Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Karen Ashley, the former Chief Nursing Officer of Clay County Memorial Hospital (CCMH), raised concerns about patient safety issues, including missing fentanyl and procedural errors in blood transfusions. She reported these issues internally and publicly at a CCMH Board meeting. Ashley also advocated for CCMH to terminate its contract with Concord Medical Group PLLC and partner with ACPHealth. Following this advocacy, Ashley alleges that the County, CCMH, and the Foundation retaliated against her by terminating her employment, violating her First Amendment rights.Ashley filed suit against the County and Concord Medical Group, alleging retaliation under the Texas Occupations Code and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The County moved to dismiss, asserting it was not Ashley’s employer and had taken no adverse actions against her. Ashley amended her complaint to add CCMH as a defendant and narrowed her claims against the County. The County maintained it was not Ashley’s employer and moved to dismiss on governmental immunity grounds. CCMH invoked an arbitration clause in Ashley’s employment agreement and moved to compel arbitration. The district court compelled the County to arbitration alongside CCMH and denied the County’s motion to dismiss as moot.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court erred by not addressing the County’s governmental immunity defense before compelling arbitration. The appellate court reversed the district court’s order compelling arbitration and remanded the case with instructions for the district court to resolve the issue of governmental immunity as it pertains to the County’s motion to dismiss before ruling on the motion to compel arbitration. View "Ashley v. Clay County" on Justia Law

The case involves the fate of the Frank J. Wood Bridge, a historic bridge in Maine connecting Topsham and Brunswick. Built in 1932, the bridge is no longer safe without substantial rehabilitation or replacement. The Maine Department of Transportation (MDOT) decided that replacing the bridge was more sensible than rehabilitating it. Since federal funds would be used, MDOT needed approval from the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) and compliance with federal statutes, including Section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act, due to the bridge's historic status.The FHWA approved MDOT's plan to replace the bridge, despite objections from preservation groups. The plaintiffs challenged this decision in the United States District Court for the District of Maine, which rejected their challenges. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated the FHWA's decision in part, remanding the case to determine whether a 53% price differential between rehabilitation and replacement constituted a cost of extraordinary magnitude under Section 4(f).On remand, the FHWA concluded that the 53% differential was indeed a cost of extraordinary magnitude. Plaintiffs argued that updated cost estimates showed that rehabilitation would now be cheaper than replacement. The FHWA, however, found the plaintiffs' updated estimates flawed and did not recalculate the differential. The plaintiffs then sued again, and the district court granted summary judgment for the agencies, finding that the FHWA had complied with the remand instructions.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the FHWA acted within the scope of the remand by deciding whether the 53% price differential was a cost of extraordinary magnitude and was not required to reopen the record to consider new cost information. View "National Trust for Historic Preservation v. Buttigieg" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Curtis Hier requested records from the Slate Valley Unified School District related to incidents of restraint and seclusion of students at Fair Haven Grade School. Specifically, he sought redacted copies of "Rule 4500 forms" from January to April 2021, documents related to the use of certain rooms between 2015 and 2022, and any redacted restraint and seclusion documents concerning the assistant principal. The school district denied the requests, claiming the records were student records and thus exempt from disclosure under the Public Records Act.The Superior Court, Rutland Unit, Civil Division, denied the school district's motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment to the plaintiff. The court found that the Rule 4500 forms were not student records but were meant for monitoring the use of restraint and seclusion in schools. It ordered the school district to disclose the forms with specific redactions to protect student privacy. The court also denied the plaintiff's motion to amend the judgment to remove certain redactions.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the trial court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the Rule 4500 forms are categorically exempt from disclosure as student records under the Public Records Act. The court emphasized that the language of the student records exception is broad and unqualified, similar to its previous ruling in Caledonian-Record Publishing Co. v. Vermont State Colleges. The court concluded that the forms, which contain information related to specific students and incidents, fall squarely within the statutory exception for student records and are not subject to redaction or disclosure. View "Hier v. Slate Valley Unified School District" on Justia Law

