Appellant A. Thomas Jones challenged the City of Atlanta's imposition of charges through two ordinances, arguing that these charges, levied on the Department of Watershed Management (DWM) customers, are unlawful taxes. The ordinances in question impose a franchise fee on DWM's gross revenue and a payment in lieu of taxes (PILOT) on DWM's real property, with the collected sums deposited into the City's General Fund. Jones contended that these charges exceed the costs they purportedly cover and are instead used to generate general revenue, violating various constitutional and statutory provisions.The trial court initially dismissed Jones's suit on procedural grounds, but the Court of Appeals reversed this decision in part. Upon remand, the City moved for judgment on the pleadings, and Jones filed motions for partial summary judgment. The trial court granted the City's motion and denied Jones's motions, leading to this appeal. Jones argued that the trial court erred in its application of the standard of review and in its conclusions regarding the nature of the charges.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and found that the trial court erred in granting the City's motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Supreme Court held that the trial court failed to treat Jones's allegations as true, particularly his claims that he paid the disputed charges, that the revenue generated from these charges grossly exceeded the associated costs, and that these costs were covered by other transfers from DWM to the City's General Fund. Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated the trial court's judgment on the pleadings and remanded the case for further proceedings.However, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of Jones's motions for partial summary judgment. The Court concluded that Jones failed to demonstrate the absence of genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether the charges were taxes or fees and whether the revenue generated exceeded the associated costs. The case was remanded for reconsideration of Jones's claims under the proper standard of review. View "Jones v. City of Atlanta" on Justia Law

A group of healthcare and air-ambulance providers challenged certain agency rules regarding the No Surprises Act, which aims to protect patients from unexpected medical bills. The key issues involved the calculation of the "qualifying payment amount" (QPA), deadlines for insurers to respond to provider bills, and disclosure requirements for insurers.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas reviewed the case and held several provisions of the rules unlawful, vacating them. The court found that the rules conflicted with the Act's terms and were arbitrary and capricious. The defendant agencies appealed the decision regarding certain provisions, while the plaintiffs cross-appealed the court's upholding of the disclosure requirements.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court's vacatur of the QPA calculation provisions, holding that the rules did not conflict with the Act and were not arbitrary and capricious. The court affirmed the district court's vacatur of the deadline provision, agreeing that it conflicted with the Act's unambiguous terms. The court also affirmed the district court's decision upholding the disclosure requirements, finding them reasonable and adequately explained.In summary, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's decision on the QPA calculation provisions, affirmed the vacatur of the deadline provision, and upheld the disclosure requirements. The court concluded that the proper remedy for the unlawful deadline provision was vacatur, not remand, and rejected the idea of party-specific vacatur. View "Texas Medical Association v. Health and Human Services" on Justia Law

In 2016, a suicide bombing occurred at the U.S. military base in Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan. The bomber, an Afghan national employed by a subcontractor of Fluor Corporation, detonated an explosive vest, injuring Specialist Winston Tyler Hencely, among others. Hencely sued Fluor, alleging negligence in supervision, entrustment, and retention of the bomber, and breach of contract with the U.S. Government.The U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina granted judgment to Fluor on all claims. The court found that federal law preempted Hencely’s tort claims and that he was not a third-party beneficiary entitled to enforce the Government’s contract with Fluor. Hencely appealed these decisions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that the Federal Tort Claims Act’s combatant activities exception preempted Hencely’s state-law tort claims. The court concluded that Fluor was integrated into combatant activities and that the military retained command authority over Fluor’s supervision of Local Nationals at Bagram Airfield. The court also held that Hencely was not an intended third-party beneficiary of the contract between Fluor and the U.S. Government, as the contract did not express an intent to benefit individual soldiers or confer upon them the right to enforce its provisions.Thus, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, precluding Hencely’s tort claims and denying his breach of contract claim. View "Hencely v. Fluor Corporation" on Justia Law

