Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

A financial services company operating a designated contract market began offering sports-event contracts, which allowed users to buy and sell positions based on the outcome of various sporting events. These offerings attracted the attention of Ohio and Tennessee state gambling regulators, who asserted that the company was violating state gambling laws by operating without appropriate licenses and by allowing underage users to participate. Both states sent cease-and-desist letters to the company, demanding it stop offering sports-event contracts to their residents. The company, which claimed to be federally authorized under the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA), argued that federal law preempted state regulation of its activities.In Ohio, the company filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, seeking a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of state gambling laws against it. The district court denied the injunction, finding the company had not demonstrated that its sports-event contracts were “swaps” subject to exclusive jurisdiction of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and, even if they were, had not established federal preemption. The company appealed. In Tennessee, a similar suit was filed in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, which granted a preliminary injunction, holding the company was likely to succeed because the contracts constituted “swaps” and conflict preemption applied. Tennessee officials appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed both cases together. It held that the company’s sports-event contracts did not satisfy the statutory definition of a “swap” under the CEA and thus did not fall within CFTC exclusive jurisdiction. The court further held that, even assuming the contracts were swaps, the CEA neither expressly nor impliedly preempted Ohio’s or Tennessee’s gambling laws. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of the preliminary injunction in Ohio, vacated the grant of the injunction in Tennessee, and remanded for further proceedings. View "KalshiEX LLC v. Schuler" on Justia Law

The federal government expanded the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) program to allow state and local authorities to verify the citizenship status of registered voters and individuals registering to vote. This new version of the program incorporated Social Security Administration (SSA) records, including social security numbers, and permitted bulk searches. Under the modified program, personal information would be cross-checked with SSA databases, and if citizenship could not be confirmed, individuals would be required to provide additional proof to register or remain registered to vote.The League of Women Voters and other organizations sued the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), SSA, and related federal entities, claiming that the modified SAVE program violated confidentiality provisions of the Social Security Act, the Privacy Act of 1974, and was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The organizations sought summary judgment. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia ruled in their favor, vacated the modified SAVE program, and denied the government’s request for a stay. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit also denied a stay, with a dissent.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the government’s application for a stay. The Supreme Court found that the plaintiff organizations likely had standing but concluded their claims were unlikely to succeed on the merits. The Court explained that 8 U.S.C. §1373, enacted as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), authorizes DHS to request and receive information about citizenship status from other agencies, overriding restrictions in other laws. The Supreme Court granted the government’s application for a stay, allowing the modified SAVE program to operate pending appeal and possible review by the Supreme Court. View "Department of Homeland Security v. League of Women Voters" on Justia Law

A technology company developed an artificial intelligence system and imposed contractual and technical restrictions to prevent its use for fully autonomous lethal military operations and mass domestic surveillance. The company had previously adapted its product to meet some government needs but refused to remove these two key restrictions when the Department of War (formerly the Department of Defense) sought contractual terms allowing all lawful uses of the AI system. This disagreement coincided with a dispute over the product’s use in a sensitive military operation and previous incidents where the AI’s restrictions prevented it from fulfilling government requests. As a result, the Secretary of War determined that continued use of the AI posed a national security risk and ordered its removal from the Department’s supply chain under the Federal Acquisition Supply Chain Security Act of 2018.The Department promptly notified the company, offered an opportunity for reconsideration, and began implementing the exclusion. The company petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review and raised statutory and constitutional challenges, arguing that the exclusion was arbitrary, beyond statutory authority, and violated due process and First Amendment rights. The company also sought a stay, which was denied, and later requested rescission, which was also denied by the Secretary.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that it had jurisdiction under the statute to review the procurement action. The court found the Department’s determination reasonable, concluding that the company’s ability and willingness to restrict the AI’s use posed a covered “supply chain risk” under the statute, even without evidence of malicious intent. The court also held that less intrusive measures were not reasonably available, and that any procedural deficiencies in notice did not prejudice the company. The court further held that the exclusion did not violate the Fifth or First Amendments. The petitions for review were denied. View "Anthropic PBC v. United States Department of War" on Justia Law