The case involves Russell County and its officials (collectively, the County parties) appealing a summary judgment from the Russell Circuit Court in favor of the City of Phenix City and the Town of Hurtsboro (collectively, the municipalities). The dispute centers on whether the Alabama Terminal Excise Tax Act (ATETA), effective October 1, 2012, repealed a local law (Act No. 859, Ala. Acts 1969) that required Russell County to distribute 10% of its share of state gasoline excise tax proceeds to the municipalities.The Russell Circuit Court ruled in favor of the municipalities, declaring that the ATETA did not repeal the local law, despite the ATETA repealing Act No. 224, which the local law referenced. The court found that the ATETA's provisions, which stated that local legislation governing the distribution of gasoline excise tax proceeds remained in force, supported this conclusion.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case de novo. The County parties argued that the local law was void because it specifically referenced Act No. 224, which the ATETA repealed, and that the ATETA was not a continuation of Act No. 224. They also contended that the ATETA implicitly repealed the local law. The Supreme Court found that the local law's reference to the "state gasoline excise tax" was a general reference, incorporating subsequent amendments, including the ATETA. The court also determined that the ATETA was a continuation of Act No. 224, as it did not substantially alter the distribution scheme. Additionally, the court held that the ATETA did not repeal the local law by implication, as it contemplated local variation in the distribution of tax proceeds.The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the circuit court's judgment, holding that the ATETA did not repeal the local law and that the local law remained in force, requiring Russell County to distribute 10% of its share of gasoline excise tax proceeds to the municipalities. View "Russell County, Alabama v. City of Phenix City, Alabama" on Justia Law

Dennis Neal, a heating, ventilation, and air conditioning technician at Howard University Hospital, was injured on the job when a ladder gave way beneath him. He experienced pain and underwent spinal surgery. After attempting to return to work and experiencing further pain, he quit and sought reinstatement of his disability benefits and vocational rehabilitation services. The hospital terminated his benefits when he accepted new employment but quit after four days due to physical discomfort from long drives and job duties.An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) granted Neal's claim for reinstatement of benefits and services, and the Compensation Review Board (CRB) affirmed. The hospital appealed, arguing that the CRB lacked substantial evidence to support its findings that Neal did not voluntarily limit his income and did not fail to cooperate with vocational rehabilitation. The hospital contended that the ALJ and CRB ignored critical testimony from witnesses.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and found that the CRB's decision was supported by substantial evidence. The court noted that the ALJ's findings were based on credible evidence, including medical evaluations and Neal's testimony about his physical limitations and the nature of the job duties at his new employment. The court also found that Neal had cooperated with vocational rehabilitation services and had demonstrated a willingness to continue doing so.The court held that the CRB's decision flowed rationally from the facts and was supported by substantial evidence. The court affirmed the CRB's decision to reinstate Neal's temporary total disability benefits and vocational rehabilitation services. View "Howard University Hospital v. D.C. Department of Employment Services" on Justia Law

The case involves the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) Communities Act, which mandates that cities and towns with local access to MBTA services adopt zoning laws to provide at least one district of multifamily housing "as of right" near their MBTA facilities. The town of Milton, which has four MBTA stations, voted down a proposed zoning scheme to comply with the act. The Attorney General then sued the town to enforce the act.The Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk reviewed the case. The town initially took steps to comply with the act, including hiring a consultant and submitting an action plan to the Executive Office of Housing and Livable Communities (HLC). However, a town-wide referendum ultimately rejected the proposed zoning bylaw. The Attorney General filed a complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to enforce compliance with the act.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the MBTA Communities Act is constitutional and that the Attorney General has the authority to enforce it. However, the court found that the HLC did not comply with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) when promulgating the guidelines, rendering them ineffective. The court granted declaratory relief in part and dismissed the remaining claims, directing the single justice to enter a declaratory judgment consistent with the opinion. View "Attorney General v. Town of Milton" on Justia Law

Manley Barton, a registered member of the Navajo tribe, applied for relocation benefits from the Office of Navajo and Hopi Indian Relocation (ONHIR) based on his residence at his grandparents' homesite on the Hopi Partitioned Lands (HPL). The Navajo-Hopi Settlement Act required individuals residing on land partitioned to the tribe of which they were not a member to relocate. To be eligible for benefits, applicants had to show they were residents of the land partitioned to the other tribe on December 22, 1974, and were heads of household when they moved away. Manley claimed he lived at the HPL homesite until 1986, despite being away for education and employment.ONHIR denied Manley's application, and the Independent Hearing Officer (IHO) upheld the denial, concluding that Manley's residence at the HPL homesite ended in 1984 when his grandparents relocated. The IHO did not consider other evidence of Manley's intent to reside at the HPL homesite, such as his testimony and that of his family members about his continued use of the homesite for ceremonies and chores. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of ONHIR, finding the IHO's decision was supported by substantial evidence and not arbitrary or capricious.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's summary judgment. The court held that the IHO improperly applied the "temporarily away" exception, which allows applicants who are away for education or employment to establish residency through intent and manifestations of intent. The IHO's reliance solely on the grandparents' relocation to determine Manley's legal residence was arbitrary and capricious. The court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "BARTON V. OFFICE OF NAVAJO AND HOPI INDIAN RELOCATION" on Justia Law

