The case concerns the Department of Water Resources (DWR), a state agency with eminent domain authority, which sought entry onto private properties to perform environmental and geological studies as part of the planning for a potential water conveyance project in the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta. DWR initiated a series of petitions under California’s precondemnation entry statutes, which authorize entities with eminent domain power to access property for investigative activities before deciding whether to acquire the property for a public project.Previously, the San Joaquin County Superior Court coordinated the petitions and permitted DWR to conduct environmental studies under certain conditions but denied entry for geological testing, reasoning that such actions constituted a taking requiring a classic condemnation action. The California Court of Appeal initially agreed, but the California Supreme Court reversed in Property Reserve, Inc. v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 151, holding that the precondemnation entry statutes provide a constitutionally valid process for precondemnation activities, so long as landowners can obtain a jury trial on damages. Following this, the trial court approved DWR’s authority for both environmental and geological tests, and additional entry orders were issued for the Delta Conveyance Project.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed whether DWR was required to have an authorized and funded project under Water Code sections 250 and 11580 before undertaking precondemnation entry and testing. The court held that these requirements apply only to classic condemnation proceedings, not to precondemnation entry activities. The court affirmed that DWR need only possess general eminent domain authority to utilize the precondemnation entry process, regardless of whether the activities might constitute a taking. The trial court’s entry order was affirmed. View "Dept. of Water Resources Cases" on Justia Law

A federal prisoner challenged the calculation of his earned time credits under the First Step Act by the Bureau of Prisons, arguing that the Bureau’s failure to properly apply these credits prevented his timely transfer from prison to prerelease custody. While the petition was pending, the prisoner was transferred to a residential reentry center, a form of prerelease custody, though he still had a significant number of unused credits. The Bureau had already used some credits to move up the start date of his supervised release, but the remaining credits were not applied.The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut determined that, although his original request for transfer to prerelease custody was moot, the petition should be construed more broadly as requesting application of remaining time credits to reduce the length of his supervised release. The district court concluded that the First Step Act required such credits to be used to shorten the prisoner’s supervised release and ordered the Bureau of Prisons to calculate and communicate the remaining credits for that purpose.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and held that the relevant statutory provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(C), allows earned time credits only to accelerate a prisoner’s move from incarceration to prerelease custody or to an earlier start of supervised release, but not to reduce the length of a term of supervised release itself. The court found that, once the prisoner was transferred to prerelease custody and his credits were applied to start supervised release early, his petition became moot. The Second Circuit therefore vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss the case as moot. View "Rivera-Perez v. Stover" on Justia Law

An adult individual filed a civil lawsuit against a city and unnamed prison employees, alleging he was sexually assaulted while incarcerated. The complaint claimed that several prison employees assaulted him, motivated by his sexual orientation, resulting in severe physical injuries. The only cause of action implicating the city was for sexual abuse, with allegations that the city was negligent in its supervision, staffing, and protection of inmates.The Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County initially overruled the city’s preliminary objections, allowing the case to proceed and requiring the city to answer the complaint. However, upon the city’s request for reconsideration and after additional briefing, the court amended its order to permit an interlocutory appeal. The city then petitioned the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, challenging the applicability of a statutory exception to governmental immunity for sexual abuse. The Commonwealth Court reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that the statutory sexual abuse exception to governmental immunity applied only when the victim was a minor at the time of the abuse, and remanded for further proceedings.On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed whether the statutory waiver of governmental immunity for sexual abuse claims under Section 8542(b)(9) of the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act applies solely to victims who were minors at the time of the abuse. The Supreme Court held that the statutory language unambiguously limits the exception to cases where the plaintiff was under eighteen at the time of the offense. Accordingly, the court affirmed the Commonwealth Court’s order, maintaining that the city retains immunity from tort liability for alleged sexual abuse unless the victim was a minor when the abuse occurred. View "City of Phila. v. J.S." on Justia Law

The case concerns the National Marine Fisheries Service’s (NMFS) designation of critical habitat in 2022 for two species of Arctic seals, following their listing as threatened under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) in 2012. The designated areas covered waters off Alaska’s north coast and were based on findings that those areas contained physical and biological features essential to the conservation of the seal species. Alaska opposed these designations, contending that they were too broad and provided minimal benefit, and requested that certain coastal areas be excluded due to economic impacts. NMFS excluded an area used by the Navy for training but declined to exclude others requested by Alaska and the North Slope Borough, finding no significant economic impact.The United States District Court for the District of Alaska largely agreed with Alaska, holding that the critical habitat designations were unlawful. The court vacated the rules and remanded the matter to NMFS, concluding that NMFS had not adequately explained why the entire designated area was necessary for the seals’ conservation, had failed to consider foreign conservation efforts and foreign habitat, and had abused its discretion by not considering certain exclusions. The Center for Biological Diversity intervened as a defendant and appealed the district court’s decision. The district court did, however, reject Alaska’s argument that NMFS had failed to comply with the ESA’s “prudency” requirement.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that it had jurisdiction, reversed the district court’s rulings that the designations were unlawful, and affirmed the court’s ruling on the ESA’s prudency requirement. The Ninth Circuit held that NMFS’s designations complied with the ESA, that the agency was not required to consider foreign conservation efforts or habitat, and that the decision not to exclude certain coastal areas was within its discretion. The critical habitat designations were reinstated, and the case was remanded with instructions to enter judgment for the Center and NMFS. View "STATE OF ALASKA V. NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE" on Justia Law

