The defendant, Noe Lezama, was initially charged with murder but later entered a plea to voluntary manslaughter in 2019. In 2022, he filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, arguing that the timing and factual basis of his plea should not preclude him from being eligible for resentencing. The trial court summarily denied his petition, concluding that legislative history confirmed that those who pled guilty to manslaughter after statutory amendments eliminated imputed malice theories of murder liability are not eligible for resentencing as a matter of law.Previously, the trial court had sentenced Lezama to a total of 13 years in prison for voluntary manslaughter and a gang enhancement. The prosecution had initially charged Lezama and another individual with murder and conspiracy to commit murder, alleging that they had killed a man with malice aforethought. However, in 2019, the prosecution and Lezama reached a plea agreement, and the original information was amended to add a count of voluntary manslaughter and modify a criminal street gang enhancement.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Three affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court found that the statutory language and defendant’s record of conviction confirmed that Lezama was not eligible for resentencing. The court noted that Senate Bill 1437, which took effect in 2019, amended the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life. However, the court concluded that this did not apply to Lezama, who pled guilty to manslaughter after such theories had been eliminated by Senate Bill 1437. View "P. v. Lezama" on Justia Law

The case involves James Fejes, a pilot who held a certificate issued by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) under 49 U.S.C. § 44703. Fejes used his aircraft to transport and distribute marijuana to retail stores within Alaska, an activity that is legal under state law but illegal under federal law. After an investigation, the FAA revoked Fejes's pilot certificate under 49 U.S.C. § 44710(b)(2), which mandates revocation when a pilot knowingly uses an aircraft for an activity punishable by more than a year's imprisonment under a federal or state controlled substance law.Fejes appealed the FAA's decision to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who affirmed the revocation. He then appealed the ALJ's decision to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), which also affirmed the ALJ. Throughout the agency proceedings, Fejes admitted that he piloted an aircraft to distribute marijuana within Alaska, but argued that his conduct fell outside of § 44710(b)(2)'s reach.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied Fejes's petition for review of the NTSB's order affirming the FAA's revocation of his pilot certificate. The court rejected Fejes's argument that the FAA lacked jurisdiction to revoke his pilot certificate because Congress cannot authorize an administrative agency to regulate purely intrastate commerce like marijuana delivery within Alaska. The court held that airspace is a channel of commerce squarely within congressional authority, and therefore, Congress can regulate Fejes's conduct. The court also rejected Fejes's argument that his conduct was exempt under FAA regulation 14 C.F.R. § 91.19, and that the FAA misinterpreted § 44710(b)(2). The court concluded that the FAA's revocation of Fejes's pilot certificate was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. View "FEJES V. FAA" on Justia Law

A scientist with physical disabilities, Dr. Andrew Mattioda, sued his employer, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. He alleged that he suffered a hostile work environment after informing his supervisors of his disabilities and requesting upgraded airline tickets for work travel. He also claimed he was discriminated against due to his disability by being passed over for a promotion.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed Dr. Mattioda’s hostile-work-environment claim and granted summary judgment in favor of NASA on his disability-discrimination claim. The court concluded that Dr. Mattioda failed to allege a plausible causal nexus between the claimed harassment and his disabilities. It also held that NASA provided a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for not selecting Dr. Mattioda for an available senior scientist position.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of Dr. Mattioda’s hostile-work-environment claim, affirming that a disability-based harassment claim is available under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and the Rehabilitation Act. The court held that Dr. Mattioda plausibly alleged a hostile-work-environment claim based on his disability. However, the court affirmed the district court’s order granting summary judgment for NASA on the disability-discrimination claim, agreeing that NASA had provided a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for not selecting Dr. Mattioda for the senior scientist position. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "MATTIODA V. NELSON" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the approval of a site certificate for the construction of a wind energy facility in Umatilla County, Oregon. The Energy Facility Siting Council granted the certificate to Nolin Hills Wind, LLC, despite the proposed facility not complying with a local siting criterion requiring a two-mile setback between any turbine and a rural residence. Umatilla County sought judicial review of the council's decision, arguing that the council should have required Nolin Hills to comply with the two-mile setback rule.The case was reviewed by the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon. The court noted that the council had the authority to approve the proposed energy facility despite its failure to comply with the two-mile setback rule. The court also noted that the council had the authority to approve the proposed facility even if it did not pass through more than three land use zones and even if it did not comply with all of the county’s recommended substantive criteria.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon affirmed the council's decision, concluding that the council was authorized to issue a site certificate for the proposed wind facility notwithstanding the failure of the proposed facility to comply with the two-mile setback rule. The court found that the council was not required to reject a proposed facility simply because it did not comply with a local criterion. The court also rejected the county's argument that the council erred in concluding that the proposed facility "does otherwise comply with the applicable statewide planning goals." View "Umatilla County v. Dept. of Energy" on Justia Law

