Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

A county board created a port authority in 2003 to encourage economic development, administering a business park on contaminated land formerly operated by a lumber company. In 2022, the port authority entered into agreements with a private company to clean up and potentially develop the property, culminating in the sale of 105 acres for $1.6 million, with a credit for cleanup costs. The plaintiff alleged that between May 2022 and April 2025, the port authority failed to provide adequate public notice of its meetings or opportunities for public participation regarding the land transactions, in violation of Montana’s open meeting and right to participate laws.The Nineteenth Judicial District Court, Lincoln County, reviewed a motion for a preliminary injunction, which sought to halt any actions pursuant to the port authority’s decisions during the contested period and to void the land sale and related contracts. The District Court denied the injunction, reasoning that the relief sought would not merely enforce open meeting laws but would invalidate completed transactions and disrupt the property’s new ownership and development. The court found that the plaintiff had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits, particularly given the significant passage of time and changes to the property. The court did not resolve contested factual issues about notice or participation, nor did it make any final rulings on the underlying claims.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the District Court manifestly abused its discretion in denying the preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the District Court did not abuse its discretion because the plaintiff failed to establish all required elements for preliminary injunctive relief. The Supreme Court emphasized that the lower court had not decided the merits of the open meeting law claims and left those questions for future proceedings. View "Torgison v. Lincoln County" on Justia Law

Two individuals who are transgender women, one living in Montana and the other in Alaska, challenged recent Montana laws and administrative policies that restrict the ability to amend the sex designation on birth certificates and driver's licenses. These state actions, enacted in response to legislative changes, allow amendments to these documents only in limited circumstances such as clerical errors, not to reflect a person’s gender identity. The plaintiffs argued that these restrictions forced them to carry identification that does not match their gender identity, resulting in concrete harms such as disclosure of their transgender status during routine activities and difficulties in verifying their identity.The case was filed in the First Judicial District Court of Lewis and Clark County. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging violations of equal protection, right to privacy, and prohibition against compelled speech under the Montana Constitution, as well as violations of the Montana Administrative Procedure Act. The District Court found that the plaintiffs had standing, demonstrated concrete and particularized injuries, and satisfied all four factors required for a preliminary injunction. The court concluded that the policies likely violated Montana’s Equal Protection Clause by discriminating against transgender individuals on the basis of sex, and that the plaintiffs were likely to suffer irreparable harm without relief. The District Court preliminarily enjoined enforcement of the challenged state policies as applied to amending birth certificates and driver’s licenses.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the plaintiffs had standing and whether the District Court manifestly abused its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s order. It held that the plaintiffs had standing and that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the state policies likely constitute unconstitutional sex discrimination under Article II, Section 4 of the Montana Constitution, warranting preliminary injunctive relief. View "Kalarchik v. State" on Justia Law

The case involves a series of petitions filed by a state agency seeking to enter privately owned properties to conduct environmental, cultural, and geological investigations related to a potential water conveyance project in the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta. The agency pursued these entries under California’s precondemnation entry statutes, which allow entities with eminent domain authority to access property for studies necessary to determine suitability for public projects, before initiating formal condemnation proceedings. The landowners opposed these entries, arguing that, under specific provisions of the Water Code, the agency could not conduct such activities unless the project was fully authorized and funded.The Superior Court of San Joaquin County coordinated the various petitions and, after hearings, ultimately granted the agency’s requests to enter property and conduct the proposed activities. The trial court expressly found that the agency had eminent domain authority, did not need to initiate a classic condemnation action for these precondemnation activities, and was not required to comply with the project approval and funding prerequisites set forth in the Water Code. The landowners appealed these orders, maintaining their position that the agency’s authority was limited by the Water Code’s project approval requirements.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the appeal. The appellate court held that the Water Code’s project approval and funding requirements apply only to formal condemnation proceedings and not to precondemnation entry and testing activities authorized by the precondemnation entry statutes. The court relied on the California Supreme Court’s decision in Property Reserve, Inc. v. Superior Court, which established that these statutes provide a constitutionally valid process for temporary entry and testing, regardless of whether such activities amount to a taking. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s order granting the agency entry to perform the investigative activities. View "Dept. of Water Resources Cases" on Justia Law

