Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Two separate cases were filed in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County by administrators of the estates of deceased individuals who died while incarcerated in West Virginia regional jails. The plaintiffs alleged that jail staff and medical providers failed to respond to the decedents’ serious medical needs, resulting in death or injury. Both complaints included claims against the West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation (DCR) for negligence, negligent training, and “deliberate indifference in violation of clearly established West Virginia law,” but explicitly disclaimed reliance on federal law or constitutional claims, instead seeking damages under state common law.DCR moved to dismiss the deliberate indifference counts, arguing that West Virginia common law does not recognize a standalone cause of action for “deliberate indifference to clearly established law.” The Circuit Court denied the motions, concluding that such a claim was recognized by prior West Virginia Supreme Court decisions and supported by decisions from the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA). DCR then filed petitions in the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia seeking writs of prohibition to prevent enforcement of the circuit court orders denying dismissal.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the matter and granted the writs of prohibition. The Court held that a claim for damages for “deliberate indifference to clearly established law” is not cognizable under the common law of West Virginia. The Court determined that prior decisions, including Nobles v. Duncil, did not establish such a cause of action, but rather recognized deliberate indifference as a legal standard in constitutional claims, most often under federal law. The orders by the Circuit Court were found to be clearly erroneous as a matter of law and thus were prohibited from enforcement. View "State ex rel. Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation v. Salango" on Justia Law

A sixteen-year-old, K.B., was the subject of a juvenile delinquency proceeding for possession of a controlled substance. During the hearing, K.B. alleged that she was subjected to physical and emotional abuse by her mother and grandmother. The circuit court judge, upon hearing these allegations, initiated a separate administrative proceeding and ordered the West Virginia Department of Human Services (DHS) to investigate and report on the allegations, particularly because five other children resided in the home. Despite DHS finding the allegations unsubstantiated after multiple investigations and interviews, the court continued to direct further investigation and ultimately ordered DHS to “open a case” for services following a separate disclosure of alleged sexual abuse by one sibling against another. The administrative proceeding was repeatedly reopened and extended, with the circuit court directing specific actions, such as ordering a psychosexual evaluation of the alleged perpetrator, even when law enforcement had not filed any charges.Over several months, status hearings were held jointly with the ongoing juvenile delinquency case. The circuit court’s involvement extended to specifying interventions and requiring further DHS actions, despite the lack of substantiated abuse findings and objections from DHS and the prosecutor about the court’s authority. Eventually, the circuit court entered an order directing DHS to file a formal child abuse and neglect petition within fourteen days or face contempt, prompting DHS to seek relief from the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia granted a writ of prohibition, holding that the circuit court exceeded its legitimate judicial authority and violated the separation of powers by ordering DHS to file an abuse and neglect petition. The court found that statutory authority to investigate and initiate such petitions resides solely with the executive branch, and the judiciary cannot compel the executive to file a petition in the absence of statutory prerequisites. The June 4, 2026, order was found clearly erroneous and unenforceable. View "State ex rel. Department of Human Services v. Cohee" on Justia Law

A state agency and two of its Child Protective Services (CPS) workers were sued by parents whose child was allegedly assaulted by another child at a youth baseball game. The CPS workers were present to supervise a visitation between a child in state custody and her family, following prior allegations of sexual assault by her brother, who had since been returned to his family. The plaintiffs alleged that the CPS workers knew of the brother’s history, observed him with their child, and failed to intervene, resulting in the assault.After discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment in the Circuit Court of Harrison County, arguing both qualified and statutory immunity. The circuit court denied summary judgment, focusing on whether the CPS workers were grossly negligent under a statutory exception to personal liability. The court concluded there was enough evidence for a jury to decide if gross negligence occurred, without conducting a qualified immunity analysis.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the appeal. It conducted a de novo analysis and determined that the CPS workers’ supervision of the family visitation constituted discretionary governmental functions, entitling them and the agency to qualified immunity unless the plaintiffs could show a violation of clearly established statutory or constitutional rights or malicious, fraudulent, or oppressive conduct. The court found the plaintiffs’ cited statutes and policy manual provisions were too general or insufficiently specific to defeat qualified immunity and that no evidence of malicious or oppressive conduct was presented.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed the circuit court’s denial of summary judgment and remanded with instructions to grant summary judgment to the defendants and dismiss them from the lawsuit, holding that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from these claims. View "Department of Human Services v. A.Z." on Justia Law

