The case involves the estate of Bud Conyers seeking a relator’s share of the proceeds from a settlement between the United States and military contractor Kellogg Brown & Root (KBR) under the False Claims Act (FCA). Conyers, a former KBR truck driver, had filed a qui tam suit alleging various fraudulent activities by KBR, including the use of mortuary trailers for supplies, kickbacks for defective trucks, and billing for prostitutes. The government later intervened in Conyers’s suit but pursued different claims involving KBR employees Mazon, Seamans, and Martin, who were involved in separate kickback schemes.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas awarded Conyers’s estate approximately $1.1 million, finding a “factual overlap” between Conyers’s allegations and the settled claims, particularly with Martin’s kickback scheme involving trucks. The court reasoned that Conyers’s allegations had put the government on notice of fraud in trucking contracts, which arguably led to the investigation of Martin. The district court also ordered the government to pay Conyers’s attorney’s fees.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that under the FCA, a relator is entitled to a share only of the settlement of the claim he brought, not additional claims added by the government. The court found no relevant factual overlap between Conyers’s claims and the settled claims involving Mazon, Seamans, and Martin. The court also rejected the district court’s reasoning that Conyers’s allegations spurred the investigation into Martin’s misconduct, noting that the FCA does not entitle a relator to recover from new claims discovered by the government. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit concluded that Conyers’s estate was not entitled to any share of the settlement proceeds and reversed the award of attorney’s fees. View "USA v. Conyers" on Justia Law

Dobbin Plantersville Water Supply Corporation (Dobbin) held a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity (CCN) to provide water service in certain areas of Texas. Dobbin, a recipient of federal loans under 7 U.S.C. § 1926, which grants monopoly protection to loan recipients, faced decertification petitions from developers SIG Magnolia L.P. and Redbird Development L.L.C. The Public Utility Commission of Texas (PUC) granted these petitions, finding that Dobbin was not providing actual water service to the developers' properties. Dobbin then filed a lawsuit in federal court, arguing that the Texas Water Code section allowing decertification was preempted by federal law.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas dismissed Dobbin's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against the PUC officials, concluding they were not appropriate defendants under § 1983. At the summary judgment stage, the district court dismissed Dobbin's remaining claims with prejudice, primarily on jurisdictional grounds. The court found that Dobbin lacked a cause of action against the developers and that an injunction against the PUC would not redress Dobbin's injuries.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Dobbin lacked standing to seek an injunction against the PUC officials because such relief would not redress its injuries. The court also upheld the dismissal of Dobbin's § 1983 claim against the PUC officials, reiterating that state officials in their official capacities are not "persons" under § 1983. Lastly, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to dismiss Dobbin's claims against the developers with prejudice, as Dobbin lacked a viable cause of action against them. View "Dobbin Plantersville Water Supply Corporation v. Lake" on Justia Law

David Lesh, a social media content creator and owner of an outdoor apparel brand, posted photos on Instagram of himself snowmobiling at Keystone Resort, Colorado, during its closure due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The United States charged him with using an over-snow vehicle on National Forest Service (NFS) land off a designated route and conducting unauthorized work activity on NFS land. A magistrate judge convicted him of both counts after a bench trial.The magistrate judge found Lesh guilty of using an over-snow vehicle on NFS land off a designated route, taking judicial notice of a publicly available map indicating that Keystone Resort was not designated for snowmobile use. Lesh's argument that the map's undated nature failed to provide sufficient notice was not preserved for appeal. The district court affirmed the magistrate judge's decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed Lesh's conviction for using an over-snow vehicle on NFS land off a designated route, finding that Lesh had waived his challenge to the judicial notice of the map. However, the court reversed his conviction for unauthorized work activity under 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(c). The court held that the regulation was impermissibly vague as applied to Lesh's conduct, as it did not provide fair warning that posting images on social media could constitute a federal crime. The court also found insufficient evidence to prove that Lesh's primary purpose in posting the photos was to sell goods or services, as required by the regulation. The court concluded that Lesh was not deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, as the maximum penalty he faced did not exceed six months of imprisonment. View "United States v. Lesh" on Justia Law

