Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

A company that owned several billboards in Texas faced administrative action by the Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT), which sought to cancel four of its billboard permits due to alleged noncompliance with state regulations. The company requested an administrative hearing, after which TxDOT dismissed its claims for cancellation of three permits but proceeded against one. An administrative law judge recommended canceling the remaining permit and imposing significant administrative penalties for violations related to the other permits. The Texas Transportation Commission (TTC) adopted this decision.The company then filed for judicial review in a Texas state district court, but its petition was dismissed because it was filed past the statutory thirty-day deadline. This dismissal for lack of jurisdiction was affirmed by the state appellate court, and the Supreme Court of Texas declined review. While the state proceedings were ongoing, the company separately filed a federal lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas against TxDOT, TTC, and TxDOT’s Executive Director, asserting five claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law. The district court dismissed most claims on sovereign immunity grounds, and held that the remaining claims were barred by res judicata, entering final judgment for the defendants.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit determined that it lacked jurisdiction over all of the company’s claims. The court found that the company had failed to adequately allege the necessary connection between the individually named official and the enforcement of the challenged law, a requirement under the Ex parte Young doctrine for suits against state officials. As a result, the Fifth Circuit modified the district court’s judgment to dismiss all claims without prejudice and affirmed the judgment as modified. View "Gannon v. Texas Dept of Trans" on Justia Law

At an oil and gas wellsite in Texas, a contractor, TCP Specialists, LLC, provided wireline services alongside other companies that managed the well’s pressure and equipment. During a maintenance operation, a pressurized pipe ruptured while the well was being depressurized, causing fatal injuries to two workers and serious injury to a TCP employee. Although TCP did not control the depressurization or supply the faulty pipe, its employees were standing near the wellhead at the time of the accident. The Department of Labor alleged that TCP exposed its employees to known hazards by not establishing a buffer zone around the well during depressurization.An administrative law judge (ALJ) of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission held a hearing and found that TCP had violated the General Duty Clause of the Occupational Safety and Health Act. The ALJ determined that TCP had control over its employees’ proximity to the hazard and that a buffer zone would have been a feasible and effective abatement measure. The ALJ concluded that TCP failed to implement adequate safety policies and upheld the citation, imposing a penalty. The full Commission declined to review the ALJ’s decision, making it a final order.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed TCP’s petition and denied it. The court held that the hazard was properly defined by reference to the physical agents (the frac stack and pressurized piping) and that TCP had control over its employees’ exposure to that hazard. The court found substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s conclusions regarding the feasibility and effectiveness of a buffer zone, and rejected TCP’s constitutional and procedural arguments. The order upholding the citation and penalty was affirmed. View "TCP Specialists, LLC v. Secretary of Labor" on Justia Law

The appellant submitted a whistleblower application to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) alleging that two taxpayers had underpaid taxes from 2004 to 2012 and requested that the IRS also consider similar conduct for 2013 through 2017 when determining any award. The IRS had already begun investigating much of the reported conduct and ultimately collected proceeds from the taxpayers. However, the IRS’s Whistleblower Office denied the claim, reasoning that the information provided was either previously known or “tainted”—meaning it was unlawfully obtained or privileged—and asserted it did not rely on this information when auditing the later years.After receiving this denial, the appellant sought review in the United States Tax Court. The appellant requested to supplement the administrative record or conduct discovery regarding the audits for 2013 through 2017, arguing that the record did not adequately show whether her information was used. The Tax Court denied these requests, citing procedural deficiencies in how discovery was sought, and granted summary judgment to the IRS, finding the administrative record sufficient to support the IRS’s determination.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the IRS’s rationale for denying the whistleblower award for tax years 2013 through 2017 was not supported by the administrative record, which was largely silent regarding those years. The court concluded that the IRS’s decision was arbitrary and capricious because it did not reasonably investigate or explain whether the whistleblower’s application contributed to the audits for those years. The court reversed the Tax Court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Trongone v. Cmsnr. IRS" on Justia Law