A group of individuals alleged to be members of Tren de Aragua, a Venezuelan criminal gang and foreign terrorist organization, were detained in Texas after the President, invoking the Alien Enemies Act, ordered their removal from the United States. On March 15, 2025, government officials placed several of these detainees, including the plaintiffs, on planes bound for El Salvador. Shortly after their departure, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) barring the government from removing the plaintiffs from the United States for 14 days. Despite the TRO, the planes continued to El Salvador, where the detainees were transferred to Salvadoran custody.The district court then began contempt proceedings against government officials, reasoning that the government’s actions violated the TRO, and threatened criminal contempt unless the government returned the plaintiffs to U.S. custody. The Supreme Court vacated the TRO, holding it was based on a legal error and filed in the wrong venue. Despite this, the district court persisted with contempt proceedings, seeking to identify and potentially prosecute the official responsible for the transfer. The government identified the Secretary of Homeland Security as the responsible party and provided declarations from involved officials. Unsatisfied, the district court ordered further hearings and investigation into the Executive Branch’s decision-making.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit granted the government’s petition for a writ of mandamus, holding that the district court’s investigation was a clear abuse of discretion. The appellate court found the TRO lacked the clarity required to support criminal contempt for transferring custody and that further judicial inquiry into Executive Branch deliberations was improper, especially given national security concerns. The court ordered the district court to terminate the contempt proceedings. View "In re: Donald Trump" on Justia Law

A U.S. citizen of Pakistani descent was denied boarding an international flight in 2019 and subsequently learned, after following the Department of Homeland Security’s redress process, that he was listed on the federal government’s No Fly List. He then sought to challenge his inclusion both on the No Fly List and the broader Terrorist Watchlist, which contains the names of individuals reasonably suspected of terrorism. Placement on the No Fly List is dependent on inclusion in the Terrorist Watchlist. The individual alleged ongoing travel and immigration-related harms due to his watchlist designations.He filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, raising constitutional and statutory claims and seeking removal from both lists. The district court concluded it lacked jurisdiction over the No Fly List claims due to the statutory requirement that such challenges proceed in the circuit court under 49 U.S.C. § 46110, and transferred those claims accordingly. The district court retained the Terrorist Watchlist claims under general federal question jurisdiction. After further briefing, the district court dismissed the remaining Terrorist Watchlist claims for lack of Article III standing, finding it could not redress the alleged injuries because removing the plaintiff from the Terrorist Watchlist would necessarily set aside the TSA Administrator’s order keeping him on the No Fly List—an action reserved for the circuit court.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. The court held that while the plaintiff suffered concrete injuries from his inclusion on the Terrorist Watchlist, the district court lacked authority to redress those injuries because any effective remedy would encroach on the circuit court’s exclusive jurisdiction to review and set aside TSA No Fly List orders under § 46110. Thus, the district court properly dismissed the case for lack of standing. View "Khalid v. Blanche" on Justia Law

A United States citizen of Pakistani descent challenged his continued placement on the federal No Fly List, which prohibits individuals from boarding flights in U.S. airspace. After enhanced screening and questioning by the FBI in 2012 and being prevented from boarding a flight in 2019, he sought redress through the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (DHS TRIP). He received an unclassified summary stating that his listing was based on concerns about his associations and candor regarding activities in Pakistan. He contested these grounds, denied any terrorist associations, and argued that his inclusion was erroneous.While his DHS TRIP redress was pending, he filed suit in the United States District Court, which ultimately concluded it lacked jurisdiction, as exclusive review of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Administrator’s order rested with the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The district court transferred his claims to the appellate court.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the TSA Administrator’s order, applying a “substantial evidence” and “arbitrary and capricious” standard, and reviewed constitutional claims de novo. The court dismissed the petitioner’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act claim for lack of standing, finding insufficient concrete plans to travel for religious purposes. It denied his other claims, holding that there is no fundamental right to air travel under substantive due process, and that the DHS TRIP process provides constitutionally adequate procedural protections. The court found that the Administrator’s order was supported by substantial evidence and not arbitrary or capricious. The court also rejected the argument that the major questions doctrine applied, finding TSA’s statutory authority adequate. The petition was dismissed in part and otherwise denied. View "Khalid v. TSA" on Justia Law

The case concerns an individual who was injured after tripping over the base of a removed bus stop sign on a public sidewalk in Manitou Springs, Colorado, on August 26, 2021. The injured party promptly notified Manitou Springs of her injury as required by the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA), which mandates notice to the liable public entity within 182 days of discovering the injury. Manitou Springs did not disclose its lack of responsibility for the sidewalk until April 2023, well after the statutory period had expired, when it told the claimant that Colorado Springs was responsible under an intergovernmental agreement. The claimant then notified Colorado Springs forty days later, but this notice was well outside the 182-day window.After the claimant brought suit against both cities for premises liability and negligence, Colorado Springs moved to dismiss, arguing that the notice was untimely under the CGIA and that equitable defenses were unavailable. The District Court denied this motion, holding that the notice period should have started when the claimant learned of Colorado Springs’ potential liability, not on the date of injury. The District Court reasoned that the claimant could not have known about the intergovernmental agreement without disclosure from Manitou Springs and thus had acted diligently.The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the CGIA’s 182-day notice period is jurisdictional, cannot be tolled or waived, and begins when the injury is discovered, regardless of knowledge of the liable public entity. The Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed this judgment, holding that strict compliance with the notice provision was required and that the notice period began on the date of injury. Because the claimant’s notice to Colorado Springs was untimely, dismissal was required. View "Mostellar v. City of Colo. Springs" on Justia Law

