Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

TC Telephone participated as a provider in California’s LifeLine program, offering measured-rate telephone service to low-income customers. This service allowed subscribers 60 untimed local calls per month, for which TC Telephone incurred per-minute charges from other carriers. To recoup its costs, TC Telephone sought and received reimbursement from the California Public Utilities Commission (the Commission) based on the total minutes used, rather than per-call. Over several years, Commission staff approved these per-minute reimbursement claims and provided guidance that was ambiguous about the proper method for calculating reimbursements.The Commission began investigating TC Telephone’s reimbursement practices after concerns arose regarding claim amounts. In March 2020, the Commission issued a resolution clarifying that LifeLine providers should seek reimbursement on a per-call basis, not per-minute, and specified that this clarification applied prospectively. However, the Commission subsequently initiated proceedings to determine whether TC Telephone’s prior per-minute reimbursement claims violated program rules. In its initial decision, the Commission found that TC Telephone had improperly sought per-minute reimbursement and ordered it to repay over $8 million in funds received between January 2018 and March 2020, plus interest. TC Telephone’s petition for rehearing was denied.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the Commission’s decisions. The court held that prior to the Commission’s resolution, the reimbursement rules were unconstitutionally vague and failed to provide TC Telephone with fair notice that per-minute reimbursement was prohibited. Because even Commission staff did not know whether per-minute reimbursement was allowed, punishing TC Telephone for its claims violated due process. The court annulled the Commission’s decisions and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "TC Telephone v. Pub. Utilities Com." on Justia Law

The dispute centers on the division of a government pension earned by an employee during a lengthy period of cohabitation before marriage. The employee worked at the East Bay Municipal Utility District (EBMUD), contributing to his pension from 1987 to 2018. He and his partner began living together in 1993, executed a domestic partnership affidavit for benefits, purchased a home jointly, and eventually married in 2003. After their relationship ended, the partner sought legal separation and also filed a civil action alleging breach of an oral agreement made during their cohabitation period, in which they agreed to pool their earnings and share equally any property acquired as a result.The Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco consolidated the civil and divorce proceedings. It bifurcated the case, first trying the claims regarding the oral agreement. After trial, the court found that an implied-in-fact (Marvin) agreement existed during the cohabitation period, entitling each party to an equal share of property acquired, including pension contributions and accumulations. The employee moved to clarify that statutory protections made his pension “unassignable” and “exempt from execution,” but the court held that the partner was entitled to half of the pension benefits accrued during the Marvin period, and could receive payment upon distribution or via other assets after actuarial valuation.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed whether Public Utilities Code section 12337 barred the partner from sharing in pension benefits accrued during cohabitation. The court held that section 12337 does not prohibit the partner from receiving a share of pension contributions and accumulations, because her claim was based on ownership arising from the Marvin agreement, not as a creditor or assignee. The trial court’s order was affirmed. View "Seiwald v. Irias" on Justia Law

Crown Resources Corporation and its parent company operated the Buckhorn Mountain Mine in Okanogan County, Washington, under a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit issued by the Washington State Department of Ecology. Alleging violations of the Clean Water Act related to the mine’s discharges, both the Okanogan Highlands Alliance (OHA), a private environmental group, and the State of Washington filed separate citizen suits against Crown in 2020. The cases were consolidated and jointly litigated for several years. After mediation failed, OHA and Crown negotiated a settlement without Washington’s involvement. OHA and Crown submitted a proposed consent decree to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington, which resolved OHA’s claims only. The district court entered the consent decree.Following the entry of the consent decree, Crown moved for judgment on the pleadings in Washington’s suit, arguing that the claims were barred by claim preclusion due to the prior resolution of OHA’s suit. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington agreed, finding that Washington was in privity with OHA and thus barred from pursuing its claims. Washington’s motion for relief from judgment was denied, leading to this appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The Ninth Circuit held that Washington, not being a party to the consent decree and not in privity with OHA, was not barred from bringing its suit. The court found that the exceptions to nonparty preclusion identified in Taylor v. Sturgell did not apply here. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "WASHINGTON V. CROWN RESOURCES CORP." on Justia Law