A Texas city created a local government corporation to finance public improvements in a designated district. The corporation borrowed $17.4 million from a Wisconsin bond issuer, which funded the construction of improvements, with the city agreeing to purchase those improvements over time using assessments levied within the district. The financing structure involved a promissory note and other contracts, but the corporation did not submit these documents to the Texas Attorney General for required examination and approval. After a change in city leadership and financial difficulties, the city and corporation sued the bondholder and related parties, arguing that the failure to obtain Attorney General approval rendered the transaction void and that the financing arrangement violated provisions of the Public Improvement District (PID) Act.The trial court (District Court of Williamson County) granted summary judgment for the bondholder and other defendants, holding that while submission to the Attorney General was required, failure to do so did not void the transaction. The court also determined that the PID Act had not been violated, and it rejected challenges to certain evidence and to the award of attorney’s fees. The Court of Appeals for the Third District of Texas affirmed, agreeing that the note and contracts were not void and that statutory requirements regarding bond issuance did not apply to the transaction.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. The court held that failing to submit the promissory note and supporting contracts to the Attorney General removes the statutory defense of incontestability but does not render the transaction void or unenforceable. It further held that the transaction did not violate the PID Act because the relevant restrictions applied only to bonds issued by the city or its corporation, which was not the case here. The court also found no reversible error regarding evidentiary rulings or the award of attorney’s fees. View "RIVER CREEK DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. PRESTON HOLLOW CAPITAL, LLC" on Justia Law

The case concerns landowners whose property in Harris County, Texas, was condemned by the State for a highway project. After initially offering compensation, the State initiated condemnation proceedings, and the parties settled on a value for the property. Years later, the planned highway route was altered, leaving a portion of the condemned land unused. When the State indicated that some of the property was now considered surplus but refused to sell it back, the landowners assigned their rights to JRJ Pusok Holdings, LLC, to pursue a statutory right of repurchase under Texas law.JRJ filed suit in a Harris County civil court at law against the State of Texas and the Director of Right of Way, asserting a statutory right to repurchase the surplus property. The State responded with a plea to the jurisdiction, asserting sovereign immunity and lack of justiciability. The trial court granted the State’s plea and dismissed the case. The Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District of Texas reversed the dismissal as to the repurchase claim, holding that the State’s sovereign immunity was waived for such claims, that the property had been acquired “through eminent domain,” and that the county court at law had jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Texas affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision. It held that the State is not immune from statutory repurchase claims arising under Chapter 21 of the Texas Property Code when condemned property is no longer necessary for public use. The court clarified that property acquired through a condemnation suit, even if settled before judgment, is acquired “through eminent domain.” It also held that a landowner may repurchase only the portion of property no longer necessary for public use and that county courts at law have concurrent jurisdiction over these claims. The court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "THE STATE OF TEXAS v. JRJ PUSOK HOLDINGS, LLC" on Justia Law

A woman was seriously injured as a passenger in a car accident in Montgomery County, Alabama. She first received treatment at one hospital and was then transferred to another for further care. Both hospitals, which are affiliated with public entities, filed statutory hospital liens in probate courts to secure payment for her medical expenses from any settlement or recovery she might obtain related to her injuries. The total amount of the liens exceeded the amount available from the car owner’s insurance, which provided $75,000 in coverage. The woman settled with the insurance company and received a portion of the proceeds, with the rest held by her attorney pending resolution of the hospital liens.Afterward, she filed an action in the Montgomery Circuit Court, seeking interpleader and declaratory relief to determine the validity and amounts of the hospitals’ liens. One hospital, the University of South Alabama Health University Hospital, argued it was immune from suit under Article I, § 14, of the Alabama Constitution because it is a state agency. The trial court agreed, found that the state hospital was a necessary party, and dismissed the claims against both hospitals with prejudice, concluding it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the dismissal de novo. It held that an interpleader action brought under Rule 22 of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure to resolve the validity and amount of hospital liens does not implicate state immunity and does not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction, even when a state entity is named as a defendant. The Court reversed the trial court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings, allowing the plaintiff’s interpleader claim to go forward. View "Wood v. Health Care Authority for Baptist Health" on Justia Law

The dispute arose from attempts by Mississippi officials to recover state funds allegedly misused in the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program. After the State Auditor issued a demand for repayment from several defendants, including Favre Enterprises, Inc. and Brett Favre, and the demand went unmet, the matter was formally referred to the Attorney General for prosecution. The Attorney General then brought a lawsuit in circuit court on behalf of the Mississippi Department of Human Services against multiple defendants, including those named by the Auditor, but chose not to seek statutory interest at that time. Subsequently, the Auditor, after being dismissed as a counterclaimant in related litigation, filed a separate suit in his official capacity to recover the remaining TANF funds and statutory interest, asserting exclusive authority to pursue such claims.The Hinds County Chancery Court was asked to determine whether the Attorney General held sole authority to manage and prosecute litigation for the recovery of state funds. The Chancery Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Auditor, finding that Mississippi Code Section 7-7-211(g) vested the Auditor with the authority to initiate such lawsuits and required the Attorney General to prosecute them, concluding that the Attorney General did not possess exclusive authority over state litigation in this context.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the statutory framework and historical context, determining that while the Auditor has duties related to demanding and accounting for state funds, the Attorney General is the state’s chief legal officer with exclusive power to litigate on behalf of the state unless otherwise specifically provided by law. The Supreme Court held that the Attorney General, not the Auditor, possesses the authority to manage and prosecute litigation for the recovery of state money under the statutes in question. The Supreme Court reversed the Chancery Court’s decision and rendered judgment in favor of the Attorney General. View "Fitch v. White" on Justia Law

