The case revolves around a child, R.N., who was removed from his mother's care and placed in foster care with Ben and Charissa Wagner. The Wagners had previously adopted two of the mother's other children. The Department of Public Health and Human Services was granted temporary legal custody of R.N. and ordered the mother to complete a treatment plan. The Department later filed a petition to terminate the mother's parental rights due to her failure to complete the treatment plan and alleged abandonment of R.N. However, the mother began to engage with the Department and made positive changes, leading to the Department's shift from termination to reunification.The Wagners, unhappy with the Department's change of stance, filed a motion to intervene, asserting that it was appropriate under M. R. Civ. P. 24 and § 41-3-422(9)(b), MCA. The District Court granted the Wagners' intervention motion, despite objections from the mother, the Department, and the guardian ad litem. The Wagners then filed a motion seeking an order for R.N. to be immediately placed in their care and for the Department to pursue termination of the mother's parental rights. The District Court did not set a hearing or issue a determination on the Wagners' motion. The Department filed a motion to dismiss the case, which the District Court granted.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court's decision to dismiss the case. The Supreme Court found that the District Court had misinterpreted the law when it allowed the Wagners to intervene. The court also ruled that the Wagners did not have a fundamental liberty interest in the care and custody of R.N. because the mother's rights had not been terminated. Furthermore, the court held that neither the District Court nor the Supreme Court had the authority to order or compel the Department to refile and prosecute its petition for termination. View "In re R.N." on Justia Law

The case revolves around a defendant, Tara Shawnee Pritchett, who was on probation for two misdemeanor offenses. In September 2021, a detective conducted a warrantless search of Pritchett's room, believing she was on searchable probation. The search resulted in the discovery of U.S. currency and what was believed to be fentanyl. Pritchett was subsequently charged with one felony count of possession for sale of a controlled substance. However, Pritchett moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the search, arguing that her probation had been automatically terminated by Assembly Bill No. 1950 (AB 1950), which limited the maximum term of probation for most misdemeanor offenses to one year.The trial court granted Pritchett's motion to suppress the evidence. It concluded that Pritchett's probation had automatically terminated when AB 1950 became effective on January 1, 2021, several months before the search. The court also ruled that the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply, leading to the dismissal of the charge against Pritchett.The People appealed the trial court's decision to the Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District. They argued that the trial court erred in concluding that Pritchett's probation had terminated automatically due to AB 1950. They also contended that the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule should apply because the detective had made objectively reasonable efforts to determine Pritchett's probation status.The appellate court agreed with the People's latter contention and reversed the trial court's decision. The court found that the detective had acted in objectively reasonable good faith by relying on court records to verify Pritchett's probation status prior to conducting the search. The court concluded that applying the exclusionary rule in this case would not serve its purpose of deterring unlawful police conduct. Therefore, the court directed the trial court to set aside the order granting Pritchett's motion to suppress and to enter a new order denying the motion. View "People v. Pritchett" on Justia Law

An investigative reporter, Jason Leopold, sought access to the written directives of the United States Capitol Police and audits and reports prepared by the Inspector General of the Capitol Police. He invoked the District Court’s mandamus jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1361, claiming a common law right to access public documents and a statutory right under 2 U.S.C. § 1909(c)(1). The District Court dismissed these claims, holding that sovereign immunity barred the suit.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the District Court’s dismissals for lack of jurisdiction, but for different reasons. The court found that Leopold failed to establish that the Capitol Police had a clear, indisputable, and ministerial duty to provide access to the records. The court also rejected Leopold's argument that the Inspector General of the Capitol Police breached his duty to publish all audits and reports that recommend corrective action under 5 U.S.C. § 404(e)(1)(C), as applied to the Inspector General of the Capitol Police under 2 U.S.C. § 1909(c)(1). The court concluded that even if this duty existed, the Inspector General was forbidden from publishing the audits and reports due to their designation as "security information" under 2 U.S.C. § 1979. The dismissal was affirmed without prejudice, allowing Leopold to refile his complaint with the requisite allegations to satisfy the mandamus standard if he so desires and if he plausibly believes that he can prove those allegations. View "Leopold v. Manger" on Justia Law