The case concerns the suspension of a driver’s license by the California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) after the driver, stopped for erratic driving and suspected of being under the influence of alcohol, refused a chemical test when properly advised of the consequences. At the administrative hearing regarding his suspension, the DMV’s hearing officer introduced evidence, asked clarifying questions, and ruled on objections, all while stating she was acting as a neutral factfinder rather than as an advocate for the DMV. The driver argued that the hearing officer’s dual roles violated his due process rights by making her both a prosecutor and adjudicator.After the DMV sustained the license suspension, the driver petitioned the Superior Court of Alameda County for a writ of mandate, claiming that the hearing officer functioned as both advocate and judge, creating an unconstitutional risk of bias. The trial court denied the petition, finding that the DMV’s current policy required hearing officers to act only as neutral decisionmakers and that no due process violation occurred.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the denial. The court clarified that due process requires an impartial adjudicator but does not prohibit the same person from developing the evidence and making a decision in an administrative setting, so long as there is no disqualifying interest or extraordinary evidence of bias. The court held that the DMV’s current structure does not violate due process, as hearing officers are presumed impartial and their actions in presenting evidence do not turn them into advocates. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed. The court expressly declined to follow recent decisions adopting an “appearance of bias” standard and reinforced that only an actual, constitutionally intolerable risk of bias triggers a due process violation. View "Chi v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law

Several married couples, with one spouse in each couple serving on active military duty, purchased educational materials from a business operating on military bases. The seller, George LeMay, through his company, brought lawsuits against these couples after they stopped payment, ultimately securing state-court judgments against each couple. Some judgments were later overturned, but LeMay sought to enforce the remaining judgments in Maryland using its Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act. The judgments were domesticated by Maryland state-court clerks without the procedural protections required by the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA), such as affidavits regarding military status or appointment of counsel. The clerks also issued writs of garnishment, leading to the plaintiffs’ bank accounts being frozen. Plaintiffs eventually succeeded in vacating the judgments, but not before suffering financial harm.The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland against LeMay (later dismissed after settlement), the Governor of Maryland, and the Justices of the Supreme Court of Maryland, all in their official capacities. The district court found that the act of domesticating a judgment did not trigger the SCRA’s protections, but that issuing writs of garnishment did. It ruled that plaintiffs lacked standing to seek injunctive or declaratory relief but allowed their damages claims against the Justices to proceed, reasoning their supervisory role was sufficiently linked to the injuries. However, the district court ultimately granted summary judgment for the defendants, relying on legislative immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment, holding that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing because their injuries were not fairly traceable to acts or omissions by the Governor or the Justices. The court concluded the plaintiffs failed to show any defendant’s action caused the injuries, and it remanded with instructions to dismiss the case without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Rouse v. Fader" on Justia Law

Several Maryland local governments, including Baltimore City, Anne Arundel County, and the City of Annapolis, filed lawsuits in Maryland circuit courts against 26 multinational oil and gas companies. They alleged that the defendants’ extraction, production, promotion, and sale of fossil fuels—combined with deceptive marketing about their products’ climate risks—substantially contributed to global greenhouse gas emissions, resulting in severe local impacts such as sea-level rise, flooding, and heat waves. The local governments sought damages and equitable relief based on Maryland common law claims of public nuisance, private nuisance, trespass, negligent failure to warn, and strict liability failure to warn.In the trial courts (the Circuit Courts for Baltimore City and Anne Arundel County), the defendants successfully moved to dismiss the complaints. The courts found that the local governments’ claims were preempted by federal law, specifically by federal common law and the Clean Air Act, and that the complaints failed to state claims upon which relief could be granted under Maryland law. The cases took a procedural detour through federal courts due to removal attempts, but were ultimately remanded to state court. The Appellate Court of Maryland consolidated the appeals, and the Supreme Court of Maryland granted review by writ of certiorari.The Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the dismissals. The court held that the local governments’ state law claims, though pled as torts, effectively sought to regulate interstate and international air emissions—an area governed exclusively by federal law. Relying on United States Supreme Court precedent, the court explained that such claims are displaced by federal common law and, in turn, by the Clean Air Act, which does not authorize broad state law claims in this context. The court further held that, even if not preempted, none of the plaintiffs stated valid claims under Maryland law for public or private nuisance, trespass, or failure to warn. View "Mayor & City Cncl. Of Balt. v. B.P. P.L.C." on Justia Law

