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The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment rejecting the City's attempt to oust defendant from his seat on the City Council in this quo warranto action. The City argued that defendant's prior guilty plea for misdemeanor obstruction of justice constituted a conviction for "malfeasance in office" within the meaning of article VII, section 8, subdivision (b) of the California Constitution that forever disqualified him from public office under Government Code section 1021. The court held that the record of defendant's conviction for obstruction of justice did not establish a conviction for malfeasance in office under article VII, section 8, subdivision (b). The court also affirmed the trial court's post-judgment order denying defendant's motion for an award of attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. The court held that the attorney fees defendant incurred were not out of proportion to his individual stake in the matter and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to shift the financial burden of his defense. View "The People ex rel. City of Commerce v. Argumedo" on Justia Law

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Appellees were suburban common carriers which, pursuant to certificates of public convenience, were authorized to provide hail or call taxicab services, known in the industry as “call or demand services,” in the Commonwealth. Appellees were also authorized to provide call or demand services in limited portions of the City, while being prohibited from providing call or demand service to the City’s business or tourist districts, Philadelphia International Airport, 30th Street Station, or City casinos. Taxicabs which were authorized to provide call or demand service throughout the City were known as “medallion taxicabs,” while appellees operated what were known as “partial rights taxicabs.” Prior to 2004, PUC was responsible for regulating all taxicab service in the Commonwealth. Medallion taxicabs were regulated pursuant to the Medallion Act, and all other taxicabs, including those operated by appellees, were regulated pursuant to the Public Utility Code and PUC regulations. Appellants, the Philadelphia Parking Authority (PPA) and the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (PUC), appealed a Commonwealth Court order invalidating a jurisdictional agreement between PPA and PUC and concluding certain PPA regulations were invalid and unenforceable as to partial rights taxicabs operating in the City of Philadelphia (City). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court’s order in part (with regard to amended Count IV of the Amended Petition for Review), and affirm it in part (with regard to Counts V-VIII). The Court found the Commonwealth Court erred in concluding the Jurisdictional Agreement violated appellees’ substantive due process rights. The purpose of the Jurisdictional Agreement was to clarify whether PPA, PUC, or both agencies would regulate a trip which is subject to dual jurisdiction, and the Agreement simply states that where dual jurisdiction exists PUC cedes jurisdiction to PPA. The Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court in all other respects. View "Bucks Co. Svc., et al. v. PPA" on Justia Law

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The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted discretionary review to address two issues associated with workers’ compensation claims by firefighters suffering from cancer. First, the Court had to determine the evidentiary requirements for a claimant to demonstrate that he or she has an “occupational disease,” as that term is defined in Section 108(r) of the Workers’ Compensation Act (the “Act”). Second, the Court had to decide whether epidemiological evidence may be used by an employer to rebut the evidentiary presumption that the claimant’s cancer is compensable as set forth in Section 301(f) of the Act. With respect to the first issue, the Supreme Court concluded that pursuant to Section 108(r), the claimant has an initial burden to establish that his or her cancer is a type of cancer that is capable of being caused by exposure to a known IARC Group 1 carcinogen. With respect to the second, the Court concluded that epidemiological evidence was not sufficient to rebut the evidentiary presumption under Section 301(f). View "City of Phila. FD v. WCAB; Appeal of: Sladek, S." on Justia Law

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At issue were legal questions concerning the meaning of a regulation and the scope of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals’ remedial obligations under U.S. Code Title 38 and the Federal Circuit’s previous decision in Pirkl v. Shinseki, 718 F.3d 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Pirkl I). This case centered on clear and unmistakable (CUE) error in a disability decision from long ago. After Pirkl I was decided, the Board on remand dismissed Appellant’s appeal of a decision not to give relief for a 1953 CUE past the effective date of a 1956 rating reduction. The Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims affirmed. The Federal Circuit vacated the Veterans Court’s decision and remanded the case after addressing the remedy required for a CUE error in a disability rating decision, holding that the Veterans Court mistakenly interpreted a key regulation and took too narrow a view of the legally required corrective remedy for the rating decision error. View "Pirkl v. Wilkie" on Justia Law

