Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The IRS audited Plaintiff's and erroneously determined he owed tax for 2013 when he had actually overpaid. Plaintiff sought a timely 2012 tax refund based on the discovered miscalculation. Plaintiff claimed that, in the same envelope, he also requested a refund for the 2013 tax year, although the IRS claims it did not receive the 2013 refund request. Ultimately, the IRS awarded Plaintiff the requested 2012 refund, but denied the 2013 refund based on Plaintiff's failure to provide a timely request.Plaintiff sought enforcement of his 2013 refund, which the district court denied. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that Plaintiff failed to meet the required elements of the Mailbox Rule but plausibly alleged physical delivery of his refund request. Thus, the Fourth Circuit reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Stephen Pond v. US" on Justia Law

Petitioner Raji Rab contended that by allowing Los Angeles County workers to scan vote by mail ballots into the Voting Solutions for All People (VSAP) system (the computer hardware and software system used to capture and count votes in Los Angeles County) beginning 10 days before the March 2020 primary election, Dean Logan, the Los Angeles County Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk violated California Elections Code section 15101 (b)’s, prohibition on accessing and releasing a vote count prior to 8 p.m. on the day of an election. Rab alleged respondents the Los Angeles Board of Supervisors and its members (with Logan, the County) and the California Secretary of State, failed in their oversight of Logan, and, therefore, failed to protect the election process and aided and abetted in Logan’s alleged misconduct. Rab brought a petition for writ of mandate, seeking a manual recount of ballots from the March 2020 primary election, and claiming this matter was one “of [the] greatest public interest.” The trial court denied his petition. Specifically, in denying the petition, the trial court wrote, “[t]he Court interprets ‘machine reading’ to include, and thus to permit, scanning ballots. To leave no room for confusion in the future, the Court reiterates: Elections Code section 15101(b) allows the County to start scanning ballots on the 10th business day before the election.” Rab appealed, arguing the trial court misinterpreted Elections Code section 15101(b). Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court. View "Rab v. Weber" on Justia Law

Alaska, pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement with the Alaska State Employees Association (ASEA), a public sector union representing thousands of State employees, including union members and nonmembers, deducted union members’ dues from their paychecks and deducted from nonmembers’ paychecks a mandatory “agency fee” and transmitted the funds to ASEA. In June 2018 the United States Supreme Court held in Janus v. American Federation of State, County, & Municipal Employees, Council 31 (Janus) that charging union agency fees to nonmember public employees violated their First Amendment rights by “compelling them to subsidize private speech on matters of substantial public concern.” The State and ASEA modified their collective bargaining agreement to comply with Janus, and the State halted collecting agency fees from nonmembers. In 2019, after a change in executive branch administrations following the November 2018 election, the State took the position that Janus also required the State to take steps to protect union member employees’ First Amendment rights. The State contended that Janus required it to obtain union members’ clear and affirmative consent to union dues deductions, or else they too might be compelled to fund objectionable speech on issues of substantial public concern. The governor issued an administrative order directing the State to bypass ASEA and deal directly with individual union members to determine whether they wanted their dues deductions to continue and to immediately cease collecting dues upon request. Some union members expressed a desire to leave the union and requested to stop dues deductions; the State ceased collecting their union dues. The State then sued ASEA, seeking declaratory judgment that Janus compelled the State’s actions. ASEA countersued seeking to enjoin the State’s actions and recover damages for breach of the collective bargaining agreement and violations of several statutes. The superior court ruled in favor of ASEA, and the State appealed. The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s declaratory judgment in favor of ASEA because neither Janus nor the First Amendment required the State to alter the union member dues deduction practices set out in the collective bargaining agreement. And because the State’s actions were not compelled by Janus or the First Amendment, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s rulings that the State breached the collective bargaining agreement and violated relevant statutes. View "Alaska, et al. v. Alaska St. Emp. Ass'n, et al." on Justia Law

Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC has been trying to build its eponymous Mountain Valley Pipeline through West Virginia and Virginia. In 2017, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission first issued a certificate approving the project. To build an interstate natural gas pipeline, a company often needs additional federal permits from agencies other than the Commission. Mountain Valley needed approvals from the Bureau of Land Management, Forest Service, Army Corps of Engineers, and Fish and Wildlife Service. While Mountain Valley initially obtained each of those additional permits, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated all of them over time. The Commission responded with a series of follow-up orders. As Mountain Valley reacquired permits from the other agencies, the Commission extended the deadline for completing construction and authorized work to resume. Several environmental groups petitioned for a review of the Commission’s orders allowing the project to proceed.   The DC Circuit denied most of their claims and concluded that one is moot. But the court agreed with one of the claims: that the Commission inadequately explained its decision not to prepare a supplemental environmental impact statement addressing unexpectedly severe erosion and sedimentation along the pipeline’s right-of-way. While the court granted the petitions for review in part on that ground, it did not vacate the Commission’s orders allowing work on the project to resume. Instead, the court remanded the orders without vacatur to enable the Commission either to prepare a supplemental environmental impact statement or to better explain why one is unnecessary. View "Sierra Club v. FERC" on Justia Law

In August 2020, plaintiff Vermont Journalism Trust (VJT) sought from the State emails to or from former Secretary of the Agency of Commerce and Community Development Lawrence Miller related to the Jay Peak EB-5 fraud scandal. The State denied the request, citing the Public Records Act's (PRA) litigation exception. Following an unsuccessful agency appeal, VJT filed this suit in October 2020. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, which the court granted and denied in part. It found that the requested records were covered by the litigation exception but that outside circumstances had partially overtaken the case. In October 2021, VJT moved to compel the State to produce a "Vaughn" index of the remaining withheld records under 1 V.S.A. § 318(b)(2). VJT argued that the State had do so because it continued to withhold documents. During the pendency of this appeal, the State produced all records responsive to VJT’s public-records request, including those previously withheld. Because no live controversy remains, the Vermont Supreme Court dismissed this appeal as moot. View "Vermont Journalism Trust v. Agency of Commerce & Community Development" on Justia Law

The taxpayer, Saltwater Sportsman Outfitters, LLC (SSO), was a one-man operation that sold clothing online and at trade shows, conventions, and other events. SSO kept few records of what it had sold or where, though its sole member testified that most of its sales occurred out of state. After an audit, the Mississippi Department of Revenue (MDOR) assessed additional sales tax liability, ultimately settling on about $80,000 based on the disparity between SSO’s wholesale purchases and the sales taxes it had paid in Mississippi and other states. MDOR’s assessment was appealed to the circuit court, which granted summary judgment in favor of MDOR. SSO appealed. The Mississippi Supreme Court concluded that SSO’s failure to keep adequate records rendered MDOR’s assessment presumptively correct. The Court found no merit to SSO’s various arguments on appeal, including that the promoters of the events at which SSO sold were the true parties liable for the taxable sales. The Court therefore affirmed the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment. View "Saltwater Sportsman Outfitters, LLC v. Mississippi Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a reimbursement cap imposed by the Tennessee Department of Finance and Administration's Division of TennCare, the state agency tasked with administering the federal Medicaid program in Tennessee, was a "rule" within the meaning of the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act that should have been promulgated through the notice-and-comment process.Emergency Medical Care Facilities, P.C., a corporation compromised of private healthcare professionals who provide emergency-department services to TennCare enrollees, brought this action against TennCare alleging that TennCare's decision to impose a $50 cap on the amount that Emergency Medical and other healthcare professionals could recover from TennCare for certain treatment provided to TennCare enrollees was a rule and that TennCare violated the Tennessee Uniform Administrative Procedures act (UAPA) by implementing the cap without rulemaking. The chancery court granted summary judgment in favor of Emergency Medical. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the $50 cap fell within the so-called "internal-management exception" to the UAPA. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the $50 cap was a rule under the UAPA and should have been promulgated through notice-and-comment rulemaking. View "Emergency Medical Care Facilities, P.C. v. Division of Tenncare" on Justia Law

