Risen Energy Co., Ltd. (Risen), a Chinese exporter of solar cells, was subject to an antidumping order by the Department of Commerce (Commerce). In the Sixth Administrative Review, Commerce used surrogate values from Malaysia to calculate normal values for Risen's products. Risen challenged Commerce's surrogate value calculations for its backsheet and ethyl vinyl acetate (EVA) inputs, as well as the overhead ratio calculation.The United States Court of International Trade (Trade Court) initially found Commerce's surrogate value calculations for Risen's backsheet and EVA inputs unsupported by substantial evidence and remanded the matter for further explanation. Commerce then provided additional evidence from ASTM standards to support its choice of HTS categories for these inputs, which the Trade Court sustained. However, the Trade Court upheld Commerce's surrogate financial ratio calculation for overhead despite some reservations about Commerce's rationale.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed Commerce's use of the HTS categories for "sheet" to value Risen's backsheet and EVA inputs, finding the decision supported by substantial evidence. However, the court found Commerce's surrogate overhead ratio calculation unsupported by substantial evidence. The court noted that Commerce's reliance on the Hanwha financial statement and the IFRS standard was unclear and speculative.The Federal Circuit affirmed the Trade Court's decision regarding the surrogate value calculations for backsheet and EVA inputs but vacated the decision on the surrogate overhead ratio calculation. The case was remanded to Commerce for further proceedings to provide substantial evidence for its overhead calculation. View "Risen Energy Co., LTD. v. United States" on Justia Law

Petitioners, a group of ambulance service providers, challenged the validity of a final rule promulgated by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). The rule, titled "Change in Rates VA Pays for Special Modes of Transportation," amended how the VA pays for noncontract ground and air ambulance transports for eligible beneficiaries. The rule stipulated that the VA would pay the lesser of the actual charge or the Medicare fee schedule amount for these services, rather than the actual costs. Petitioners argued that this rule exceeded the VA's statutory authority under 38 U.S.C. § 111(b)(3)(C).The case was reviewed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The court examined whether the VA had the authority to implement the rule under the cited statute. The court noted that while 38 U.S.C. § 111(a) allows the VA to pay for travel expenses to or from a "Department facility or other place," § 111(b)(3)(C) specifically limits the VA's payment discretion to ambulance transports to or from a "Department facility" only. The court found that the VA's rule improperly extended this payment methodology to transports to or from places other than Department facilities, which was not authorized by the statute.The Federal Circuit held that the VA's final rule exceeded the statutory authority granted by Congress under 38 U.S.C. § 111(b)(3)(C). Consequently, the court granted the petition and set aside the final rule. The court did not address other arguments raised by the petitioners, as the decision on the statutory authority was sufficient to resolve the case. The petitioners' motion to stay the rule pending judicial review was denied as moot, given the court's decision on the merits. View "Metropolitan Area EMS Authority v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

In July 2009, veteran John H. Casey filed a Notice of Disagreement (NOD) with the VA challenging the denial of service connection for disabilities. In June 2010, Robert Goss entered into a contingent fee agreement with Casey, agreeing to represent him in his pursuit of benefits from the VA and receive twenty percent of any past-due benefits awarded. Goss filed the necessary forms with the VA, and in January 2011, Casey terminated their attorney-client relationship. Despite this, the VA awarded past-due benefits to Casey in September 2011 and February 2012, and paid Goss twenty percent of these benefits. Casey challenged the payment of fees to Goss, arguing that Goss did not perform any work on his case.The VA issued a Statement of the Case (SOC) denying Casey’s challenge, and Casey appealed to the Board of Veterans Appeals (Board). The Board remanded the case to the VA Regional Office (RO) three times, instructing the RO to request an itemized account of Goss’s work to determine the reasonableness of the fees. Goss refused to provide this information, and the RO repeatedly denied Casey’s claim without providing full reasons and bases. In November 2020, the Board found the twenty percent fee unreasonable, as Goss had not contributed significantly to the case, and Casey’s NOD was filed before Goss’s appointment.Goss appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, arguing that the Board lacked jurisdiction over the reasonableness of the fee award. The VA initially opposed but later conceded this point. The Veterans Court accepted the VA’s concession, vacated the Board’s decision on reasonableness, and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Goss then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.The Federal Circuit reversed the Veterans Court’s decision, holding that the Board did have jurisdiction to review the reasonableness of the fee award. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this determination. View "Goss v. McDonough" on Justia Law

