Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The case concerns a code enforcement action initiated by the County of Marin against Tim Sakach, acting as trustee for a parcel of land. Following a hearing, an administrative law judge ordered Sakach to abate violations and pay associated costs and penalties. The administrative decision advised that judicial review could be sought by filing a notice of appeal in the Marin County Superior Court within twenty days. On the twentieth day after service, Sakach, representing himself, submitted his notice of appeal to the superior court. However, seven days later, the court clerk rejected this filing because it did not include a copy of the administrative decision. Sakach resubmitted the notice with the required attachment, but it was file-stamped after the deadline.The County of Marin responded by filing a demurrer, arguing that the appeal was untimely since the accepted notice was filed after the twenty-day period. Sakach opposed the demurrer, attaching documents related to his initial timely submission and the clerk’s rejection notice. The Marin County Superior Court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, finding the appeal untimely and declining to take judicial notice of Sakach’s documents, reasoning they were not court records under Evidence Code section 452(d). Judgment of dismissal was entered, and Sakach appealed.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. Applying de novo review, it held that the superior court clerk erred in rejecting Sakach’s initial notice of appeal, as state law does not require an appellant to attach the administrative decision. The appellate court found the clerk’s rejection notice to be a court record subject to judicial notice and determined that Sakach’s original notice should be deemed filed on the date it was submitted. The judgment was reversed, with instructions to deem Sakach’s notice of appeal filed on January 9, 2024, and Sakach was awarded his costs on appeal. View "Sakach v. County of Marin" on Justia Law

A group of more than 150 U-visa petitioners in the United States challenged the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) over delays and denials related to their pending U-visa petitions. Due to a statutory cap on U visas, these petitioners faced long waits. Some were placed on a waiting list (“WLD Plaintiffs”), while others received only a “bona fide determination” (“BFD Plaintiffs”). All had deferred action and work authorization but lacked advance parole, which would allow them to travel abroad and return. The plaintiffs argued that USCIS unlawfully withheld or delayed waiting list decisions (Claim 1), unlawfully withheld or delayed consideration for advance parole (Claim 2), and arbitrarily and capriciously denied advance parole to those on the waiting list (Claim 3).The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed Claims 2 and 3 for all plaintiffs, finding that the APA does not permit courts to compel discretionary agency actions and that the plaintiffs did not plead or prove that they requested and were denied parole. The court allowed only Claim 1, brought by BFD Plaintiffs, to proceed, but later granted summary judgment to USCIS, holding that the BFD Plaintiffs lacked standing because being waitlisted would not independently entitle them to parole.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that granting parole to waitlisted U-visa petitioners is discretionary under 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(d)(2), not mandatory. The panel affirmed dismissal of the WLD Plaintiffs’ claims for lack of statutory jurisdiction, as the APA does not permit courts to compel discretionary action and there was no final agency action on parole denials. The panel also affirmed the district court’s rejection of the BFD Plaintiffs’ parole-related injury theory for standing, but reversed and remanded for consideration of their alternative injury theories and, if necessary, the merits of Claim 1. View "U VISA APPELLANTS V. DIRECTOR, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES" on Justia Law

The case concerns a long-term resident of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) who applied to United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) for NM-1 immigration status, a special status created by the Northern Mariana Islands Long-Term Legal Residents Relief Act. This status was designed to regularize the position of certain residents after federal immigration law was applied to the CNMI, which had previously operated under its own immigration system. The applicant’s request for NM-1 status was denied by USCIS on the grounds that he did not meet the required period of continuous, lawful residence. His request for administrative reconsideration was also denied.The applicant then filed suit in the District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands, seeking a declaration that his application satisfied the statutory criteria and an injunction ordering USCIS to approve his application. The government moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the Relief Act’s jurisdiction-stripping provision—specifically, 48 U.S.C. § 1806(e)(6)(D)—barred judicial review of the denial. The district court agreed with the government and dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed whether the jurisdictional bar in the Relief Act precluded review of decisions made by USCIS as the Secretary of Homeland Security’s delegate. The court held that the statute’s bar on judicial review of any “decision of the Secretary of Homeland Security” covers decisions made by USCIS pursuant to delegated authority. The court reasoned that delegation is a routine administrative practice and that Congress legislated against the backdrop of such delegation. The court further noted that precedent interpreting similar jurisdiction-stripping provisions supported this conclusion. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. View "BARMAN V. USA" on Justia Law