The case involves journalist Robert Schilling's attempt to obtain records related to the Committee on Oversight and Reform of the United States House of Representatives' use of outside consultants as part of a congressional investigation. Schilling sought these records under the common law right of access, alleging that the hearings were part of a series of public-private collaborations targeting political opponents of the climate policy agenda. He claimed that the requested records would show that the Committee used unpaid consulting services to prepare for the hearings, in violation of federal law and House rules.The district court dismissed Schilling's petition, ruling that the Constitution's Speech or Debate Clause barred the case. The court held that the Clause acts as an absolute jurisdictional bar to suits seeking compelled disclosure of materials related to legislative activity. Schilling appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal, but on different grounds. The appellate court did not address the question of whether the Speech or Debate Clause barred Schilling's claim. Instead, it dismissed the case on the grounds of sovereign immunity. The court found that the documents Schilling sought were not "public records," and thus, there was no duty imposed on Congress to grant Schilling's request. As a result, the Larson-Dugan exception to sovereign immunity did not apply, and Schilling's claim was barred by sovereign immunity. View "Schilling v. United States House of Representatives" on Justia Law

The case involves Thryv, Inc., a company that had a dispute with the union representing some of its sales employees. The union complained to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), alleging that Thryv engaged in several unfair labor practices. The NLRB agreed with the union and ordered Thryv to take significant steps to remedy the alleged violations. Thryv petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for review.Previously, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled in favor of the NLRB's General Counsel in part and Thryv in part. The ALJ agreed with the General Counsel that Thryv failed to respond to the Union’s information requests, constituting six unfair labor practices. However, the ALJ disagreed with the General Counsel that Thryv’s layoffs violated the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), finding that Thryv had bargained in good faith.The NLRB affirmed the ALJ’s finding that Thryv violated the NLRA by failing to comply with the Union’s information requests. However, it disagreed with the ALJ about the layoffs and held them unlawful. The NLRB held that Thryv had an obligation to bargain with respect to the layoffs and that Thryv breached that obligation by presenting the layoffs as a fait accompli and withholding information from the Union that the Union needed to bargain effectively.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit granted Thryv’s petition and vacated the NLRB’s order in part. The court disagreed with the NLRB's conclusion that Thryv's layoffs violated the NLRA. The court held that Thryv was permitted to implement its last best, final offer (LBFO) upon reaching an impasse with the Union. The court found that Thryv complied with the terms of the LBFO, which included providing the Union with thirty days’ notice before initiating layoffs, providing the Union an opportunity to discuss the layoffs, and offering severance payments to the affected employees. Therefore, the court concluded that Thryv's layoffs were lawful so long as Thryv and the Union remained at overall impasse on the date the layoffs occurred. The court also enforced the NLRB’s order requiring Thryv to cease and desist from failing and refusing to furnish the Union with requested information that is relevant and necessary to the Union’s performance of its functions as the collective-bargaining representative of its employees. View "Thryv v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

The case involves a petition for a writ of prohibition filed by Dr. Jose Ravelo, a board-certified oral surgeon, against the West Virginia Board of Dentistry. The petitioner sought to halt the Board's ongoing investigation and any further disciplinary action against him based on his treatment of a patient in 2021. He argued that the Board violated the statutory time limitation for resolution of disciplinary actions and violated his due process rights.The Board initiated an investigation after Dr. Ravelo self-reported a complication following a surgical procedure he performed on a patient. The Board's Complaint Committee recommended filing a complaint against Dr. Ravelo, citing concerns about his standard of care. Dr. Ravelo responded to the complaint, and the Board continued its investigation.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia found that the Board complied with West Virginia Code § 30-1-5(c), which permits an extension of time for the Board to issue a final ruling. The Court held that an agreement to extend the period of time for an applicable regulatory board to issue a final ruling on a complaint is not barred by the fact that the applicable board is also the complainant. The Court also found that the Board had not violated the petitioner's constitutional right to due process. Therefore, the Court denied the petitioner's request for a writ of prohibition. View "State ex rel. Ravelo v. West Virginia Board of Dentistry" on Justia Law

Seth Lookhart, a dentist, was convicted of numerous crimes related to a fraudulent scheme that endangered his patients' health and safety. The scheme involved unnecessary sedation of patients to fraudulently bill Alaska’s Medicaid program, overcharging it by more than $1.6 million. Lookhart also stole $412,500 from a business partner. His reckless sedation practices nearly resulted in the loss of two patients' lives. He was arrested in April 2017 and convicted on 46 charges in January 2020, leading to a sentence of 20 years in prison with eight years suspended.Following Lookhart's convictions, the Division of Corporations, Business and Professional Licensing sought to revoke his dental license. Lookhart agreed to the facts of the accusation but argued that revocation was not an appropriate sanction. The administrative law judge (ALJ) disagreed, stating that Lookhart's misconduct was more severe than any prior case and that revocation was the clear and obvious sanction. The Board of Dental Examiners adopted the ALJ's decision.Lookhart appealed to the superior court, arguing that the Board's decision was inconsistent with its prior decisions. The court disagreed, stating that the Board had wide discretion to determine appropriate sanctions and that no prior case was comparable to Lookhart's. The court affirmed the Board's decision. Lookhart then appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska.The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision. It held that the Board of Dental Examiners did not abuse its discretion by revoking Lookhart's license. The court found that none of the Board's prior licensing cases involved misconduct of the scope and severity in this case, so there was no applicable precedent to limit the Board's exercise of its discretion. View "Lookhart v. State of Alaska, Board of Dental Examiners" on Justia Law

