A Rhode Island oral and maxillofacial surgeon, Dr. Stephen T. Skoly, refused to comply with a COVID-19 Emergency Regulation issued by the Rhode Island Department of Health (RI DOH) that required all healthcare workers and providers to be vaccinated against COVID-19. Following his public declaration of noncompliance, the RI DOH issued a Notice of Violation and Compliance Order against him. Skoly then filed a lawsuit in federal court against the state and its officials, alleging violations of equal protection, due process, and First Amendment rights. The district court dismissed his complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).The district court's decision was based on the fact that the state officials were either entitled to absolute or qualified immunity for their actions. The court held that the RI DOH directors were exercising prosecutorial authority delegated to them by Rhode Island law, thus granting them absolute immunity. As for Governor McKee, the court found that he was protected by qualified immunity as Skoly had no clearly established right to continue practicing while violating the vaccine mandate. The court also rejected Skoly's First Amendment retaliation claim, stating that the posting of the Notice constituted government speech, which could not form the basis of a plausible First Amendment retaliation claim.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Skoly's complaint. The appellate court agreed with the lower court's findings that the state officials were entitled to either absolute or qualified immunity and that Skoly's constitutional claims were without merit. The court also upheld the dismissal of Skoly's First Amendment retaliation claim, stating that Skoly had not sufficiently alleged that he was targeted due to his opposition to the First Emergency Regulation. View "Skoly v. McKee" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Morgan Morales, who appealed against an administrative law judge's (ALJ) decision that she was not disabled and hence, not entitled to Social Security disability benefits. Morales claimed to suffer from several conditions, including bipolar disorder, depression, anxiety, ADHD, and narcolepsy. After being treated at a mental health center and starting on prescription medications, Morales reported that her conditions were in remission. The ALJ, however, denied her application for benefits, finding that her mental impairments were mild and did not limit her ability to perform basic work activities, including her past job as a material handler.Morales challenged the ALJ's decision in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division. She criticized the ALJ's decision about her functional capacity to work but failed to provide evidence compelling the conclusion that the adverse disability decision lacked substantial support in the record. The District Court upheld the ALJ's decision, stating that Morales had not carried her burden of proof and that the ALJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence.The case was then brought to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, stating that Morales had misunderstood the burden she bore on appeal. The court noted that it was not enough to criticize the ALJ's decision; Morales needed to point to evidence compelling the conclusion that the adverse disability decision lacked substantial support in the record. The court also dismissed Morales's criticism of the District Court's decision, stating that the District Court had conducted an adequate review of the ALJ's determination and correctly applied the law. The court concluded that the ALJ's determination was reasonable and supported by substantial evidence, and therefore, affirmed the decision. View "Morales v. O'Malley" on Justia Law

The case involves Absolute Healthcare, operating as Curaleaf, a company that runs medical marijuana dispensaries across the United States. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) found that Curaleaf committed four unfair labor practices, including unlawfully firing an employee, Anissa Keane, for attempting to unionize a Curaleaf store in Gilbert, Arizona. The NLRB also ordered Curaleaf to read aloud to its Gilbert-based employees a notice describing the Board’s findings and to grant the union access to Curaleaf’s Gilbert store.The case was initially heard by an administrative law judge who found in favor of the NLRB on all four charges. The judge ordered Curaleaf to reinstate Keane with backpay, to read aloud a notice of the unfair labor practice findings to Curaleaf Gilbert employees, and to grant the union access to Curaleaf Gilbert’s facilities any time Curaleaf spoke to its employees about unionization. Curaleaf appealed to the NLRB, challenging only the unlawful-discharge finding and the notice-reading and union-access remedies. A divided three-member panel of the NLRB affirmed the administrative law judge's decision.The case was then reviewed by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The court held that the NLRB's finding that Curaleaf unlawfully fired Keane was not supported by substantial evidence. The court also held that the NLRB's notice-reading and union-access remedies could not be enforced. However, the court granted the NLRB's cross-application for enforcement as to the three uncontested unfair labor practices. View "Absolute Healthcare v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

