In March 2022, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued an order to seven chemical manufacturers/processors, managed by the Vinyl Institute, to test the chronic toxicity of 1,1,2-Trichloroethane (1,1,2-TCA) under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA). The Vinyl Institute challenged the order, arguing that the EPA failed to comply with several statutory requirements. The Vinyl Institute also moved to supplement the administrative record with a scientific consultant’s report.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit granted the Vinyl Institute's petition for review. The court found that the EPA's reliance on non-public portions of the administrative record was not part of "the record taken as a whole" subject to review. The court held that the EPA failed to provide substantial evidence that met its statutory mandate. The court vacated the order and remanded the case to the EPA to satisfy that mandate with "substantial evidence in the record taken as a whole." The court also denied the Vinyl Institute's motion to supplement the record with scientific information it could have—and should have—submitted earlier. View "Vinyl Institute, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

This case involves a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA) and the Iowa False Claims Act (IFCA) brought by Stephen Grant, a sleep medicine practitioner, against Steven Zorn, Iowa Sleep Disorders Center, and Iowa CPAP. Grant alleged that the defendants had knowingly overbilled the government for initial and established patient visits and violated the Anti-Kickback Statute and the Stark Law by knowingly soliciting and directing referrals from Iowa Sleep to Iowa CPAP. The district court found the defendants liable for submitting 1,050 false claims to the United States and the State of Iowa and imposed a total award of $7,598,991.50.The district court had rejected the defendants' public disclosure defense and awarded summary judgment to the defendants on the Anti-Kickback Statute and Stark Law claim. After a bench trial, the district court found the defendants liable on several claims, including that Iowa Sleep had violated the anti-retaliation provisions of the FCA and IFCA by firing Grant. The district court also concluded that the defendants had overbilled on initial patient visits but not on established patient visits.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that the public disclosure bar was inapplicable because Grant’s complaint did not allege “substantially the same allegations” contained in the AdvanceMed letters. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony on extrapolation and overbilling. However, the court found that the district court erred in its determination of damages and civil penalties, violating the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause. The court vacated the punitive sanction and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Grant v. Zorn" on Justia Law

This case involves two consolidated appeals from Northwestern Medical Center and Rutland Regional Medical Center against the Green Mountain Care Board (GMCB). The GMCB had approved the proposed budgets of both medical centers for the fiscal year 2024, but with certain conditions. The medical centers challenged the GMCB's imposition of budgetary conditions that capped increases to rates charged to commercial payers. However, the medical centers had not properly raised their claims with the GMCB, leaving them unpreserved for review.The GMCB is an independent board that regulates the health care industry in Vermont. It reviews and establishes hospital budgets annually, with the aim of reducing the per-capita rate of growth in expenditures for health services in Vermont across all payers. The GMCB had released its established benchmarks for the 2024 fiscal year budget submissions, which included a benchmark that limited a hospital’s growth of net patient revenue/fixed prospective payment (NPR/FPP) to 8.6%, effectively capping increases to NPR/FPP growth by that amount. It also included a benchmark for commercial rate increases which provided that the GMCB would “also review and may adjust requested hospital commercial rate increases.”The GMCB approved the budgets of Northwestern and Rutland Regional, subject to certain conditions. These conditions included a cap on increases to commercial rates. However, neither Northwestern nor Rutland Regional had raised their claims with the GMCB, leaving them unpreserved for review.On appeal, Northwestern and Rutland Regional argued that the GMCB deprived them of due process by failing to provide adequate notice that it would impose the Commercial Rate Cap Conditions on their proposed budgets. They also claimed that the GMCB had no authority to impose the Commercial Rate Cap Conditions because the conditions lacked a factual basis and contradicted the GMCB’s initial approval of their proposed budgets. However, the Vermont Supreme Court declined to reach the merits of these claims because they were not preserved for review. The court noted that Northwestern and Rutland Regional had several opportunities to raise their claims with the GMCB before the GMCB issued its final budget decisions, but they failed to do so. Therefore, the court affirmed the decisions of the GMCB. View "In re Northwestern Medical Center Fiscal Year 2024" on Justia Law