The case involves Bainbridge Fund Ltd. (Bainbridge), which sought to attach property owned by the Republic of Argentina (Argentina) in partial satisfaction of a judgment entered against Argentina in 2020. The property in question, the Chancery Annex, was a building owned by Argentina in Washington, D.C. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) stipulates that the property of a foreign sovereign cannot be attached unless the sovereign waives immunity and the property is used for commercial activity in the United States. The district court denied Bainbridge’s application after finding that the property in question is not used for commercial activity.Previously, in the Southern District of New York, Bainbridge obtained a judgment against Argentina for $95,424,899.38, arising out of Argentina’s default on a bond owned by Bainbridge. The bond contained a waiver of sovereign immunity by Argentina. Bainbridge sought to attach and execute upon the Chancery Annex to satisfy the judgment in part.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Bainbridge’s application. The court found that the Chancery Annex was not “used for commercial activity” at the time of filing. The court also rejected Bainbridge's argument that Argentina had waived the “commercial activity” requirement under Section 1610(a) of the FSIA. The court held that the bond did not evince an explicit promise or intent by Argentina not to raise FSIA defenses. View "Bainbridge Fund Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina" on Justia Law

The case involves East Ohio Gas Company, doing business as Dominion Energy Ohio ("Dominion"), and J. William Vigrass, individually and as executor of Virginia Vigrass’s estate. Dominion had requested access to Virginia's residence to inspect the gas meter located inside. However, due to Virginia's immunocompromised state and susceptibility to COVID-19, she denied Dominion access. Despite her account being paid in full, Dominion disconnected its natural-gas service to Virginia’s residence in January 2022. The disconnection resulted in freezing temperatures inside the residence, causing the water pipes to burst and damage the property. Virginia was later found dead in her residence.In the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Vigrass sued Dominion on claims relating to the shutoff of its natural-gas service to Virginia’s residence. Dominion moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing that the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio had exclusive jurisdiction over the claims as they related to a service issue. However, Judge Peter J. Corrigan denied Dominion’s motion, reasoning that he had jurisdiction over the complaint because Vigrass had asserted common-law claims.Dominion then filed an original action in prohibition in the Supreme Court of Ohio, asserting that Judge Corrigan patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction over Vigrass’s action. Dominion sought an order to prevent Judge Corrigan from exercising jurisdiction and to vacate the orders he has issued in the underlying case.The Supreme Court of Ohio granted the writ of prohibition, ordering Judge Corrigan to cease exercising jurisdiction over the underlying case and directing him to vacate the orders that he had previously issued in the case. The court concluded that both parts of the test set forth in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. were met, indicating that the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio had exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The court also granted in part and denied in part Dominion's motion to strike certain parts of Vigrass's brief. View "State ex rel. E. Ohio Gas Co. v. Corrigan" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the suicide of Donnie Clay while he was detained in the Tunica County Jail. Barbara Clay, Donnie's wife, and Whitney Jackson, Donnie's girlfriend, filed a wrongful death lawsuit against Sheriff K.C. Hamp and Tunica County. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated Donnie's Fourteenth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by failing to prevent his suicide. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants were aware or should have been aware of Donnie's vulnerability to suicide due to his history of multiple suicide attempts while detained in the jail, and that they failed to take action to prevent this risk.The defendants filed a combined motion for summary judgment, arguing that Sheriff Hamp was entitled to qualified immunity and that the County could not be held liable under § 1983 as the plaintiffs failed to establish that a policy or custom of the jail was the direct cause of Donnie's suicide. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding that Sheriff Hamp was entitled to qualified immunity and that the plaintiffs failed to identify a single policy or custom of the County that directly caused Donnie's suicide. The plaintiffs appealed the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the County.The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the trial court's decision. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to present evidence to establish that the training provided to the jail employees demonstrated deliberate indifference by the County to the potential for constitutional injuries. The court also found that a single episode of an employee's failure to follow jail policy does not establish a pattern of constitutional violations amounting to the policy of the County. Therefore, the court concluded that the trial judge did not err by granting the County's motion for summary judgment. View "Clay v. Tunica County, Mississippi" on Justia Law