Healthy Gulf and other environmental groups challenged the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC) decision to authorize the construction and operation of liquefied natural gas (LNG) facilities in southwestern Louisiana. They argued that FERC did not properly address certain requirements under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Natural Gas Act (NGA). Specifically, they contended that FERC inadequately explained its failure to determine the environmental significance of the project's greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and failed to adequately assess the cumulative effects of the project's nitrogen dioxide (NO2) emissions. However, they acknowledged that FERC did consider alternatives to the project.The Commission had issued a final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) and authorized the project, finding it environmentally acceptable and consistent with the public interest. Petitioners requested a rehearing, which was deemed denied by operation of law when FERC did not respond timely. They then sought review from the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found that FERC inadequately explained its failure to determine the significance of the project's GHG emissions and failed to properly assess the cumulative effects of the project's NO2 emissions. The court noted that FERC's reliance on the Significant Impact Levels (SILs) to assess cumulative effects was insufficient and that FERC did not adequately consider the significance of GHG emissions using available methodologies. However, the court upheld FERC's consideration of alternatives to the project, finding that FERC had provided sufficient reasoning for rejecting the proposed alternatives.The court granted the petitions in part, denied them in part, and remanded the case to FERC for further consideration without vacating the authorization order. The court instructed FERC to provide a more thorough explanation of its GHG emissions analysis and to properly assess the cumulative effects of NO2 emissions. View "Healthy Gulf v. FERC" on Justia Law

In late 2003, Wye Oak Technology, Inc., a small American company, entered into a contract with the Iraqi Ministry of Defense to rebuild Iraq’s military. Wye Oak performed under the contract for nearly five months, but Iraq refused to pay and instead gave the money to another party. When Wye Oak’s owner traveled to Iraq to resolve the payment issue, he was killed by unidentified assailants. Wye Oak eventually ceased operations in Iraq and later sued Iraq in a U.S. federal district court for breach of contract.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia found Iraq liable after a bench trial and awarded Wye Oak over $120 million in damages. The court initially held that it had jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) based on the commercial exception’s second clause. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit vacated this judgment, ruling that the second clause did not apply and remanded the case to determine if the third clause of the commercial exception applied. On remand, the district court found that Iraq’s breach had direct effects in the United States, thus reentering its damages order.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that Iraq’s breach did not cause a direct effect in the United States as required by the FSIA’s commercial exception. The court noted that the contract and its breach were centered in Iraq, and any effects in the United States were too attenuated or involved intervening elements. Consequently, the court held that Iraq was immune from suit, vacated the district court’s judgment, and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss. View "Wye Oak Technology, Inc. v. Republic of Iraq" on Justia Law

Barbara Kowal, a paralegal for a federal public defender, filed FOIA requests with the ATF, FBI, and DEA seeking records related to Daniel Troya, who was sentenced to death for a gang-related murder. The agencies conducted searches and produced some documents but withheld others, citing various FOIA exemptions. Dissatisfied, Kowal filed two lawsuits claiming the searches were inadequate and the records were wrongfully withheld.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment in favor of the agencies in both cases. The court found that the agencies conducted adequate searches and properly invoked FOIA exemptions to withhold certain records. Kowal appealed these decisions.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's rulings. The appellate court held that the agencies' searches were reasonable and tailored to Kowal's specific requests. The court also found that the agencies properly justified their withholdings under FOIA Exemptions 3, 6, 7(C), 7(D), and 7(E). The court noted that the agencies provided sufficient affidavits explaining the applicability of these exemptions and that Kowal failed to demonstrate any significant public interest that would outweigh the privacy and security concerns protected by the exemptions.In conclusion, the appellate court affirmed the district court's grants of summary judgment, holding that the agencies conducted adequate searches and properly withheld records under the cited FOIA exemptions. View "Kowal v. DOJ" on Justia Law

Kimani E. Ware filed a mandamus action under Ohio’s Public Records Act, seeking an order compelling John Pierce to produce certain public records and requesting statutory damages. Pierce is employed by Aramark Correctional Services, a private company providing food services to the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction’s (ODRC) facilities. Ware had requested a copy of the food menu and calorie counts for meals served at Trumbull Correctional Institution (TCI), but Pierce responded that such information was either not available or could be obtained from dieticians.The case was initially reviewed by the Supreme Court of Ohio. Ware’s application for default judgment was denied, and an alternative writ was granted, requiring both parties to submit evidence and briefs. Pierce argued that he was not a public official and thus had no duty to respond to Ware’s requests under the Public Records Act. The court ordered the parties to provide additional evidence and briefs, which they did.The Supreme Court of Ohio held that Ware failed to meet his burden of proving that Aramark, Pierce’s employer, was the functional equivalent of a public office. The court applied the functional-equivalency test, which considers factors such as whether the entity performs a governmental function, the level of government funding, the extent of government involvement or regulation, and whether the entity was created by the government. The court found insufficient evidence to determine that Aramark was the functional equivalent of a public office. Consequently, Pierce had no duty to provide the requested records, and Ware’s request for a writ of mandamus was denied. View "State ex rel. Ware v. Pierce" on Justia Law

