The case involves Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc., Smith & Wesson Sales Company, and Smith & Wesson Inc. (collectively, “Smith & Wesson”) and the Attorney General of the State of New Jersey and the New Jersey Division of Consumer Affairs. The New Jersey Attorney General issued a subpoena to Smith & Wesson under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, seeking documents related to the company's advertising practices. Smith & Wesson filed a federal lawsuit to enjoin enforcement of the subpoena, alleging it violated various constitutional provisions. The New Jersey Attorney General then filed a subpoena enforcement action in state court. The state court rejected Smith & Wesson’s objections and ordered the company to comply with the subpoena.The state court proceedings concluded before the federal case, with the state court ordering Smith & Wesson to comply with the subpoena. The federal court then dismissed Smith & Wesson’s civil rights action on claim preclusion grounds, giving preclusive effect to the state court’s order. The state appellate court later affirmed the state court judgment. Smith & Wesson appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, arguing that the District Court should not have given preclusive effect to the state court order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s order. The court found that all elements of New Jersey’s claim preclusion test were satisfied. The court also rejected Smith & Wesson’s argument that it had reserved its right to litigate in federal court, finding that such reservation was unavailable in this case. The court emphasized that litigants get one opportunity to make their arguments, not two, and they cannot file a federal lawsuit to hedge against a potentially unfavorable state ruling. View "Smith & Wesson Brands Inc. v. Attorney General of the State of New Jersey" on Justia Law

Catherine Bradford applied for Social Security disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income, claiming she became unable to work due to multiple ailments. Her disability insurance coverage expired on September 30, 2018, and to receive benefits, she had to establish that her period of disability began between April 24, 2015, and September 30, 2018. Bradford also sought supplemental security income payments for the period between April 24, 2015, and April 8, 2020. Bradford's medical records included opinions from a nurse practitioner, three state-agency physicians, and a family medicine practitioner.The administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that Bradford had not performed substantial gainful activity since the date of her alleged disability and that she was severely impaired by multiple ailments. However, the ALJ found that none of these impairments, either individually or in combination, met or medically equaled the severity of any impairment listed in the relevant regulation. The ALJ assessed Bradford’s residual functional capacity before April 9, 2020, and concluded that she was capable of performing light work, subject to certain limitations. The ALJ determined that Bradford’s limitations did not preclude her from performing her past work as a housekeeper, laundry aide, or factory cleaner. The ALJ gave Nurse Ash’s opinion little weight and gave great weight to the opinions of the state-agency physicians and Dr. Keown.The Appeals Council denied review, and the district court granted judgment for the Commissioner. Bradford appealed, arguing that the ALJ committed legal error by disregarding a prior remand order of the district court and disputing the ALJ’s conclusion that she could perform light work. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, concluding that the ALJ permissibly weighed the evidence and committed no legal error. The court found that the ALJ's determination that Bradford could stand for six hours and perform light work was supported by substantial evidence. View "Bradford v. Kijakazi" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute over a Final Rule issued by the Department of the Interior Bureau of Land Management (BLM) in 2003. The rule withdrew a proposed rule that would have limited the maximum size of “mill sites” for mining claims on federal lands and instead codified the agency’s historical understanding that the governing statute imposes no such limit. Earthworks and several other conservation groups challenged the validity of the 2003 Rule under both the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), arguing that the rule embodies an impermissible interpretation of federal mining law and that the BLM promulgated it in violation of NEPA and APA. The BLM responded that the appellants lacked standing to bring their suit.The District Court for the District of Columbia rejected the Department’s contention that the appellants lacked standing and ruled in favor of the Department on the statutory issue. The court concluded that the appellants had standing to sue, Section 42 is facially ambiguous regarding the aggregate size of mill sites but the Department’s interpretation of Section 42 is reasonable, it was not a violation of the NEPA for the BLM to issue the 2003 Final Rule without an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), and it was not a violation of the APA for the BLM to promulgate the Final Rule without an additional round of notice-and-comment.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. The court held that the appellants have standing and that the BLM’s interpretation of Section 42 of the Mining Law set out in the Final Rule is reasonable. The court also concluded that the Final Rule was not a “major Federal action” within the meaning of the NEPA, and it was not arbitrary or capricious for the BLM not to prepare an EIS for the Final Rule. Lastly, the court found that the Department did not violate the notice provision of the APA by issuing the Final Rule without an additional cycle of notice and comment. View "Earthworks v. DOI" on Justia Law

