Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

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The case involves a challenge by local governments and municipal organizations to the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) 2020 Ruling, which interprets and clarifies existing legislative rules from the 2014 Order. These rules implement section 6409(a) of the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012, requiring state and local governments to approve certain wireless network modifications that do not substantially change existing facilities.The petitioners challenged several provisions of the FCC’s 2020 Ruling: the Shot Clock Rule, the Separation Clause, the Equipment Cabinet Provision Clarification, the Concealment and Siting Approval Conditions Provisions, and the Express Evidence Requirement. They argued that these clarifications were either arbitrary and capricious or improperly issued without following the Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA) notice-and-comment procedures.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the 2020 Ruling’s clarifications of the Shot Clock Rule, the Separation Clause, and the Equipment Cabinet Provision were consistent with the 2014 Order, were interpretive rules, and were not arbitrary or capricious. Therefore, the court denied the petition for review regarding these provisions.However, the court found that the 2020 Ruling’s clarifications of the Concealment and Siting Approval Conditions Provisions were inconsistent with the 2014 Order, making them legislative rules. The FCC’s failure to follow the APA’s procedural requirements in issuing these legislative rules was not harmless. Consequently, the court granted the petition for review concerning these provisions.Finally, the court denied the petition for review regarding the Express Evidence Requirement, concluding that its application would not have a retroactive effect. The court’s decision was to grant the petition in part and deny it in part, affirming some of the FCC’s clarifications while invalidating others. View "League of California Cities v. Federal Communications Commission" on Justia Law

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Elizabeth Holt, a former insurance agent for Medicare Medicaid Advisors, Inc. (MMA), alleged that MMA and several insurance carriers (Aetna, Humana, and UnitedHealthcare) violated the False Claims Act (FCA). Holt claimed that MMA engaged in fraudulent practices, including falsifying agent certifications and violating Medicare marketing regulations, which led to the submission of false claims to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri dismissed Holt's complaint. The court found that no claims were submitted to the government, the alleged regulatory violations were not material to CMS’s contract with the carriers, and the complaint did not meet the particularity standard required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). The court also denied Holt's motion for reconsideration, which introduced a fraudulent inducement theory and requested leave to amend the complaint.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal, agreeing that Holt's allegations did not meet the materiality requirement under the FCA. The court applied the materiality standard from Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, considering factors such as whether the government designated compliance as a condition of payment, whether the violations were minor or substantial, and whether the government continued to pay claims despite knowing of the violations. The court found that the alleged violations did not go to the essence of CMS’s contract with the carriers and were not material to the government's payment decisions.The Eighth Circuit also upheld the district court's denial of Holt's motion for reconsideration and request to amend the complaint, concluding that adding a fraudulent inducement claim would be futile given the immateriality of the alleged violations. View "United States ex rel. Holt v. Medicare Medicaid Advisors" on Justia Law

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Deari Cole was committed to a developmental center under California's Welfare and Institutions Code section 6500, which allows for the commitment of individuals with developmental disabilities who pose a danger to themselves or others. Near the end of his commitment period, a petition to extend his commitment was filed, but it was too late for a trial to occur before the original commitment expired. Cole was held pending trial and subsequently filed a petition for writ of mandate or habeas corpus, arguing that equal protection principles required his release pending trial.The Contra Costa County Superior Court initially found Cole incompetent to stand trial on charges including felony possession of a firearm and second-degree burglary. He was committed to the Porterville Developmental Center for one year. Two days before this commitment was set to expire, the People filed a petition to extend it, and the court ordered Cole held pending trial on the recommitment petition. Cole's petition for writ of mandate and/or habeas corpus was summarily denied by the Court of Appeal, but the California Supreme Court directed the appellate court to issue an order to show cause.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case and rejected Cole's equal protection argument. The court held that the statutory scheme under section 6500, which allows for continued confinement pending a hearing on a recommitment petition, did not violate equal protection principles. The court reasoned that the differences between individuals with developmental disabilities and those with mental health disorders justified the disparate treatment. The court concluded that the legislative distinctions were reasonable and factually based, and thus, Cole's continued confinement pending trial was constitutionally permissible. The petition was ultimately dismissed as moot. View "Cole v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

