPA. A 1990 CAA amendment set a national Reid Vapor Pressure (RVP) standard for gasoline. In 2004, the EPA informed Michigan that eight counties in southeast Michigan were “nonattainment” areas for the ozone NAAQS. In response, Michigan enacted the “Summer Fuel Law” to limit the RVP for gasoline sold during the summer months within those eight counties. After concluding that the revised RVP standards were “necessary” for the attainment of the ozone NAAQS, the EPA approved the incorporation of the Summer Fuel Law into Michigan’s SIP. Ammex unsuccessfully sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the Michigan Department of Agriculture and Rural Development from enforcing the Summer Fuel Law, arguing that the standard violates the Supremacy Clause and dormant Foreign Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. MDARD’s enforcement of the standard is the enforcement of federal law. View "Ammex, Inc. v. Wenk" on Justia Law

The Federal Railway Safety Act (FRSA) provides that if railroad carriers retaliate against employees who report safety violations, the aggrieved employee may file a complaint with OSHA within 180 days after the alleged retaliation, 49 U.S.C. 20109(d)(2)(A)(ii). The Secretary of Labor then has 210 days to issue a final decision. If the Secretary takes too long, the employee may file suit. Guerra, a Conrail conductor and brakeman, alleged that Conrail urged him to ignore safety regulations. When he refused, Conrail threatened him and eliminated incidental perks of his job. Guerra reported this to Conrail’s compliance office. He says he was told that if he kept reporting safety issues, there would be “undesirable consequences.” Soon after Guerra filed complaints about allegedly defective braking systems, a train Guerra was operating failed to brake properly and ran through a railroad switch. On April 6, 2016, Conrail notified Guerra that he would be suspended. On May 10, Guerra’s attorney, Katz, allegedly filed a FRSA complaint. Receiving no response, on November 28, Katz followed up with OSHA by email. OSHA notified Guerra that his claim was dismissed as untimely because OSHA first received Guerra’s complaint 237 days after the retaliation. Guerra attempted to invoke the common-law mailbox rule’s presumption of delivery. The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Third Circuit affirmed on other grounds. FRSA’s 180-day limitations period is a non-jurisdictional claim-processing rule. Guerra’s claim still fails because he has not produced enough reliable evidence to invoke the common-law mailbox rule. View "Guerra v. Consolidated Rail Corp" on Justia Law

Citing the Fair Labor Standards Act, which entitles employees to overtime pay for their hours of work that exceed 40 hours per week, 29 U.S.C. 207(a)(1), a group of U.S. Border Patrol Agents sought compensation for activities they claim were performed during “hours of work” while attending a voluntary canine instructor course. Agents who do not seek canine instructor certification by attending that course do not suffer any adverse consequences with respect to their existing jobs. Agents are motivated to obtain canine instructor certification in order to “mak[e] that next step in [their] career” and to potentially become a “course development instructor or . . . to be maybe an assistant director, even director.” The Claims Court granted the government summary judgment. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The course did not constitute “hours of work” under the Office of Personnel Management's regulations. The student instructors were not “directed to participate” in off-hours studying within the meaning of 5 C.F.R. 551.423(a)(2); the primary purpose for enrolling in the DCIC was for career advancement. View "Almanza v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging a resolution adopted by the Board of Supervisors to levy an annual assessment of $80 upon certain real property to fund expenditures related to firefighting services. After the County prevailed on all issues, plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Appeal held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the trial court's judgment and dismissed the appeal. In this case, plaintiffs were obligated to comply with the procedural requirements of Government Code section 50078.17 and failed to do so, because they filed their appeal after the 30 day deadline under the validation statutes, which govern the judicial proceedings in section 50078. Independent of the validation statutes, the court held that section 5008.17 requires that any appeal from a final judgment be filed within 30 days after entry of the judgment. View "Davis v. Mariposa County Board of Supervisors" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's order enjoining the Montana Department of Public Service Regulation (PSC) from propounding discovery in a dispute between Republic Services of Montana and North Valley Refuse (collectively, Petitioners), removing the PSC from the matter and ordering appointment of an independent hearing examiner to preside over the case, holding that the district court erred in requiring the PSC to appoint an independent hearing examiner. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court did not err by issuing a writ of prohibition barring the PSC from propounding discovery because the standards were satisfied for issuance of a writ of prohibition; but (2) the district court erred by issuing a writ of mandate requiring the PSC to appoint an independent hearing examiner. Because the authority for removal of the entire PSC based upon the independent actions of a staff member were insufficient, and the remedy under the circumstances was overbroad, the Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Allied Waste Services of N.A., LLC v. Montana Department of Public Service Regulation" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit held that the City of LaGrange did not enjoy state-action immunity when it ties its water-utility service to its natural-gas service for customers in unincorporated Troup County, Georgia. In this case, the Georgia legislature could have foreseen that cities would use their water monopoly to increase their share of an unrelated market and that such an anticompetitive move was not the inherent, logical, or ordinary result of the legislative scheme. Therefore, the district court correctly denied the City's motion to dismiss for state-action immunity and the court affirmed the district court's judgment in this interlocutory appeal. View "Diverse Power, Inc. v. City of LaGrange" on Justia Law