A privately owned railroad company was engaged by the Nevada Department of Transportation to build a high-speed passenger rail line between Southern California and Las Vegas, Nevada. To fund this $12 billion project, the company sought and received a $3 billion federal grant from the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) under the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act. The Act contains a “Buy America” requirement, generally mandating that federally funded projects use goods produced in the United States, but it allows waivers if domestic goods are unavailable or unsatisfactory. The railroad company solicited bids for high-speed trains, and only two manufacturers responded: one offering to build most trains domestically but at a lower maximum speed, and another proposing to build the first two trains abroad to meet the project’s higher speed requirement, before shifting production to the U.S.After reviewing the bids, the FRA proposed to waive the Buy America requirement for either bid, but ultimately finalized a waiver only for the foreign-manufactured trains, based on its finding that no domestic manufacturer could produce trains at the required speed. The railroad company then contracted with the foreign manufacturer. The domestic manufacturer, having lost the contract, challenged the waiver in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, arguing it was unlawful and arbitrary. The district court dismissed the complaint, finding the domestic manufacturer lacked standing.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the domestic manufacturer had standing, as it suffered a concrete economic injury traceable to the waiver and redressable by court action. However, the court determined that the waiver was both lawful and reasonable under the statute, as the FRA correctly found no domestic producer could supply the required high-speed trains. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s judgment, converting it from a jurisdictional dismissal to a decision on the merits. View "Alstom Transportation, Inc. v. Federal Railroad Administration" on Justia Law

A fatal accident occurred in 2016 when a bicyclist, Jonathan Tansavatdi, collided with a turning truck at an intersection in the City of Rancho Palos Verdes. The bicycle lane on Hawthorne Boulevard ended before the intersection, forcing cyclists to share the roadway. Jonathan’s mother, Betty Tansavatdi, sued the City, alleging that the intersection constituted a dangerous condition of public property and that the City failed to adequately warn of this danger.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County initially granted summary judgment for the City based on the affirmative defense of design immunity under Government Code section 830.6. The trial court found the City had established all elements of design immunity regarding the absence of a bicycle lane. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the finding of design immunity but remanded the case for consideration of the failure to warn claim. The California Supreme Court, in Tansavatdi v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 639, held that design immunity does not categorically preclude failure to warn claims and remanded the matter, leaving open whether design immunity applies if warnings were part of an approved design.Upon remand, the City renewed its motion for summary judgment, arguing that all warning signs and markings at the intersection were part of the 2009 approved design plans. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, held that when a public entity has provided some warning of a dangerous condition as part of an approved and reasonable design, complaints about the adequacy of that warning fall within the scope of design immunity. The court affirmed summary judgment for the City and upheld the award of expert fees, finding the City’s section 998 settlement offer valid. View "Tansavatdi v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes" on Justia Law

Following the passage of Proposition 50, which revised congressional district maps in California, a community group in Riverside County alleged a discrepancy in the number of ballots counted versus ballots cast during the 2025 special election. Acting on the group’s report, the county sheriff’s department obtained search warrants from the Riverside County Superior Court and seized large quantities of ballots and election materials. The county registrar defended the official tally and explained the discrepancy at a public meeting. Despite the Attorney General’s request for a pause to review the investigation, the sheriff’s department advanced their search and began counting ballots, only halting after direct communication from the Attorney General.The Attorney General issued formal directives to the sheriff, instructing him to pause the investigation, preserve all seized materials, and provide case records for review. The sheriff initially did not respond, began counting ballots, then paused the count and secured the materials. Subsequent communications from the Attorney General reiterated these directives and requested records. After further seizures by the sheriff’s department, the Attorney General initiated litigation, seeking a writ of mandate in the California Court of Appeal, which denied relief on procedural grounds. The Attorney General then sought review in the Supreme Court of California.The Supreme Court of California held that the Attorney General, under the state Constitution and Government Code section 12560, possesses the authority to give binding directions to sheriffs regarding specific investigations when necessary to ensure uniform and adequate enforcement of state laws. The court concluded the directives issued in this case were within the Attorney General’s lawful authority and sufficiently specific. It granted writ relief, ordering the sheriff and department to comply with the Attorney General’s instructions to pause investigative actions, retain seized records (with certain exceptions), and provide requested materials. Each party was directed to bear its own costs. View "Bonta v. Bianco" on Justia Law

A bystander was injured in June 2023 when a police dog owned by a municipality mistakenly attacked him during a pursuit. The injured party, seeking damages for his injuries, timely submitted a statutory notice of claim to the municipality. In the notice, he offered to settle his personal injury claim for “one hundred thousand dollars ($250,000),” creating an internal inconsistency between the written and numerical amounts. The municipality did not accept the offer within the 60-day statutory period.After the offer was not accepted, the injured party filed a complaint in the Superior Court in Gila County. The municipality moved to dismiss, asserting that the notice failed to comply with Arizona Revised Statutes § 12-821.01(A)’s requirement to state a specific amount for which the claim can be settled. The Superior Court treated the motion as one for summary judgment and granted it, finding the notice insufficient. On appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two, reversed, holding that contract law principles should be used to resolve the inconsistency, and concluding that the written amount controlled, thus satisfying the statute.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed the case. It held that strict compliance with the statutory requirement is necessary: a notice of claim must state a single, specific settlement amount that leaves no room for doubt. The court rejected the use of contract interpretation principles or extrinsic evidence to resolve conflicting figures in the notice, emphasizing that the municipality has no obligation to investigate or seek clarification. Because the notice contained two different amounts, it did not comply with § 12-821.01(A). The Supreme Court vacated the appellate decision and affirmed summary judgment for the municipality. View "TERBORG v TOWN OF PAYSON" on Justia Law

