The plaintiffs, property owners in West Virginia, filed a lawsuit against the current and former owners of abandoned oil and gas wells on their properties. They sought damages for the defendants' failure to plug the wells, alleging common law nuisance, trespass, and negligence. The defendants argued that the West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection (WVDEP) was responsible for well plugging and that WVDEP had approved transactions between the defendants, which purportedly relaxed their statutory duty to plug the wells. They claimed WVDEP was an indispensable party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 and, because it could not be joined due to sovereign immunity, sought judgment in their favor under Rule 12(c).The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia denied the defendants' motion, ruling that WVDEP was not a necessary and indispensable party under Rule 19. The court concluded that it could grant the plaintiffs damages on their common law claims without implicating the State’s interests. The defendants then filed an interlocutory appeal, arguing that the district court's order was reviewable under the collateral order doctrine, as it effectively denied WVDEP sovereign immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the district court's order did not rule on any immunity issue but only on whether WVDEP was a necessary and indispensable party under Rule 19. The appellate court found that the order did not satisfy the requirements of the collateral order doctrine and was not a final decision. Consequently, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "McEvoy v. Diversified Energy Company PLC" on Justia Law

During Winter Storm Uri, Southwest Power Pool, Inc. (Southwest) contacted Associated Electric Cooperative, Inc. (the Cooperative) to purchase emergency energy. The Cooperative provided the energy, and Southwest compensated the Cooperative according to their existing written contract, known as the Tariff, filed with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). The Cooperative claimed the payment was insufficient and not in line with a separate oral agreement made during the storm. Southwest refused to pay more than the Tariff rate, leading the Cooperative to file a lawsuit in federal district court for breach of contract and equitable claims.Southwest petitioned FERC for a declaratory order asserting primary jurisdiction over the dispute and confirming that the payment was appropriate under the Tariff. FERC agreed, and the Cooperative's petition for rehearing was denied. The Cooperative then sought review from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which denied the petitions, affirming FERC's primary jurisdiction and the applicability of the Tariff rate.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri granted Southwest’s motion to dismiss the Cooperative’s complaint, agreeing with FERC’s jurisdiction and the Tariff’s control over the payment terms. The district court also denied Southwest’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs. The Cooperative appealed the dismissal, and Southwest appealed the denial of attorneys’ fees.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo and affirmed the decision, agreeing that FERC had primary jurisdiction and the Tariff controlled the payment terms. The court also affirmed the district court’s denial of attorneys’ fees, finding that the relevant contract provision did not apply to this dispute and that the district court did not abuse its discretion. View "Associated Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Southwest Power Pool, Inc." on Justia Law

During Winter Storm Uri, Southwest Power Pool, Inc. (Southwest) contacted Associated Electric Cooperative, Inc. (the Cooperative) to purchase emergency energy. The Cooperative provided the energy and was subsequently paid by Southwest according to their existing written contract and the rates filed with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). The Cooperative claimed that the payment was insufficient and not in accordance with a separate oral agreement made during the storm. Southwest refused to pay more than the rate in the written contract, leading the Cooperative to file a lawsuit in federal district court for breach of contract and equitable claims.Before the district court made any determinations, Southwest petitioned FERC for a declaratory order asserting that FERC had primary jurisdiction over the dispute and that Southwest had properly compensated the Cooperative. FERC agreed, stating it had primary jurisdiction and that Southwest had appropriately compensated the Cooperative according to the filed rate. The Cooperative then petitioned for review of FERC’s order and the denial of rehearing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the emergency energy transaction was governed by the existing written contract and the rates filed with FERC, not by any separate oral agreement. The court found that FERC had properly exercised primary jurisdiction over the dispute and correctly applied the filed rate doctrine, which mandates that no seller of energy may collect a rate other than the one filed with and approved by FERC. Consequently, the court denied the Cooperative’s petitions for review, affirming that Southwest had not breached its contractual obligations. View "Associated Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. FERC" on Justia Law

