The case revolves around a dispute over the constitutionality of two Arkansas statutes that mandate the creation of certain county-funded employee positions to serve three of the seventeen judicial-district divisions within the Sixth Judicial Circuit serving Pulaski and Perry Counties. The funding for these positions was initially part of the 2023 budget, authorized by Pulaski County Ordinance No. 22-OR-45. However, Pulaski County Judge Barry Hyde later announced his decision not to fill some of the vacant positions within the Fifth Division. This led to a lawsuit by then-sitting Fifth Division Circuit Judge Wendell Griffen and his successor in office, Judge-elect LaTonya Austin Honorable, against Judge Hyde, seeking a judicial remedy to mandate the filling of these positions as appropriated in the 2023 budget.The case was first heard in the Pulaski County Circuit Court, where Judge Hyde contended that the two statutes in question are unconstitutional as special and local legislation under amendment 14 of the Arkansas Constitution. The circuit court ruled in favor of Judge Hyde, declaring the statutes unconstitutional because they apply only to specific divisions rather than all divisions in the Sixth Judicial Circuit. The court also dismissed arguments of estoppel raised by Judge-elect Honorable, finding that Pulaski County’s previous funding of these positions did not preclude it from now challenging the constitutionality of the statutes.Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court held that both statutes violate amendment 14’s prohibition on local and special acts, as they arbitrarily apply specifically to the employment of certain personnel for the First, Fourth, and Fifth Divisions of the Sixth Judicial Circuit rather than uniformly across the district or the state. The court also rejected the argument of estoppel, stating that the County should not be punished for its previous compliance with the law and should not be estopped from bringing this constitutional challenge. View "Austin v. Hyde" on Justia Law

The case involves a mother, N.C.-F., who appealed a decision by the Circuit Court of Kanawha County, West Virginia, regarding the placement of her children, M.F.-1, M.F.-2, and M.F.-3. The children's father had admitted to killing M.F.-3's mother, leading to an abuse and neglect case. The West Virginia Department of Human Services (DHS) placed M.F.-3 with his maternal aunt, S.M., while M.F.-1 and M.F.-2 remained in N.C.-F.'s physical custody, but their legal custody was with the DHS. The court terminated the father's parental rights and restored legal custody of M.F.-1 and M.F.-2 to N.C.-F. However, it denied N.C.-F.'s request for placement of M.F.-3 with her and his half-siblings.The Circuit Court of Kanawha County adjudicated M.F.-1, M.F.-2, and M.F.-3 as abused and neglected children based on the father's actions. The court terminated the father's parental rights and restored legal custody of M.F.-1 and M.F.-2 to N.C.-F. However, it denied N.C.-F.'s request for placement of M.F.-3 with her and his half-siblings, determining that maintaining M.F.-3’s placement with S.M. served his best interests.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the lower court's decision. It found that the circuit court did not err in its rulings, including the decision to maintain M.F.-3’s placement with S.M. The court also found that the circuit court did not violate N.C.-F.'s constitutional due process rights by placing custody of her children with the DHS during the abuse and neglect proceedings. The court concluded that the circuit court's decision to place M.F.-3 with S.M. was in the child's best interest and that the court had properly facilitated regular visitation between M.F.-3 and his half-siblings. View "In Re M.F.-1" on Justia Law

The case involves the paternal grandparents of a child, M.F. III, who sought to intervene in an abuse and neglect proceeding following the fatal stabbing of the child's mother by his father. The grandparents, who lived in Baltimore, Maryland, but had a second home in Charleston, West Virginia, filed three motions to intervene in the proceedings, seeking placement of the child and/or visitation rights. The Circuit Court of Kanawha County denied all three motions. The grandparents appealed, arguing that the West Virginia Department of Human Services (DHS) failed to conduct a home study to determine their suitability as adoptive parents, as required by West Virginia Code § 49-4-114(a)(3).The Circuit Court of Kanawha County had previously reviewed the case. The court denied the grandparents' motions to intervene in the abuse and neglect proceedings. The court also did not order the DHS to conduct a home study to assess the grandparents' suitability as adoptive parents, despite the termination of the father's parental rights and the child's placement in the DHS's permanent custody.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the lower court's decision to deny the grandparents' motions to intervene, as they did not fall within the class of individuals who may seek permissive intervention under West Virginia Code § 49-4-601(h). However, the court found that the DHS had failed to comply with the mandatory requirement of West Virginia Code § 49-4-114(a)(3) to consider the grandparents' suitability as adoptive parents. The court remanded the case with directions for the DHS to comply with the statute and for the circuit court to determine the child's best interests for permanent placement following the DHS's compliance. View "In Re M.F. III" on Justia Law

