Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries
Bakersfield Crisis Pregnancy Center v. Dept. of Managed Health Care
A group of plaintiffs, including a nonprofit pregnancy center and two physicians, brought a taxpayer action challenging the constitutionality of the Abortion Accessibility Act of 2022 in California. This law prohibits health insurance plans from imposing cost-sharing requirements such as deductibles and copays for abortion and abortion-related services, while allowing such cost-sharing for prenatal and maternity care for those who continue a pregnancy. The plaintiffs argued that this statutory scheme violated the right to reproductive privacy and the right to equal protection for women who choose to carry their pregnancies to term.The Superior Court of Kern County conducted a two-day court trial, during which both sides presented expert and factual witnesses and stipulated to several key facts about costs and insurance coverage. The trial court found that the plaintiffs failed to prove the Act either encouraged or coerced women into having abortions, or that it interfered with women’s ability to exercise their constitutional right to choose whether to have an abortion or continue a pregnancy. The court concluded that the plaintiffs had not established a “serious invasion” of privacy or a significant interference with a fundamental right. As a result, the trial court applied the rational basis standard to the equal protection claim and found a rational legislative purpose for the distinctions made by the Act.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the legal standards applied and the allocation of the burden of proof. The appellate court affirmed that strict scrutiny did not apply because no significant impairment of a fundamental right was proven. It held that the Act did not violate the right to privacy or equal protection under the California Constitution, as the law’s classifications were rationally related to the legislative purpose of removing barriers to abortion services. The court affirmed the judgment in favor of the state defendants. View "Bakersfield Crisis Pregnancy Center v. Dept. of Managed Health Care" on Justia Law
Dolan v. Federal Emergency Management Agency
In 2022, a wildfire in New Mexico resulted from two controlled burns conducted by the United States Forest Service, ultimately causing substantial property loss and personal harm to local residents. In response, Congress passed the Hermit’s Peak/Calf Canyon Fire Assistance Act to provide compensation to victims. The Act tasked the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) with implementing a streamlined process for administering claims for damages under the Act. Plaintiffs who lost property and suffered various injuries—including both economic and noneconomic harm—filed claims with FEMA. FEMA interpreted the Act not to allow recovery for noneconomic damages, such as pain and suffering or emotional distress, and denied those portions of the claims.The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico reviewed the plaintiffs’ challenge to FEMA’s interpretation under the Administrative Procedures Act. The district court held that FEMA’s exclusion of noneconomic damages was arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law. The court set aside FEMA’s rule and ordered FEMA to consider and pay claims for noneconomic damages when warranted. FEMA’s motion to alter or amend the judgment was denied, and FEMA appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The Tenth Circuit held that the Assistance Act does not contain a clear and unequivocal waiver of the United States’ sovereign immunity for noneconomic damages. The court found the relevant statutory language ambiguous and, applying the presumption in favor of sovereign immunity, concluded that noneconomic damages are not recoverable under the Act. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Dolan v. Federal Emergency Management Agency" on Justia Law
State College Area SD v. DHS
A Pennsylvania school district operated a before- and after-school program, called the Community Education Extended Learning (CEEL) program, in six of its elementary schools. The program provided care for children outside regular school hours and included both academic enrichment and unstructured activities such as free time and games. Parents paid fees for their children to participate, and the program replaced services previously provided by licensed outside organizations. A representative from the Department of Human Services (DHS) visited the program and, concluding it constituted unlicensed child care, issued cease-and-desist letters to the district.The district appealed, and the dispute was first addressed by an administrative law judge, who found that DHS had not established supervisory authority over the district’s program. However, DHS’s Bureau of Hearings and Appeals, after reconsideration by the Secretary of DHS, determined that the district was a “children’s institution” under the Human Services Code and thus subject to DHS supervision. The Commonwealth Court affirmed this determination, also rejecting the district’s argument that it was independently authorized under the Public School Code to operate the CEEL program without DHS oversight or approval from the Pennsylvania Department of Education (PDE).The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case to determine whether the district was a “children’s institution” subject to DHS supervision and whether the School Code authorized the program without DHS involvement. The court held that the district qualifies as a “children’s institution” under the Human Services Code because it is a public agency that receives or cares for children as defined by the statute. The court also held that DHS’s supervisory authority applies regardless of any authorization or lack thereof under the School Code or PDE. The court affirmed the Commonwealth Court’s order. View "State College Area SD v. DHS" on Justia Law
Poor Boy v. City of Winnfield
