Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Verizon Wireless sought permits from the City of Milwaukee to install small cells and matching utility poles in a downtown plaza next to a major arena. The City denied most of the permits, initially citing aesthetic concerns and proximity to existing poles. Later, it claimed it lacked authority to grant the permits because the plaza was leased to Deer District LLC. Verizon sued the City, arguing the denials violated the Telecommunications Act (TCA) and Wisconsin state law. The district court ruled in favor of Verizon, finding the City's justifications insufficient and ordered the City to issue the permits. Verizon installed the poles, and the City accepted the ruling.The district court found that the City's initial reasons for denial were not supported by substantial evidence and violated the TCA. It also found the City's later rationale, based on the lease with Deer District, untimely and unconvincing. The court held that the City violated Wisconsin state law as well, and ordered the City to issue the permits. The City complied and did not appeal the decision. Deer District, an intervening defendant, appealed, challenging the district court's interpretation of the lease and state law, but not the TCA holding.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court dismissed Deer District's appeal for lack of Article III standing, as Deer District could not demonstrate that its injury would be redressed by a favorable decision. The court noted that the City did not join the appeal and that the injunction ran exclusively against the City. Therefore, even if the court ruled in Deer District's favor, it would not change the City's obligations under the district court's order. The appeal was dismissed for want of jurisdiction. View "Cellco Partnership v Deer District LLC" on Justia Law

A student, E.I., attended El Segundo Middle School during the 2017-2018 school year and experienced bullying from classmates, particularly Skylar. Despite E.I. and her parents repeatedly reporting the bullying to school officials, including the principal and counselor, the school failed to take effective action. The bullying included verbal harassment, social media abuse, and physical aggression, which led E.I. to self-harm and develop PTSD and depression. The school’s anti-bullying policies were not adequately followed by the staff.The case was initially reviewed by the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, where a jury found the El Segundo Unified School District negligent and awarded E.I. $1 million in damages. The District moved for a new trial and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, both of which were denied by the court.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The District argued several points on appeal, including errors in allowing reliance on certain Education Code provisions, claims of immunity under Government Code section 820.2, insufficient evidence of causation, improper consideration of a negligent training and supervision theory, admission of expert testimony, and attorney misconduct during closing arguments. The appellate court found that many of the District’s arguments were either waived or lacked merit. The court held that the District was not immune from liability under Government Code section 820.2, as the actions in question were operational rather than policy decisions. The court also found substantial evidence supporting the jury’s causation finding and determined that any potential errors were not prejudicial. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the judgment in favor of E.I. View "E.I. v. El Segundo Unified School Dist." on Justia Law

A charter city in California entered into an agreement with a private developer to revitalize a nearly vacant mall into a multipurpose development. The city contributed approximately $51.36 million in local funds for public improvements, while the developer invested $143 million of its own funds and obtained additional loans. The developer selected the contractors and paid workers less than the prevailing wage, relying on a city ordinance exempting the project from the Prevailing Wage Law (PWL).The Department of Industrial Relations (DIR) determined that the project was subject to the PWL, as it involved public funds. The developer challenged this determination, but the Superior Court of Riverside County affirmed the DIR's decision, concluding that the project was not a municipal affair exempt from the PWL.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's judgment. The court held that the project was not a municipal affair under the home rule provision of the California Constitution. The court distinguished this case from others where charter cities directly managed and funded public works projects. Here, the developer controlled the construction, selected contractors, and bore the majority of the financial burden. The court concluded that the primary purpose of the project was to benefit the developer, not the city, and thus, the PWL applied. The judgment was affirmed, and the DIR was awarded costs on appeal. View "Palm Springs Promenade, LLC v. Dept. of Industrial Relations" on Justia Law