A Sedona resident, who has obsessive-compulsive disorder, often sleeps in her car because her disability prevents her from entering her apartment. The City of Sedona has a criminal ordinance prohibiting sleeping in a vehicle on public or private property. The resident was twice warned by police for sleeping in her car and requested reasonable accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to exempt her from enforcement of this ordinance. The city denied her requests, and her landlord threatened not to renew her lease if she continued sleeping in her car. She alleges that the city’s actions caused her emotional distress and loss of income, and she continues to sleep in her car several times a week.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona dismissed her claims for lack of standing, finding that the prior police warnings were insufficient to support a specific threat of prosecution and that she failed to allege a history of enforcement against similarly situated individuals. The district court addressed only her standing to seek injunctive relief, despite her claims for damages as well. Her requests to amend her complaint were denied, and she appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that she had Article III standing to bring an ADA claim for both damages and injunctive relief, based on the city’s denial of her request for accommodation and a credible threat of future enforcement. The court further held that Title II of the ADA applies to requests for reasonable accommodation to comply with municipal criminal ordinances. The ADA claim was remanded for further proceedings, allowing her to amend her complaint, while the dismissal of her Eighth Amendment claim was affirmed. View "BERAM V. CITY OF SEDONA" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, John William Scharnhorst, III, was held as a pretrial detainee at the Washington County Detention Center (WCDC) for several months. During his detention, he experienced restrictions on access to books, newspapers, and religious materials. WCDC implemented these restrictions in response to issues with inmates using paper for illicit purposes, such as jamming locks, flooding cells, concealing contraband, and making weapons. The facility limited inmates to four books—three from a book cart and one religious text—and transitioned to providing electronic access to books and newspapers via kiosks and tablets, though access to these devices was time-limited. While religious materials and paper mail could be requested, Scharnhorst claimed that staff inconsistently delivered these materials.The United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas, adopting a magistrate’s recommendation, granted summary judgment to some defendants and found moot the preliminary injunction requiring daily newspaper uploads. However, it denied summary judgment and qualified immunity to Sheriff Cantrell, Major Denzer, and Lieutenant Ake, finding material disputes about their enforcement of WCDC policies and concluding that, if enforced as alleged, the restrictions violated clearly established First Amendment rights.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity. Accepting the facts found or likely assumed by the district court, the appellate court held that Scharnhorst did not demonstrate a violation of clearly established law. The Eighth Circuit found that WCDC’s policies did not amount to a “de facto permanent ban” on communication or access to religious materials, as inmates retained access to mail, electronic newspapers, and religious texts. Consequently, the court reversed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to the defendants and remanded for further proceedings. View "Scharnhorst v. Cantrell" on Justia Law

Two candidates, Anthony Kathol and Celestine Stadnick, sought nomination for State Senate in South Dakota’s District 27. Stadnick submitted her candidacy petition with 155 signatures, above the 50 required. However, her declaration of candidacy listed an address different from her voter registration, and Kathol challenged her candidacy on these grounds, alleging that state law demands a single principal address. Kathol also claimed many petition signatures were defective, specifically objecting to some signers listing their county as “Oglala” instead of “Oglala Lakota.”The Secretary of State reviewed Kathol’s affidavit and found that, despite some invalid signatures, Stadnick still had enough valid signatures to qualify. The Secretary rejected Kathol’s address discrepancy argument and accepted “Oglala” as a sufficient county designation for voter registration. Kathol appealed to the Circuit Court for the Sixth Judicial Circuit, which allowed Stadnick to intervene. In circuit court, Kathol raised new objections to additional signatures and reiterated his address argument. The circuit court found some signatures invalid but determined that listing “Oglala” substantially complied with statutory requirements. It also concluded there is no statutory requirement for a candidate’s declaration address to match voter registration. With at least 53 valid signatures, Stadnick was certified as a candidate.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the appeal. It held that the circuit court exceeded its appellate authority by considering signature challenges not raised before the Secretary and limited its review to those challenges presented to the Secretary. The Court affirmed the Secretary’s and circuit court’s determinations that the “Oglala” county designation constituted substantial compliance and that South Dakota law does not require a candidate’s declaration address to match their voter registration address. The Supreme Court affirmed the certification of Stadnick’s candidacy for District 27. View "Kathol v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The defendant, Arkady Malakhov, was the CEO of a small business that applied for and received a grant from the National Science Foundation (NSF) under the Small Business Innovation Research program. He requested and received two disbursements totaling $200,000. Malakhov spent a portion of these funds on non-project-related expenses, including personal and unrelated business costs, before the principal investigator was properly authorized to work on the project. Eventually, Malakhov admitted to converting a portion of the grant funds to his own use and pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641 for this conduct.Proceedings before the United States District Court for the Western District of New York resulted in a sentence of probation and an order requiring Malakhov to pay $200,000 in restitution to NSF. The district court found the full amount of diverted grant funds to be the government’s loss and rejected Malakhov’s arguments that restitution should be statutorily limited to $1,000 or that NSF suffered no actual loss because the project was ultimately completed.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed Malakhov’s claims. The court held that restitution for a misdemeanor violation of Section 641 is not statutorily limited to $1,000. However, it found that the district court erred by awarding restitution based on losses that did not arise from the specific conduct underlying Malakhov’s conversion offense. The court vacated the restitution portion of the judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration of the restitution award, instructing the district court to limit restitution to losses directly caused by the offense of conviction. View "United States v. Malakhov" on Justia Law