Jamesway Construction, Inc. was involved in a dispute with the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (TDEC) regarding the alleged unauthorized filling of wetlands in Coffee County. After a citizen complaint and subsequent investigation, TDEC issued an order in 2018 assessing damages and penalties against Jamesway, alleging violations under the Water Quality Control Act. Jamesway contested these allegations in a contested case hearing before an administrative law judge. The judge found TDEC failed to prove its case regarding wetland filling and dismissed most damages but imposed a civil penalty for failing to obtain a stormwater permit.Following the initial administrative decision, TDEC appealed to the Board of Water Quality, Oil, and Gas. Jamesway moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing TDEC’s notice of appeal was untimely under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act’s 15-day deadline, and the Board lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The administrative law judge denied the motion, finding a 30-day deadline applied. Jamesway then filed a petition for judicial review in the Davidson County Chancery Court, seeking immediate review of this procedural ruling. The chancery court, and subsequently the Tennessee Court of Appeals, ruled in Jamesway’s favor, finding the appeal deadline was 15 days and the Board lacked jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed whether the chancery court had subject matter jurisdiction under Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-5-322(a)(1) to review a preliminary agency decision. The Court held that the chancery court lacked jurisdiction because Jamesway had not shown judicial review of the final agency decision would be inadequate. The Supreme Court vacated the judgments of the lower courts and remanded the case to the Board of Water Quality, Oil, and Gas for further proceedings, clarifying that only review of a final agency decision is permitted absent a showing of inadequate remedy. View "Jamesway Construction, Inc. v. Salyers" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to Proposition M, a San Francisco measure approved by voters in 2022 that imposed an annual “Empty Homes Tax” on owners of certain residential units kept vacant for more than 182 days in buildings with more than two units. The stated aim was to discourage prolonged vacancies and increase available housing. Plaintiffs included individuals and associations representing property owners, who argued that Proposition M violated statutory and constitutional protections, including property rights and familial relations, and was preempted by the Ellis Act, which protects property owners’ right to withdraw accommodations from the rental market.The San Francisco City & County Superior Court reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment. Plaintiffs submitted declarations detailing how Proposition M would force them to either rent out units against their wishes or pay substantial taxes, potentially resulting in financial hardship or effective eviction. The City argued plaintiffs lacked standing and that their legal claims failed as a matter of law. After briefing and a hearing, the Superior Court granted summary judgment for plaintiffs, holding that Proposition M violated the Takings Clause, was preempted by the Ellis Act, burdened fundamental liberty interests in familial relations, violated equal protection, and infringed upon the constitutional right to privacy. The court entered judgment prohibiting the City from administering or enforcing Proposition M.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the City’s appeal. The appellate court analyzed the measure’s conflict with the Ellis Act and concluded that Proposition M imposed a “prohibitive price” on owners’ right not to offer property for rent, directly contravening the Act’s protections. The court found that the Ellis Act preempts Proposition M and affirmed the trial court’s judgment, without reaching additional constitutional claims. The judgment prohibiting enforcement of Proposition M was thus upheld. View "Debbane v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

Federal and state agencies enacted a rule listing two distinct population segments of the lesser prairie-chicken as "endangered" and "threatened" under the Endangered Species Act. The rule divided the bird’s range into Northern and Southern segments, based on habitat and genetic differences. Conservation groups, including one that originally petitioned for the listing, were active throughout the process. After a change in presidential administration in 2025, the federal government signaled a shift in environmental policy and, in ongoing litigation, ultimately conceded error in applying the "distinct population segment" policy. The government and various state and industry plaintiffs sought to settle by vacating the listing rule.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas consolidated the lawsuits challenging the listing. Conservation groups moved to intervene twice: the first motion was denied because the court found the government would adequately represent their interests, and the second was denied as untimely and for failure to rebut that presumption. Meanwhile, the district court granted the government’s motion for voluntary vacatur and remand, finding the listing rule unlawful due to the agency’s conceded error.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of intervention de novo and the timeliness determination for abuse of discretion. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion in finding the second motion to intervene untimely, as the conservation groups acted promptly after government conduct revealed a divergence of interests. The court found all requirements for intervention of right satisfied and reversed the denial of intervention. However, the Fifth Circuit determined the conservation groups lacked appellate standing to challenge the vacatur and remand of the listing rule, so it did not reach the merits of the district court’s substantive ruling. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Texas v. Dept of the Interior" on Justia Law

A driver was injured after his vehicle struck a pothole on a busy street in Topeka, Kansas, causing the car to flip and eject him. He brought a negligence claim against the city, alleging that it had failed to keep the street in a reasonably safe condition, neglected to repair a large and dangerous pothole despite knowing about it, and did not use reasonable care in maintaining the roadway for regular traffic.The District Court of Shawnee County granted summary judgment in favor of the city, finding that the public-duty doctrine barred the claim because any duty owed by the city was to the public at large, not to any specific individual. The court also found that the city had no actual or constructive notice of the pothole and that, even if there was a duty, it was shielded by discretionary-function immunity under the Kansas Tort Claims Act. The Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed, agreeing that the public-duty doctrine applied and that discretionary-function immunity protected the city’s conduct. However, the appellate panel found the district court had improperly resolved some disputed facts.The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas reversed both lower courts. The court held that the Kansas Tort Claims Act waives sovereign immunity but does not abolish the public-duty doctrine. However, the court clarified that a city’s duty to keep its streets reasonably safe is owed to the class of persons invited to travel on those streets, not to the public at large; therefore, the public-duty doctrine does not bar such claims. It further held that whether the city breached its duty, and whether the discretionary-function exception to liability applies, are fact questions inappropriate for summary judgment on the present record. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Martin v. City of Topeka " on Justia Law