The City of Los Angeles received millions in federal housing grants over a period of years, certifying compliance with federal housing accessibility laws as a condition of those funds. Mei Ling and the Fair Housing Council of the San Fernando Valley (FHC) brought a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA), alleging that the City had falsely represented its compliance with accessibility requirements. The United States later intervened in the case. Separately, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) investigated the City for noncompliance and, after its own findings, entered into a Voluntary Compliance Agreement (VCA) with the City. Under the VCA, the City agreed to spend at least $200 million over ten years to remediate or build accessible housing, but the VCA explicitly excluded the FCA claims at issue in the litigation.The United States District Court for the Central District of California presided over years of discovery and litigation. Eventually, the United States, FHC, and the City agreed to settle the FCA claims for $38,266,989. The district court approved the settlement as fair, adequate, and reasonable, and dismissed all claims against the City, with relators entitled to a statutory share of the settlement proceeds. Mei Ling appealed, arguing that the VCA constituted an “alternate remedy” under the FCA, which would entitle her to a share of the VCA’s value.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the VCA was not an alternate remedy within the meaning of 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(5) because it did not take the place of the FCA suit or settlement. The VCA addressed the City’s civil rights violations, not the alleged fraud underlying the FCA action, and expressly carved out the FCA claims. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s approval of the FCA settlement. View "LING V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES" on Justia Law

A family rented military housing located within the Naval Amphibious Base Coronado in California, managed by San Diego Family Housing (SDFH) and Lincoln Military Property Management. During their tenancy, the family experienced repeated water intrusion and mold contamination, which allegedly caused health issues and property damage. After reporting these problems, remediation was attempted, but the family was dissatisfied with the response and subsequent actions. They ultimately vacated the property and brought claims in California state court for negligence and other state law issues against SDFH, Lincoln, and InDepth, a mold remediation company.SDFH and Lincoln removed the action to the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, asserting federal enclave, federal agency, and federal officer jurisdiction. The district court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss based on derivative sovereign immunity and later, after supplemental briefing and a Statement of Interest from the United States, rejected all grounds for federal jurisdiction. The district court found no evidence that the federal government had exclusive jurisdiction over the property, no sufficient nexus for federal officer removal, and insufficient grounds for federal agency status. The court remanded the case to state court.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s remand order after the Supreme Court remanded for consideration in light of Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that no basis for federal jurisdiction existed: (1) federal enclave jurisdiction was not established due to lack of evidence of federal government assent to exclusive jurisdiction; (2) federal officer removal requirements were not satisfied, as defendants were not “acting under” a federal officer; and (3) SDFH did not qualify as a federal agency. The district court’s remand to state court was affirmed. View "CHILDS V. SAN DIEGO FAMILY HOUSING, LLC" on Justia Law

This case stems from a fatal plane crash in which a pilot, Chelsea Brittney Infanger, collided with exhaust stacks owned by a processing plant near the Burley Municipal Airport in Idaho. The stacks, which extended over 100 feet high, were situated within the runway’s approach path and had been the subject of prior regulatory concern. The pilot’s parents brought a wrongful death suit, alleging that the Idaho Department of Transportation’s Division of Aeronautics negligently failed to regulate or mitigate the known risk posed by these stacks, arguing that various statutory, common law, special relationship, and contractual duties compelled the Division to act.After settlements with other defendants, the case proceeded against the Division in the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, Ada County. The Division moved for summary judgment, contending it owed no individualized duty to the deceased under the Airport Zoning Act, common law, or through a special relationship, and that it was immune under the Idaho Tort Claims Act. The district court agreed, holding that the Division’s statutory duties were general obligations to the public, not specific duties to individual aviators, and found no basis for liability under special relationship or contract theories. The court granted summary judgment to the Division, and the plaintiffs appealed.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the district court’s decision. It held that the Airport Zoning Act did not create a tort duty to a particular class of persons, but rather imposed general obligations for public safety, and thus could not support a negligence per se claim. The Court also found that the plaintiffs did not preserve or demonstrate the elements necessary for a special relationship or assumed duty sufficient to impose liability. The Court declined to award attorney fees, but granted costs to the Division. View "Infanger v. State of Idaho, Idaho Department of Transportation" on Justia Law