Ricardo Jones sued the City of Jackson for injuries sustained from driving into a pothole. Before filing the lawsuit, Jones sent certified letters to the mayor and city council members but did not send a notice of claim to the city clerk, as required by the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA).The Hinds County Circuit Court denied the City’s motion for summary judgment, which sought dismissal of Jones’s claims due to his failure to comply with the MTCA’s presuit notice requirement. The City then petitioned the Supreme Court of Mississippi for an interlocutory appeal.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case de novo and found that Jones did not comply with the mandatory requirement to serve notice on the city clerk. The court held that the MTCA’s presuit notice requirement is clear and mandatory, and serving notice on the mayor or city council members does not suffice. Consequently, the court reversed the trial court’s decision and rendered judgment in favor of the City, dismissing all of Jones’s claims. View "The City of Jackson, Mississippi v. Jones" on Justia Law

In 1984, Richard Wershe, Jr., at fourteen, was recruited by the FBI as a drug informant. Over the next few years, he was involved in dangerous drug operations under the direction of federal and state officers. In 1987, Wershe was arrested and convicted of possessing a large quantity of cocaine, receiving a life sentence without parole, which was later amended to allow parole eligibility. While incarcerated, he cooperated with law enforcement in various investigations, including "Operation Backbone" and a grand jury against the "Best Friends" gang, based on promises of assistance with his parole. Despite his cooperation, Wershe was denied parole in 2003 and was only released in 2017, subsequently serving time in Florida for an unrelated charge until his release in 2020.Wershe filed two lawsuits: one in July 2021 against the City of Detroit and various federal and state officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens, and another in October 2022 against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). He alleged constitutional violations and tort claims related to his time as a juvenile informant and subsequent parole denial. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan dismissed both lawsuits with prejudice, ruling that Wershe’s claims were time-barred and not subject to equitable tolling.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The court held that Wershe’s claims were indeed time-barred under the applicable statutes of limitations and that he was not entitled to equitable tolling. The court found that Wershe had constructive knowledge of the filing deadlines, did not diligently pursue his claims, and that the defendants would be prejudiced by the delay. Additionally, the court ruled that the district court did not err in dismissing the complaints with prejudice or in its handling of materials outside the pleadings. View "Wershe v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law

The Industrial Energy Consumer Group (IECG) appealed an order from the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) regarding the recovery of costs related to power supply obligations and state energy programs. The PUC decided that these costs should be recovered volumetrically from all ratepayer classes, except for one category, which should be recovered using a fixed customer charge. IECG argued that the order was preempted by the Federal Power Act and that the allocation and design violated cost-causation principles and state statutes.The Office of the Public Advocate contended that IECG’s appeal was untimely and should be dismissed. The PUC argued that the appeal was an improper collateral attack on a prior rate order. Both the Public Advocate and the PUC maintained that if the merits were considered, the order should be affirmed as rational and supported.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court concluded that the appeal was timely and not barred by collateral estoppel. The court did not address the preemption argument, finding it unpreserved for appellate review. The court rejected IECG’s arguments on the merits, noting the deferential standard of review for the PUC’s expert judgment in ratemaking. The court found that the PUC’s decision to treat NEB costs separately from traditional T&D service costs was rational and supported by the record. The court also determined that the PUC’s allocation and rate design did not violate state statutes.The court affirmed the PUC’s order, holding that the PUC’s approach to NEB cost recovery was within its broad discretion and sufficiently justified. The court noted that the PUC might refine its approach in the future based on further data collection and party input. View "Industrial Energy Consumer Group v. Public Utilities Commission" on Justia Law