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At issue in this case was whether the False Claims Act (FCA) allows a qui tam plaintiff to intervene in criminal forfeiture proceedings when the government chooses to prosecute fraud rather than to intervene in the qui tam plaintiff's action. The Eleventh Circuit held that, even if the FCA could be read to allow intervention, the statutes governing criminal forfeiture specifically barred it, with exceptions that did not apply in this case. The court held that the criminal forfeiture statutes controlled and agreed with the district court's denial of the interested party's motion to intervene. The court held that, because denial was proper, the court no longer had jurisdiction over the appeal. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal based on lack of jurisdiction. View "United States v. Couch" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court dismissing as untimely Appellant’s petition seeking review of a rule promulgated by the Department of Corrections (DOC), holding that the court should have treated Appellant’s petition as a complaint for declaratory judgment and allowed him to amend his petition to that effect. In his petition, Appellant, a prisoner at the Maine State Prison, claimed that the DOC had promulgated and enforced a rule that violated Me. Rev. Stat. 34-A, 3039 and several provisions of the state and federal Constitutions. The superior court dismissed the petition without reaching the merits of Appellant’s statutory and constitutional arguments. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding that, given Appellant’s clear challenge to the legality of the DOC rule itself and not its application to his individual circumstances, the court abused its discretion in declining to allow Appellant to amend his complaint and seek relief through a declaratory judgment action. View "Sweeney v. Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff Conduent State & Local Solutions, Inc. (Conduent) appealed a superior court order denying Conduent’s request for a declaration that defendant New Hampshire Department of Transportation (DOT) exceeded its statutory authority, and, therefore, violated the separation of powers doctrine, by procuring from defendant Cubic Transportation Systems, Inc. (Cubic) a new system to support DOT’s electronic collection of tolls, using the “best value” method for evaluating competing bids. On appeal, Conduent argued the DOT had no statutory authority to procure the new system because procurement authority was given to the New Hampshire Department of Administrative Services (DAS). Alternatively, Conduent claimed that even if the DOT had statutory authority to procure the new system, it lacked authority to use the “best value” method for evaluating competing bids. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed denial of the declaration. View "Conduent State & Local Solutions, Inc. v. New Hampshire Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

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This case arose out of the termination of petitioner James Cole by the New Hampshire Department of Information Technology (DOIT). One of Cole’s initial assignments was overhauling an Account Security Form (ASF). This was intended to be a short-term project. Although some aspects of Cole’s work on this project were satisfactory, his incorrect processing of other aspects of the overhaul resulted in audits being conducted on the forms to ensure accuracy. Cole was also initially assigned a “Wireless Access Point” Project (WAP). This project required communication with customers who were requesting installation of a WAP, and coordination with the persons who were to install the WAPs. However, Cole’s communications were inadequate. This resulted in customers not knowing how to use the WAPs after they were installed, or even that the WAPs had been installed. Cole was given three warnings over the course of his employment. The New Hampshire Personnel Appeals Board (PAB) upheld Cole’s termination. On appeal, Cole argued his termination did not comply with New Hampshire Administrative Rules, Per 1002.08 because he did not receive the three letters in accordance with New Hampshire Administrative Rules, Per 1002.04 for the same or substantially similar conduct or offense. DOIT argued the New Hampshire Supreme Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to decide this case, and, in the alternative, that Cole’s termination complied with Per 1002.08 and Per 1002.04. Finding that it had jurisdiction, the Supreme Court affirmed the PAB’s decision. View "Appeal of James Cole" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff San-Ken Homes, Inc. (San-Ken) appealed a superior court decision requiring it to apply for registration or exemption with defendant New Hampshire Attorney General, Consumer Protection and Antitrust Bureau (Bureau), under the Land Sales Full Disclosure Act (Act), and to make certain improvements to Old Beaver Road in the Oakwood Common subdivision in New Ipswich. The Act allows for exemptions from registration under certain circumstances. In October 2006, the Bureau granted a certificate of exemption to the development in which Old Beaver Road was located, 112 Chestnut, “as to the offer and sale of” the 16 lots “because of the limited character of the offering and because the subdivision is adequately regulated by municipal ordinances.” In June 2014, San-Ken, which had no relationship to 112 Chestnut, purchased nine undeveloped lots at a foreclosure sale and recorded title to the property. The New Ipswich Planning Board held a hearing on San-Ken’s application for modification of the Board’s original conditions for Old Beaver Road. As an alternative to the Board revoking the subdivision approval, Town counsel recommended that it entertain a motion to waive the prior road completion requirements and specifications on the condition that San-Ken complete certain improvements to the road at its own expense. San-Ken satisfied all of the Board’s requirements. San-Ken later appealed to the trial court challenging the Bureau's authority under the Act to require it to be registered or exempted and to require it to make improvements to Old Beaver Road. When that challenge was unsuccessful, San-Ken appealed to the New Hampshire Supreme Court, arguing the trial court erred in: (1) applying a mistaken standard of review; (2) finding San-Ken to be a successor subdivider under the Act; and (3) determining that the Bureau was within its authority to require San-Ken to further improve Old Beaver Road as a condition of obtaining a certificate of exemption. The Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred as a matter of law in finding that the Act authorized the Bureau to require San-Ken to complete Old Beaver Road to the standard promised by 112 Chestnut as a condition of obtaining a certificate of exemption. View "San-Ken Homes, Inc. v. New Hampshire Attorney General" on Justia Law

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Losantiville Country Club hosted unprofitable nonmember events for many years, consistently using those losses to avoid paying tax on its investment income. Because the Internal Revenue Service determined that Losantiville did not hold nonmember events for the primary purpose of making a profit, the club could not offset its income from investments with losses from those nonmember activities. Invalidating those deductions resulted in Losantiville having underpaid tax on its unrelated business income between 2010 and 2012. Plus, the IRS imposed accuracy-related penalties. On appeal, the Tax Court upheld this determination, reasoning that Losantiville did not intend to profit from its nonmember events. Finding no reversible error in that decision, the Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Losantiville Country Club v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law