Consumers Energy Company, a private utility in Michigan, planned to retire the J.H. Campbell Generating Plant, a decades-old coal facility, and replace it with newer, cleaner, and more reliable energy sources. The proposed closure and replacement plan underwent extensive review by the Michigan Public Service Commission and the Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO), both of which ultimately approved it after finding that the substitute resources would meet reliability standards and improve affordability and environmental outcomes. As the retirement date neared, the Department of Energy (DOE) issued an order under section 202(c) of the Federal Power Act, compelling Consumers Energy to keep the Campbell plant operational, citing an energy emergency in the region.The Michigan Public Service Commission approved the integrated resource plan after a contested case proceeding, finding that it would enhance resource adequacy. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, concluding that substantial evidence supported the Commission’s approval. MISO also determined that Campbell’s retirement, as planned, would not threaten reliability. Consumers Energy documented sufficient capacity to meet projected demand, and MISO’s resource auction confirmed adequate supply and reserve margins for the relevant period. No state or regional entity requested FERC intervention, nor did the Michigan governor declare an energy emergency.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the DOE’s order. The court held that section 202(c) grants DOE limited, emergency authority to intervene only when an electricity shortage creates an acute risk that cannot be timely addressed by state or regional planning, and immediate federal action is necessary. The court found that DOE’s asserted circumstances did not constitute such an emergency, as reasonable alternatives existed and the state had adequately planned for resource adequacy. Accordingly, the court granted the petitions for review and vacated DOE’s order. View "People of the State of Michigan v. DOE" on Justia Law

An individual Nebraska resident, voter, and taxpayer sought declaratory and injunctive relief challenging the constitutionality of two medical cannabis laws enacted by voter-approved initiatives in the November 2024 general election. He named as defendants the Governor, other state officials, members of the Nebraska Medical Cannabis Commission, and the sponsors of the initiatives. The plaintiff alleged the laws violated the federal Supremacy Clause, improperly delegated regulatory authority in violation of Nebraska’s separation of powers, and were otherwise unconstitutional. He further claimed public officials and agencies would expend state funds and resources to implement these laws, and that this expenditure was unlawful.Previously, before the laws passed, the same individual brought a preelection challenge to the legal sufficiency of the initiative petitions in the District Court for Lancaster County. That challenge was rejected, and the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed. After the election, he filed a new action in the same district court, seeking to enjoin the Governor from certifying the measures. The district court denied his request for a temporary restraining order. Once the laws were certified and enacted, he amended his complaint several times, ultimately alleging taxpayer standing, standing for a matter of great public concern, and standing under a Nebraska statute governing initiative challenges. The defendants moved to dismiss, contending he lacked standing.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff lacked standing to bring the suit. Specifically, it concluded he did not have taxpayer standing, as his allegations of incidental expenditures and government employee time spent implementing the laws did not amount to illegal expenditures sufficient to confer standing under Nebraska law. The Court also found he did not qualify for any exception for matters of great public concern. The order dismissing his complaint without prejudice was affirmed. View "Kuehn v. Pillen" on Justia Law

Sponsors of a ballot initiative in Nebraska sought to have their proposed constitutional amendment, which would protect the powers of initiative and referendum, placed on the November 2026 general election ballot. The initiative aimed to require a four-fifths vote of the Legislature to amend, repeal, or impair laws enacted by initiative after November 2, 2004, and to similarly restrict the Legislature’s authority over laws affecting the initiative and referendum process itself. It also imposed a requirement that any laws facilitating or safeguarding the process advance a compelling state interest by the least restrictive means and prohibited legislative acts that would condition, restrict, burden, or impair these reserved powers.After the sponsors collected sufficient signatures, the Nebraska Secretary of State reviewed the measure. Following an objection by a current and a former state senator, the Secretary determined that the initiative violated Nebraska’s constitutional single subject rule and announced that he would not place it on the ballot.The sponsors filed an emergency application for a writ of mandamus directly with the Nebraska Supreme Court, asking the court to compel the Secretary to certify the initiative for the ballot. The Secretary argued that he was obligated to withhold ballot placement because the initiative contained more than one subject, contrary to the Nebraska Constitution. The Nebraska Supreme Court, exercising original jurisdiction, reviewed the matter de novo as a question of law.The Nebraska Supreme Court held that the proposed initiative violated the single subject rule because it addressed at least two distinct subjects: limiting legislative power over both the initiative process and the substance of laws enacted by initiative. The court concluded that these subjects were not naturally and necessarily connected. Accordingly, the court denied the writ of mandamus and dissolved its alternative writ, holding that the Secretary had no duty to place the initiative on the ballot. View "State ex rel. Davis v. Evnen" on Justia Law