In this challenge to the action of the Prince George's County Council sitting as the District Council approving a special exception and variance sought by Wal-Mart Real Estate Business Trust regarding an existing store located in the Woodyard Crossing Shopping Center in Clinton, Maryland, the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the District Council has extensive authority to regulate and establish zoning laws and procedure, which includes special exception and variance application. The ZHE issued a decision denied an application for a special exception and variance sought by Wal-Mart. Wal-Mart filed exceptions to the Zoning Hearing Examiner's (ZHE) decision and requested that the District Council hear the case. Petitioners responded in opposition to Wal-Mart's exceptions. The District Council proceeded to approve Wal-Mart's application for a special exception and variance. The circuit court and Court of Special Appeals affirmed the District Council's decision. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the District Council is authorized to delegate the preparation of its opinion and order to its staff attorney; (2) the District Council rightfully exercises original jurisdiction when hearing zoning cases from the ZHE; and (3) Petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence that the District Council violated the Maryland Open Meetings Act. View "Grant v. County Council of Prince George's County" on Justia Law

Due to an unsafe condition on the premises, Osborne suffered a broken arm at the Center, which is owned and operated by Metro Nashville. Osborne obtained a state court judgment against Metro under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act; the damages included specific medical expenses related to the incident and found Osborne’s comparative fault to be 20 percent. Before the state court suit, Osborne incurred medical expenses for which Metro did not pay at the time. Medicare made conditional payments to Osborne totaling at least $9,453.09. Osborne claims he incurred—in addition to the costs of his state court litigation—the cost of his co-pays, deductibles, and co-insurance for treatments not covered through Medicare. Osborne alleged Metro is a primary payer who failed to pay under the Medicare Secondary Payer Act (MSPA), 42 U.S.C. 1395y(b), and was therefore liable for reimbursement of Medicare’s conditional payments and a double damages penalty under section 1395y(b)(3)(A). Metro claimed it paid the judgment in full, including discretionary costs. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that Osborne lacked statutory standing to sue for his individual losses and the conditional payments made by Medicare because the MSPA does not permit a private cause of action against tortfeasors. Because the MSPA is not a qui tam statute and financial injury suffered by Medicare is not attributed to Osborne, he also lacked Article III standing to sue for Medicare’s conditional payments. View "Osborne v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County" on Justia Law

The Association challenged the NCUA's promulgation of a final rule that makes it easier for community credit unions to expand their geographical coverage and thus to reach more potential members. The DC Circuit considered the Federal Credit Union Act's text, purpose, and legislative history, and held that the agency's policy choices were entirely appropriate for the most part. With respect to the qualification of certain Combined Statistical Areas as local communities and the increased population cap for rural districts, the court directed the district court to issue summary judgment in favor of the NCUA. With respect to the elimination of the urban-core requirement for local communities based on Core Based Statistical Areas, the court directed the district court to issue summary judgment in favor of the Association and to remand, without vacating, the relevant portion of the 2016 rule for further explanation. View "American Bankers Assoc. v. National Credit Union Administration" on Justia Law