Kenneth Michaud submitted a Right-to-Know request to the Town of Campton Police Department, seeking certain records pertaining to him, his address, or any member of his household. The Town denied his request, asserting that it was an attempt to circumvent the discovery process in a separate litigation between the parties. Michaud then filed a lawsuit against the Town to gain access to the requested records. The Town reiterated its justification for the denial, and the court stayed the Right-to-Know suit until the separate litigation reached a resolution. After the resolution of the other litigation, the court ordered the Town to respond to Michaud's requests. The Town provided some documents, but Michaud filed a motion to compel, claiming that not all records were produced. The court denied the motion, finding that the Town had complied with the order and that the withheld records were either already in Michaud's possession or were exempted from disclosure.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed the lower court's decision, ruling that the Town violated the Right-to-Know Law by categorically denying Michaud's request based on his motive and without first reviewing the records responsive to the request. The court concluded that the Town's initial response was not lawful and that the trial court erred in ruling that the Town's initial denial was lawful. The court also vacated the trial court's denial of Michaud's request for attorney’s fees and costs and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that to award attorney’s fees on remand, the trial court must find that the lawsuit was necessary to enforce compliance with the Right-to-Know Law and that the Town knew or should have known that its conduct violated the Right-to-Know Law. View "Michaud v. Town of Campton Police Department" on Justia Law

This case revolves around the appointment of a general registrar of elections in Lynchburg, Virginia. The plaintiff, Christine Gibbons, was appointed as registrar in 2018 by a board consisting of two Democrats and one Republican. Her term expired in 2023, at which point the board had two Republican members and one Democratic member. The board informed Gibbons that she would have to reapply for her position. Despite reapplying, the two Republican members voted to appoint a different candidate who was a registered Republican. Gibbons sued the board and its two Republican members, alleging that the decision not to reappoint her was based on her political affiliation, which she claimed violated the First Amendment.The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, asserting that sovereign immunity barred all of Gibbons’ claims. The district court dismissed Gibbons’ claims against the board itself as barred by sovereign immunity, but denied the individual board members’ motions to dismiss. The court concluded that the board members could be sued for equitable relief in their official capacities and for damages in their personal capacities. The board members appealed both orders.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the appellants’ motions to dismiss. The court rejected the board members’ argument that sovereign immunity bars Gibbons’ claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against them in their official capacities. The court also rejected the board members’ assertion that Gibbons’ damages claims against them are barred by sovereign immunity. The court concluded that individual members of Virginia electoral boards may be sued in their official capacities for equitable relief under Ex parte Young and that Gibbons’ claims for damages against the board members in their personal capacities are not barred by sovereign immunity. View "Gibbons v. Gibbs" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between the City of Valdez and the Prince William Sound Oil Spill Response Corporation, the State of Alaska, Department of Revenue, and the State Assessment Review Board. The City of Valdez appealed the State's determination that certain property was not taxable. After nearly two decades of administrative and court proceedings, Valdez won. However, due to the length of the litigation, Valdez has not been able to collect taxes on the property that should have been taxed.The Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, ruled that even though the State wrongly determined certain property was not taxable, the State cannot now assess taxes on this property if more than three years have passed since the taxpayer filed its tax return. According to this ruling, taxes may be assessed on this property only for the most recent tax years. Valdez appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska affirmed the superior court’s decision. The court held that the statutory text is clear and does not suggest that the legislature intended something other than the plain meaning of the text. The court also disagreed with Valdez's argument that it is impossible for a municipality to challenge a taxability determination in less than three years. The court concluded that AS 43.05.260’s three-year limitations period applies to tax assessments under AS 43.56, even if Revenue’s initial decision not to tax certain property was wrong. View "City of Valdez v. Prince William Sound Oil Spill Response Corporation" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over a parcel of land within the Rio Grande National Forest in Colorado, owned by Leavell-McCombs Joint Venture (LMJV). The land, obtained through a land exchange with the U.S. Forest Service (USFS) in 1987, was intended for development into a ski resort village. However, access to the parcel was hindered due to a gravel road managed by the USFS that was unusable by vehicles in the winter.In 2007, LMJV invoked the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA), claiming it required the USFS to grant access to inholdings within USFS land. The USFS initially proposed a second land exchange with LMJV to secure access to Highway 160. However, this proposal was challenged by several conservation groups under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), alleging violations of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Endangered Species Act (ESA). In 2017, the district court vacated the USFS decision and remanded to the agency.The USFS then considered a new alternative in the form of a right-of-way easement to LMJV across USFS land between the Parcel and Highway 160. The USFS consulted with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) to secure a new biological opinion (BiOp) and incidental take statement (ITS) for the proposed action in 2018. The USFS then issued a final Record of Decision (ROD) in 2019, approving the easement.The conservation groups challenged this latest ROD under NEPA, the ESA, and ANILCA. The district court vacated and remanded under the law of the case doctrine, concluding that it was bound by the reasoning of the district court’s 2017 order. The Agencies appealed the district court’s decision vacating the 2018 BiOp and 2019 ROD.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit vacated the district court’s order and affirmed the Agencies’ decisions. The court concluded that it had jurisdiction over the matter under the practical finality rule, and that the Conservation Groups had standing. The court held that the district court incorrectly applied the law of the case doctrine because the Agencies considered a different alternative when issuing the 2019 ROD. The court also concluded that ANILCA requires the USFS to grant access to the LMJV Parcel. The court determined that even if the Conservation Groups could show error under NEPA, they had not shown that any alleged error was harmful. Finally, the court held that the Conservation Groups failed to successfully challenge the 2018 BiOp under the ESA, and that the Agencies correctly allowed the ITS to cover not only the proposed easement, but also LMJV’s proposed development. View "Rocky Mountain Wild v. Dallas" on Justia Law