Three plaintiffs, including a Virginia citizen, a Virginia entity, and an out-of-state entity, challenged Virginia Senate Bill 903, which regulates the retail sale of hemp products based on their total tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) concentration. The plaintiffs argued that the 2018 Farm Bill, which legalized hemp with a delta-9 THC concentration of no more than 0.3%, preempts the more restrictive Virginia law. They also claimed that the Virginia law violates the Dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. The court found that the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on their preemption arguments, as the 2018 Farm Bill does not expressly preempt state laws regulating hemp more stringently. The court also concluded that the plaintiffs did not sufficiently allege that they were licensed processors under Virginia law, thus lacking standing to challenge the provision preventing Virginia processors from selling hemp products to others who would use them in violation of the total THC standard. Additionally, the court rejected the plaintiffs' Dormant Commerce Clause claims, finding no evidence that the Virginia law discriminates against or unduly burdens interstate commerce.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed with the district court that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the sales restriction provision, as they did not allege sufficient facts showing they were licensed processors. The court vacated the district court's order regarding this claim and remanded with instructions to dismiss it without prejudice. However, the court affirmed the district court's denial of injunctive relief concerning the total THC standard, finding that the plaintiffs failed to show a likelihood of success on their preemption and Dormant Commerce Clause claims. View "Northern Virginia Hemp and Agriculture, LLC v. Commonwealth of Virginia" on Justia Law

Oman Fasteners, LLC, a foreign producer and exporter of steel nails, was subject to a 2015 antidumping-duty order by the U.S. Department of Commerce. During the 2020-2021 administrative review, Oman Fasteners submitted a response to Commerce's detailed questionnaire 16 minutes past the 5:00 PM deadline. Commerce rejected the late submission and applied an adverse inference, resulting in a 154.33% antidumping-duty rate for Oman Fasteners.Oman Fasteners challenged Commerce's decision in the Court of International Trade (Trade Court), seeking a preliminary injunction against the imposition of the 154.33% duty rate. The Trade Court consolidated the preliminary injunction proceeding with a trial on the merits and held that Commerce abused its discretion. The court remanded the case to Commerce for recalculation and issued an injunction limiting cash deposits to the pre-existing 1.65% rate.Mid Continent Steel & Wire, Inc., a domestic steel-nail producer, intervened and filed an interlocutory appeal with the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit concluded that Mid Continent had standing and that the appeal was not moot. The court affirmed the Trade Court's injunction, agreeing that Commerce's application of the 154.33% rate was unsupported by substantial evidence and constituted an abuse of discretion. The court noted that the slight delay in submission did not justify such a punitive rate and that the balance of hardships favored Oman Fasteners, which faced irreparable harm without the injunction. View "OMAN FASTENERS, LLC v. US " on Justia Law

The State of Indiana approved a plan to retire a coal-fired facility and replace it with wind and solar energy sources, supplemented by two new natural gas turbines to ensure grid reliability. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) approved a natural gas pipeline to serve these turbines. The Citizens Action Coalition of Indiana challenged FERC’s approval, arguing that FERC’s environmental analysis was unreasonable and inconsistent with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Natural Gas Act (NGA). The core claim was that FERC should have analyzed non-gas alternatives before approving the pipeline.The Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission initially denied CenterPoint Energy’s proposal for an 850-megawatt natural gas unit due to inadequate consideration of alternatives. CenterPoint then modified its plan to include wind generation and applied to build two smaller gas-fired turbines, which the Indiana Commission approved. CenterPoint contracted with Texas Gas Transmission for a 24-mile pipeline to supply natural gas to the new units. Citizens Action intervened in the FERC proceeding, raising environmental concerns. FERC prepared an environmental impact statement and approved the pipeline. Citizens Action’s request for rehearing was denied by operation of law, leading to the current petition for review.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that FERC acted lawfully and reasonably in its environmental analysis and public convenience and necessity determination. FERC was not required to consider non-gas alternatives outside its jurisdiction and properly identified the project’s purpose as supporting CenterPoint’s new natural gas units. The court also found that FERC’s use of emissions percentages and the absence of a significance label were reasonable and consistent with NEPA. The petition for review was denied. View "Citizens Action Coalition of Indiana, Inc. v. FERC" on Justia Law