Eight New Hampshire employers sought a writ of mandamus to compel the New Hampshire Department of Labor (DOL) to hold department-level hearings. These employers had their applications for reimbursement from the Special Fund for Second Injuries denied. The employers argued that they were entitled to a hearing under RSA 281-A:43, I(a). The DOL had denied their requests for such hearings, stating that the disputes were more appropriately heard by the Compensation Appeals Board (CAB).The employers initially appealed to the CAB and requested department-level hearings from the DOL. The DOL denied these requests, leading the employers to file a petition for original jurisdiction with the New Hampshire Supreme Court. The proceedings before the CAB were stayed pending the Supreme Court's decision.The New Hampshire Supreme Court reviewed whether the DOL is statutorily required to grant a request for a department-level hearing when an employer’s request for reimbursement from the Fund is denied. The court held that RSA 281-A:43, I(a) grants employers the right to a department-level hearing before an authorized representative of the commissioner when they have been denied reimbursement from the Fund. The court found that the statute's language supports the employers' right to such a hearing and that this interpretation aligns with the statutory scheme's purpose of encouraging employers to hire or retain employees with permanent impairments. Consequently, the court granted the petition for a writ of mandamus, compelling the DOL to hold the requested hearings. View "Petition of City of Manchester" on Justia Law

The case involves the California Community Choice Association (the Association), which represents Community Choice Aggregators (CCAs) that purchase electricity on behalf of residents and businesses. The Association challenged a resolution by the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) that set the effective dates for the expansion of two CCAs, Central Coast Community Energy (CCCE) and East Bay Community Energy (EBCE), to January 2025. The Association argued that the PUC exceeded its jurisdiction and failed to follow legal procedures in setting these dates.The PUC had issued Draft Resolution E-5258, setting January 1, 2025, as the earliest possible effective date for the expansions of CCCE and EBCE. The Association, CCCE, and EBCE opposed this, claiming the PUC overstepped its authority. The PUC adopted the resolution and later denied rehearing requests, modifying some factual findings but maintaining the 2025 effective date. The PUC justified the delay by citing past failures of CCCE and EBCE to meet resource adequacy requirements, which led to cost shifting to customers of investor-owned utilities.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the PUC acted within its jurisdiction under Public Utilities Code section 366.2, subdivision (a)(4), which mandates preventing cost shifting between CCA and non-CCA customers. The court held that the PUC's decision to delay the expansions was not arbitrary or capricious and was supported by evidence of past resource adequacy deficiencies by CCCE and EBCE. The court affirmed the PUC's decision and resolution, concluding that the Association's arguments did not demonstrate that the PUC had abused its discretion. View "Cal. Community Choice Assn. v. Public Utilities Com." on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, including Palestinian NGOs, Gaza residents, and Palestinian-Americans, sought to enjoin the U.S. President and senior officials from providing military, diplomatic, and financial support to Israel in its operations in Gaza. They alleged that the U.S. violated its obligations under the Genocide Convention by being complicit in genocide through its support of Israel. The plaintiffs requested wide-ranging injunctive and declaratory relief to stop U.S. assistance to Israel and to influence Israel to cease its military actions in Gaza.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed the complaint, ruling that the claims raised non-justiciable political questions. The court found that the issues were fundamentally political and not suitable for judicial resolution, as they involved decisions constitutionally committed to the political branches of government.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal. The appellate court held that the plaintiffs' claims presented non-justiciable political questions under the political question doctrine. The court emphasized that decisions regarding military and diplomatic support to foreign nations are constitutionally committed to the executive and legislative branches, not the judiciary. The court also rejected the plaintiffs' argument that framing their claims as violations of legal duties circumvented the political question doctrine. The court concluded that the judiciary does not have the authority to make decisions on national security and foreign policy matters, which are the prerogatives of the political branches. The request for declaratory relief was also found to be non-justiciable for the same reasons. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint. View "DEFENSE FOR CHILDREN INTERNATIONAL-PALESTINE V. BIDEN" on Justia Law