Charles Johnson, Jr. was arrested by Officer Garrett Rolfe for driving while intoxicated. Johnson alleged that Rolfe used excessive force during the arrest, resulting in a broken collarbone. Johnson sued Rolfe and the City of Atlanta under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Georgia state law, claiming excessive force and battery. Johnson's complaint stated that he was respectful and did not resist arrest, but Rolfe threw him to the ground, causing his injury.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia reviewed the case. The City moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing it failed to state a claim for Monell liability. Rolfe moved for judgment on the pleadings, submitting body camera and dashcam footage showing Johnson resisting arrest. The district court considered the video evidence, determining it was central to Johnson's claims and its authenticity was not disputed. The court found that Rolfe did not use excessive force and was entitled to qualified immunity on the federal claims and official immunity on the state law claims. Consequently, the court dismissed the Monell claim against the City, as there was no underlying constitutional violation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the video evidence was properly considered under the incorporation-by-reference doctrine. The court found that Rolfe's use of force was objectively reasonable given the circumstances, including Johnson's resistance and the dangerous location of the arrest. Therefore, Rolfe was entitled to qualified immunity on the federal claims and official immunity on the state law claims. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the Monell claim against the City, as no constitutional violation occurred. View "Johnson v. City of Atlanta" on Justia Law

Space Exploration Holdings (SpaceX) applied for a license from the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to operate 29,988 low-altitude non-geostationary orbit satellites for its second-generation Starlink system. The FCC conditionally approved the license for 7,500 satellites, citing the public interest in improving broadband access. The approval was contingent on SpaceX obtaining a favorable finding from the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) regarding compliance with power flux-density limits to prevent signal interference.DISH Network Corporation and the International Dark-Sky Association opposed the license. DISH argued that SpaceX's satellites would cause unacceptable interference and that the FCC unlawfully delegated its authority to the ITU. The FCC dismissed DISH's evidence, relying on SpaceX's self-certification and the ITU's eventual verification. The FCC also granted an interim waiver allowing SpaceX to begin operations before the ITU's finding, citing public interest. The International Dark-Sky Association argued that the FCC failed to conduct an environmental review as required by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The FCC concluded that its regulations did not require such a review and denied the request.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the FCC's decision to license SpaceX's satellites was lawful and reasonably explained. The court found that the FCC was not required to independently verify SpaceX's self-certification and that the interim waiver was justified by public interest considerations. The court also determined that the FCC did not unlawfully delegate its authority to the ITU, as the ITU's role was limited to fact gathering and compliance verification. Regarding the environmental review, the court held that the FCC reasonably concluded that SpaceX's mitigation efforts and the FAA's environmental assessment of rocket launches were sufficient to avoid significant environmental impacts.The court affirmed the FCC's order licensing SpaceX's Gen2 Starlink satellites. View "International Dark-Sky Association, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission" on Justia Law

Range Resources-Appalachia, LLC (Range) and Columbia Gulf Transmission, LLC (Columbia Gulf) filed administrative complaints against Texas Eastern Transmission, LP (Texas Eastern) with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). Range, a natural gas producer, has long-term agreements with Texas Eastern and Columbia Gulf to transport gas through the Adair Interconnect. During two periods in 2019 and 2021, Texas Eastern's pipeline pressure was too low to move gas into Columbia Gulf's system, causing significant financial losses for Range. Petitioners sought FERC's intervention to require Texas Eastern to maintain higher pipeline pressures.FERC dismissed the complaints, finding that Texas Eastern had no minimum delivery pressure obligation. FERC also denied rehearing requests, stating that the complaints did not sufficiently demonstrate a violation of any pressure obligations. Petitioners argued that Texas Eastern failed to comply with its tariff and the Adair Interconnection Agreement, but FERC found these arguments procedurally and substantively insufficient. Additionally, FERC concluded that Texas Eastern's force majeure declaration in 2021 was irrelevant to the issue of reservation charge credits, as Columbia Gulf's refusal to accept gas was outside Texas Eastern's control.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court upheld FERC's dismissal, agreeing that the complaints did not adequately plead violations of the Texas Eastern Tariff or the Adair Interconnection Agreement. The court also found that FERC did not need to hold an evidentiary hearing on the issues of equal service and the force majeure declaration, as the written record was sufficient. The court denied the petitions for review, affirming FERC's orders. View "Columbia Gulf Transmission, LLC v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between the City of Hastings and a group of appellants referred to as the "chief petitioners." The chief petitioners submitted a referendum petition to repeal a city council measure approving the demolition of a viaduct. The City of Hastings sought a declaratory judgment to determine whether it was required to hold a special referendum election, given that the viaduct was demolished during the pendency of the action.The District Court for Adams County initially denied the chief petitioners' request for a temporary injunction to prevent the demolition. Subsequently, the viaduct was demolished. The district court then ruled that the case was moot because the viaduct no longer existed, and any referendum would be ineffectual. However, the court also addressed other arguments and ultimately declared that no election or ballot submission should be made.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and agreed with the district court's finding that the case was moot. The court noted that the demolition of the viaduct eradicated the parties' legal interests in the dispute, making any referendum on the issue meaningless. The court also considered whether the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine applied but concluded that the specific circumstances of the case did not warrant an authoritative adjudication for future guidance.The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision in part, reversed it in part, and remanded the case with directions to dismiss the action due to mootness. View "City of Hastings v. Sheets" on Justia Law