A financial services company operating a designated contract market began offering sports-event contracts, which allowed users to buy and sell positions based on the outcome of various sporting events. These offerings attracted the attention of Ohio and Tennessee state gambling regulators, who asserted that the company was violating state gambling laws by operating without appropriate licenses and by allowing underage users to participate. Both states sent cease-and-desist letters to the company, demanding it stop offering sports-event contracts to their residents. The company, which claimed to be federally authorized under the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA), argued that federal law preempted state regulation of its activities.In Ohio, the company filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, seeking a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of state gambling laws against it. The district court denied the injunction, finding the company had not demonstrated that its sports-event contracts were “swaps” subject to exclusive jurisdiction of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and, even if they were, had not established federal preemption. The company appealed. In Tennessee, a similar suit was filed in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, which granted a preliminary injunction, holding the company was likely to succeed because the contracts constituted “swaps” and conflict preemption applied. Tennessee officials appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed both cases together. It held that the company’s sports-event contracts did not satisfy the statutory definition of a “swap” under the CEA and thus did not fall within CFTC exclusive jurisdiction. The court further held that, even assuming the contracts were swaps, the CEA neither expressly nor impliedly preempted Ohio’s or Tennessee’s gambling laws. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of the preliminary injunction in Ohio, vacated the grant of the injunction in Tennessee, and remanded for further proceedings. View "KalshiEX LLC v. Schuler" on Justia Law

The federal government expanded the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) program to allow state and local authorities to verify the citizenship status of registered voters and individuals registering to vote. This new version of the program incorporated Social Security Administration (SSA) records, including social security numbers, and permitted bulk searches. Under the modified program, personal information would be cross-checked with SSA databases, and if citizenship could not be confirmed, individuals would be required to provide additional proof to register or remain registered to vote.The League of Women Voters and other organizations sued the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), SSA, and related federal entities, claiming that the modified SAVE program violated confidentiality provisions of the Social Security Act, the Privacy Act of 1974, and was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The organizations sought summary judgment. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia ruled in their favor, vacated the modified SAVE program, and denied the government’s request for a stay. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit also denied a stay, with a dissent.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the government’s application for a stay. The Supreme Court found that the plaintiff organizations likely had standing but concluded their claims were unlikely to succeed on the merits. The Court explained that 8 U.S.C. §1373, enacted as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), authorizes DHS to request and receive information about citizenship status from other agencies, overriding restrictions in other laws. The Supreme Court granted the government’s application for a stay, allowing the modified SAVE program to operate pending appeal and possible review by the Supreme Court. View "Department of Homeland Security v. League of Women Voters" on Justia Law

A technology company developed an artificial intelligence system and imposed contractual and technical restrictions to prevent its use for fully autonomous lethal military operations and mass domestic surveillance. The company had previously adapted its product to meet some government needs but refused to remove these two key restrictions when the Department of War (formerly the Department of Defense) sought contractual terms allowing all lawful uses of the AI system. This disagreement coincided with a dispute over the product’s use in a sensitive military operation and previous incidents where the AI’s restrictions prevented it from fulfilling government requests. As a result, the Secretary of War determined that continued use of the AI posed a national security risk and ordered its removal from the Department’s supply chain under the Federal Acquisition Supply Chain Security Act of 2018.The Department promptly notified the company, offered an opportunity for reconsideration, and began implementing the exclusion. The company petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review and raised statutory and constitutional challenges, arguing that the exclusion was arbitrary, beyond statutory authority, and violated due process and First Amendment rights. The company also sought a stay, which was denied, and later requested rescission, which was also denied by the Secretary.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that it had jurisdiction under the statute to review the procurement action. The court found the Department’s determination reasonable, concluding that the company’s ability and willingness to restrict the AI’s use posed a covered “supply chain risk” under the statute, even without evidence of malicious intent. The court also held that less intrusive measures were not reasonably available, and that any procedural deficiencies in notice did not prejudice the company. The court further held that the exclusion did not violate the Fifth or First Amendments. The petitions for review were denied. View "Anthropic PBC v. United States Department of War" on Justia Law

A privately owned railroad company was engaged by the Nevada Department of Transportation to build a high-speed passenger rail line between Southern California and Las Vegas, Nevada. To fund this $12 billion project, the company sought and received a $3 billion federal grant from the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) under the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act. The Act contains a “Buy America” requirement, generally mandating that federally funded projects use goods produced in the United States, but it allows waivers if domestic goods are unavailable or unsatisfactory. The railroad company solicited bids for high-speed trains, and only two manufacturers responded: one offering to build most trains domestically but at a lower maximum speed, and another proposing to build the first two trains abroad to meet the project’s higher speed requirement, before shifting production to the U.S.After reviewing the bids, the FRA proposed to waive the Buy America requirement for either bid, but ultimately finalized a waiver only for the foreign-manufactured trains, based on its finding that no domestic manufacturer could produce trains at the required speed. The railroad company then contracted with the foreign manufacturer. The domestic manufacturer, having lost the contract, challenged the waiver in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, arguing it was unlawful and arbitrary. The district court dismissed the complaint, finding the domestic manufacturer lacked standing.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the domestic manufacturer had standing, as it suffered a concrete economic injury traceable to the waiver and redressable by court action. However, the court determined that the waiver was both lawful and reasonable under the statute, as the FRA correctly found no domestic producer could supply the required high-speed trains. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s judgment, converting it from a jurisdictional dismissal to a decision on the merits. View "Alstom Transportation, Inc. v. Federal Railroad Administration" on Justia Law