The case involves a lawsuit filed by the family of Kyle Hart against the City of Redwood City and its police officers, following Hart's death in a police shooting. Hart, who was attempting suicide with a knife in his backyard, was shot by Officer Gomez when he approached the officers with the knife despite commands to drop it. The family alleged constitutional and state law violations arising from the shooting.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied Officer Gomez's claim of qualified immunity at summary judgment. The court found that the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity, relying on a previous court decision that stated it was objectively unreasonable to shoot an unarmed man who had committed no serious offense, was mentally or emotionally disturbed, had been given no warning of the imminent use of such a significant degree of force, posed no risk of flight, and presented no objectively reasonable threat to the safety of the officer or other individuals.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Officer Gomez was entitled to qualified immunity. The court found that Hart posed an immediate threat when he rapidly approached the officers brandishing a knife and refusing commands to drop it. Furthermore, even if Officer Gomez’s conduct violated the Fourth Amendment, he would still be entitled to qualified immunity because the conduct did not violate clearly established law. None of the cases the plaintiffs identified would have put Officer Gomez on notice that his actions in this case would be unlawful. View "Hart v. City of Redwood City" on Justia Law

The case involves Salt Lake County's challenge to the constitutionality of the Aircraft Valuation Law, which provides a preferred method for determining the fair market value of aircraft for tax purposes. The County argued that the application of the law to Delta Air Lines' aircraft resulted in an assessment below fair market value, violating the Utah Constitution. The County also contended that the law, on its face, violated the Utah Constitution by divesting the Utah State Tax Commission of its power to assess airline property.The Utah State Tax Commission had previously upheld the 2017 assessment of Delta's property, which was calculated according to the Aircraft Valuation Law. The Commission found that the County did not provide clear and convincing evidence that the legislature's preferred method of valuation did not reasonably reflect fair market value.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah rejected the County's arguments. The court held that the County failed to fully utilize the statutory safety valve, which allows the Commission to use an alternative valuation method if the preferred method does not reasonably reflect fair market value. The court also rejected the County's facial challenge to the Aircraft Valuation Law, concluding that the County did not show that the law prohibits the legislature from prescribing a preferred method for valuing aircraft. Therefore, the court affirmed the Commission's decision. View "Salt Lake Co v. Tax Commission" on Justia Law