Clifford J. Culgan requested unredacted public records related to Jefferson County Grand Jury Final Reports for October 1997, November 1997, December 1997, and January 1998 from the Jefferson County Clerk of Courts. The Deputy Clerk, Christianne Benton, responded by providing the requested records but redacted the names of the grand jurors, the signature of the grand jury foreperson, and information on expunged cases using Wite-Out. Culgan claimed he did not receive the response and filed a mandamus action seeking the unredacted records, statutory damages, and court costs.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case. The clerk argued that the redactions were justified under state law, specifically citing State ex rel. Beacon Journal Pub. Co. v. Bond. The court found that the clerk's redactions of case information for expunged cases were proper but determined that the names of the grand jurors and the signature of the grand jury foreperson should not have been redacted. The court also found that the clerk's use of Wite-Out for redactions was permissible and that the redactions were plainly visible.The Supreme Court of Ohio granted a writ of mandamus ordering the clerk to provide the grand jury reports without redacting the grand jurors' names or the foreperson's signature. However, the court denied the writ regarding the redacted case information, as those redactions were deemed appropriate. The court also denied Culgan's requests for statutory damages and court costs, concluding that the clerk reasonably believed the redactions were proper based on existing case law. View "State ex rel. Culgan v. Jefferson Cty. Clerk of Courts" on Justia Law

The case involves the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) changing its air-quality standard for ozone under the Clean Air Act, which required states to amend their state plans. The EPA issued guidance memoranda to assist states, suggesting specific modeling and a minimum threshold for interstate emissions. Kentucky proposed a plan based on this guidance, but the EPA delayed action on the plan for two years and then disapproved it using different modeling and a lower threshold than initially recommended. Kentucky petitioned the court to vacate the EPA's disapproval.The EPA's disapproval of Kentucky's plan was challenged in the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The EPA sought to transfer the case to the D.C. Circuit, arguing that the disapproval was a nationally applicable final action. The Sixth Circuit denied the motion, stating that the EPA's disapproval was not nationally applicable and was based on Kentucky's unique facts. The court also found that the EPA's action violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by acting arbitrarily and inconsistently with its prior guidance.The Sixth Circuit held that the EPA's disapproval of Kentucky's plan was arbitrary and capricious. The court noted that the EPA failed to adequately explain its departure from prior guidance and did not consider Kentucky's reliance on the initial recommendations. The court vacated the EPA's disapproval of Kentucky's plan and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The court emphasized the importance of consistency and the need for the EPA to justify its actions when changing its approach. View "Kentucky v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

The Wyoming Board of Land Commissioners (Board) manages state trust lands for the benefit of public schools. In Teton County, the Board issued temporary use permits to Basecamp Hospitality, LLC and Wilson Investments, LLC for commercial activities on state trust lands. Teton County challenged these permits, arguing they should be subject to local land use regulations. The district court dismissed Teton County's challenge, stating the county lacked standing for judicial review. Subsequently, Teton County issued abatement notices to the permit holders, which led the Board to seek declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming sovereign immunity from local regulations.The Teton County Board of County Commissioners (Teton County) filed a petition for review, which was dismissed by the Ninth Judicial District Court. The Board then filed for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief in the First Judicial District, Laramie County, Wyoming. The district court issued a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against Teton County's enforcement actions. Citizens for Responsible Use of State Lands (CRUSL), formed by local property owners, sought to intervene, claiming their interests were directly impacted by the use of the state trust lands.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case. CRUSL argued it had a significant protectable interest due to the proximity of its members' properties to the state trust lands. However, the court found CRUSL's interests were contingent on the outcome of the sovereign immunity issue and thus not significant protectable interests. Additionally, the court held that Teton County adequately represented CRUSL's interests, as both sought to enforce local regulations on state trust lands. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court's denial of CRUSL's motion to intervene as a matter of right under Wyoming Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2). View "Citizens for Responsible Use of State Lands v. State" on Justia Law

An applicant sought admission to the Vermont Bar through a transferred Uniform Bar Examination (UBE) score after passing the UBE in Maine on her sixth attempt. Vermont Rule 13(c) requires that a passing UBE score be achieved within no more than four sittings. The applicant requested a waiver of this requirement, arguing that her unique circumstances and qualifications warranted an exception.The Board of Bar Examiners denied the applicant's request for admission, stating that Rule 13(c) does not allow for a waiver of the four-sittings requirement. The applicant appealed to the Vermont Supreme Court, arguing that the court should read an implied waiver provision into Rule 13(c) and that the absence of such a provision was an oversight.The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the Board's decision, holding that the plain language of Rule 13(c) does not allow for a waiver and that it would be inappropriate to read such a provision into the rule. The court emphasized that the rules are designed to ensure that attorneys meet the standards for professional competence and that limiting the number of attempts to pass the bar examination is rationally connected to this goal. The court also noted that the applicant's arguments regarding fairness and public policy are best directed toward the Board's formal rulemaking process. The court rejected the applicant's request to waive the rule and admit her, stating that it would be inconsistent with the plain language of the rule and the established process for assessing professional competence. View "In re Granger" on Justia Law