Two married tenured professors at California State University, Chico alleged that they were subjected to harassment and discrimination by their department chair, with one professor experiencing conduct targeted at her gender and Korean ancestry. Despite their reports to university administration, the university did not intervene. As a result, one professor suffered serious mental health consequences, leading their doctor to recommend that she not work in the same environment as the chair. The university’s lack of response allegedly forced both professors to resign and accept positions at another university. After their resignation, the university initiated an investigation into one professor for an alleged violation of student privacy laws and communicated these allegations to the new employer, which the professors claimed was intended to sabotage their new employment. There were also alleged delays in transferring their lab equipment.The professors filed suit in the Superior Court of Butte County, asserting, among other claims, retaliation and whistleblower retaliation under California law. The university filed a special motion to strike these two causes of action under California’s anti-SLAPP statute, arguing that the claims were based in part on communications protected by the statute. The trial court denied the motion, finding the university’s actions involved an official proceeding but also concluding that the professors demonstrated a likelihood of prevailing on their claims.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s denial of the anti-SLAPP motion. The appellate court held that the university failed to carry its burden to show that all actions underlying the challenged causes of action were protected activity. The court clarified that the presence of some protected communications within the allegations does not mean the entire cause of action arises from protected activity. The judgment denying the anti-SLAPP motion was therefore affirmed. View "Pechkis v. Trustees of the Cal. State University" on Justia Law

Several rural electricity distribution cooperatives entered into long-term, all-requirements contracts with a generation-and-transmission cooperative, requiring them to purchase nearly all of their electric service from the cooperative through 2050. Some of these distribution cooperatives later sought to terminate their memberships and contracts early. In response, the generation-and-transmission cooperative proposed a methodology for calculating an exit fee and submitted it to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) for approval.FERC initiated hearing procedures to determine a just and reasonable exit-fee methodology. In those proceedings, both the cooperative and FERC’s Trial Staff presented different approaches: the cooperative advocated a lost-revenues approach, while Trial Staff proposed a balance-sheet approach. An administrative law judge found that the cooperative’s methodology was not just and reasonable, but that the balance-sheet approach, with modifications, was. The cooperative sought review from FERC, which agreed with the administrative law judge, rejecting the lost-revenues approach and directing the cooperative to adopt the modified balance-sheet methodology.The cooperative then sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, arguing that FERC’s adopted methodology was arbitrary and capricious. The Tenth Circuit reviewed FERC’s orders under the standards of the Administrative Procedure Act. The court held that FERC did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in rejecting the lost-revenues approach, adopting the balance-sheet approach, implementing a transmission-crediting mechanism, or applying the methodology to certain members despite existing contracts. The Tenth Circuit concluded that FERC engaged in reasoned decisionmaking, supported by substantial evidence, and denied the petitions for review. View "Tri-State Generation and Transmission Association, v. FERC" on Justia Law

The case concerns a dispute between a city and a civil liberties organization regarding public access to police records under the California Public Records Act. The organization submitted a request for records related to police K-9 use-of-force incidents, specifically seeking documents involving incidents resulting in “death or great bodily injury.” The city produced some records but withheld or redacted others, asserting that only records involving “serious bodily injury” as narrowly defined should be disclosed. The central disagreement focused on the meaning of “great bodily injury” in the statutory context.After the city maintained its position, the organization challenged the city’s interpretation in the Superior Court of Fresno County. The court did not decide whether the documents were investigatory records but instead ruled on the meaning of “great bodily injury.” It concluded that the term should be understood as “a significant or substantial physical injury,” consistent with the definition in Penal Code section 12022.7, rather than the narrower definition of “serious bodily injury” found elsewhere. The court therefore ordered the city to produce records involving any deployment of a police canine that resulted in great bodily injury, as so defined.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the city’s petition for writ of mandate. The appellate court agreed with the superior court, holding that the term “great bodily injury” in Penal Code section 832.7 should be construed in accordance with section 12022.7, meaning “a significant or substantial physical injury.” The court found no ambiguity in the statutory language, rejected the city’s alternative arguments, and concluded that the legislative history supported this broader interpretation. The court denied the city’s petition, affirmed the order for disclosure, and awarded costs to the organization. View "City of Fresno v. Superior Court" on Justia Law