After Hurricane Laura struck Louisiana, Poor Boy Tree Service, Inc. and Mobile Help 4U, Inc. traveled to the City of Winnfield to provide cleanup and recovery services. Poor Boy communicated with City officials, including the mayor and certain employees, about performing these services, but there was no written agreement formalizing their relationship. Poor Boy later issued invoices totaling over $1 million for the work performed, but the City did not pay. Poor Boy sought payment through legal action, alleging a breach of an open account relationship under Louisiana law.The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana granted summary judgment in favor of the City. The court determined that there was a genuine dispute regarding whether the City consented to a contract with Poor Boy, but found that, under the Lawrason Act, the mayor could not bind the City to a contract without approval from the board of aldermen, which was not shown by Poor Boy. The district court also held that the parties’ arrangement did not constitute an open account relationship, relying on Fifth Circuit precedent requiring a history of prior dealings. Finally, it ruled that unjust enrichment was unavailable because Poor Boy had another legal remedy.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court’s holding that the mayor lacked capacity to bind the City to an oral contract without aldermen approval. However, it vacated the grant of summary judgment on Poor Boy’s open account claim, finding that the district court relied on outdated precedent and that Louisiana Supreme Court guidance allows open account actions without prior dealings. The court also vacated as premature the district court’s determination that Poor Boy could not pursue unjust enrichment, remanding both the open account and unjust enrichment issues for further proceedings. View "Poor Boy v. City of Winnfield" on Justia Law
Building Resilient Infrastructure & Developing Greater Equity, Inc. v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
A trade organization representing companies involved in a type of home-improvement loan, in which local governments finance property improvements for homeowners and collect repayment through property tax bills, challenged a new federal rule. For years, these loans were generally exempt from federal consumer credit regulations, as they were treated as tax assessments rather than credit. However, after Congress amended the Truth in Lending Act and directed the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) to regulate these loans and consider their unique features, the CFPB promulgated a rule classifying them as consumer credit transactions subject to federal disclosure, underwriting, and liability requirements.The case was first heard by the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. The district court denied the organization’s motion for a preliminary injunction to halt enforcement of the rule, and later granted summary judgment in favor of the CFPB, concluding that the Bureau acted within its statutory authority, did not act arbitrarily or capriciously, and did not violate the Tenth Amendment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment de novo. The appellate court held that the CFPB properly exercised its rulemaking authority, as the loans in question meet the statutory definition of consumer credit transactions. The court found the Bureau’s reliance on available data reasonable and determined that the rule did not interfere with states’ sovereign taxing powers or unlawfully commandeer state officials. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the CFPB and dismissed the appeal of the preliminary injunction denial as moot. View "Building Resilient Infrastructure & Developing Greater Equity, Inc. v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau" on Justia Law
State ex rel. Board of Education v. Warner
The West Virginia Board of Education and the State Superintendent sought extraordinary relief after a legislative dispute over the Board’s rulemaking authority. The Board had historically promulgated rules for state schools without legislative pre-approval, but in 2025, the Legislature enacted House Bill 2755, requiring Board rules to be submitted for legislative approval before becoming effective. The Board opposed this, citing the West Virginia Constitution’s grant of “general supervision” of public schools to the Board, and asserting that HB 2755 was unconstitutional. When the Board submitted Policy 4334 directly to the Secretary of State for publication, the Secretary refused to accept it, citing the new statutory requirements.Previously, similar statutory provisions were challenged in 1988, leading to the West Virginia Supreme Court’s decision in West Virginia Board of Education v. Hechler, which held that legislative review requirements constituted unconstitutional interference with the Board’s rulemaking power. The Board’s current action was a petition for a writ of mandamus, arguing that Hechler controlled and rendered HB 2755 unconstitutional.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case under its original jurisdiction. The Court determined that the practical effect of HB 2755 was the same as the statutes struck down in Hechler, requiring legislative approval of Board rules and thus interfering with the Board’s constitutional authority. The Court reaffirmed Hechler and held that rulemaking by the State Board of Education is part of its “general supervision” under Article XII, Section 2 of the West Virginia Constitution, and any statutory provision interfering with such rulemaking is unconstitutional. Accordingly, the Court granted the writ of mandamus, declared HB 2755 unconstitutional, and ordered the Secretary of State to accept and publish Policy 4334. View "State ex rel. Board of Education v. Warner" on Justia Law
State ex rel. Pushkin v. Morrisey
After winning both the Republican primary and the general election for the 91st Delegate District in West Virginia in 2024, Joseph A. de Soto was unable to take the oath of office due to his arrest for alleged threats against other delegates. He entered a bail agreement that restricted his contact with other legislators and put him on home confinement. Subsequently, the West Virginia House of Delegates adopted a resolution declaring his seat vacant, citing his failure to appear to take the oath and referencing his alleged misconduct. Both the Republican and Democratic Executive Committees submitted nominees to fill the vacancy, and the Governor appointed a Republican nominee, Ian Masters, who was seated as delegate.Several procedural missteps ensued, with the petitioners—Mike Pushkin, Stephen Willingham, and the West Virginia Democratic Party—filing multiple petitions for a writ of mandamus in the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. These petitions sought to compel the House Speaker to seat Mr. de Soto or, alternatively, to select a replacement from the Democratic nominees. Each petition encountered procedural hurdles, including the failure to provide timely pre-suit notice and to file a timely motion for expedited relief, resulting in dismissals or denials. The petitioners ultimately filed a third petition after attempting to correct notice issues.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the latest petition and denied the request for a writ of mandamus. The Court held that the petitioners lacked standing because their alleged injuries were not redressable by the Court. Specifically, the relief sought depended on actions beyond the respondents’ authority, and there was no vacancy to fill after the Governor’s appointment. Because the Court could not grant the relief requested, it found the petitioners failed to satisfy the redressability prong required for standing and denied the writ. View "State ex rel. Pushkin v. Morrisey" on Justia Law