A childcare provider operating multiple daycare centers in Georgia participated in the state’s childcare voucher program, which is funded primarily by a federal grant and administered by the Georgia Department of Early Care and Learning. The provider agreement requires daycare centers to maintain arrival and departure records for each child and to make these records immediately available during on-site audits. In 2023, the Department conducted simultaneous audits at four of the provider’s locations. Only one location produced the required records during the audits, and the Department determined that the provider failed to comply with the investigation. The Department dismissed all of the provider’s centers from the voucher program, issuing notice that the dismissal was not appealable but allowing a grievance process. The provider attempted to contest the dismissal, but was repeatedly told it had no right to appeal.The provider brought suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia against several Department officials, alleging a violation of due process and seeking a preliminary injunction for reinstatement in the program. The district court found that while the provider might suffer irreparable harm, it was unlikely to succeed on the merits of its due process claim because it lacked a property interest in continued participation in the program, and denied the motion for a preliminary injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the denial of the preliminary injunction. Assuming without deciding that the provider had a property interest in continued participation, the court held that the provider was not entitled to a pre-deprivation hearing under the Due Process Clause. Applying the balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge, the court concluded that additional procedural safeguards would not significantly reduce the risk of erroneous deprivation in this context. The court affirmed the denial of the preliminary injunction. View "iCare Child Development Center LLC v. Cicero-Brown" on Justia Law

A group of environmental organizations challenged the decision by the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality (VDEQ) to grant a water quality certification for the Southgate Project, a proposed pipeline crossing parts of Virginia and North Carolina. The organizations argued that the certification was improperly issued because VDEQ failed to adequately address the pipeline developer’s past record of environmental violations and did not include all necessary conditions to ensure compliance with water quality standards. VDEQ had previously approved the developer’s erosion and sediment control plans, received public comments, and ultimately issued the certification after addressing those comments.After VDEQ issued the certification, the petitioners sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and filed a motion to stay the certification pending judicial review, pointing to the imminent start of pipeline construction. Their main contentions were that VDEQ did not rationally justify its prediction that the pipeline would not violate water quality standards, especially given the developer’s history of noncompliance, and that the certification failed to explicitly require compliance with certain state environmental plans and agreements.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered the motion for a stay and denied it. The court found that the petitioners had not made a strong showing that they were likely to succeed on the merits of their claims. The court noted that VDEQ provided a detailed explanation for its decision, including differences between the current project and past projects, and incorporated relevant environmental plans by reference in the certification. The court also determined that the remaining factors supporting a stay did not outweigh the petitioners’ failure to demonstrate likely success on the merits. The motion for a stay pending review was therefore denied. View "Dan River Basin Association v. Virginia Department of Environmental Quality" on Justia Law

A proposed pipeline project, known as the Southgate Project, is planned to traverse portions of North Carolina and Virginia. This project is an extension of an existing pipeline system, and its construction has generated substantial environmental and legal concerns. The Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC, sought a water quality certification from the North Carolina Department of Environmental Quality (NCDEQ), which is required under the Clean Water Act for such projects. After considering public comments, a public hearing, and a report from its hearing officer, NCDEQ issued the necessary certification in November 2025, finding that the project, if conducted according to specified conditions, would comply with state water quality standards.Previously, in 2020, NCDEQ had denied a water quality certification for the project, but that decision was vacated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in 2021. After the main pipeline was completed in 2024 and project plans were revised to reduce its length in North Carolina, NCDEQ reviewed and ultimately granted the new application. Environmental groups then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit for review of NCDEQ’s decision, and, as construction appeared imminent, sought a stay to prevent the project from proceeding while the case was pending.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied the motion for a stay, applying the traditional four-factor test for such relief. The court held that the petitioners did not make a strong showing that they were likely to succeed on the merits of their challenges to NCDEQ’s decision, particularly given the deference owed to the agency’s expertise under the Administrative Procedure Act. As a result, the motion for preliminary relief was denied, though the underlying merits of the challenge remain for later determination. View "Sierra Club v. North Carolina Department of Environmental Quality" on Justia Law