The case involves Marcus Womack, who was arrested in 2017 following a search warrant executed at a residence in Huntingdon County, Pennsylvania. The search revealed that Womack had been selling drugs from the location, and he was found in possession of a large sum of money, drugs, and a stolen firearm. On the same day, a criminal complaint was filed against Womack, charging him with nine offenses. Unable to post bail, Womack remained in custody. Subsequent investigations revealed that Womack's drug enterprise extended beyond Huntingdon County, leading to the involvement of the Office of the Attorney General (OAG) and a statewide investigating grand jury. In 2018, a second criminal complaint was filed against Womack, charging him with twenty-eight offenses based on evidence gathered during the grand jury investigation.The trial court denied Womack's motion to dismiss the second complaint under Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(D)(1), which requires a trial to commence within 365 days from the date the complaint is filed. Womack's motion to dismiss the first complaint on the same grounds was granted. Womack was found guilty of several offenses in a bench trial on the second complaint and was sentenced to an aggregate term of 39 to 90 years’ imprisonment. He appealed to the Superior Court, arguing that the computation of time for Rule 600 purposes should have been based on the filing date of the first complaint. The Superior Court affirmed the trial court's decision.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the Superior Court’s order denying relief. The court applied the test from Commonwealth v. Meadius, which requires the Commonwealth to demonstrate due diligence between the period in which the complaints were filed, establish that the filing of the second complaint was necessitated by factors beyond its control, and show that its actions were not an attempt to circumvent or manipulate the speedy trial requirements. The court found that the Commonwealth met these requirements, and therefore, the Rule 600 clock began when the second complaint was filed. View "Commonwealth v. Womack" on Justia Law

In January 2020, Tiffany McClure, a probation officer, responded to a call for assistance during riots at the state penitentiary at Parchman. She alleges that the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC) failed to pay her the promised overtime wages. This case is part of a series of actions filed by probation and parole officers seeking unpaid wages for their overtime work with the MDOC. The main question is whether Mississippi courts have jurisdiction to hear state employees’ claims against their employers for breach of contract.The MDOC argued that the Hinds County County Court erred by not dismissing McClure’s claims due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. They contended that employment-related grievances are exclusively reviewed by the Employee Appeals Board, and any non-grievable claims have no right to relief under state law. McClure agreed that her claims were non-grievable, but asserted that the Hinds County County Court was the only forum that could provide relief.The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the trial court’s ruling, stating that the Mississippi Constitution vests original jurisdiction with the circuit courts, and there are no adequate administrative remedies for McClure’s breach of contract and constitutional claims. However, the court noted that its holding was narrowly tailored to the specific facts of this case. The court also affirmed the Hinds County County Court's exercise of jurisdiction over the matter and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Mississippi Department of Corrections v. McClure" on Justia Law

A fire broke out at Victor Young's property in Yazoo City, Mississippi, and spread to Kenneth Hampton's property. The Yazoo City Fire Department struggled to extinguish the fire due to a lack of tank water and difficulty connecting to a nearby fire hydrant. As a result, Young's property was completely destroyed, and Hampton's property was significantly damaged. Hampton, who was not physically injured during the fire, suffered a cardiac event and subsequent stroke three days later. Hampton and Young sued Yazoo City, alleging negligence and reckless disregard in failing to provide the necessary knowledge and equipment to fight fires, failing to properly train and supervise its firefighters, and failing to adequately maintain its fire hydrant system.The Yazoo County Circuit Court denied Yazoo City's motion for summary judgment, ruling that the questions of the city's immunity under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA) for property damage and personal injury liability could not be answered without additional discovery. The city appealed this decision, arguing that it was immune from both property damage and personal injury liability under the MTCA.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed the lower court's decision. The court found that Yazoo City was immune from property damage liability because the plaintiffs did not allege that the city acted with reckless disregard for the safety and well-being of any person, as required by the MTCA. The court also found that the city was immune from personal injury liability because Hampton's claim linked the property damage to his personal injury, but did not argue that the fire department acted in reckless disregard of his safety and well-being. The court concluded that Yazoo City was immune from both property damage and personal injury liability under the MTCA, and therefore, the lower court improperly denied the city's motion for summary judgment. View "Yazoo City v. Hampton" on Justia Law

In 2017, Terry Bevill, a captain of the Quitman Police Department, signed an affidavit supporting a motion to transfer venue in a criminal case against his friend and former colleague, David McGee. Bevill's affidavit alleged potential bias in the local justice system, including personal relationships between the sheriff, the district attorney, and the presiding judge. Following an investigation, Quitman Mayor David Dobbs terminated Bevill's employment, concluding that Bevill's affidavit violated two police department policies. Bevill filed a lawsuit claiming First Amendment retaliation and conspiracy to retaliate against him for his speech.Previously, the district court denied motions to dismiss the case filed by Sheriff Castloo, District Attorney Wheeler, and Judge Fletcher, who claimed qualified immunity. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed this decision. Now, the same court is reviewing the district court's denial of the defendants' motions for summary judgment.The court affirmed the district court's decision. It found that Bevill spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern when he submitted his affidavit. The court also held that Bevill's interest in his speech outweighed the government's interest in the efficient provision of public services. The court concluded that Bevill's constitutional rights were clearly established, and the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity. The court also held that District Attorney Wheeler was not entitled to prosecutorial immunity. The court noted that it lacked jurisdiction to review the district court's finding that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to infer that the defendants conspired to terminate Bevill's employment in retaliation for his speech. View "Bevill v. Wheeler" on Justia Law

