Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries
Voegeli v. Cao
A Navy Reserve Lieutenant, while serving as a sailing instructor in 1992, rescued a drowning student on Lake Mendota in Madison, Wisconsin. His reserve unit nominated him for the Coast Guard Gold Lifesaving Medal, submitting statements from the rescued student and a motorboat operator. Ultimately, he received a Coast Guard Public Service Commendation instead. Decades later, after learning about the possibility of post hoc military decorations, he sought the Navy and Marine Corps Medal with the assistance of a U.S. Senator. Unable to locate the original eyewitnesses, he submitted a citation referencing their earlier statements and an affidavit from his former commanding officer attesting that such statements had existed.The Office of the Chief of Naval Operations denied the nomination, citing the absence of required eyewitness statements as set forth in Navy policy. The nominee appealed to the Navy’s Board for Correction of Naval Records, which also denied his application, concluding he did not meet the baseline eligibility criteria and that his evidence did not substitute for the eyewitness statements. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia subsequently granted summary judgment to the Secretary of the Navy, ruling that the Board’s decision was not arbitrary or capricious.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. The appellate court held that, under the highly deferential standard of review for military records corrections, the Board’s requirement for two eyewitness statements was reasonable and its refusal to accept other evidence as a substitute was not arbitrary and capricious. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of the Secretary of the Navy. View "Voegeli v. Cao" on Justia Law
TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY v. ESPINOZA
A traffic accident occurred on December 3, 2021, when Sonia Espinoza’s vehicle was rear-ended by a car driven by Madyson Leita, a Texas Tech University employee who was acting within the scope of her employment. Texas Tech qualifies as a governmental unit under the Texas Tort Claims Act. Espinoza filed suit on November 17, 2023, naming only Leita in her official capacity as the defendant, just before the two-year statute of limitations for personal-injury claims expired.After being served, Leita filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 101.106(f), which allows for dismissal unless the plaintiff amends the pleadings to name the governmental unit as defendant and dismiss the employee within thirty days. Espinoza failed to do so within the statutory window; she amended her petition to name Texas Tech as a defendant fifty-three days later, after limitations had expired, and did not formally dismiss Leita until even later. Texas Tech responded with a plea to the jurisdiction, which the trial court granted, dismissing the case.The Court of Appeals for the Seventh District of Texas reversed the trial court, reasoning that § 101.106(f) simply ensured the proper party was named and did not require dismissal for untimely amendments. Upon review, the Supreme Court of Texas concluded that § 101.106(f) requires dismissal if the plaintiff does not amend within thirty days, and that a subsequent suit naming the governmental employer is then subject to limitations and other procedural bars. Because Espinoza amended her petition after limitations had expired, the Supreme Court of Texas reversed the appellate court’s judgment and reinstated the trial court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. View "TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY v. ESPINOZA" on Justia Law
COMPREHENSIVE TRAINING CENTER, LLC v. EDCOUCH-ELSA INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT
A superintendent for a Texas public school district entered into contracts with two consulting firms to provide grant-writing and administration services, agreeing to pay them a contingent fee based on a percentage of any federal grant monies awarded. The contracts were not brought before the district’s board of trustees for approval, even though the board had a policy requiring board approval for any single, budgeted purchase of goods or services costing $25,000 or more. The consultants’ fees ultimately amounted to over $800,000 after the district successfully obtained a federal grant. When the district refused to pay, the consultants sued for breach of contract.The consultants filed suit in a Texas trial court, seeking to enforce the contracts under Chapter 271 of the Texas Local Government Code, which waives governmental immunity for properly executed contracts with local governments. The district responded with a plea to the jurisdiction, arguing that the superintendent lacked authority to bind the district to these contracts because they exceeded his delegated authority and were not budgeted. The trial court denied the district’s plea. On interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth District of Texas reversed, holding that the contracts were not properly executed because they were not budgeted for and exceeded the superintendent’s authority.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and affirmed the appellate court’s judgment. The Court held that, under the district’s policy, the superintendent only had authority to make budgeted purchases under $25,000, and these contracts far exceeded that limit. Because the contracts were not properly executed by someone with authority, Chapter 271’s waiver of governmental immunity did not apply and the district was immune from suit. The Supreme Court of Texas affirmed the dismissal of the consultants’ claims. View "COMPREHENSIVE TRAINING CENTER, LLC v. EDCOUCH-ELSA INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT" on Justia Law
AFSCME Iowa Council 61 v. State of Iowa