A fatal accident occurred in 2016 when a bicyclist, Jonathan Tansavatdi, collided with a turning truck at an intersection in the City of Rancho Palos Verdes. The bicycle lane on Hawthorne Boulevard ended before the intersection, forcing cyclists to share the roadway. Jonathan’s mother, Betty Tansavatdi, sued the City, alleging that the intersection constituted a dangerous condition of public property and that the City failed to adequately warn of this danger.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County initially granted summary judgment for the City based on the affirmative defense of design immunity under Government Code section 830.6. The trial court found the City had established all elements of design immunity regarding the absence of a bicycle lane. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the finding of design immunity but remanded the case for consideration of the failure to warn claim. The California Supreme Court, in Tansavatdi v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 639, held that design immunity does not categorically preclude failure to warn claims and remanded the matter, leaving open whether design immunity applies if warnings were part of an approved design.Upon remand, the City renewed its motion for summary judgment, arguing that all warning signs and markings at the intersection were part of the 2009 approved design plans. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, held that when a public entity has provided some warning of a dangerous condition as part of an approved and reasonable design, complaints about the adequacy of that warning fall within the scope of design immunity. The court affirmed summary judgment for the City and upheld the award of expert fees, finding the City’s section 998 settlement offer valid. View "Tansavatdi v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes" on Justia Law

Following the passage of Proposition 50, which revised congressional district maps in California, a community group in Riverside County alleged a discrepancy in the number of ballots counted versus ballots cast during the 2025 special election. Acting on the group’s report, the county sheriff’s department obtained search warrants from the Riverside County Superior Court and seized large quantities of ballots and election materials. The county registrar defended the official tally and explained the discrepancy at a public meeting. Despite the Attorney General’s request for a pause to review the investigation, the sheriff’s department advanced their search and began counting ballots, only halting after direct communication from the Attorney General.The Attorney General issued formal directives to the sheriff, instructing him to pause the investigation, preserve all seized materials, and provide case records for review. The sheriff initially did not respond, began counting ballots, then paused the count and secured the materials. Subsequent communications from the Attorney General reiterated these directives and requested records. After further seizures by the sheriff’s department, the Attorney General initiated litigation, seeking a writ of mandate in the California Court of Appeal, which denied relief on procedural grounds. The Attorney General then sought review in the Supreme Court of California.The Supreme Court of California held that the Attorney General, under the state Constitution and Government Code section 12560, possesses the authority to give binding directions to sheriffs regarding specific investigations when necessary to ensure uniform and adequate enforcement of state laws. The court concluded the directives issued in this case were within the Attorney General’s lawful authority and sufficiently specific. It granted writ relief, ordering the sheriff and department to comply with the Attorney General’s instructions to pause investigative actions, retain seized records (with certain exceptions), and provide requested materials. Each party was directed to bear its own costs. View "Bonta v. Bianco" on Justia Law

A bystander was injured in June 2023 when a police dog owned by a municipality mistakenly attacked him during a pursuit. The injured party, seeking damages for his injuries, timely submitted a statutory notice of claim to the municipality. In the notice, he offered to settle his personal injury claim for “one hundred thousand dollars ($250,000),” creating an internal inconsistency between the written and numerical amounts. The municipality did not accept the offer within the 60-day statutory period.After the offer was not accepted, the injured party filed a complaint in the Superior Court in Gila County. The municipality moved to dismiss, asserting that the notice failed to comply with Arizona Revised Statutes § 12-821.01(A)’s requirement to state a specific amount for which the claim can be settled. The Superior Court treated the motion as one for summary judgment and granted it, finding the notice insufficient. On appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two, reversed, holding that contract law principles should be used to resolve the inconsistency, and concluding that the written amount controlled, thus satisfying the statute.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed the case. It held that strict compliance with the statutory requirement is necessary: a notice of claim must state a single, specific settlement amount that leaves no room for doubt. The court rejected the use of contract interpretation principles or extrinsic evidence to resolve conflicting figures in the notice, emphasizing that the municipality has no obligation to investigate or seek clarification. Because the notice contained two different amounts, it did not comply with § 12-821.01(A). The Supreme Court vacated the appellate decision and affirmed summary judgment for the municipality. View "TERBORG v TOWN OF PAYSON" on Justia Law