The United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence generated a report on the Detention and Interrogation Program conducted by the CIA after September 11th. The Committee transmitted the report to various federal agencies. Douglas Cox submitted FOIA requests to these agencies for their copies of the report. The agencies denied the requests, arguing that the report is a congressional record, not an agency record, and thus not subject to FOIA disclosure.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of the agencies, agreeing that the report is a congressional record not subject to FOIA. The court also denied Cox’s request for discovery.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court applied the test from Behar v. United States Department of Homeland Security, which asks whether the non-covered entity (Congress) manifested a clear intent to control the documents. The court found that the Committee had a clear intent to control the report at the time of its creation, as evidenced by a June 2, 2009, letter. The court concluded that the Committee’s subsequent actions did not vitiate this intent. Therefore, the report remains a congressional record not subject to FOIA. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying discovery, as Cox failed to show bad faith or provide evidence that the exemptions claimed by the agencies were improper. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Cox v. Dep't of Justice" on Justia Law

The case involves healthcare providers and air ambulance services challenging regulations established by the Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and the Treasury. These regulations were designed to guide independent arbitrators in resolving insurance reimbursement disputes under the No Surprises Act, which aims to protect patients from unexpected medical bills by limiting their out-of-pocket costs for emergency and certain non-emergency services provided by out-of-network providers.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas reviewed the case and vacated the regulations, finding that they improperly favored the qualifying payment amount (QPA) over other statutory factors that arbitrators are required to consider. The court held that the regulations conflicted with the No Surprises Act and violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by imposing additional requirements not found in the statute. The court also found that the plaintiffs had standing to sue based on procedural and financial injuries.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Fifth Circuit held that the regulations exceeded the Departments' authority by imposing a sequence in which arbitrators must consider the QPA first, disregarding information deemed not credible or unrelated, and requiring arbitrators to explain why they deviated from the QPA. The court found that these provisions placed undue emphasis on the QPA, contrary to the statute's requirement that all factors be considered equally. The court also upheld the district court's universal vacatur of the challenged provisions, rejecting the Departments' arguments for more limited relief. View "Texas Medical Association v. Health and Human Services" on Justia Law

Jose Oliveras, serving a life sentence without parole, was found with over 600 pornographic images on a tablet provided by the prison. The images were stored on a removable SIM card. Oliveras pled guilty to an administrative violation for possession of contraband and received counseling without reprimand. However, at a subsequent classification review, his computer clearance was rescinded, citing regulations that prohibit inmates with a history of computer fraud or abuse from accessing computers.Oliveras filed a grievance with the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), arguing that his violation did not constitute "computer fraud or abuse" as defined by Penal Code section 502. The CDCR denied his grievance and appeal. Oliveras then petitioned the Del Norte County Superior Court, which denied his petition, stating that the hearing officer's decision was supported by "some evidence."The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that Oliveras's conduct did not meet the criteria for "computer fraud or abuse" under Penal Code section 502. The court noted that Oliveras had permission to access the tablet and there was no evidence he used computer services without permission or for fraudulent purposes. The court concluded that the CDCR's interpretation of Oliveras's conduct as "computer fraud or abuse" was incorrect.The Court of Appeal ordered the CDCR to vacate any reference to a section 502 violation from Oliveras's record and reversed the October 2022 revocation of his computer clearance. The court directed the CDCR to remove any reference to this revocation from Oliveras's file. View "In re Oliveras" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Miriam Lowell and Seth Healey, challenged the Vermont Department for Children and Families (DCF) after being investigated for child abuse and neglect. DCF substantiated the allegations and notified the plaintiffs, who then requested an administrative review. The review process was delayed, and the plaintiffs filed a federal lawsuit claiming the process violated their due process rights. The federal court denied their injunction request, and the plaintiffs later filed a similar complaint in state court, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, and mandamus under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 75.The Superior Court, Washington Unit, Civil Division, dismissed the complaint, assuming the plaintiffs had a protected liberty interest but finding the administrative review process constitutionally sufficient. The court noted that the plaintiffs' claims of potential procedural violations were speculative and not reviewable. The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the administrative review process did not provide adequate due process protections.The Vermont Supreme Court dismissed Lowell's claims as moot because the administrative reviewer overturned the substantiation against her, providing her with no further relief. For Healey, the court assumed a protected liberty interest but found the administrative review process constitutionally adequate under the Mathews v. Eldridge test. The court noted that the process provided sufficient notice and an opportunity to be heard, with a neutral arbiter and the ability to present evidence. The court emphasized the importance of DCF's interest in protecting children and the availability of a prompt post-deprivation hearing before the Human Services Board, which offers more extensive procedural protections. The court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Healey's complaint, concluding that the administrative review process met due process requirements. View "Lowell v. Department for Children and Families" on Justia Law