Two former employees of the Iowa Department of Transportation, Helmrichs and Gallup, lost their jobs and sought to challenge their terminations through a grievance process, requesting union representation at a Step 3 meeting. The Department of Administrative Services denied them union representation. The employees, along with their union AFSCME Iowa Council 61, filed a prohibited-practice complaint with the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB), alleging the refusal constituted a prohibited labor practice. During the proceedings, PERB’s functions were transferred to the Employment Appeal Board (EAB). An administrative law judge initially ruled in favor of the complainants, but the EAB reviewed the case and dismissed the complaint, concluding no prohibited practice had occurred.Following the EAB’s dismissal, AFSCME, Helmrichs, and Gallup filed a petition for judicial review in the Iowa District Court for Polk County under Iowa Code section 17A.19. The State moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that Iowa Code section 20.34 prohibited judicial review under chapter 17A for contested cases in prohibited-practice proceedings. The district court denied the State’s motion, interpreting section 20.34 as permitting chapter 17A judicial review for contested cases, and allowed the petition to proceed.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the district court’s denial of the State’s motion to dismiss. The court examined the statutory language of section 20.34, its legislative history, and the broader context of Iowa Code chapter 17A. The court determined that the first sentence of section 20.34, which references a “petition for judicial review,” is more specific and should prevail over the second sentence. The court held that section 17A.19 judicial review is available for contested cases arising under chapter 20. Accordingly, the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order denying the State’s motion to dismiss. View "AFSCME Iowa Council 61 v. State of Iowa" on Justia Law
State ex rel. Hilgers v. Herman
A criminal case was initiated in Sarpy County, Nebraska, against an individual accused of first degree sexual assault of a child. At the preliminary hearing in county court, a deputy county attorney prosecuted the case, and the judge found probable cause to bind it over to district court. Defense counsel did not raise any issues about ex parte communications or conflicts of interest at this stage. After the case moved to district court, a different deputy county attorney was assigned, and the original prosecutor was no longer involved. Defense counsel later alleged, for the first time in district court, that the deputy county attorney had engaged in improper ex parte communications with the county court judge during the preliminary hearing. She sought to call the deputy county attorney as a witness, but ultimately did not do so.The district court, on its own initiative, considered these allegations and the purported appearance of impropriety, and appointed a special prosecutor from the Attorney General’s office, disqualifying the Sarpy County Attorney’s office from further participation. The Sarpy County Attorney’s office objected, arguing there was no evidence supporting a conflict of interest or improper conduct. The court denied motions to reconsider, and the defense never presented evidence of misconduct or called the deputy county attorney to testify. The district court eventually found the motion to quash the subpoena moot.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the district court's actions in an original quo warranto proceeding brought by the Attorney General and Sarpy County Attorney. The Court held that the district court abused its discretion in appointing a special prosecutor because no evidence was presented supporting a disqualifying conflict of interest under the relevant statute. The appearance of impropriety alone was insufficient, and the conflict was not shown to affect the entire county attorney’s office. The Court ordered judgment of ouster, reinstating the Sarpy County Attorney’s office to the prosecution and removing the Attorney General’s office as special prosecutor. View "State ex rel. Hilgers v. Herman" on Justia Law
The Armory Commission of Alabama v. Nearen Construction Company, LLC
A construction company submitted a bid to build a military project for a state commission, but its bid was rejected because it included only one original bid form instead of the preferred two, despite otherwise complying with requirements. The company claimed to be the lowest responsible bidder and alleged the commission failed to consider its bid due to a minor irregularity. After exhausting administrative remedies, the company sued the commission, seeking to enjoin further work and recover bid-preparation costs, arguing the rejection was improper.The Montgomery Circuit Court initially dismissed the complaint, but the Supreme Court of Alabama reversed, finding the complaint stated a claim. On remand, the company sought a preliminary injunction to stop further payments on the project, citing ongoing disbursement of funds. The commission moved for judgment on the pleadings, asserting sovereign immunity under the Alabama Constitution, which it argued deprived the trial court of jurisdiction. The trial court granted the preliminary injunction against the commission and its officers, but stayed the injunction pending appeal.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and held that the commission is an arm of the state entitled to absolute sovereign immunity, meaning the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to issue an injunction against it. The court emphasized that such immunity is not waived and applies regardless of the nature of the plaintiff or the relief sought, including claims relating to competitive bidding laws or taxpayer status. The court concluded that the preliminary injunction was void and dismissed the appeal, instructing the trial court to vacate the injunction and dismiss the commission from the case. The court took no position on whether claims could proceed against the commission's officer in his official capacity. View "The Armory Commission of Alabama v. Nearen Construction Company, LLC" on Justia Law
Hopson v. City of Indianola, Mississippi
A city attorney entered into a retainer agreement with a municipal board, serving as an independent contractor at the board’s pleasure, with the agreement permitting termination at will, with or without cause. Several months into the engagement, disputes arose regarding the attorney’s invoices and billing practices. The board discussed these concerns at various meetings and, at a special-called meeting, voted to terminate the attorney’s retainer agreement. The agenda for this meeting listed “Attorney Bills?” but did not explicitly mention termination of the attorney’s contract. The attorney did not attend the meeting and received notice of his termination the following day.After his termination, the attorney appealed to the Sunflower County Circuit Court under Mississippi Code Section 11-51-75, arguing that the meeting was not lawfully noticed for the business transacted, specifically the termination of his contract, and that he was denied due process. The City responded that the attorney was an at-will contractor with no property interest requiring due process and that the board acted within its legal authority. The circuit court found that the attorney had standing and had timely appealed but held that the board’s decision was not arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory, or illegal, and that as an at-will contractor, the attorney was owed no hearing or due process protections.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Mississippi held that while the board could terminate the attorney at will and owed no hearing, the termination action taken at the special-called meeting was void because the written call for the meeting did not distinctly specify the subject of terminating the city attorney, as required by statute and city ordinance. The court accepted the City’s failure to file a brief as a confession of error, reversed the circuit court’s order, set aside the termination, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The court denied the attorney’s requests for additional relief. View "Hopson v. City of Indianola, Mississippi" on Justia Law
The Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission v. 4Hc Energy LLC
An exploration company submitted twenty-eight applications to a state commission, seeking compulsory pooling orders for a drilling unit under state oil and gas law. Two mineral interest owners objected to these applications, prompting the commission to hold a contested case hearing. All parties presented evidence and argument at the hearing. The commission subsequently approved twelve applications, granted extended election periods for thirteen, and denied three as moot.After the commission issued its order, the two objecting mineral interest owners sought judicial review in the District Court of Natrona County, naming both the applicant company and the commission as respondents. The commission moved to dismiss itself as a party, arguing it had acted in an adjudicatory capacity and was not a proper party to the appeal. The district court denied the commission’s motion to dismiss and later affirmed the commission’s order on the merits. The mineral interest owners appealed the district court’s affirmance, while the commission cross-appealed the denial of its motion to dismiss. The mineral interest owners subsequently dismissed their appeal, but the commission’s cross-appeal remained.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed whether the commission was a proper party to the district court proceedings. The court held that when an administrative agency acts in an adjudicatory capacity—serving as an impartial tribunal in a contested case—it is not a proper party to an appeal of its own decision. The court explained that requiring the commission to participate as a party on appeal would compromise its impartiality and is not contemplated by Wyoming law. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Wyoming reversed the district court’s denial of the commission’s motion to dismiss, clarifying that the commission should not be named as a party in appeals of its adjudicatory decisions. View "The Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission v. 4Hc Energy LLC" on Justia Law
Bradshaw Dev., Inc. v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus.
A fitness center in Yakima County, Washington, was subject to a temporary closure order during the COVID-19 pandemic under a gubernatorial emergency proclamation. The Department of Labor and Industries (L&I) received a complaint that the gym was operating despite the closure order. L&I safety inspectors went to the gym, which displayed an illuminated “open” sign but was accessible only by key card. The inspectors unsuccessfully attempted to contact the business by phone, then entered the gym by following a key card holder inside. Once inside, they observed employees and customers and requested consent to inspect the premises. The employee they spoke with declined consent and asked the inspectors to wait for the general manager, who also denied consent. The inspectors left after being refused consent.L&I cited the gym’s owner for willfully violating the emergency workplace safety rule. An industrial appeals judge vacated the citation due to insufficient evidence, but the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals reinstated it, finding the inspectors’ entry proper for the sole purpose of seeking consent. The owner then sought review in Yakima County Superior Court, which vacated the citation, holding that the gym had a reasonable expectation of privacy due to the key card entry system, making the inspectors’ observations inadmissible. The State appealed, and the Washington Court of Appeals affirmed on different grounds, finding the inspectors’ entry improper.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case. It held that the inspectors did not violate the relevant statute, RCW 49.17.070, because they entered through a “reasonably recognizable entry point” to seek consent, as permitted by law. The court further held that the entry did not violate the Fourth Amendment, as the gym’s front entrance impliedly invited the public to enter and there was no evidence of an enforced policy excluding nonmembers. The court reversed and vacated the trial court’s order dismissing the citation and remanded for further proceedings. View "Bradshaw Dev., Inc. v. Dep't of Lab. & Indus." on Justia Law
BURNETT V. G&T ENTERPRISES OF NLR, LLC
The appellant was the director of the Arkansas Towing and Recovery Board and was sued in his individual capacity for tortious interference with contract. The plaintiff, a towing company, had a longstanding contract with a local Wal-Mart to remove abandoned or illegally parked vehicles. The complaint alleged that the director, who had close ties to a competing towing company and its owners, used his position and influence to encourage Wal-Mart managers to terminate their contract with the plaintiff and sign with the competing company. The plaintiff also claimed that the director made misleading and coercive statements to Wal-Mart staff and conducted a sting operation targeting the plaintiff’s tow operator, resulting in harm to its business and reputation.The case was initially reviewed by the Pulaski County Circuit Court. The competing towing company and its owners moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, while the director filed a separate motion to dismiss, asserting both sovereign and statutory immunity. The circuit court denied all motions to dismiss, allowing the case to proceed. The director appealed the denial of his motion to dismiss on the grounds of immunity, pursuant to Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure–Civil Rule 2(a)(10).The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the circuit court’s denial of the director’s motion to dismiss. Applying the statutory immunity standard, the court found that the plaintiff failed to allege facts establishing that the director’s actions were malicious or constituted a conscious violation of the law without just cause. As a result, the director was entitled to statutory immunity. The court reversed the circuit court’s order and dismissed the complaint against the director. The court also clarified that sovereign immunity did not apply because the director was sued in his individual capacity. View "BURNETT V. G&T ENTERPRISES OF NLR, LLC" on Justia Law