The case involves the State of Texas and Dwayne Robert Heath, who was indicted for injury to a child in 2016. Heath's counsel requested discovery from the District Attorney's Office, which provided law enforcement records, child protective services records, and photographs. However, a 911 call made by the complainant's mother on the date of the alleged offense was not disclosed until six days before the fourth trial setting, despite being in the possession of law enforcement since 2016. Heath's counsel filed a motion to suppress the 911 call, alleging that the evidence was improperly withheld in violation of Article 39.14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and various constitutional provisions.The trial court granted Heath's motion to suppress the 911 call, concluding that the State violated Article 39.14(a) by failing to disclose the 911 call "as soon as practicable" after Heath's timely request for discovery. The State appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. The State then sought discretionary review from the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. The court held that under Article 39.14, "the state" means the State of Texas, which includes law enforcement agencies. The court also held that "as soon as practicable" means as soon as the State is reasonably capable of doing so. Therefore, the State violated its duty under Article 39.14 by failing to timely disclose the 911 call. The court further held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the 911 call due to the State's untimely disclosure. View "Texas v. Heath" on Justia Law

The case involves two defendants, Raekwon Patton and Austin Mallory, who were found guilty of their roles in a drive-by shooting following an encounter with a rival gang member. The shooting occurred after the defendants and their gang members spotted Raysean Nelson, a rival gang member, in a parking lot and followed him. The defendants were charged with attempted murder in aid of racketeering and discharging a firearm during a crime of violence.The district court overruled multiple objections raised by the defendants. Patton argued that the jury instructions were missing and that the evidence presented by the government was excessive and portrayed him negatively. He also claimed that his decision to return fire was justified as the other side shot first. However, the court found that Patton had not attempted to retreat before using force, which was required by Iowa law. The court also rejected Patton's argument that the instructions set the bar too low on the racketeering element.Mallory challenged the verdict based on two evidentiary decisions and questioned whether the government established that he was a knowing accomplice. The court excluded a hearsay statement that Mallory hoped would prove he was not the driver during the shooting. The court also did not admit evidence showing Mallory's involvement in non-gang activities, considering it as inadmissible character evidence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgments of the district court, finding sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Mallory was guilty as an accomplice and rejecting Patton's arguments about the jury instructions and the evidence presented by the government. View "United States v. Mallory" on Justia Law

The case involves Amazon.com Services LLC and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). The NLRB alleged that Amazon committed an unfair labor practice by discharging an employee for engaging in protected concerted activity. While the charge was pending before the Board, the Board sought temporary injunctive relief, including the employee’s reinstatement. The district court found "reasonable cause" to believe Amazon committed an unfair labor practice in terminating the employee. However, it concluded that ordering Amazon to cease and desist from committing certain violations of the Act was "just and proper," but that ordering Amazon to reinstate the employee was not.The district court's decision was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The appellate court found that the district court did not adequately explain why the cease-and-desist order was just and proper, particularly in light of its conclusion that the employee’s reinstatement was not. Therefore, the injunction was vacated in part. The court noted that the district court's lack of explanation for granting the cease-and-desist order, coupled with its explicit, undisputed findings in rejecting the request to order the employee's reinstatement, cast serious doubt on the propriety of the cease-and-desist order. View "Poor v. Amazon.com Services LLC" on Justia Law