Two tribal companies, Rock River Manufacturing, Inc. and HCI Distribution, Inc., challenged Nebraska's enforcement of its escrow and bond requirements for cigarette sales. These requirements stem from a Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) that mandates tobacco manufacturers either join the MSA or place money in escrow based on cigarette sales. The companies argued that the Indian Commerce Clause prevents Nebraska from enforcing these requirements on cigarettes sold within Indian country.The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska granted partial summary judgment, enjoining Nebraska from enforcing the escrow and bond requirements for cigarettes sold on the Winnebago Tribe's reservation but not for those sold on the Omaha Tribe's reservation. Nebraska appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that Nebraska's escrow and bond requirements could be enforced for cigarette sales to nonmembers on the Winnebago Reservation but not for sales to tribal members. The court reasoned that the state's interest in public health and fiscal soundness outweighed the tribal and federal interests for sales to nonmembers. However, for sales to tribal members, the tribe's sovereignty and self-governance interests prevailed. The court reversed the district court's decision in part and remanded with instructions to tailor the injunction, enjoining Nebraska from enforcing the escrow and bond requirements for cigarettes sold on the Winnebago Reservation to tribal members. View "HCI Distribution, Inc. v. Hilgers" on Justia Law

The City of Helena appealed a decision by the Shelby Circuit Court that allowed the Pelham Board of Education (PBE) to acquire, develop, and use a piece of real property within Helena's corporate limits for an athletic field and parking lot to serve Pelham High School students. The property, purchased by the PBE in 2021, is adjacent to Pelham High School but located within Helena. Helena argued that the PBE lacked the authority to construct and operate school facilities outside Pelham's corporate limits and that the project violated Helena's zoning ordinance.The Shelby Circuit Court ruled in favor of the PBE, stating that city zoning ordinances do not apply to governmental functions performed by a government body. The court found that the PBE's construction of the athletic field was a governmental function related to public education, which is exempt from local zoning regulations. Helena appealed, arguing that the PBE's actions were not authorized under Alabama Code § 16-11-9 and that the project did not comply with Helena's zoning ordinance.The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the circuit court's decision. The court held that § 16-11-9 does not restrict a city board of education's powers to the geographic boundaries of the city it serves. The court also concluded that the PBE's construction and operation of the athletic field constituted a governmental function related to public education, which is exempt from municipal zoning ordinances. Therefore, Helena's zoning ordinance could not be enforced against the PBE's project. The court affirmed the circuit court's order, allowing the PBE to proceed with the development and use of the property. View "City of Helena v. Pelham Board of Education" on Justia Law

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Governor of Delaware issued a series of emergency orders that included restrictions on religious services. These restrictions, which were lifted by June 2020, limited in-person worship to ten people and imposed various other mandates. Over 18 months later, two religious leaders filed suit in the Court of Chancery seeking injunctive relief against these restrictions, which were no longer in effect. The Court of Chancery dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that the plaintiffs could not demonstrate a reasonable apprehension of future harm.The plaintiffs then transferred their action to the Superior Court, seeking declaratory judgment and damages for alleged violations of their constitutional rights. The Superior Court dismissed the claims, ruling that the requests for declaratory relief were not justiciable because the restrictions had been lifted and there was no ongoing controversy. Additionally, the court found that the Governor was immune from the damages claims under the State Tort Claims Act and the doctrine of qualified immunity.On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The Court agreed that the plaintiffs failed to show a reasonable apprehension of future harm, which is necessary for injunctive relief. The Court also held that the plaintiffs' claims for declaratory judgment were not justiciable because there was no ongoing controversy and the alleged harm could not be redressed by a declaratory judgment. Finally, the Court upheld the Superior Court's finding that the Governor was immune from damages claims, as his actions were discretionary and taken in good faith during an unprecedented public health crisis. View "In re Covid-Related Restrictions on Religious Services" on Justia Law