The Sativa Water District was created in 1938 under the County Water District Law to provide potable drinking water to the residents living in a neighborhood in the unincorporated community of Willowbrook and parts of the City of Compton within Los Angeles County. On July 9, 2018, four named individuals— (collectively, Plaintiffs)—filed a putative class action lawsuit against the Sativa Water District. The Sativa Water District moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ entire lawsuit. Following a briefing, a hearing, and supplemental briefing, the trial court granted the motion. Plaintiffs asserted that the trial court erred in (1) granting the Sativa Water District’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, (2) denying Plaintiffs’ motion to vacate the order dismissing the County as a defendant, and (3) decertifying their class as to the nuisance claim.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that the Reorganization Act grants a LAFCO discretion whether to permit a district to wind up its own affairs or whether instead to appoint a successor agency responsible for doing so. Because the LAFCO, in this case, took the latter route, Plaintiffs’ class action lawsuit against the dissolved district must be dismissed. The court further concluded that the trial court’s dismissal of the successor agency was proper because Legislature expressly granted civil immunity to that agency. View "Barajas v. Satvia L.A. County Water Dist." on Justia Law

On November 3, 2020, the voters of San Bernardino County passed Measure K, amending the county charter so as to: (1) limit a supervisor to a single four-year term; and (2) limit a supervisor’s compensation to $5,000 a month. At the same time, the voters also elected three new supervisors. The trial court ruled that the one-term limit was unconstitutional, but that the compensation limit was constitutional. The court ruled that because Measure K was not severable, it, too, had to be struck down. Finally, it ruled that Measure K did not apply to the new supervisors (although it acknowledged that the issue was moot, in light of its other rulings). Nadia Renner, proponent of Measure K, appealed.The San Bernardino County Board of Suprervisors (Board) cross-appealed, contending: (1) Supervisors’ compensation could not be set by initiative; (2) the compensation limit violated minimum wage laws; alternatively, if it effectively forced supervisors to work part-time, it impaired governmental functions; and (3) the compensation limit improperly acted as a referendum on San Bernardino County Code section 13.0614. After determining the trial court’s ruling was appealable, the Court of Appeal concluded the one-term limit was constitutional. Further, the Court held that the supervisors’ compensation could be set by initiative, and the Board did not show the limit violated minimum wage laws. The Board also did not show the limit conflicted with section 13.0614. “Even assuming that it does, the voters can amend or abrogate an ordinance not only by referendum, but also by initiative.” Because the Court held the one-term and compensation limits were valid, the Court did not reach the issue of whether Measure K was severable. The Court was split as to whether Measure K applied to new supervisors: the term limit applied, but the compensation limit did not. View "San Bernardino County Bd. of Supervisors v. Monell" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are flight attendants who sustained injuries in connection with their employment by United Airlines. They filed claims in the Northern District of Texas, but the district court dismissed them because the flight attendants failed to adequately plead diversity jurisdiction. This was despite the fact that the parties agree that the flight attendants could have invoked the district court’s jurisdiction if they had included the proper allegations. The flight attendants appealed, and this court affirmed. They filed the instant case shortly after. The district court dismissed the claims as barred by the statute of limitations. This appeal presents two primary questions, both of which concern the interpretation of the jurisdiction savings statute.   The Fifth Circuit wrote that it cannot make a reliable Erie guess on these important matters of state law. Accordingly, the court certified two questions to the Supreme Court of Texas: 1) Does Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code Section 16.064 apply to this lawsuit where Plaintiffs could have invoked the prior district court’s subject matter jurisdiction with proper pleading? 2) Did Plaintiffs file this lawsuit within sixty days of when the prior judgment became “final” for purposes of Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code Section 16.064(a)(2)? View "Sanders v. Boeing Company" on Justia Law