Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Hall Trucking, Inc., a company that moves oil rigs, was cited by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) after an employee was fatally struck by a truck during a rig-moving operation. OSHA alleged that Hall Trucking violated the general duty clause under 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1), which requires employers to provide a workplace free from recognized hazards. The citation suggested that implementing an internal traffic control plan (ITCP)—including measures such as minimizing interactions between employees and trucks, requiring high-visibility gear, and employee training—was a feasible method to reduce the risk.An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) of the Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission reviewed the case. The ALJ excluded testimony from Hall Trucking’s expert, finding he lacked specialized knowledge in traffic control and that his opinions amounted to legal conclusions. The ALJ admitted the Secretary’s expert, who had specific experience with ITCPs, and found his testimony reliable. The ALJ concluded that Hall Trucking’s existing safety procedures were inadequate and that an ITCP was a feasible and effective abatement method. Hall Trucking’s arguments regarding the adequacy of its measures, the specificity of abatement steps, and the industry standards were rejected. Additionally, Hall Trucking’s argument that a specific OSHA regulation supplanted the general duty clause was deemed waived because it was not properly raised before the Commission.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed Hall Trucking’s petition for review. The court held that the ALJ’s factual findings were supported by substantial evidence and that the legal conclusions were not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. The court also found the ALJ’s rulings on expert witness admissibility and reliability were proper. The Eighth Circuit denied Hall Trucking’s petition for review, affirming the Commission’s decision. View "Hall Trucking Inc. v. Secretary of Labor" on Justia Law

TC Telephone, a provider participating in California’s Universal LifeLine Telephone Service Program, offered measured-rate phone service to low-income customers by purchasing service from other carriers and reselling it. Under the program’s measured-rate plan, customers received 60 untimed local calls monthly, while TC Telephone incurred per-minute charges from its suppliers. The company sought and received reimbursement from the California Public Utilities Commission (the Commission) for these per-minute charges, believing this practice was permitted under the Commission’s rules, which allowed for recovery of “lost revenues” caused by providing untimed calls. Commission staff initially approved these claims for years.After a 2019 inquiry into rising reimbursement claims, Commission staff expressed uncertainty about whether per-minute reimbursement was correct but instructed TC Telephone to continue its submissions until further clarification. In March 2020, the Commission issued a resolution explicitly forbidding per-minute reimbursement, stating that only per-call reimbursement would be allowed on a prospective basis. Following this, the Commission investigated TC Telephone’s past claims, concluded that its prior per-minute reimbursements violated program rules, and ordered repayment of over $8 million plus interest. TC Telephone’s petition for rehearing was denied by the Commission.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that, prior to the 2020 resolution, the Commission’s rules were unconstitutionally vague and failed to provide TC Telephone with fair notice that per-minute reimbursement was prohibited. The court found that neither the program’s regulations nor staff communications made this prohibition clear, and even Commission staff lacked certainty. As a result, the court annulled the Commission’s decisions ordering repayment and remanded the matter for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "TC Telephone v. Pub. Utilities Com." on Justia Law

A group of residents challenged a decision by a city to issue general obligation bonds for the construction of a city-owned homeless shelter. The city held an election in which 54.25% of voters approved the bond proposition. The residents argued that the homeless shelter was not a “public utility” under the Oklahoma Constitution and thus the bond issue required approval by at least 60% of voters, rather than a simple majority. They sought both declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the issuance of the bonds, contending that the shelter was a social service facility serving only a limited segment of the population and not analogous to facilities previously recognized as public utilities.The case was initially heard in the District Court of Cleveland County. The city responded with a motion to dismiss, asserting that the shelter qualified as a public utility under Okla. Const. Art. 10, § 27, which allows cities to issue bonds for public utilities with majority voter approval. The trial court agreed with the city, found that the shelter was a public utility, dismissed the residents’ petition, and denied their request for an injunction.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma conducted de novo review and examined prior Oklahoma decisions defining “public utility” broadly as public use or public benefit, not limited to traditional infrastructure projects. The court held that a city-owned homeless shelter falls within the definition of a public utility under Article 10, Section 27, because it is exclusively owned by the city and beneficially employed for the welfare of the community. The court further concluded that the city properly determined the bond issue passed with a simple majority vote and affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of the residents’ petition. View "HUTZEL v. CITY OF NORMAN" on Justia Law