A Montana-based workers’ compensation insurer was sued by a Texas company in federal court, with the suit alleging breach of contract and seeking over $8 million in damages. The litigation was settled confidentially, but before settlement, the insurer filed its annual financial statement with the Montana Commissioner of Securities and Insurance, failing to specifically disclose the existence of the federal lawsuit. The Commissioner repeatedly directed the insurer to amend its statement to include the ongoing litigation, but the insurer declined to do so.After the insurer refused to comply, the Commissioner initiated administrative proceedings, seeking both a supplement to the annual statement and a $25,000 fine. A Hearing Examiner partially granted summary judgment, permitting the Commissioner to supplement the statement with the existence of the litigation but not the settlement, since the settlement occurred outside the reporting period. The Special Deputy Insurance Commissioner adopted these findings and imposed the maximum fine. The First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, reviewed the agency’s final decision and affirmed it fully, holding that the Commissioner was empowered to impose the fine without explanation.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the lower courts’ and agency’s finding that the insurer violated the Insurance Code by failing to disclose the federal lawsuit in its annual statement. The Court held that the Commissioner’s orders to supplement the statement were lawful and within statutory authority. However, the Court reversed the imposition of the $25,000 fine, concluding that the agency’s failure to explain its exercise of discretion in setting the fine amount was arbitrary and capricious. The case was remanded for the agency to provide a cogent explanation before imposing any fine. View "Victory Insurance v. State Auditor" on Justia Law

The case centers on a government investigation into a leak of highly classified information regarding a military operation. After a news article revealed details previously unreported, authorities suspected that journalists associated with the news outlet might have communicated with confidential sources via LinkedIn. The government obtained two orders under the Stored Communications Act: one requiring LinkedIn to disclose metadata records for the journalists over an eighteen-month period, and another barring LinkedIn from informing anyone, including the journalists and their employer, about the existence of the orders for one year. LinkedIn challenged both orders, arguing that they were substantially overbroad and threatened First Amendment protections by sweeping in unrelated confidential sources.A magistrate judge for the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia found LinkedIn had standing but sided with the government on the merits, holding that LinkedIn could only challenge the orders based on logistical or practical burdens, not on overbreadth or constitutional grounds. The district court adopted this recommendation, rejecting LinkedIn’s arguments regarding overbreadth and First Amendment protections, and upholding both the Disclosure and Secrecy Orders. LinkedIn’s motion for access to ex parte materials and for reconsideration following new information about the government’s disclosure to the news outlet was also denied.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found LinkedIn had standing to challenge both orders. The court held that the Disclosure Order was substantially overbroad, violating statutory and constitutional norms, and required the district court to narrow its scope. The court also held that the Secrecy Order was overly broad as a prior restraint and must be modified to allow LinkedIn to disclose the existence of the orders to a single vetted attorney for the news outlet. However, the court affirmed the district court’s denial of LinkedIn’s request for access to ex parte materials, citing national security concerns. The case was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "In re: Application" on Justia Law

Congress established the U.S. Agency for Global Media to oversee several federally funded international news broadcasters and later created the International Broadcasting Advisory Board as an independent agency with authority over hiring and firing the heads of these networks. Michael Abramowitz was appointed head of Voice of America with unanimous Board approval. After a change in presidential administration, most Board members were fired and the Agency’s Acting CEO, along with a Senior Advisor, attempted to remove Abramowitz without Board approval, placing him and other employees on indefinite administrative leave and later reassigning him. Abramowitz refused the reassignment and was subsequently notified of his removal.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted preliminary injunctions to restore Voice of America programming and, after proceedings, granted partial summary judgment and a permanent injunction barring Abramowitz’s removal without Board approval. The district court found it had federal-question jurisdiction over the claim and that the Agency’s actions violated statutory requirements, specifically 22 U.S.C. § 6205(e), which protects the independence of network heads by requiring Board approval for removal.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s order. The appellate court held that the district court had jurisdiction, as Congress did not intend for claims under section 6205(e) to be channeled through the Civil Service Reform Act’s administrative framework. The court concluded that section 6205(e) is constitutionally valid under Article II, as Congress may vest removal authority in department heads, and the Broadcasting Board qualifies as such. The Agency’s unilateral removal of Abramowitz was contrary to law. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s permanent injunction, holding that injunctive relief was appropriate and necessary to protect the statutory safeguard of the broadcaster’s independence. View "Abramowitz v. Lake" on Justia Law