The case involves East Central Water District ("East Central") and the City of Grand Forks ("City"). East Central alleged that the City unlawfully curtailed its water service area, violating federal and state laws. East Central sought to declare a water supply and service agreement with the City void from the beginning under a specific North Dakota statute. The agreement, entered into in 2000, was designed to avoid conflict in providing potable water as the City annexed territory in East Central's service area. The agreement was subject to a North Dakota statute that required the public lending authority to be a party to the agreement. However, the Bank of North Dakota, the public lending authority, was not a party to the agreement.The case was initially brought before the United States District Court for the District of North Dakota. The City answered East Central’s complaint and counterclaimed, and brought a third-party complaint against William Brudvik and Ohnstad Twichell, P.C. for legal malpractice in their representation of the City during negotiations and execution of the Agreement. The City then moved the federal district court to certify questions to the Supreme Court of North Dakota on the interpretation of the North Dakota statute.The Supreme Court of North Dakota was asked to answer two certified questions of law: whether the language “invalid and unenforceable” in the North Dakota statute means an agreement made without the public lending authority as a party is (1) void from the beginning or (2) voidable and capable of ratification. The court concluded that the language “invalid and unenforceable” means void from the beginning, and does not mean voidable and capable of ratification. The court reasoned that the statute speaks to the authority to contract on this subject matter, as opposed to the manner or means of exercising one’s power to contract. Therefore, none of the parties were authorized to contract for water services without the public lending authority being a party to the agreement. View "East Central Water District v. City of Grand Forks" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Wisconsin ruled that certain legislative review provisions governing the Knowles-Nelson Stewardship Program, a land conservation initiative, were unconstitutional. The provisions in question allowed the Joint Committee on Finance (JFC), a legislative committee, to review and potentially block expenditures exceeding $250,000 or for land acquisitions outside of a project boundary, even after the legislature had already appropriated the funds.The case was brought by Governor Tony Evers and several state departments, who argued that these provisions violated the separation of powers by allowing the legislature to intrude on the executive branch's power to execute the law. The legislative respondents defended the statutes, arguing that they were necessary for overseeing the executive branch's expenditure of state funds.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin disagreed with the legislative respondents, ruling that the provisions unconstitutionally authorized the legislative branch to impede the executive's core power to execute the law. The court held that once the legislature appropriates funds for a particular purpose, the executive branch possesses the power to distribute those funds in accordance with the purposes outlined by the legislature. The court concluded that the legislative review provisions violated the separation of powers structurally enshrined in the Wisconsin Constitution. View "Evers v. Marklein" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a plaintiff, Carol Allen, who slipped and fell on the steps of Newport City Hall during a winter storm, resulting in severe injuries. Allen alleged that the city and its employees were negligent in failing to properly treat the stairs for adverse weather conditions. The case was heard in the Superior Court, where the trial justice ruled in favor of Allen, finding that the city and its employees had a duty to clear the steps of snow and ice, even during an ongoing storm, due to "unusual circumstances."The city and its employees appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of Rhode Island. They argued that the trial justice erred in not applying the "Connecticut Rule," which states that a property owner's duty to clear snow and ice does not arise until a reasonable time after a storm has ended. The city argued that the storm was ongoing at the time of Allen's fall, and therefore, they did not owe her a duty to clear the steps.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island agreed with the city and its employees. The court found that the trial justice had erred in applying the "unusual circumstances" exception to the Connecticut Rule. The court clarified that "unusual circumstances" exist when a property owner's actions exacerbate the inherent risk of traveling during a storm, not when the owner fails to alleviate the danger. In this case, the city and its employees did not engage in any behavior that increased the risk to Allen. Therefore, the court vacated the judgments of the Superior Court and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of the city and its employees. View "Allen v. Sitrin" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Xavier T. Vidot, an inmate, filed a complaint against the Rhode Island Department of Corrections (RIDOC) and its officials, alleging that they failed to provide inmates with a daily minimum of 8.5 hours outside their cells, in violation of RIDOC's internal policy and a state statute. The plaintiff sought a writ of mandamus, a declaration of violation, and a permanent injunction.The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that RIDOC's internal policies do not establish a private cause of action for inmates and that the application of these policies involves discretionary decisions. The plaintiff responded, asserting that the defendants had a ministerial legal duty to operate in accordance with RIDOC's policy and that the statute does not afford the defendants any discretion except that which is allowed by internal policies.The Superior Court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, reasoning that the policies governing these issues are internal and discretionary, as they are not codified in the statute. The plaintiff appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the Superior Court's decision. The court found that the statute outlining the duties of the director of the Department of Corrections clearly bestows upon the director a great deal of discretion in the exercise of his or her duties. The court also found that both the previous and amended versions of RIDOC's policy contemplate that RIDOC must exercise its discretion in "exigent circumstances," in the case of "emergencies," or in the event of "overriding conditions"—all for the purpose of maintaining a "safe and orderly operation of the facility." Therefore, the court concluded that the hearing justice did not err in denying relief in the form of a writ of mandamus and in granting the motion to dismiss. View "Vidot v. Salisbury" on Justia Law