The case involves a group of plaintiffs who were selected in the diversity visa lottery for fiscal years 2020 and 2021. The plaintiffs argued that the Department of State unlawfully suspended, deprioritized, and delayed the processing of their visa applications during the COVID-19 pandemic. They contended that these actions prevented them from receiving visas before the fiscal-year-end deadlines.The district courts agreed with the plaintiffs and ordered the Department of State to continue processing applications and issuing visas after the statutory deadlines had passed. The Department of State appealed these decisions, arguing that the courts lacked the authority to order such relief.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the district courts lacked the authority to order the Department of State to continue processing applications and issuing visas after the statutory deadlines. The court reasoned that the statutory deadline for issuing visas was clear and unambiguous, and neither history nor context provided any basis for departing from it. The court further noted that the plaintiffs did not have a substantive entitlement to the visas, and decisions regarding the prioritization and processing of visa applications implicated weighty concerns of foreign policy and national security. The court reversed the remedial orders of the district courts and remanded the cases with instructions to enter judgment for the government. View "Goodluck v. Biden" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Ravi Teja, an Indian citizen, who paid thousands of dollars to enroll at the "University of Farmington," expecting to take classes. Unbeknownst to him, the University was a fictitious entity created by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as part of an undercover operation to target fraud involving student visas. When the operation came to light, the government neither provided the education Ravi had paid for nor refunded his money. Ravi filed a lawsuit against the United States in the United States Court of Federal Claims, alleging a breach of contract and an accompanying breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.The United States Court of Federal Claims dismissed Ravi's complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, without addressing other issues. The court reasoned that its jurisdiction under the Tucker Act does not extend to contracts entered into by the government when acting as a sovereign unless those contracts unmistakably subject the government to damages in the event of breach. The court concluded that the government was acting in its sovereign capacity as it entered into the alleged contract in furtherance of an undercover law-enforcement operation, and that the alleged contract did not unmistakably subject the government to damages in the event of breach.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the Claims Court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Appeals Court concluded that the Claims Court had jurisdiction pursuant to the Tucker Act over the agreement alleged by Ravi. The court disagreed with the Claims Court's interpretation of the Tucker Act, stating that the contract in question did not concern what was promised to happen or not to happen in a different proceeding in another adjudicatory forum, and thus did not fall into the narrow exception carved out by precedent. The court remanded the case for further proceedings, noting that other grounds not reached by the Claims Court but raised by the government as alternative bases to affirm warranted further exploration. View "RAVI v. US " on Justia Law

The case involves the Los Angeles County Employees Retirement Association (LACERA) and the County of Los Angeles. LACERA, a public employee retirement system, sued the County over the authority to set employment classifications and salaries for its employees. LACERA argued that under the County Employees Retirement Law of 1937 (CERL) and the California Constitution, it had the authority to create employment classifications and set salaries for its employees. The County disagreed, asserting that it had the authority to set employment classifications and salaries for all county employees, including those of LACERA.Previously, the Superior Court of Los Angeles County sided with the County, following a 2003 decision, Westly v. Board of Administration, which held that the broad authority granted to retirement boards was not broad enough to give them the power to establish employment classifications and set salaries for their employees.However, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Seven disagreed with the lower court's decision. The appellate court found that the Westly decision was inconsistent with the language, purpose, and intent of Proposition 162, a 1992 voter initiative that gave governing boards of public employee retirement systems “plenary authority and fiduciary responsibility for investment of moneys and administration of the system.” The court concluded that this plenary authority included the power to create employment classifications and set salaries for employees of the retirement system. The court also found that section 31522.1 of the CERL imposed a ministerial duty on a county board of supervisors to include in the county’s employment classifications and salary ordinance the classifications and salaries adopted by the board of a county public employee retirement system for employees of that system. The court reversed the judgment of the lower court. View "L.A. County Employees Retirement Assn. v. County of L.A." on Justia Law

This case arose from a raid by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) at Abel Ramirez-Peñaloza’s family home in Heber City, Utah. After Mr. Ramirez-Peñaloza was indicted for unlawful entry into the U.S., ICE officials attempted to arrest him at his home. During two searches of his home, officials detained and questioned his family members. The plaintiffs, some of Mr. Ramirez-Peñaloza’s family members who were detained during the searches, filed claims against the U.S. and the agents alleging Fourth Amendment and state law violations.The district court dismissed most of the plaintiffs’ claims, but allowed three claims to go to trial, where a jury returned a verdict in favor of the officers. The plaintiffs appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the officers on the excessive use of force and false arrest claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the dismissed claims were barred by the Federal Tort Claims Act’s (FTCA) judgment bar, which precludes suits against federal employees after the entry of final judgment on a claim against the U.S. for an analogous cause of action. Since the district court entered final judgment in favor of the U.S. on the plaintiffs’ analogous FTCA claims, the claims against the individual defendants were barred. View "Ramirez v. Reddish" on Justia Law