Gerardo Arvizu Velador was charged with battery on a peace officer, resisting or obstructing a peace officer, and reckless driving. His counsel requested a competency evaluation, and proceedings were suspended pending this determination. While the competency evaluation was ongoing, Velador's counsel filed a motion for mental health diversion, supported by various reports and records indicating Velador's mental health issues.The trial court granted the motion for mental health diversion before determining Velador's competency, which led the People to appeal to the appellate division of the Riverside County Superior Court. The appellate division upheld the trial court's decision, concluding that the court had jurisdiction to grant mental health diversion even while the competency determination was pending. The appellate division reasoned that the statutes governing mental health diversion and competency did not require a competency determination before granting diversion.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case to settle the legal question. The court affirmed the appellate division's decision, holding that a trial court can grant mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36 before resolving a defendant's competency to stand trial. The court found that the statutory language of section 1001.36 and the competency statutes allowed for diversion regardless of the defendant's competency status. The court also determined that the suspension of criminal proceedings under section 1368 did not preclude the trial court from considering and granting diversion. The decision emphasized that diversion could be granted to both competent and incompetent defendants, aligning with legislative intent to provide alternatives to incarceration for individuals with mental health disorders. View "People v. Velador" on Justia Law

WasteXperts, Inc. (WasteXperts) filed a complaint against Arakelian Enterprises, Inc. dba Athens Services (Athens) and the City of Los Angeles (City) in June 2022. WasteXperts alleged that Athens, which holds a waste collection franchise from the City, sent a cease and desist letter to WasteXperts, arguing that WasteXperts was not legally permitted to handle Athens’s bins. WasteXperts sought judicial declarations regarding the City’s authority and Athens’s franchise rights, and also asserted tort claims against Athens for interference with contract, interference with prospective economic advantage, unfair competition, and trade libel.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted Athens’s anti-SLAPP motion to strike the entire complaint, finding that the claims were based on Athens’s communications, which anticipated litigation and were therefore protected activity. The court also held that the commercial speech exemption did not apply and that WasteXperts had no probability of prevailing on the merits of its claims. WasteXperts’s request for limited discovery was denied.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, reversed the trial court’s order. The appellate court concluded that the declaratory relief claim did not arise from protected activity, as it was based on an existing dispute over the right to move waste collection bins, not on the prelitigation communications. The court also found that the commercial speech exemption applied to Athens’s communications with WasteXperts’s clients, removing those communications from the protection of the anti-SLAPP statute. Consequently, the tort claims did not arise from protected activity. The appellate court did not address the probability of WasteXperts prevailing on the merits or the request for limited discovery. View "Wastexperts, Inc. v. Arakelian Enterprises, Inc." on Justia Law

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) brought an action against Townstone Financial, Inc. and its CEO, Barry Sturner, alleging that they discouraged black prospective applicants from applying for mortgage loans, violating Regulation B of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA). The CFPB cited several statements made by Townstone on their radio show that it claimed would discourage black applicants. These statements included derogatory comments about predominantly black areas and other racially insensitive remarks. The CFPB also provided statistical evidence showing that Townstone received fewer mortgage applications from black applicants compared to its peers.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted Townstone's motion to dismiss. The court held that the ECOA does not authorize liability for discouraging prospective applicants, focusing on the ECOA’s definition of "applicant" as someone who has applied for credit. The court concluded that the ECOA’s protections do not extend to prospective applicants who have not yet applied for credit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the ECOA, when read as a whole, does authorize the imposition of liability for discouraging prospective applicants. The court found that the ECOA’s broad purpose of preventing discrimination in credit transactions includes actions taken before an application is submitted. The court also noted that the ECOA’s text and legislative history support the interpretation that discouraging prospective applicants is prohibited. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. Townstone Financial, Inc." on Justia Law