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George Loy Clarke challenged the California Department of Motor Vehicles' (DMV) decision to suspend his driver’s license following his arrest for driving under the influence (DUI). Clarke argued that the DMV's administrative hearing violated due process and that his refusal to submit to a breath or blood test should be excused. The DMV had conducted an administrative per se (APS) hearing, which led to the suspension of Clarke’s license.The Superior Court of Orange County initially denied Clarke’s petition for a writ of mandate, which sought to overturn the DMV’s decision. Clarke’s first APS hearing resulted in a suspension, but the trial court later granted his petition for a writ of mandate, remanding the case for a new hearing. At the second hearing, Clarke contested the allegations of refusal to submit to a chemical test. Despite his objections, the hearing officer (HO) admitted the DMV’s evidence and ultimately reimposed the suspension.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court found that the DMV’s practice of having a single employee act as both advocate and adjudicator during the APS hearing violated due process, as established in California DUI Lawyers Assn. v. Department of Motor Vehicles and Knudsen v. Department of Motor Vehicles. The court concluded that the HO in Clarke’s case failed to separate her roles adequately, resulting in a due process violation. This constituted structural error, necessitating a reversal of the trial court’s denial of Clarke’s petition.The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order and remanded the case, directing the lower court to grant Clarke’s petition for a writ of mandate. The court also denied requests for judicial notice and to augment the record, leaving those issues to be addressed in a potential new APS hearing. View "Clarke v. Gordon" on Justia Law

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The City of Sammamish passed an ordinance to condemn property rights in George Davis Creek, which runs through the petitioners' property, for stormwater management and fish passage protection. The city aimed to address storm drainage issues, improve traffic safety, provide flood protection, and remove barriers to fish passage. The petitioners argued that the city lacked authority to condemn their property for fish passage purposes, citing the salmon recovery act (SRA) and a previous case, Cowlitz County v. Martin.The Superior Court denied the city's motion for condemnation, agreeing with the petitioners that the city had no authority to condemn private property for fish passage purposes. The city appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the decision, holding that the city had statutory authority under RCW 8.12.030 to condemn property for stormwater management. The court distinguished this case from Cowlitz County, noting that the project in question had multiple purposes, including stormwater management, which is explicitly authorized by the statute.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case to determine the scope of the city's statutory condemnation authority. The court held that RCW 8.12.030 grants cities the authority to condemn property for stormwater management and other public uses. The inclusion of fish passage as one of the project's purposes did not divest the city of its authority to condemn property for stormwater management. The court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "City of Sammamish v. Titcomb" on Justia Law

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Nine Black, female, low- to moderate-income first-time homebuyers purchased condominium units at the RiverEast at Grandview Condominium complex through the District of Columbia’s Housing Purchase Assistance Program. Shortly after moving in, they encountered severe habitability issues, including foundation problems, sewage, and mold. Their attempts to resolve these issues were unsuccessful, leading them to file a thirteen-count lawsuit against the developers, the District of Columbia Department of Housing and Community Development (DHCD), and the RiverEast at Grandview Condominium Owner’s Association. The developers later filed for bankruptcy, and the plaintiffs were forced to evacuate their units.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia granted motions to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims against the District and the Association for failure to state a claim. The court found that DHCD, as a District agency, was non sui juris and thus incapable of being sued. It also concluded that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the District of Columbia Consumer Protection Procedures Act (CPPA) because the District could not be considered a “merchant” under the statute. The court dismissed other claims, including violations of the District of Columbia Human Rights Act (DCHRA), breach of contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and negligence.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the CPPA claim, holding that the District could be considered a merchant under the statute. The case was remanded for further consideration of whether the District’s trade practices were unfair or deceptive. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the DCHRA, breach of contract, IIED, and negligence claims, finding that the plaintiffs failed to sufficiently allege facts to support these claims. The court also upheld the trial court’s denial of the plaintiffs’ request to amend their complaint. View "May v. River East at Grandview" on Justia Law