K.S., the plaintiff, was placed in a group home by the County of Alameda when he was a minor in foster care. Between 2006 and 2007, while he was twelve to thirteen years old, he was sexually abused by an adult staff member at the facility. K.S. reported the abuse to a supervisor, an agent of the County, but no investigation or protective action was taken. Instead, K.S. alleges he was penalized, and the abuse continued. He contends that, beyond the failure to respond to his report, the County and its employees failed to implement adequate policies, procedures, and supervision to prevent foreseeable abuse of children in their care, and that systemic deficiencies contributed to his injuries.After K.S. filed a negligence action against the County in the Alameda County Superior Court, the County moved for judgment on the pleadings, asserting that it was immune from liability under California Government Code section 820.2, which grants immunity for discretionary acts by public employees. The trial court granted the County’s motion, concluding the complaint’s allegations demonstrated that the relevant acts or omissions were discretionary decisions entitled to immunity.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s judgment, holding that at the pleading stage, it could not be determined that all of the acts or omissions alleged by K.S. were necessarily discretionary within the meaning of section 820.2, nor that they resulted from a conscious, considered exercise of discretion by County employees. The court explained that some alleged conduct, such as failure to notice abuse or take reasonable protective measures, might be ministerial rather than discretionary, and that immunity under section 820.2 could not be resolved solely on the pleadings. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "K.S. v. County of Alameda" on Justia Law

Mary Jane Sweet Spot, LLC and its principal, Ashley McCoy, applied for a business license to operate a bakery in Blue Island, Illinois. After initially positive interactions with city officials, the license was denied based on the City’s finding that the applicants had hosted unapproved, paid events involving “infused” treats and entertainment, which the City deemed inconsistent with the intended bakery business. The City also cited evasive conduct by McCoy during inspections. The denial was sustained after an administrative hearing, and the applicants did not pursue further administrative review before the City Council as required by municipal code.Instead of completing the administrative review, the plaintiffs sought judicial review in the Circuit Court of Cook County, which dismissed the petition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and for untimely filing. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the dismissal based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies. While that appeal was pending, the plaintiffs filed a federal suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, raising constitutional and state-law claims stemming from the license denial.The district court dismissed the federal suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, relying on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, concluding that the plaintiffs were seeking review of a state-court judgment. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that Rooker-Feldman did not apply because the plaintiffs’ alleged injuries resulted from the City’s administrative action, not the state-court judgment. The appellate court vacated the dismissal and remanded for further proceedings, noting that claim preclusion, not Rooker-Feldman, might bar the suit, but left that issue for the district court if raised by defendants. View "Mary Jane Sweet Spot, LLC v City of Blue Island" on Justia Law

A nonprofit church-based daycare center in Indianapolis, serving over one hundred children from underserved communities, participated in the federal Child and Adult Care Food Program (CACFP) for more than twenty-five years. In 2015 and 2018, the Indiana Department of Education (DOE) found deficiencies in the daycare’s meal patterns and labeling, but allowed corrective action, which the daycare successfully completed. In 2022, after COVID-related delays, the DOE again found several deficiencies, including missing child-nutrition labels that were the responsibility of a third-party vendor. After submitting corrective plans and requests for technical assistance, the DOE temporarily deferred termination but warned that any recurrence would result in immediate termination without further opportunities for correction.A subsequent review in 2023 found recurring deficiencies, primarily due to the vendor’s failure to provide required labels. The DOE proposed termination and disqualification of the daycare and its administrators from CACFP for seven years. The daycare appealed administratively, taking further corrective steps, but the DOE refused to consider these efforts, adhering to a policy of not accepting corrective action after termination proceedings began. An administrative law judge affirmed the DOE’s decision, finding that the recurrence and pattern of deficiencies warranted termination and that the DOE had provided sufficient technical assistance.On judicial review, the Hamilton Superior Court reversed the administrative decision. The trial court found that the DOE’s unwritten policy of refusing further corrective opportunities and technical assistance after proposing termination was arbitrary and capricious, contrary to federal regulations and the CACFP Handbook. The court ordered the DOE to reinstate the daycare’s participation and provide technical assistance.The Indiana Court of Appeals subsequently reversed the trial court, concluding the DOE was not required to offer further corrective opportunities or technical assistance. Upon transfer, the Indiana Supreme Court vacated the appellate decision and held that the DOE abused its discretion by not considering additional corrective action or providing sufficient technical assistance. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s reinstatement of the daycare’s CACFP agreement. View "Indiana Department of Education v. Mt. Zions Loving Day Care Ministry" on Justia Law

A North Dakota truck stop and convenience store challenged a Federal Reserve regulation that set a 21-cent cap on debit card interchange fees charged by cardholder banks to merchants. The dispute centered on the statutory requirement that such fees be “reasonable and proportional to the cost incurred by the issuer with respect to the transaction,” specifically requiring that only the “incremental cost incurred . . . in the authorization, clearance, or settlement of a particular electronic debit transaction” be considered, while excluding other costs not specific to individual transactions.After the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff’s challenge was timely under the Administrative Procedure Act, the United States District Court for the District of North Dakota considered the merits. On summary judgment, the district court found that the Federal Reserve’s regulation impermissibly included non-transaction-specific costs, such as fixed costs related to authorization, clearance, and settlement, network processing fees, fraud-monitoring costs, and fraud losses, in setting the fee cap. The district court concluded this approach violated the statute and ordered the rule vacated, but stayed its decision pending appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The appellate court determined that the statute requires the Federal Reserve to consider only the marginal (incremental) costs of individual debit transactions, not fixed or non-specific costs. It held that the Federal Reserve’s regulation was contrary to law because it failed to distinguish properly between transaction-specific and non-specific costs, and it set a uniform cap without sufficient regard to statutory requirements. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment vacating the 21-cent cap and remanded for the agency to establish a fee structure consistent with the statutory mandate. View "Corner Post, Inc. v. Board of Governors" on Justia Law