This case revolves around the denial of a disability pension application by a former state trooper, James Donnelly-Taylor. The defendants are the State of Rhode Island, Division of the State Police, and the Colonel of the State Police and Governor in their official capacities. The trooper had been involved in an incident where he assaulted an individual he had arrested. Following this incident, he reported experiencing personal and work-related stress and was placed on injured-on-duty status. Later, he was indicted on one count of simple assault. He pleaded nolo contendere to the assault charge and was ordered to perform community service. The trooper remained out of work and was later diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder and major depressive disorder. He applied for a disability pension, which was denied by the superintendent of the state police.The superintendent's decision was appealed to the Superior Court, which found the denial to be arbitrary and capricious. The court remanded the case back to the superintendent for further consideration. The superintendent issued a supplemental decision, maintaining the denial of the disability pension. The Superior Court again found the superintendent's decision to be arbitrary and capricious and reversed the denial, instructing the superintendent to grant the trooper's request for a disability pension.The State of Rhode Island appealed the Superior Court's decision to the Supreme Court of Rhode Island. The Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court's decision, finding that the superintendent's denial of the disability pension was neither arbitrary nor capricious. The court held that the superintendent had reasonable grounds to conclude that the trooper's assault of the individual was not in the course of performance of his duties as a state police officer, and therefore his disabling injuries were not suffered in the course of performance of his duties. The case was remanded back to the Superior Court with instructions to enter judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Rhode Island Troopers Association v. State of Rhode Island" on Justia Law

The case involves the Newport School Committee and the Cumberland School Committee (collectively, plaintiffs) and the Rhode Island Department of Education and the Rhode Island Council on Elementary and Secondary Education (collectively, defendants). The dispute arose when the plaintiffs refused to reimburse the Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF) at the "per-pupil special-education" rate for the cost of educating children who were placed in residential treatment programs by DCYF but were not receiving special-education services. The Family Court had placed two children in the temporary custody of DCYF and designated Newport and Cumberland as the residences of the children's custodial parents for the purpose of determining the municipalities' financial responsibility for the children's education.The Commissioner of Elementary and Secondary Education agreed with DCYF's argument that the municipalities were required to pay the per-pupil special-education rate according to the unambiguous language of the relevant statutes. The Commissioner issued two decisions ordering Newport and Cumberland to reimburse DCYF for the cost of educational services provided to the children at the special-education rate. After the Council on Elementary and Secondary Education denied the municipalities' independent appeals of the Commissioner's decisions, the municipalities appealed to the Superior Court. The trial justice consolidated the two cases and issued a written decision, determining that the clear and unambiguous language of the statute required the designated city or town to pay its share of the cost of educational services to DCYF rather than the higher, per-pupil special-education rate.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed the case and found that there is nothing in the relevant statutes that expressly obligates a municipality to pay the per-pupil special-education rate when the child in question is not actually receiving special-education services. The court concluded that municipalities are not required to reimburse DCYF at the per-pupil special-education rate when there were no special education services rendered and thus, no special education costs incurred. The court directed the parties to file supplemental briefs to resolve the remaining question of what reimbursement, if any, DCYF should receive for the educational cost of non-special-education students placed in residential treatment programs that include the delivery of educational services. View "Newport School Committee v. Rhode Island Department of Education" on Justia Law

This case involves four individuals, Joao Neves, Keith Nunes, Pablo Ortega, and Mario Monteiro, who were convicted of various crimes in Rhode Island and were serving multiple sentences, including life sentences. The issue at hand is the interpretation of a Rhode Island statute, G.L. 1956 § 13-8-13(e), which was enacted in 2021 and provides that any person sentenced for any offense committed prior to their twenty-second birthday, other than a person serving life without parole, shall be eligible for parole review after serving no fewer than twenty years' imprisonment.The state argued that the statute applies only to individuals serving a single sentence and does not require the aggregation of multiple sentences for parole eligibility. The respondents, on the other hand, argued that the statute applies to "any offense," and thus requires the aggregation of multiple sentences, including consecutive sentences, for parole eligibility.The trial justice agreed with the respondents and ordered that each respondent be immediately released on parole. The state appealed, arguing that the trial justice's interpretation of the statute violated the separation-of-powers doctrine by modifying judicial sentences.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that the statute mandates the aggregation of a qualified offender’s sentences, including consecutive sentences, for parole eligibility. The court also concluded that the statute, as interpreted, does not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine. However, the court found that the trial justice erred in ordering each respondent to be immediately released on parole, as the statute only provides a qualified offender the opportunity to appear before the parole board, not the right to be paroled. The court affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgments of the lower court, and remanded the cases to the parole board for further proceedings. View "Neves v. State of Rhode Island" on Justia Law