A group of Burlington residents appealed a summary judgment order from the Environmental Division that upheld a permit for the Cathedral of the Immaculate Conception Parish Charitable Trust to demolish church structures on its property. The residents argued that the court erred in concluding that 24 V.S.A. § 4413(a)(1)(C) prevented the City of Burlington from applying its Comprehensive Development Ordinance (CDO) to restrain the demolition. They also contended that the court erred in denying their motion to compel discovery regarding the pending sale of the property to a nonreligious buyer, asserting that the sale was relevant to the applicability of § 4413(a)(1)(C).The Environmental Division granted summary judgment to the Trust, finding that the intended functional use of the property was for religious purposes, specifically the deconsecration of the Cathedral through demolition, which was an ecclesiastical process. The court concluded that applying the CDO would interfere with this intended functional use. The court also denied the residents' motion to compel discovery, determining that the information sought was unrelated to the issue on appeal, which was limited to whether § 4413(a)(1)(C) exempted the property from regulation under the CDO.The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the Environmental Division's decision. The Court held that the applicability of § 4413(a)(1)(C) depends on the intended functional use of the property at the time of the application, not on the identity of the owner or potential future uses. The Court found that the Trust's intended use of the property for religious deconsecration through demolition was protected under § 4413(a)(1)(C). The Court also upheld the denial of the motion to compel discovery, as the future use of the property by a potential buyer was irrelevant to the current application. Thus, the summary judgment in favor of the Trust was affirmed. View "In re Cathedral of the Immaculate Parish Charitable Trust Appeal" on Justia Law

Julien P. Champagne, a veteran who served from December 1953 to December 1956, filed a claim in September 1987 for benefits related to his cerebellar degenerative disorder (CDD) using VA Form 21-526. The VA regional office (RO) interpreted this as a pension claim and awarded a disability pension in December 1987. In 1999, Champagne sought service connection compensation for malaria and any residual illnesses, including CDD. The RO granted service connection for malaria at 0% in 2002 but did not grant compensation for CDD. Champagne filed a notice of disagreement in 2003, and after multiple proceedings, he was granted compensation for CDD at 100%, effective February 3, 2005. This effective date was later changed to July 14, 2003, but Champagne sought an earlier date, arguing it should be from 1987.The Board of Veterans’ Appeals denied an earlier effective date in October 2020, finding no indication in the 1987 application that Champagne intended to claim service connection compensation. Champagne appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, which affirmed the Board’s decision in July 2022. The Veterans Court held that under 38 C.F.R. § 3.151(a), the VA may consider a pension claim as a compensation claim but is not required to do so.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the Veterans Court’s decision. The Federal Circuit held that the plain language of 38 C.F.R. § 3.151(a) is permissive, allowing but not requiring the VA to consider a pension claim as a compensation claim. The court also found no merit in Champagne’s argument that the Veterans Court engaged in impermissible fact-finding, as the court had merely determined that any findings by the RO would not bind the Board. View "Champagne v. McDonough" on Justia Law

Abram J. Harris, a pro se plaintiff, sued the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) of the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) in the D.C. Superior Court, alleging fraud and abuse of process. Harris claimed that a female employee he hired, who also worked for FMCSA, turned the agency against him after their working relationship soured. The Superior Court dismissed the case sua sponte for failure to state a claim, and Harris appealed to the D.C. Court of Appeals. Subsequently, the DOT removed the case to federal court.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the case after removal. Harris did not object to the removal or seek remand to the Superior Court. The district court dismissed the case, concluding it lacked jurisdiction because Harris's claims fell outside the Federal Tort Claims Act’s limited waiver of sovereign immunity and because Harris had failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Alternatively, the court held that Harris had failed to state a claim. Harris timely appealed the dismissal as to DOT but not as to Assistant U.S. Attorney Stephanie Johnson, whom he had added as a defendant.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a), a federal defendant may remove a case from state appellate court to federal district court. The court also determined that Harris forfeited any arguments regarding procedural defects in the removal process by not objecting in the district court or moving for remand. Additionally, Harris forfeited any arguments that the district court erred in dismissing his case for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim by failing to raise them in his briefs. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the case. View "Harris v. Department of Transportation Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration" on Justia Law