An employee of the Department of Public Health (DPH), Juanita Estrada, filed a complaint with the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, alleging that the DPH retaliated against her for a whistleblower disclosure. Estrada's job duties included reviewing the qualifications of individuals appointed as municipal directors of health. She approved an appointment without verifying the individual's credentials, which were later found to be false. After notifying her supervisor, the individual was removed from the position. Estrada then repeated the error with another appointment and received a letter of reprimand. She subsequently received another reprimand, multiple unsatisfactory performance appraisals, and was demoted. Estrada filed grievances challenging these actions but did not raise a whistleblower retaliation claim. All grievances were denied. She then filed a whistleblower retaliation claim with the commission.The trial court concluded that the commission lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate Estrada’s whistleblower complaint, that Estrada had not made a protected whistleblower disclosure, and that she had failed to establish a causal connection between any alleged whistleblower disclosure and the alleged retaliation. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment on the merits in favor of the department. The commission appealed to the Supreme Court of Connecticut.The Supreme Court held that the commission had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Estrada’s whistleblower retaliation claim. The court also held that an employee is entitled to whistleblower protection under the statute for reporting his or her own error. However, the court concluded that Estrada had failed to prove that the department’s adverse personnel actions were caused by Estrada’s reporting of her errors rather than the errors themselves. The judgment of the Appellate Court was affirmed. View "Dept. of Public Health v. Estrada" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a lodging tax increase proposal in McCurtain County, Oklahoma, intended to fund a new county hospital. The Board of County Commissioners for McCurtain County approved the proposal to be submitted to the voters. However, the Board did not publish the proposal in a county newspaper for four weeks before the election as required by Title 19 O.S. 2021 §383. Instead, the Board and the Hospital engaged in a three-month campaign to inform voters of the measure through various means such as radio advertisements, billboards, newspaper articles, town hall meetings, and social media posts. After the measure was approved by the voters, a lodging renter and property owner filed a lawsuit seeking to have the election declared null and void due to the lack of newspaper publication. The Hospital sought to have the election upheld.The District Court of McCurtain County, Oklahoma, granted summary judgment in favor of the Board and Hospital, and against the lodging renter and property owner. The renter and owner appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma held that because the county commissioners neglected to follow the statutory publication requirements, the voter-approved lodging tax increase is invalid. The court emphasized that the Legislature has mandated what constitutes adequate notice by publication and anything less than strict compliance requires the court to invalidate the election. The court also encouraged the legislature to consider revisiting and possibly updating publication requirements to be more compatible with today's methods of communication. The decision of the lower court was reversed. View "Cathey v. Board of County Commissioners for McCurtain County" on Justia Law

The case involves the Edmond Public Schools (the Petitioner) and the State of Oklahoma, the State Board of Education, and the State Superintendent of Public Instruction (the Respondents). The Petitioner filed an application for the Supreme Court to prevent the enforcement of rules by the Respondents. These rules were to be used in enforcement proceedings against the school district before the State Board. The Petitioner argued that the State Board lacked the authority to supervise, examine, and control a local school board's discretion in supplying books for a school library that meet local community standards.The State Board of Education had publicized proposed rules for school library media programs, which included prohibitions on pornographic and sexualized content for books and other media. The Board adopted these rules, citing the Oklahoma Constitution and state statutes as their authority. However, the Oklahoma Attorney General issued an opinion stating that the proposed rules were not based on a specific grant of legislative authority, which was necessary for the Board to create these rules. The Legislature passed a resolution that did not expressly approve or disapprove the State Board's new rules. The Governor later issued a Declaration stating that the proposed rules for the State Department of Education were not subject to the joint resolution and approved these proposed rules as permanent rules for the State Department of Education.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma assumed original jurisdiction, in part, over the controversy. The court held that state statutes give a local school board power and a type of statutory discretion to supply books for a school library that meet local community standards. The court also held that no statute gives the State Board of Education, State Department of Education, and Superintendent of Public Instruction the authority to supervise, examine, and control a local school board's exercise of this discretion when the local school board applies local community standards for books it supplies for a local school library. The court issued a writ of prohibition to prevent additional enforcement proceedings against the school district based on the respondents' objection to the presence of certain books in the local school library. The court denied the petitioner's request for declaratory and injunctive relief. View "INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 12 v. STATE" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Gary Avant, was a truck driver for Muskogee County. County officials believed that Avant was complaining to other citizens about the county’s road plan and the assignment of a county worker. Avant was subsequently fired by the county commissioner. Avant sued the commissioner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. However, during the litigation, Avant denied making the statements that led to his firing. The commissioner moved for summary judgment, arguing that the perceived speech hadn’t involved a matter of public concern. The district court denied this part of the motion, and the case was remanded for the district court to develop the record.After remand, the district court again denied summary judgment, leading the commissioner to appeal again. On appeal, the commissioner argued that Avant hadn’t pleaded a claim for perceived speech and that qualified immunity applies given the lack of precedent on how to assess a public concern for perceived speech.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the adequacy of the pleadings. However, it did have jurisdiction over the commissioner’s argument for reversal based on the absence of a clearly established violation. The court concluded that Avant had not shown that the perceived speech involved a clearly established public concern. Therefore, the commissioner was entitled to qualified immunity, and the court reversed the denial of qualified immunity and remanded the case for the district court to grant summary judgment to the commissioner in his personal capacity on the First Amendment claim for retaliation based on perceived speech. View "Avant v. Doke" on Justia Law