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Christian Greene, the Ombudsman for the District of Columbia Child & Family Services Agency (CFSA), was terminated from her position and subsequently filed a lawsuit against the District, claiming her termination violated the District of Columbia Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA). Greene argued that her termination was in retaliation for her disclosures about CFSA's non-compliance with the Foster Youth Statements of Rights and Responsibilities Amendment Act of 2012 (FYAA).The Superior Court of the District of Columbia granted summary judgment in favor of CFSA, concluding that Greene's disclosures were merely policy disagreements about the role of the Ombudsman and not protected under the WPA. The court did not address whether Greene reasonably believed her disclosures revealed unlawful activity or whether there was a causal connection between her disclosures and her termination.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and found that Greene's disclosures were indeed protected under the WPA. The court held that Greene reasonably believed her disclosures revealed violations of the FYAA, which required CFSA to report on the outcomes of investigations and ensure compliance with relevant laws. The court noted that Greene's belief was genuine and reasonable, given the evidence she provided and the context of her role.The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in part and remanded the case for further proceedings. The trial court was instructed to determine whether there is a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether Greene's WPA-protected disclosures were a cause of her termination. View "Greene v. D.C. Child & Family Services Agency" on Justia Law

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The case involves Susan Hartnett, a public employee who worked for the Commonwealth from 1978 to 1990 and then rejoined public service in 2002, working for the city of Boston. Upon her return, her salary more than doubled compared to her 1990 salary. Hartnett continued working until 2006 and deferred her retirement until 2016. Initially, her pension was calculated without applying the anti-spiking provision of the public employee pension statute, but after an audit, the Boston Retirement System (BRS) applied the provision, reducing her pension.Hartnett challenged the application of the anti-spiking provision. The Division of Administrative Law Appeals (DALA) and the Contributory Retirement Appeal Board (CRAB) affirmed BRS's decision. Hartnett then sought judicial review in the Superior Court, which ruled in her favor, concluding that the anti-spiking provision did not apply because the years 1990 and 2002 were not "two consecutive years" under the statute. The agencies appealed, and the case was transferred to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the phrase "two consecutive years" in the anti-spiking provision refers to two back-to-back years without interruption. The court found that the plain meaning of "consecutive" means following one after another without interruption, and this interpretation is consistent with the statutory scheme. The court rejected the agencies' argument that "two consecutive years" should mean two creditable years of service without another intervening year of service. Consequently, the court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment in favor of Hartnett, ruling that the years 1990 and 2002 are not "two consecutive years" under the anti-spiking provision. View "Hartnett v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board" on Justia Law

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The case involves a proposed electric substation in East Boston by NSTAR Electric Company, doing business as Eversource Energy. The Energy Facilities Siting Board (the board) granted a certificate of environmental impact and public interest to Eversource for the substation. The petitioners, Conservation Law Foundation and GreenRoots, Inc., challenged this decision, arguing that Eversource failed to show "undue delay" by two city agencies, and that the board did not properly consider environmental justice principles, among other issues.Previously, Eversource's petition to build the substation was approved by the board in 2017, with a project change approved in 2018. The petitioners intervened in the proceedings, and the board issued a decision in November 2022, granting the certificate. The petitioners then filed for judicial review in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and upheld the board's decision. The court found that the board's determination of "undue delay" by the city agencies was supported by substantial evidence. The court also concluded that the board properly considered environmental justice principles, including the equitable distribution of energy benefits and burdens. Additionally, the court found that the board's decision to issue the equivalent of a G. L. c. 91 tidelands license was lawful and supported by substantial evidence. The court affirmed the board's findings on the need for the substation, its compatibility with environmental protection, public health, and safety, and its alignment with the public interest. The decision of the board was affirmed. View "Conservation Law Foundation v. Energy Facilities Siting Board" on Justia Law

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Robert Mayfield, a small-business owner operating thirteen fast-food restaurants in Austin, Texas, challenged the Department of Labor's (DOL) 2019 Minimum Salary Rule. This rule raised the minimum salary required to qualify for the White Collar Exemption under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) from $455 per week to $684 per week. Mayfield argued that the DOL exceeded its statutory authority by imposing any salary requirement and that such a requirement violated the nondelegation doctrine.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas granted summary judgment in favor of the DOL, finding that the 2019 Minimum Salary Rule was within the DOL's authority to define and delimit the terms of the White Collar Exemption. The court also held that this delegation of authority did not violate the nondelegation doctrine.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Fifth Circuit held that the DOL's authority to define and delimit the terms of the White Collar Exemption included the power to set a minimum salary level. The court found that this power was explicitly delegated by Congress and was not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. The court also determined that the major questions doctrine did not apply, as the economic and political significance of the rule did not meet the threshold for invoking the doctrine. Additionally, the court concluded that the FLSA's purpose and the text of the exemption itself provided sufficient guidance to satisfy the nondelegation doctrine's requirements. View "Mayfield v. Department of Labor" on Justia Law