A group of environmental organizations challenged the issuance of a Clean Water Act Section 404 permit by the United States Army Corps of Engineers for a large mixed-use development on the Cainhoy property in Charleston, South Carolina. The property comprises over 9,000 acres, including more than 2,500 acres of wetlands. The development plan would impact 181.5 acres of wetlands, while the remainder would be protected through conservation measures. The Corps, after a multi-year review process, assessed numerous alternatives—including off-site locations, on-site alternatives, a plan proposed by the plaintiffs known as the Dover plan, and a no action alternative—and ultimately determined that the proposed project was the least environmentally damaging practicable alternative (LEDPA).The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina reviewed the plaintiffs’ challenge, which argued that the Corps’ LEDPA determination was arbitrary and capricious because it did not consider alternatives that would impact fewer acres of wetlands. The district court concluded that it had jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act citizen suit provision, dismissed the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) claim, and granted summary judgment for the Corps and intervening landowners. The court found that the Corps had conducted a thorough alternatives analysis and that its decision was neither arbitrary nor capricious.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that jurisdiction for challenges to final agency action such as this arises under the APA, not the Clean Water Act citizen suit provision. However, the court found the jurisdictional error harmless because both statutes require the same standard of review. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that the Corps’ LEDPA determination was not arbitrary or capricious because it thoroughly evaluated all relevant alternatives and provided a rational explanation for its decision. View "South Carolina Coastal Conservation League v. United States Army Corps of Engineers" on Justia Law

A homeowner applied for a permit to construct an accessory dwelling unit (ADU) on his property in the City of Palos Verdes Estates. He alleged that, despite statutes requiring ministerial approval of such permits within a specific time, the City unlawfully delayed the process for over three years by imposing discretionary reviews and additional requirements. As a result of these delays, the homeowner claimed to have suffered significant financial damages, including increased construction costs and diminished property value.The matter was first heard in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. The City demurred, arguing that the statutes governing ADU permitting were not intended to protect the private financial interests of individual homeowners, but rather to address the public’s general interest in increasing housing supply. The trial court agreed, finding that the relevant statutes aimed to facilitate housing construction generally, not to protect homeowners from financial losses due to permitting delays. The court sustained the City’s demurrer, and judgment was entered in favor of the City.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. It held that the statutory duty to ministerially and promptly approve ADU permits was designed to confer a direct benefit on permit applicants, such as the homeowner in this case. The court reasoned that preventing delays for ADU applicants is not incidental but central to the statutory scheme. Consequently, the homeowner stated a valid cause of action under Government Code section 815.6 for damages resulting from the City’s failure to comply with its mandatory duty. The appellate court reversed the judgment of the Superior Court, allowing the claim to proceed. View "Shi v. City of Palos Verdes Estates" on Justia Law

GateOne Gillette, LLC entered into a 20-year lease with the Northeast Wyoming Regional Airport Board to serve as the fixed base operator at the Campbell County airport, providing services such as flight instruction and aircraft maintenance. The Board was responsible for maintaining certain airport facilities and for shared maintenance of the fuel farm. In March 2025, the Board issued a notice terminating GateOne’s lease, asserting breach of contract, and subsequently took over GateOne’s operations and solicited its employees.GateOne filed a lawsuit against the Board in the District Court of Campbell County, seeking declaratory relief, damages for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and unjust enrichment. The Board moved to dismiss the suit under Rule 12(b)(6), asserting that it was immune from suit under both the terms of the lease and the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act (WGCA). The district court denied the Board’s motion, finding that the lease was ambiguous regarding the preservation of governmental immunity and could reasonably be read in more than one way. The Board appealed that denial.The Supreme Court of Wyoming first determined that the order denying the motion to dismiss based on governmental immunity was immediately appealable because immunity under the WGCA constitutes immunity from suit, not merely a defense to liability. On review, the Supreme Court held that the lease was ambiguous as to whether it preserved the Board’s immunity from contract claims, noting conflicting provisions and the need to consider extrinsic evidence. The Court affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss and remanded for further proceedings to resolve the ambiguity using extrinsic evidence, as necessary. View "Northeast Wyoming Regional Airport Board v. GateOne Gillette, LLC" on Justia Law