The case involves a group of relators seeking to place a proposed constitutional amendment titled "Ohio Voters Bill of Rights" before Ohio voters. The relators submitted the text and a summary of their proposed amendment to the Ohio Attorney General, Dave Yost, for certification. The Attorney General refused to certify the summary, arguing that the title "Ohio Voters Bill of Rights" was not a fair and truthful statement of the proposed amendment.Previously, the relators had submitted their petition with a different title, "Secure and Fair Elections," which the Attorney General also rejected for similar reasons. The relators revised their petition and resubmitted it with the new title, but the Attorney General again refused to certify it, focusing solely on the title's perceived inaccuracy.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case. The court determined that the Attorney General's authority under R.C. 3519.01(A) is limited to examining the summary of a proposed constitutional amendment, not its title. The court found that the Attorney General exceeded his statutory authority by rejecting the petition based on the title. The court noted that the statutory scheme differentiates between a "summary" and a "title," and the Attorney General's duty is to review only the summary.The Supreme Court of Ohio granted a limited writ of mandamus, ordering the Attorney General to examine the summary of the relators' proposed amendment within ten days, determine whether it is a fair and truthful statement, and, if so, certify and forward the petition to the Ohio Ballot Board. The court emphasized that the Attorney General must perform his statutory duty without considering the title of the proposed amendment. View "State ex rel. Dudley v. Yost" on Justia Law

Lucky Chances, Inc., Rommel Medina, and Ruell Medina (collectively, Licensees) had their gambling licenses renewed by the California Gambling Control Commission (Commission) with additional conditions. The Commission also imposed a 14-day suspension, stayed it, and ordered a monetary penalty based on findings that Rene Medina, a disqualified person, was materially involved in their gambling operation. The trial court issued a writ of administrative mandamus, ordering the Commission to reconsider the penalty, limiting it to $20,000 per violation.The Licensees appealed, arguing that the imposition of any discipline was unauthorized. The Commission cross-appealed, contending the trial court misinterpreted the relevant regulations and statutes. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case.The appellate court concluded that the Commission was authorized to impose additional license conditions based on its findings. However, it determined that the Commission could not use California Code of Regulations, title 4, section 12554, subdivision (d) to impose discipline because the Commission did not find that the Licensees violated any relevant law, regulation, or previously imposed license condition. The court modified the judgment to order the Commission to reconsider the discipline imposed in a manner consistent with its opinion and affirmed the judgment as modified. View "Lucky Chances, Inc. v. Cal. Gambling Control Com." on Justia Law

Santa Rita Holdings, Inc. applied for a conditional use permit (CUP) from the County of Santa Barbara to cultivate cannabis on a 2.54-acre parcel owned by Kim Hughes. The only access to the parcel is through a private easement over land owned by JCCrandall, LLC. JCCrandall objected to the use of its easement for cannabis transportation. Despite the objection, the County granted the CUP, and the County’s Board of Supervisors upheld the decision, finding the road adequate for the project.JCCrandall petitioned for a writ of administrative mandate, challenging the County’s determination. JCCrandall argued that the use of the easement for cannabis activities was prohibited by the easement deed and federal law, required JCCrandall’s consent under state law, and violated County standards for private roads. The trial court denied the petition, applying the substantial evidence standard and finding the County’s decision supported by substantial evidence.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court erred in applying the substantial evidence standard instead of the independent judgment standard, as JCCrandall’s right to exclude unauthorized persons from its property is a fundamental vested right. The appellate court also found that under federal law, cannabis is illegal, and thus, the use of the easement for cannabis transportation exceeds the scope of the easement. The court concluded that the County’s reliance on Civil Code section 1550.5, subdivision (b) was misplaced, as it defies the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The judgment was reversed, and costs were awarded to JCCrandall. View "JCCrandall v. County of Santa Barbara" on Justia Law

The case involves a father, H.B., who appealed a juvenile court's disposition order declaring his two sons dependents of the court, placing them in the custody of their mother, and granting family maintenance services to the mother and supportive services to the father. The San Francisco Human Services Agency filed a petition alleging that the minors were at substantial risk of harm due to the father's substance abuse and provision of drugs to one of the children. The juvenile court sustained the petition and ordered the children to remain with their mother while the father received supportive services.The juvenile court found that the father had a long history of substance abuse and had provided drugs to his son, which posed a substantial danger to the children. The court also noted the father's poor judgment and parenting skills. The court ordered the children to remain with their mother and granted the father supervised visitation and supportive services. The father argued that the court applied the wrong legal standard and that there was insufficient evidence to support the findings.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the juvenile court erred in applying section 362(c) instead of section 361(c) of the Welfare and Institutions Code, which requires findings by clear and convincing evidence that there would be a substantial danger to the children if returned to the father's custody and that reasonable efforts were made to prevent removal. The appellate court concluded that substantial evidence supported the finding of substantial danger but not the finding that reasonable efforts were made to prevent removal. The court reversed the disposition order and remanded the case for a new disposition hearing. View "In re H.B." on Justia Law