Spirit Airlines sold tickets to customers and collected a government-mandated security fee at the time of purchase. When customers canceled their tickets, Spirit deducted a cancellation fee and, if any value remained, issued a travel credit that expired after 60 days. If a customer did not use the credit before it expired, Spirit retained the full value—including the security fee—as revenue. Spirit either did not remit the security fee from these unused credits to the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), or, if the fee had already been remitted, offset it against future payments.The U.S. Customs and Border Protection audited Spirit and determined that it had “under-remitted” security fees by retaining those attributable to expired credits. TSA adopted these findings, concluding that Spirit owed nearly $2.8 million. Spirit sought administrative review, arguing that it was not required to remit fees for customers who did not travel, as such individuals were not “passengers” under the statute. Alternatively, Spirit asserted it had effectively refunded the fees through credits and offsets. TSA rejected these arguments, finding that the statutory scheme required remittance of all fees collected unless they were actually refunded to the customer, and that expired credits did not constitute refunds.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed TSA’s decision, applying de novo review to questions of law and upholding factual findings if supported by substantial evidence. The court held that the statute required airlines to remit all security fees collected, regardless of whether the customer traveled, unless the fee was actually refunded. The court also found that TSA’s guidance gave Spirit fair notice of its obligations. The Eleventh Circuit denied Spirit’s petition for review, affirming TSA’s decision. View "Spirit Airlines, LLC v. Transportation Security Administration" on Justia Law

Several individuals, all enthusiasts of distilling spirits, and a non-profit organization devoted to legalizing at-home hobby distilling, sought to challenge longstanding federal laws prohibiting the operation of home distilleries. The plaintiffs, who had experience with lawful alcohol production for fuel or other beverages, expressed clear intent to distill spirits for personal consumption at or near their residences. They faced explicit warnings from federal authorities that such activity was illegal and punishable by substantial penalties, and that no permits would be issued for home-based distillation of consumable spirits.After contacting the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau (TTB) and receiving confirmation that home distilling would not be permitted, the plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas against the TTB and the U.S. Department of Justice. The district court dismissed several individual plaintiffs for lack of standing but allowed the claims of one individual and the non-profit organization to proceed. On the merits, the district court determined that federal statutes barring home distilling for beverage purposes violated the Constitution’s Commerce, Taxation, and Necessary and Proper clauses. The government appealed, and the dismissed plaintiffs cross-appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that all individual plaintiffs and the non-profit organization had standing to sue. On the merits, the Fifth Circuit ruled that the statutory prohibition on home distilleries and associated criminal penalties exceeded Congress’s constitutional authority under both the Taxation Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause, as the prohibitions were not “plainly adapted” to raising revenue and represented an improper federal intrusion into matters reserved to the states. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and injunction against enforcement of the statutes, as modified. View "McNutt v. Dept of Justice" on Justia Law

In this matter, a member of the University of Alabama’s men’s basketball team, Kai Spears, brought suit against The New York Times Company after it published articles erroneously identifying him as the unidentified passenger in a car at the scene of a high-profile shooting. The Times based its reporting on information from two confidential sources. Spears, who was not in the car, alleges that The Times failed to use reasonable care in publishing false and damaging statements about him. During litigation in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, Spears sought discovery to uncover the identities of the sources and related information. The Times resisted, invoking Alabama’s “shield statute,” which protects journalists from being compelled to reveal confidential sources.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama certified two questions to the Supreme Court of Alabama concerning the scope of the state’s shield statute. The first question asked whether the statute protects the identity of a source when information is published online. However, as Spears conceded that the print publication of the article triggered the statute’s application, the Supreme Court of Alabama declined to answer this question, finding it irrelevant to the case.The Supreme Court of Alabama addressed the second certified question, which asked whether the shield statute protects any and all information that could reasonably lead to the identification of a protected source. The Court held that Alabama’s shield statute does not extend so broadly. Instead, it protects only information that would inevitably reveal the identity of a confidential source. Thus, information that could merely “reasonably lead” to the identification of a source is not covered. The Court declined to expand the statute’s protections beyond its plain language and expressly limited the privilege to “source-identifying” information whose disclosure would make identifying the source unavoidable. View "The New York Times Company v. Spears" on Justia Law