Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The case concerns a dispute between two individuals who cohabited for nearly a decade before marrying. During their relationship, the parties agreed to pool their efforts and share any property acquired during this period, which included contributions to one party’s government pension. After the relationship ended, the non-employee party claimed entitlement to a share of the pension accrued during their pre-marital cohabitation, based on their agreement.After separation and the filing of a civil action for breach of contract, the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco consolidated the proceedings. The court found that the parties had an implied-in-fact contract—known as a Marvin agreement—to share equally in all property acquired during their relationship, including pension contributions. The trial court held that the non-employee party was entitled to an equal share of the pension benefits accrued during the period of cohabitation, even though the parties were not married at the time.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed only the question of whether Public Utilities Code section 12337 barred the non-employee party from receiving a share of the pension. The appellate court held that section 12337, which generally renders such pensions unassignable and exempt from execution, does not preclude enforcement of an ownership interest in the pension arising from a Marvin agreement. The court reasoned that the non-employee party’s claim was not as a creditor but as an owner by virtue of contract, and therefore section 12337’s restrictions did not apply. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s order, concluding that the non-employee party was entitled to an equal share of the pension benefits accrued during the Marvin period. View "Seiwald v. Irias" on Justia Law

TVA, a federally owned power provider, undertook a project to replace aging coal-fired units at its Kingston plant in Tennessee with a new gas-fired facility, aiming to retire all coal units by 2027 and add 1,500 megawatts of reliable power. TVA considered alternatives, including continuing with updated coal units and constructing solar facilities, but ultimately chose the gas plant, entering a preliminary agreement for gas supply before completing its final environmental review. Construction began in April 2024, and six months later, three conservation groups challenged TVA’s actions, alleging violations of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), particularly regarding the range of alternatives considered and alleged precommitment to the gas plant.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee reviewed the case and granted summary judgment in part for both sides. The court found TVA met NEPA’s requirements for environmental analysis and cost evaluation but held TVA violated NEPA by considering only one feasible alternative and by precommitting to the gas plant via its supply agreement. The court vacated TVA’s Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) and Record of Decision, effectively requiring TVA to halt construction. TVA sought a stay of the vacatur order, first with the district court and then with the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit granted TVA’s emergency motion for a stay pending appeal. The court held TVA likely to succeed on the merits, finding the district court misinterpreted NEPA’s “range of alternatives” requirement and erred in its reading of the precommitment issue. The court also concluded that the district court likely chose the wrong remedy by vacating the EIS and Record of Decision, given the procedural nature of NEPA and the lack of viable alternatives. The stay will allow TVA to continue construction while the appeal is resolved. View "Appalachian Voices v. TVA" on Justia Law

Santa Clara County’s Board of Supervisors responded to significant anticipated federal funding cuts, stemming from Congress’s enactment of H.R. 1, by declaring an emergency and calling for a special election to seek voter approval for Measure A—a five-year general sales tax increase. The Board determined that these federal cuts would have an immediate and severe impact on healthcare and social safety net services for county residents, and that waiting until the next general election would result in deep service reductions. The Board’s resolution outlined detailed findings about the emergency’s nature and magnitude, and the measure was placed before voters in a special election.Prior to the election, individual county residents challenged the legal sufficiency of the emergency declaration in the Superior Court of Santa Clara County. They argued that the “cases of emergency” exception in article XIII C, section 2 of the California Constitution was improperly applied, and that the measure’s ballot question and impartial analysis were not impartial or accurate as required by the Elections Code. After expedited proceedings, the trial court denied their petition regarding the emergency declaration but ordered agreed-upon modifications to some ballot language.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, held that the “cases of emergency” clause should be interpreted according to its ordinary meaning—referring to unforeseen circumstances requiring immediate action—and does not require a narrow or specially defined scope. The court found that the Board’s resolution and findings provided sufficient factual basis for the emergency declaration and that the trial court’s handling of judicial notice, even if imperfect, was not prejudicial. The court declined to address arguments about the specific ballot language or impartial analysis, finding those issues moot. The judgment denying the writ was affirmed. View "Holtz v. Moreles" on Justia Law

A Texas-based energy company, structured as a subsidiary of a Chinese corporation, sought to develop renewable energy projects in Texas, including the Blue Star Solar Project, and to interconnect these projects to the Texas electric grid managed by the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT). The Texas Lone Star Infrastructure Protection Act (LSIPA), enacted in 2021, prohibits entities majority-owned or controlled by Chinese citizens or corporations from owning or controlling critical infrastructure, including the state’s electric grid. In 2022, ERCOT, applying LSIPA, denied the company’s request to interconnect the Blue Star project and rejected subsequent efforts to repurpose the project.The company sued in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, arguing that LSIPA was preempted by federal law—specifically, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) regime under the Defense Production Act and its amendments. The company also asserted constitutional claims, but ultimately narrowed its appeal to the preemption issue. The district court dismissed the claims, holding that LSIPA was not preempted by the federal CFIUS regime, finding no conflict or field preemption.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The Fifth Circuit held that the federal CFIUS regime does not impliedly preempt LSIPA. The court found that LSIPA and CFIUS operate in purposive harmony, with LSIPA providing additional state-level protections without conflicting with federal objectives. The court also held that CFIUS is not a pervasive federal regulatory scheme that would field-preempt state law in this area. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the preemption claims. View "GH America v. Fohn" on Justia Law