HD Media Company, LLC v. West Virginia University Board of Governors
HD Media Company, operating as a local newspaper, filed suit against the West Virginia University Board of Governors, alleging violations of the West Virginia Open Governmental Proceedings Act (WVOGPA). The complaint arose from several Board meetings held in summer 2020, during which the Board entered executive sessions to discuss topics including the university’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic, budget matters, social justice issues, athletics, business college affairs, emergency pay policy, Title IX regulations, tuition and fees, and capital projects. HD Media claimed that these closed sessions did not fall within the Act’s limited exceptions and sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as attorney fees.The Circuit Court of Monongalia County granted summary judgment in favor of the Board on all nine topics, finding that most discussions fell within the “commercial competition” and “confidential matters” exceptions of the WVOGPA. The court also found a technical violation in the Board’s meeting agenda notice but denied attorney fees, concluding the Board’s position was substantially justified. HD Media appealed, first to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, which declined direct review, then to the Intermediate Court of Appeals of West Virginia (ICA). The ICA affirmed the circuit court’s rulings, including the application of exceptions and the denial of attorney fees.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the ICA’s decision de novo. It held that most topics discussed in executive session fit the “commercial competition” exception, but reversed as to the social justice issues discussion, concluding that it did not meet any statutory exception. The court affirmed the ICA in part, reversed in part, and remanded for consideration of attorney fees related to the improper closure regarding social justice issues. View "HD Media Company, LLC v. West Virginia University Board of Governors" on Justia Law
Marshall v. Blanche
The plaintiff, Thomas Marshall, sought declaratory and injunctive relief against federal officials after being denied the ability to purchase a firearm due to prior Massachusetts convictions for driving under the influence, an offense punishable by more than one year in prison. Marshall alleged that the enforcement of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and related regulations violated his Second Amendment rights, as he wished to purchase and possess firearms for self-defense but feared prosecution under federal law.The United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire found that Marshall had Article III standing, since his requested relief would redress his inability to obtain a firearm. However, the District Court dismissed his complaint for failure to state a claim, reasoning that the First Circuit’s pre-Bruen precedent in United States v. Torres-Rosario remained binding and foreclosed as-applied Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1), except in cases involving particularly minor convictions. The court concluded that Marshall’s repeated DUI convictions did not fall within the exception and thus precluded his challenge.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that the District Court’s reliance on Torres-Rosario was no longer controlling in light of recent developments, including the Supreme Court's decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, which established a new framework for Second Amendment claims. The First Circuit vacated the District Court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, directing the lower court to apply the Bruen framework to Marshall’s as-applied Second Amendment challenge, taking into account recent regulatory changes affecting restoration of firearm rights for prohibited persons. View "Marshall v. Blanche" on Justia Law
John Doe #1 v. Lee
Eight plaintiffs challenged Tennessee’s sex-offender-registration law, arguing it retroactively punished them for offenses committed before the registry’s enactment. The law assigns classifications based on offenses and imposes reporting and lifetime registration requirements, as well as geographical restrictions on where registrants may live, work, or be present. The Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (TBI) maintains the registry, classifies offenders, and publishes relevant information, including certain labels such as “violent sexual offender” and “offender against children.” Plaintiffs alleged these classifications and restrictions violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee initially granted summary judgment for plaintiffs, treating the Act as a whole and finding its combined effects punitive. The court issued a broad injunction, ordering plaintiffs’ removal from the registry and enjoining enforcement against them. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit vacated much of this relief, holding plaintiffs lacked standing to sue the Governor, and remanded for provision-specific analysis, instructing the district court to limit relief to provisions enforced by TBI.On remand, the district court found TBI responsible for both the classification and geographical claims, holding that the classifications and several geographical restrictions were punitive and unconstitutional. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that while TBI’s classifications operated retroactively, they did not impose punishment under the Ex Post Facto Clause, and thus reversed the classification judgment. For the geographical restrictions, the court found plaintiffs lacked Article III standing against TBI, as their injuries were not fairly traceable to Director Rausch and would not be redressed by relief against him. The court vacated the judgment and permanent injunction regarding the geographical claims and remanded with instructions to dismiss those claims without prejudice. View "John Doe #1 v. Lee" on Justia Law