Patrick Gordon, an attorney, was suspended from the rosters of the Maine Commission on Public Defense Services, making him ineligible to represent indigent criminal defendants. The suspension followed an investigation into Gordon’s billing practices and representation of a client. The Commission received information suggesting that Gordon had inaccurately billed for a jury trial that was actually a bench trial and that some billed work was performed by others in his firm. Additionally, there were discrepancies regarding Gordon’s client visits.The Superior Court (Kennebec County) affirmed the Commission’s decision. The investigation began after the Commission received information from a post-conviction review counsel. Gordon was asked to provide documents and clarify billing discrepancies but failed to fully comply. Despite multiple requests and extensions, Gordon did not provide the requested documents or satisfactory explanations. The Commission’s Interim Executive Director, Justin Andrus, ultimately suspended Gordon, a decision upheld by the Commission after an intra-agency appeal.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. The Court found that the Commission’s decision was not arbitrary or capricious. The evidence showed that Gordon failed to comply with the Commission’s requests, which were within the Commission’s authority. The investigation and subsequent suspension were justified based on Gordon’s non-compliance with the Commission’s rules. The Court concluded that the Commission’s decision was supported by evidence and did not reflect any abuse of discretion or erroneous findings of fact. View "Gordon v. Maine Commission on Public Defense Services" on Justia Law

3M Company operates a manufacturing facility in Cordova, Illinois, producing chemical products containing PFAS. The State of Illinois sued 3M, alleging that PFAS from the Cordova Facility contaminated the Mississippi River, violating state environmental laws. The State's complaint specifically excluded PFAS contamination from any other source, including AFFF used by the U.S. military at the nearby Rock Island Arsenal.The case was initially filed in Illinois state court. 3M removed it to the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois, citing the federal officer removal statute, arguing that some contamination might have come from AFFF provided to the military, thus invoking a federal government contractor defense. The State moved to remand the case back to state court. The district court granted the motion, finding that the State's complaint excluded AFFF-related contamination, focusing solely on PFAS from the Cordova Facility.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that 3M could not satisfy the fourth element required for removal under the federal officer removal statute, which necessitates a colorable federal defense. The court noted that the State had unequivocally conceded that it would not seek relief for mixed PFAS contamination and that any recovery would be barred if contamination was not solely from the Cordova Facility. Consequently, 3M's government contractor defense was deemed irrelevant under the State's theory of recovery. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to remand the case to state court. View "Raoul v. 3M Company" on Justia Law

The case involves several special education students who alleged that their teacher physically and emotionally abused them. The students, who have various disabilities affecting their communication abilities, were assigned to the same classroom at Elm Street Elementary School in Coweta County, Georgia. The teacher, Catherine Sprague, was hired by the principal, Dr. Christi Hildebrand, despite lacking special education certification. Throughout the fall of 2019, the students exhibited signs of distress, and their parents noticed behavioral changes and physical signs of mistreatment. A paraprofessional, Nicole Marshall, reported multiple instances of abuse by Sprague to Hildebrand, who delayed reporting these allegations to law enforcement and the students' parents.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia dismissed the students' complaint. The court ruled that emotional distress damages are not recoverable under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) following the Supreme Court's decision in Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C. The court also found that the students failed to state a constitutional violation against Hildebrand and the school district, and that Hildebrand was entitled to qualified immunity. The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law negligence claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed that emotional distress damages are not recoverable under Title II of the ADA, as Title II incorporates the remedies of the Rehabilitation Act, which the Supreme Court in Cummings ruled does not allow for emotional distress damages. However, the appellate court found that the district court erred by not considering whether the students might be entitled to other forms of relief under Title II, such as damages for physical harm or nominal damages. The appellate court also affirmed the dismissal of the section 1983 claims, ruling that the alleged abuse did not meet the "shock-the-conscience" standard required for a substantive due process violation. The case was remanded for further proceedings to consider other potential relief under Title II. View "A.W. v. Coweta County School District" on Justia Law

A public children-services agency determined that an allegation of child abuse against Kelly D. Kyser was substantiated. Kyser challenged this finding through the agency’s administrative-review process, but her appeal was unsuccessful. She then appealed the agency’s decision to the Summit County Court of Common Pleas. The court dismissed her appeal as untimely, and the Ninth District Court of Appeals affirmed this decision.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case. The court noted that under R.C. 2506.01, a person may appeal a final order or decision of an agency that determines their rights, duties, privileges, benefits, or legal relationships. However, the court found that an agency’s disposition finding that an allegation of child abuse is substantiated does not determine any of these things. The court explained that while certain consequences may result from such a finding, the agency’s disposition itself does not determine those consequences.The Supreme Court of Ohio concluded that the common pleas court did not have jurisdiction to hear Kyser’s appeal because the agency’s disposition was not a final order under R.C. 2506.01. As a result, the Supreme Court vacated the Ninth District Court of Appeals’ judgment and dismissed the appeal. View "Kyser v. Summit Cty. Children Servs." on Justia Law