Oklahoma was authorized by Congress in 2005 to extend its administration of federal environmental programs into Indian country, upon approval by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). For many years, Oklahoma did not invoke this provision. However, after the Supreme Court's decision in McGirt v. Oklahoma expanded the definition of Indian country in the state, Oklahoma requested EPA approval to apply its environmental programs to these areas. The EPA initially granted the request in 2020, then withdrew it to allow for further tribal consultation. After extensive engagement with tribal nations, the EPA issued a new approval in January 2025 with added conditions requiring tribal engagement, but subsequently rescinded those conditions in May 2025 and reissued its approval without them.The Pawnee Nation of Oklahoma challenged the EPA’s May 2025 decision in the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. Pawnee Nation argued that the EPA's action was unlawful because the congressional provision authorizing Oklahoma's request, § 10211(a) of the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act (SAFETEA), had expired in 2009, that the EPA erred by refusing to impose conditions on Oklahoma’s approval, and that the EPA failed to make contemporaneous determinations of Oklahoma’s programs’ compliance with federal law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit exercised exclusive jurisdiction and denied Pawnee Nation’s petition for review. The court held that § 10211(a) was unambiguous and remains active, not expired. It determined that EPA’s statutory obligation to approve Oklahoma’s request did not permit the agency to impose additional conditions, and found that EPA acted within the provision’s requirements by relying on its previous determinations that Oklahoma’s programs complied with federal law. The court affirmed EPA’s interpretation and approval. View "Pawnee Nation of Oklahoma v. Zeldin" on Justia Law

The appellant, an inmate in the Alabama Department of Corrections, pleaded guilty in 2008 to two counts of reckless murder and one count of assault related to a fatal car accident he caused while under the influence of methamphetamine. He was sentenced to concurrent prison terms. Over subsequent years, he submitted requests to the Department of Corrections and its Commissioner for temporary leave, specifically Christmas furloughs, and applied multiple times for early parole consideration, which were denied due to disciplinary infractions and other reasons. He also requested access to his parole file, entry into the Supervised Reentry Program, a nondriver identification card, and mental-health treatment, alleging violations of state and federal law. His efforts to seek accountability included letters to officials and bar complaints, which were not acted upon.He filed a pro se complaint in the Montgomery Circuit Court against various state officials and agencies, asserting claims related to the denial of parole, furloughs, access to records, program participation, identification, and mental-health care. The State officials and Board officials moved to dismiss, arguing lack of standing, failure to state a claim, and proper application of law. The circuit court granted both motions to dismiss, with prejudice, finding no improper conduct or grounds for relief.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the appeal and determined that the claims against the State, its agencies, and entities were barred by absolute immunity under the Alabama Constitution. Furthermore, it held that the proper avenue for challenging Board or Department actions was through a petition for a common-law writ of certiorari, not a declaratory-judgment action, and that appellate jurisdiction over such matters belonged to the Court of Criminal Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Alabama dismissed the appeal. View "Phillips v. Ivey" on Justia Law

A police officer employed by the Birmingham Police Department was patrolling late at night during a rainfall when his patrol car struck a pedestrian, resulting in the pedestrian’s death. The pedestrian was walking along a roadway, wearing dark clothing, and was found to be intoxicated. At the time of the accident, the officer was listening to a podcast on his personal cell phone, which was resting on the passenger seat; he stated he did not see the pedestrian before the collision. There was conflicting evidence as to whether the officer was exceeding the posted speed limit.The decedent’s estate brought a wrongful-death action against the officer in his official and individual capacities, as well as against the City of Birmingham based on vicarious liability. The officer and the city moved for summary judgment, arguing that both were entitled to immunity. The Jefferson Circuit Court granted summary judgment on the official-capacity claim based on State immunity but denied summary judgment on the individual-capacity and city claims, finding that there was substantial evidence the officer had acted beyond his authority by using his personal cell phone while driving, possibly violating department rules.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case on a petition for writ of mandamus, which is permissible when immunity is at issue. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded that patrolling is a discretionary function covered by State-agent immunity under the fourth category of Ex parte Cranman and § 6-5-338(a), Ala. Code 1975. The Court held that the officer did not exceed his authority by listening to a podcast, as this did not violate department rules, and found that even if the officer was speeding, such conduct would not remove his immunity in these circumstances. The Court therefore ordered summary judgment for both the officer and the city. View "In re: Cuin v. The City of Birmingham" on Justia Law