Cassandra Socha, a patrol officer with the Joliet Police Department (JPD), sent a text message to her neighbor criticizing her for testifying in the criminal trial of Socha’s boyfriend. A prosecutor recommended that Sergeant Edward Grizzle secure a search warrant for Socha’s cell phone, which he did, obtaining authority to search for any and all data related to electronic communications. Socha turned over her phone, expressing concerns about personal content. JPD detectives used forensic software to extract all data from her phone. Rumors later surfaced that explicit content from her phone had been seen by JPD members, with two detectives admitting to viewing such content.Socha sued the City of Joliet, Sgt. Grizzle, and others, bringing multiple claims under federal and Illinois law. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted summary judgment to Sgt. Grizzle on the § 1983 claim, finding he was entitled to qualified immunity. The court also granted summary judgment to the City on the intrusion upon seclusion claim, rather than relinquishing supplemental jurisdiction over the Illinois law claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed that Sgt. Grizzle was entitled to qualified immunity and affirmed the summary judgment on the § 1983 claim. However, the court disagreed with the district court on the intrusion upon seclusion claim, concluding that a reasonable jury could find that Detective McKinney accessed Socha’s photograph intentionally and without authorization. Therefore, the court reversed the grant of summary judgment on that claim and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court also noted that the district court should decide whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim on remand. View "Socha v. City of Joliet" on Justia Law

James Morell, a retired research attorney for the Orange County Superior Court, was entitled to a pension under the County Employees Retirement Law of 1937 (CERL). The dispute arose over whether the $3,500 Optional Benefit Program (OBP) payments he received should be included in the calculation of his pension. The OBP allowed attorneys to allocate the $3,500 to various benefits or receive it as taxable cash. Morell allocated portions to a healthcare reimbursement account and cash. The Orange County Employees’ Retirement System (OCERS) excluded these payments from his pension calculation, leading to prolonged litigation.The Los Angeles County Superior Court initially ruled in favor of Morell, ordering OCERS to reconsider its decision without relying on Resolution 90-1551, which OCERS argued required the exclusion of OBP payments. The court found that the resolution had been invalidated and that Morell could not waive his argument that OCERS’ calculation contravened CERL through a settlement agreement.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court concluded that Resolution 90-1551, which adopted the provisions of the now-repealed Government Code section 31460.1, remained valid due to a savings clause in Senate Bill 193. This clause preserved actions taken by counties under section 31460.1 before its repeal. The court found that Morell had elected to participate in the OBP and that the payments reflected amounts exceeding his salary.The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case with directions to deny Morell’s petition. The court held that Resolution 90-1551 was still valid and that OCERS correctly excluded the OBP payments from Morell’s pension calculation. View "Morell v. Board of Retirement of the Orange County Employees' Retirement System" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Shanita Terrell, alleges that two deputies from the Harris County Sheriff’s Office forced her into a patrol car, and one of them sexually assaulted her. The deputies were off-duty but were in uniform and using patrol vehicles while working side jobs at a bar. Terrell woke up the next morning at home with pain in her vaginal area and no memory of having sex. A DNA test revealed that semen in her underwear matched one of the deputies, Michael Hines. Hines was later charged with sexually assaulting Terrell.Terrell sued Deputy Hines, Deputy Mark Cannon, Harris County Sheriff Ed Gonzalez, and Harris County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court dismissed her claims against Cannon, Gonzalez, and Harris County for failing to state a claim. Terrell appealed the dismissal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that Terrell failed to establish that Deputy Cannon violated a clearly established constitutional right. She also failed to allege the type of pattern of deliberate indifference required to establish liability for the County or its Sheriff. The court also dismissed Terrell's supervisory and municipal liability claims against Sheriff Gonzalez and Harris County, respectively. The court concluded that Terrell's allegations were insufficient to show a failure-to-train policy or a widespread pattern of misconduct. View "Terrell v. Harris County" on Justia Law