Anthony Barron, a civilian contractor, drowned while driving through a low water crossing at Camp Bullis, a U.S. military facility near San Antonio, Texas. The crossing was not closed or guarded despite regulations requiring such measures during heavy rain. Barron’s parents sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, alleging general negligence, premises liability, and negligent undertaking.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas dismissed the claims, citing sovereign immunity and the discretionary function exception. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding that the regulation mandating the gate be locked or guarded was non-discretionary. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment for the government, ruling that Texas law barred the general negligence and premises liability claims and that the negligent undertaking claim was inadequately pleaded.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It affirmed the district court’s summary judgment on the general negligence and premises liability claims, agreeing that Texas law precludes recovery under these theories. However, the appellate court disagreed with the district court’s finding that the negligent undertaking claim was inadequately pleaded. The Fifth Circuit found that the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged the elements of negligent undertaking.Given the uncertainty in Texas law regarding whether a negligent undertaking claim can proceed when a premises liability claim is barred by the natural accumulation doctrine, the Fifth Circuit certified this question to the Supreme Court of Texas. The appellate court retained jurisdiction pending the state court’s response. View "Barron v. United States" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Indian nationals residing in the U.S. on nonimmigrant work visas and their children, sought to adjust their status to permanent residents. They challenged policies by the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and the U.S. Department of State (DOS) that determine the eligibility of derivative beneficiaries, claiming these policies violate the Equal Protection Clause and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint for failure to state a claim, allowing them to amend their complaint. Instead of amending, the plaintiffs appealed. During the appeal, the Supreme Court decided Patel v. Garland, which held that federal courts lack jurisdiction to review factual findings in discretionary-relief proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1255. The government argued that this ruling meant the courts also lacked jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal and remanded the case, holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction over most of the plaintiffs' claims because they were not ripe. The Ninth Circuit concluded that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) does not strip federal district courts of jurisdiction to hear collateral challenges to generally applicable policies and procedures. However, the claims were not ripe because the plaintiffs had not applied for adjustment of status, and USCIS had not denied their applications based on the challenged policies. For the one plaintiff who did apply and was denied, the court held that her claims must be channeled through a petition for review from a final order of removal, as per §§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) and (D). The Ninth Circuit's interpretation aligns with other circuits, maintaining that general policy challenges are not precluded by § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). View "NAGENDRA NAKKA V. USCIS" on Justia Law

Amy Romero was arrested for driving while under the influence of alcohol (DWUI) after being found stuck in a snowbank. Officer George Phillips of the Rawlins Police Department noticed the vehicle and, upon investigation, detected a strong odor of alcohol from Ms. Romero. During the interaction, Ms. Romero admitted to driving the vehicle and exhibited signs of intoxication. Officer Phillips placed her in the back of his patrol car to deescalate a potentially violent situation with her husband, Joseph Romero, who was also present and behaving aggressively.The Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) upheld the suspension of Ms. Romero’s driver’s license, concluding that Officer Phillips had reasonable suspicion to detain her for a DWUI investigation. The OAH found that the officer’s actions, including placing Ms. Romero in the patrol car and transporting her to a dry environment for field sobriety tests, were justified based on the totality of the circumstances, including the strong odor of alcohol, her admission of driving, and the need to manage her husband’s aggressive behavior.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the OAH’s decision. The Court held that Officer Phillips’ detention of Ms. Romero in the back of the patrol car did not constitute an unlawful arrest but was a reasonable investigative detention supported by substantial evidence. The Court found that the officer’s actions were necessary to ensure safety and were within the scope of a lawful investigative detention. The Court concluded that the OAH’s findings were supported by substantial evidence and that the detention was in accordance with constitutional protections. The decision to uphold the suspension of Ms. Romero’s driver’s license was affirmed. View "Romero v. State of Wyoming Ex Rel., Wyoming Department of Transportation" on Justia Law