Environmental groups challenged the Bureau of Land Management’s (BLM) approval of the Willow Project, an oil and gas venture in Alaska's northern Arctic. BLM approved the project in 2023, allowing ConocoPhillips Alaska, Inc. to construct oil and gas infrastructure in the National Petroleum Reserve. BLM prepared a Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS) after a 2021 remand by the district court, which required BLM to reassess its alternatives analysis. BLM insisted on a full field development standard to avoid piecemeal development, which led to the exclusion of certain environmentally protective alternatives.The United States District Court for the District of Alaska granted summary judgment in favor of BLM, dismissing the plaintiffs' claims under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA), the Naval Petroleum Reserves Production Act (Reserves Act), and the Endangered Species Act (ESA). The district court found that BLM had rectified the errors identified in its 2021 order and that the alternatives analysis satisfied NEPA, the Reserves Act, and ANILCA. The court also held that the plaintiffs had standing but had not shown that the defendants violated the ESA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s decision. The court held that BLM did not abuse its discretion in using the full field development standard to avoid the risks of piecemeal development. However, BLM’s final approval of the project was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) because it did not provide a reasoned explanation for potentially deviating from the full field development standard. The court also held that BLM’s assessment of downstream emissions complied with NEPA and that BLM did not act arbitrarily in selecting mitigation measures under the Reserves Act. The court found that BLM complied with ANILCA’s procedural requirements and that the ESA consultation was not arbitrary or capricious. The court remanded the NEPA claim without vacatur, allowing BLM to provide a reasoned explanation for its decision. View "SOVEREIGN INUPIAT FOR A LIVING ARCTIC V. UNITED STATES BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT" on Justia Law

Anthony Stuart, a Navy veteran, appealed a decision by the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) that denied him credit for his military service in computing his civilian retirement annuity. Stuart served in the Navy during three periods between 1974 and 1991 and was placed on the Permanent Disability Retirement List in 1994 with a 60% disability rating. He later entered federal civilian service and retired in 2015. Stuart did not waive his military retired pay to receive credit for his military service toward his Federal Employees’ Retirement System (FERS) annuity.The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) initially decided that Stuart’s military service was not creditable toward his FERS annuity because he was receiving military retired pay. OPM explained that by statute, Stuart could not receive both military retired pay and FERS credit for his military service unless his military retired pay was awarded for specific reasons, which did not apply to him. Stuart sought reconsideration, but OPM affirmed its decision. Stuart then appealed to the MSPB, where an administrative judge upheld OPM’s decision, and the full Board affirmed, modifying the initial decision to clarify the analysis.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the MSPB’s decision. The court held that under 5 U.S.C. § 8411(c)(2), Stuart’s military service could not be credited toward his FERS annuity because he was receiving military retired pay and did not meet any statutory exceptions. The court rejected Stuart’s argument that his military retired pay, calculated based on his disability percentage, was not “based on” his military service. The court found that the statute clearly barred double crediting of military service for both military retired pay and a civilian retirement annuity. View "STUART v. OPM " on Justia Law

Mady Marieluise Schubarth pursued compensation for land allegedly seized from her family in Soviet-occupied Germany after World War II. She sued BVVG Bodenverwertungs-und-Verwaltungs GmbH (BVVG), an agent of Germany, under the expropriation exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). BVVG argued that U.S. courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the taking was a domestic matter, not subject to the expropriation exception. The district court disagreed and denied BVVG’s motion to dismiss.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially dismissed Schubarth’s action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Germany but reversed and remanded as to BVVG, allowing the case to proceed. On remand, the district court directed jurisdictional discovery, and BVVG again moved to dismiss, claiming the expropriation was a domestic taking. The district court denied this motion, leading to the current appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s denial of BVVG’s motion to dismiss. The court held that the 1945 expropriation of the Estate was not a domestic taking because it implicated both Germany and the Soviet Union, thus interfering with relations among states. The court concluded that the expropriation could not be considered a domestic taking and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether the expropriation constituted a taking in violation of international law. View "Schubarth v. BVVG Bodenverwertungs- Und -Verwaltungs GMBH" on Justia Law

Kimball Wind, LLC operates a wind facility in Nebraska, generating electricity transmitted on a network owned by the Western Area Power Administration (WAPA). Before operations began, WAPA determined that a substation expansion was necessary to safely transmit the facility's electricity. WAPA offered to cover part of the expansion costs, requiring Kimball Wind to pay the rest. Kimball Wind agreed under protest, believing WAPA wrongfully made it responsible for most of the costs. Kimball Wind petitioned the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) for an order directing WAPA to reimburse its contribution to the substation expansion.The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission determined that section 211A of the Federal Power Act does not provide for the relief sought by Kimball Wind. The Commission found that Kimball Wind did not seek an order for transmission services, which is the sole form of relief provided by section 211A. Kimball Wind then filed a request for rehearing, arguing that the order was internally inconsistent and unsupported by substantial evidence. The Commission denied the request for rehearing.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed with the Commission that section 211A does not authorize the Commission to issue an order directing WAPA to reimburse Kimball Wind for its contribution to the substation expansion. The court found that Kimball Wind did not seek an order for transmission services, the only type of order the Commission may issue under section 211A. Consequently, the court denied the petition for review. View "Kimball Wind, LLC v. FERC" on Justia Law