The case involves a developmentally disabled woman, referred to as A.L., who was sexually assaulted by an employee of a transportation service. The transportation service was contracted by Harbor Developmental Disabilities Foundation, a regional center under the Lanterman Developmental Disabilities Services Act. The regional center's role is to assess the needs of developmentally disabled individuals and contract with service providers to meet those needs. A.L. sued the employee, the transportation service, and the regional center, arguing that the regional center had a duty to protect her from sexual assault by the transportation service's employees.The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the regional center, concluding that the regional center did not have a duty to protect A.L. from sexual assault by the transportation service's employees unless the regional center had actual knowledge of the employee's propensity to engage in such conduct. The trial court's decision was based on the fact that the regional center had no such knowledge in this case.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the regional center had a duty to protect A.L. from sexual assault by the transportation service's employees only if the regional center had actual knowledge of the employee's propensity to engage in such conduct. The court concluded that imposing a broader duty on the regional center would effectively convert regional centers into insurers of all harm to consumers, which could potentially shut down these centers and deny essential services to the entire population of developmentally disabled persons. View "A.L. v. Harbor Developmental Disabilities Foundation" on Justia Law

Duke Energy Indiana, a regulated electric utility, planned to build new facilities in Noblesville, Indiana, to meet increased customer demand. The project involved demolishing an abandoned house and garage and constructing a new substation, transmission lines, and a garage. The City of Noblesville insisted that Duke comply with its unified development ordinance before proceeding with the demolition, requiring Duke to obtain multiple permits. Duke declined, arguing that the city had no power to regulate a public utility's service-related projects through local permitting requirements. Despite not obtaining the permits, Duke began demolition.In response, Noblesville issued a stop-work order and sued Duke in the Hamilton Circuit Court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to enforce its ordinance. Duke counterclaimed, arguing that Noblesville lacked jurisdiction and authority to regulate its activities. The trial court found in favor of Noblesville, ordering Duke to comply with the ordinance and obtain the permits. The court also imposed a $150,000 penalty against Duke for starting demolition without the required permits and awarded Noblesville $115,679.10 in attorneys’ fees, expert fees, and costs. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.The Indiana Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' decisions, holding that while the trial court had jurisdiction over Noblesville’s enforcement action against Duke, only the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission could decide whether Noblesville’s ordinance interfered unreasonably with Duke’s utility functions. The court reasoned that the commission had both the fact-finding expertise and the broader non-local focus necessary to balance the competing interests of public utilities and municipalities in deciding such disputes. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the court's opinion. View "Duke Energy Indiana LLC v. City of Noblesville" on Justia Law

The case involves the National Rifle Association (NRA) and Maria Vullo, the former superintendent of the New York Department of Financial Services (DFS). The NRA alleged that Vullo violated their First Amendment rights by pressuring regulated entities to disassociate from the NRA and other gun-promotion advocacy groups. The NRA claimed that Vullo threatened enforcement actions against those entities that refused to disassociate, thereby stifling the NRA's pro-gun advocacy.The District Court initially denied Vullo's motion to dismiss the NRA's First Amendment damages claims, holding that the NRA plausibly alleged that Vullo's actions could be interpreted as a veiled threat to regulated industries to disassociate with the NRA or risk DFS enforcement action. However, the Second Circuit reversed this decision, concluding that Vullo's alleged actions constituted permissible government speech and legitimate law enforcement, not unconstitutional coercion. The Second Circuit also held that even if the complaint stated a First Amendment violation, the law was not clearly established, and so Vullo was entitled to qualified immunity.The Supreme Court of the United States, however, vacated the judgment of the Second Circuit. The Supreme Court held that the NRA plausibly alleged that Vullo violated the First Amendment by coercing DFS-regulated entities to terminate their business relationships with the NRA in order to punish or suppress the NRA's advocacy. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "National Rifle Association of America v. Vullo" on Justia Law