Jason Lee, an American citizen of Chinese ancestry, was employed by the FBI and held a Top Secret security clearance. After failing three polygraph examinations, the FBI revoked his security clearance and subsequently terminated his employment, as his job required such clearance. Lee contended that the revocation was based on race, national origin, and protected speech, and he brought claims under the First Amendment, the Fifth Amendment, and Title VII.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed Lee's claims. It held that his Title VII claims were not timely exhausted, that Title VII preempted his Fifth Amendment claims against the Department of Justice (DOJ), and that Lee lacked a cause of action to press constitutional claims for damages against individual DOJ officials. The court also denied Lee's motion for leave to amend his complaint to include additional claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988), barred judicial review of Lee's statutory and constitutional claims. The court reasoned that the decision to grant or revoke a security clearance is a sensitive and inherently discretionary judgment committed by law to the appropriate agency of the Executive Branch. The court also found that Lee's constitutional claims were nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine, as they involved national security matters committed to the political branches and lacked judicially manageable standards for resolution. View "Lee v. Garland" on Justia Law

Three practicing Muslim men alleged that federal agents asked them to serve as informants in Muslim communities. When they refused, the agents placed or retained them on the "No Fly List" and suggested they could be removed from the list if they agreed to work as informants. The plaintiffs sought damages under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), claiming that their religious beliefs precluded them from serving as informants and that the agents substantially burdened their exercise of religion by conditioning their removal from the No Fly List on actions that violated those beliefs.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the complaint on qualified immunity grounds, concluding that the agents were entitled to qualified immunity because there was no clearly established right not to be pressured to inform on members of one's religious community through the coercive or retaliatory use of the No Fly List.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The court held that the agents were entitled to qualified immunity because a reasonable person in their position would not have understood that their conduct implicated the plaintiffs' religious beliefs. The court noted that the plaintiffs did not disclose their religious objections to the agents, and there were no facts plausibly supporting the conclusion that the agents knew the plaintiffs' objections were grounded in their religious beliefs. Therefore, the agents were entitled to qualified immunity from damages in their personal capacities. View "Tanvir v. Tanzin" on Justia Law

The case involves Joseph Rued, who reported a potential sexual abuse incident involving his son to Scott County Health and Human Services. The County investigated and concluded that no abuse had occurred. Rued requested reconsideration, but the County upheld its initial finding. Rued then appealed to the Minnesota Department of Human Services (DHS) for a fair hearing, which was denied by the Commissioner based on a recommendation from a human services judge.Rued subsequently appealed the Commissioner’s decision to the Scott County District Court. Under Minnesota Statutes section 256.045, subdivision 7, an appeal must be served on the Commissioner and any adverse party of record within 30 days. Rued served the notice on the Commissioner but failed to serve Scott County. Despite this, a Scott County attorney appeared at the initial hearing and argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction due to the failure to serve the County. The district court ruled that the County had waived any objection to personal jurisdiction by appearing at the hearing and denied Rued’s request for appeal on the merits.The Minnesota Court of Appeals vacated the district court’s decision, holding that the failure to serve the County deprived the district court of subject matter jurisdiction. The court did not address whether Rued was entitled to a hearing on the no-maltreatment determination.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the 30-day time limit for serving a notice of appeal under section 256.045, subdivision 7, is a waivable limitations period, not a requirement for subject matter jurisdiction. The Court also clarified that adequate service of the notice of appeal is necessary for personal jurisdiction. The case was reversed and remanded to the district court to allow the County to either waive its defense related to the limitations period or move for dismissal on that basis. View "Rued vs. Commissioner of Human Services" on Justia Law