Gary Perez and Matilde Torres, members of the Lipan-Apache Native American Church, believe that certain religious services must be conducted at a specific site within Brackenridge Park in San Antonio, Texas. The City of San Antonio planned improvements to the park, including tree removal and bird deterrence, which Perez and Torres argued would destroy their sacred worship space. They sued the City, claiming violations of their religious rights under the First Amendment, the Texas Constitution, the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), and a new clause in the Texas Constitution that prohibits limiting religious services.The federal district court granted limited relief, allowing the Church access for certain ceremonies but did not enjoin the City's improvement plans. Perez appealed, and the Fifth Circuit initially affirmed the district court's decision but later withdrew its opinion and certified a question to the Supreme Court of Texas regarding the scope and force of the new Texas Religious Services Clause.The Supreme Court of Texas held that the Texas Religious Services Clause imposes a categorical bar on governmental limitations of religious services, regardless of the government's interest in the limitation. However, the Court also concluded that the scope of the clause is not unlimited and does not extend to the government's preservation and management of publicly owned lands. The Court emphasized that the clause does not require the government to provide or maintain natural elements necessary for religious services on public property. The case was remanded to the federal courts for further proceedings consistent with this interpretation. View "PEREZ v. CITY OF SAN ANTONIO" on Justia Law

A mother and daughter drowned while floating on innertubes on the Turkey River after going over a low-head dam. Their estates sued the State of Iowa, Fayette County, the Fayette County Conservation Board, and the City of Clermont, alleging negligence and premises liability for failing to maintain warnings about the dam. The defendants moved to dismiss the claims.The Iowa District Court for Fayette County dismissed all claims. The court concluded that the claims were barred by the public-duty doctrine and that the petition failed to meet the heightened pleading requirements in Iowa Code § 670.4A. The court also dismissed the claims against the State, referring generally to the reasons set forth in the State’s motion, which included qualified immunity, sovereign immunity, discretionary function immunity, and the public-duty doctrine.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that the heightened pleading requirements did not apply to the estates’ common law tort claims of negligence and premises liability. The court also determined that the public-duty doctrine did not bar the claims, as the allegations involved affirmative acts of negligence by the defendants. Additionally, the court found that the State’s sovereign immunity and discretionary function immunity did not apply at this stage, as the petition alleged inattention rather than considered choices by the State. The court also rejected the recreational immunity defense, concluding that the estates sufficiently pleaded an exception to the statute.The Iowa Supreme Court reversed the district court’s dismissal of the claims and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Estate of Kahn v. City of Clermont, Iowa" on Justia Law

Promenade D’Iberville, LLC, the owner and developer of a large retail shopping center in D’Iberville, Mississippi, discovered soil issues during construction in 2009. The problems were linked to the use of OPF42, a soil stabilizer containing bed ash from Jacksonville Electric Authority (JEA), a Florida public utility. Promenade filed a lawsuit in 2010 in the Harrison County Circuit Court against several parties, including JEA, alleging damages from the defective product.The Harrison County Circuit Court granted JEA’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, citing sovereign immunity based on California Franchise Tax Board v. Hyatt (Hyatt III). The court also held that the Full Faith and Credit Clause and comity principles required dismissal due to Florida’s presuit notice and venue requirements. Promenade appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and found that Hyatt III does not apply to JEA, as it is not an arm of the State of Florida but an instrumentality of the City of Jacksonville. The court also determined that neither the Full Faith and Credit Clause nor comity principles mandated dismissal. The court held that Promenade should be allowed to proceed with its claims against JEA in Mississippi, seeking damages similar to those allowed under Mississippi’s constitution for property damage.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed the trial court’s judgment of dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "The Promenade D'Iberville, LLC v. Jacksonville Electric Authority" on Justia Law