The defendant, Darnell Tyree-Peppers, was on supervised release after pleading guilty to stealing a firearm from a federally licensed dealer. During his supervised release, his probation officer filed a petition to modify the conditions of his supervision due to alleged violations. Later, the probation officer filed a petition for his arrest and revocation of supervision based on three alleged violations of his supervision conditions. The district court issued the requested warrant. The probation officer later submitted an amended petition alleging that Tyree-Peppers had been arrested by state police officers on charges of first-degree murder, aggravated burglary, and aggravated robbery, potentially violating the condition that he not commit another federal, state, or local crime.The district court for the District of Kansas did not conduct the hearing on the petition until after the expiration of Tyree-Peppers' supervised release term. The court granted the petition in part and ordered an additional one year of supervised release. Tyree-Peppers challenged the district court’s jurisdiction to revoke his supervised release, arguing that the delay in the revocation proceedings was not “reasonably necessary for the adjudication,” as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(i).The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit disagreed with Tyree-Peppers. The court found that the delay was attributable to an ongoing state prosecution of Tyree-Peppers on the very serious charge of first-degree murder. The outcome of that proceeding was directly related to the question of whether Tyree-Peppers violated the condition of his supervised release forbidding him from committing a state crime. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction. View "United States v. Tyree-Peppers" on Justia Law

The case involves Nicholas Sterry, an inmate at the Moose Lake Correctional Facility, who filed a lawsuit against the Minnesota Department of Corrections (DOC) and Correctional Officer Ashley Youngberg. Sterry alleged that Youngberg sexually assaulted and harassed him while he was working in the prison kitchen. The DOC was aware of Youngberg's history of harassment but had not disciplined her prior to the incidents involving Sterry. Sterry's lawsuit included claims of battery, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and negligence under a theory of vicarious liability.The district court dismissed Sterry's claims, concluding that the DOC was immune from the suit under the Minnesota State Tort Claims Act because Youngberg was not acting within the scope of her employment when the alleged assault occurred. Sterry appealed this decision, and the court of appeals reversed the district court's ruling. The court of appeals found that Sterry's complaint alleged sufficient facts to survive the motion to dismiss, as it was consistent with common law principles of vicarious liability applicable to private employers.The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals. The court held that a state employer could be held vicariously liable for an employee’s intentional tort under the Minnesota State Tort Claims Act if the tort is related to the duties of the employee and occurs within work-related limits of time and place. The court also found that Sterry's complaint alleged sufficient facts to survive the DOC's motion to dismiss. The court concluded that Sterry's claim could allow a jury to find that Youngberg was acting within the scope of her employment when the alleged assault occurred, under circumstances where the DOC would be liable under common law for vicarious liability. View "Sterry v. Minnesota Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the allocation of water from the Rio Grande River among the states of Texas, New Mexico, and Colorado. The Rio Grande Compact, an interstate agreement, governs the equitable distribution of the river's waters among these states. In 2013, Texas sued New Mexico and Colorado, alleging that excessive groundwater pumping in New Mexico was depleting the river's water supply intended for Texas, in violation of the Compact. The United States sought to intervene, asserting its own interests in the Compact's enforcement due to its operation of the Rio Grande Project, an irrigation system in southern New Mexico.In previous proceedings, the Supreme Court allowed the United States to intervene, recognizing its distinct federal interests in the Compact. The Court noted that the Compact was intertwined with the United States' operation of the Rio Grande Project and that the federal government had an interest in ensuring New Mexico complied with its obligations under the Compact.Texas and New Mexico proposed a consent decree to resolve the case, which would establish a methodology for determining each state's allocation of the river's waters. However, the United States opposed the proposed consent decree, arguing that it would dispose of its claims that New Mexico's groundwater pumping was violating the Compact.The Supreme Court of the United States agreed with the United States, holding that parties who choose to resolve litigation through settlement may not dispose of the claims of a third party without that party's agreement. The Court found that the United States still had the same claims it did in 2018, backed by the same unique federal interests. The Court concluded that the proposed consent decree would settle all parties' Compact claims and, in the process, cut off the United States' requested relief as to New Mexican groundwater pumping. As such, the Court denied the motion to enter the consent decree. View "Texas v. New Mexico" on Justia Law