The case concerns a challenge to a proposed Nebraska constitutional amendment, the “Fairness for Girls” initiative, which seeks to establish constitutional protections for sex-separate athletics, ensuring equal access to athletic opportunities for females. The sponsors filed the initiative text and an object statement with the Nebraska Secretary of State, then submitted petition signatures. The object statement was printed on the petition and signature sheets, and the full text was available to signers. The Secretary of State certified the initiative for placement on the 2026 general election ballot.Cara Ullman filed a complaint in the District Court for Lancaster County, alleging the initiative’s object statement did not comply with Nebraska statutory requirements, specifically Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 32-1401 and 32-1405. Ullman claimed the statement failed to describe the legal effect and the object sought to be secured. She requested an injunction to prevent the Secretary from placing the initiative on the ballot. After motions and a hearing, the district court dismissed Ullman’s complaint on the merits, holding that the object statement was a concise summary of the legal effect and object, and that the petition substantially complied with statutory requirements.The Nebraska Supreme Court independently reviewed the legal issues, focusing on whether the initiative's object statement satisfied statutory requirements. The Court held that the object statement met the requirement to concisely state the legal effect of the filing and the object sought, noting it was consistent with the initiative’s text and not misleading. The Court clarified that Nebraska law does not require the object statement to summarize all major provisions, only to identify the overall purpose. Accordingly, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment, upholding the legal sufficiency of the initiative and denying the requested injunction. View "Ullman v. Evnen" on Justia Law

This case concerns a dispute between an automobile manufacturer and a local dealership. In 2019, the manufacturer sought to terminate its franchise agreements with the dealership, citing years of poor sales performance and alleged breaches of franchise terms. The dealership, which had previously struggled due to inventory shortages and difficulties following the manufacturer’s bankruptcy and subsequent lack of support, argued that its poor performance was primarily due to insufficient vehicle allocation from the manufacturer. After receiving a termination notice, the dealership improved its sales and operational practices, particularly following the assignment of a new district manager.The Nebraska Motor Vehicle Industry Licensing Board held a hearing in 2023, considering evidence from both sides, including expert testimony and performance data. The Board found that the dealership’s underperformance was largely attributable to the manufacturer’s failure to allocate sufficient inventory and that the improvements made by the dealership following increased support were significant. The Board determined that there was no good cause to terminate the franchise and that the manufacturer's claims were pretextual. The manufacturer then petitioned for judicial review in the District Court for Lancaster County. The district court affirmed the Board’s decision, concluding that the manufacturer failed to prove either good cause for termination or that another franchise would promptly become effective in the community.On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case for errors on the record. It held that the Board and its executive members were not proper parties to the review proceeding, as the Board acted as a neutral factfinding body. The court concluded that due process was not violated by the Board’s composition and that substantial evidence supported the findings below. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s ruling, upholding the denial of the manufacturer’s application to terminate the franchise agreements. View "General Motors v. Nebraska Motor Vehicle Ind. Lic. Bd." on Justia Law

A group of petitioners, including a telecommunications reseller and several consumers, challenged the Federal Communications Commission’s calculation of the Universal Service Fund’s Fourth Quarter 2025 contribution factor. The FCC collects billions of dollars from telecommunications companies each year to subsidize communication services for underserved communities, using a private corporation, the Universal Service Administrative Company (USAC), to administer the fund and calculate the contribution factor. Petitioners argued, among other things, that the FCC’s creation and reliance on USAC violated federal law.Previously, after USAC submitted its projections for the fourth quarter, the FCC issued a public notice adopting USAC’s data (with a minor adjustment) to set a 38.1% contribution factor. The petitioners filed timely comments with the FCC and, after the FCC’s inaction, sought judicial review. The Supreme Court had recently rejected a broader nondelegation challenge to the universal service statute, but left open other statutory and constitutional questions. The current challenge centered on whether the FCC had statutory authority to establish USAC.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. It concluded that the FCC established USAC to act as an instrumentality for administering the Universal Service Fund and that Congress had not specifically authorized the FCC to create such a corporation, as required by the Government Corporation Control Act. The court found that neither the general statutory provisions cited by the FCC nor subsequent congressional actions amounted to the necessary specific authorization. As a result, the court held that the FCC exceeded its statutory authority by relying on USAC’s projections in setting the contribution factor. The court granted the petition for review, vacated the Fourth Quarter 2025 contribution factor, and remanded the matter to the FCC for further proceedings. View "Consumers' Research v. FCC" on Justia Law