Eric Demond Lozano, a Texas state prisoner and Sunni Muslim, filed a lawsuit against three officials of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) alleging violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and the Establishment Clause. Lozano claimed that his ability to practice his religion was substantially burdened due to the conditions in the prison. His claims included the inability to shower privately before Jumah, a weekly prayer service, due to non-Muslim inmates being allowed to shower at the same time; insufficient space to pray in his cell due to hostile cellmates; and lack of access to religious programming and instruction, specifically Taleem and Quranic studies, due to the absence of Muslim volunteers.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted summary judgment in favor of the TDCJ officials. The court found that Lozano failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact on whether the absence of a Muslim-designated unit or dorm violated the Establishment Clause. The court also concluded that Lozano provided no evidence to support his allegation that the faith-based dorms required inmates to study Christian materials.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's order granting summary judgment on Lozano's RLUIPA claims regarding Jumah showers and adequate prayer space. The appellate court found that there was a genuine dispute of material fact on whether Lozano's ability to practice his religion was substantially burdened. The court also vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment on Lozano's RLUIPA claim regarding additional religious programming and his Establishment Clause claim, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Lozano v. Collier" on Justia Law

Michael Rivera, a Pennsylvania state prisoner, was in an open-air telephone cage when he overheard prison officials preparing to forcibly extract another inmate, Ryan Miller, from a nearby cell. Anticipating the use of pepper spray, Rivera informed the officials that exposure to the spray would trigger his asthma. Despite his pleas to be moved back to his cell, the officials refused, citing the lack of available personnel due to the ongoing preparations for Miller's extraction. After the pepper spray was deployed, Rivera suffered an asthma attack. He sued the prison officials for damages, alleging they had acted with deliberate indifference to the substantial risk of serious harm to him, in violation of the Eighth Amendment.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania granted summary judgment in favor of the prison officials. The court concluded that the law was not clearly established to the extent that the officials would have known that their actions violated the Eighth Amendment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court found that the prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity because their actions did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. The court noted that the officials were confronted with competing institutional concerns and that the cited case law did not clearly establish that the officials' decision to prioritize one prisoner's health and safety over another's violated the Eighth Amendment. View "Rivera v. Redfern" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute over a medical marijuana cultivation license issued by the Arkansas Medical Marijuana Commission to Bennett Scott “Storm” Nolan II. 2600 Holdings, LLC, an unsuccessful applicant for the same license, filed a lawsuit against the Commission and other state entities, alleging that Nolan's application did not meet the minimum merit selection criteria and that the Commission violated its own rules and the Arkansas Constitution in awarding the license to Nolan. Nolan was not initially named as a defendant or joined as a party in the lawsuit.The Pulaski County Circuit Court denied Nolan's multiple motions to join the lawsuit as an indispensable party under Rule 19(a) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure and granted summary judgment in favor of 2600 Holdings. The court ruled that the Commission had exceeded its discretion and violated the Arkansas Constitution and its own rules in awarding the license to Nolan.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed the lower court's decision, finding that Nolan was indeed an indispensable party under Rule 19(a)(2). The court held that the lower court erred in not joining Nolan as an indispensable party to the litigation. As a result, the court vacated the order granting summary judgment to 2600 Holdings and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court did not address Nolan's remaining issues as they were deemed moot due to the reversal and remand. View "Nolan v. 2600 Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

Lonnie Reidburn, a self-employed insurance agent, appealed a decision by the South Dakota Department of Labor, Reemployment Assistance Division (Department) that he must repay $24,690 in pandemic unemployment benefits he received. Reidburn's income was based on commissions he received for new policies and renewals, which required in-person visits to clients' homes or businesses. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Reidburn experienced a significant reduction in his ability to procure new policies and renewals because clients did not want him to make in-person visits. As a result, Reidburn's income decreased. He applied for Pandemic Unemployment Assistance (PUA) through the Department and received benefits for 39 weeks. However, the Department later determined that Reidburn's loss of income was not the direct result of the pandemic and issued a determination of ineligibility.The administrative law judge (ALJ) upheld the Department's determination of ineligibility, reasoning that the individual decisions of Reidburn's clients to preclude him from entering their homes or places of business were not a direct result of the pandemic. However, the ALJ rejected the Department's at-fault determination and found that Reidburn was not at fault for the overpayment. The ALJ also concluded that Reidburn's request for a waiver was untimely. Reidburn appealed the ALJ's decision to the circuit court, which affirmed the ALJ's decision.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reversed the ALJ's determination that Reidburn was ineligible to receive PUA benefits for 35 of the 39 weeks at issue, based on its recent decision in Bracken v. South Dakota Department of Labor and Regulation, Reemployment Assistance Division. The court declined to address the Department's argument that Reidburn failed to present sufficient evidence to support his testimony that he experienced a significant reduction in services, as the Department did not raise this argument at Reidburn's administrative hearing. The court affirmed the circuit court's denial of Reidburn's motion for attorney fees. View "Reidburn v. Department of Labor & Regulation" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the procedural interplay between two Mississippi statutes—the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA) and the Mississippi Whistleblower Protection Act (MWPA). Mark Johnson, the plaintiff, filed a retaliation complaint under the MWPA, alleging that he was fired from his position as general manager of the Clarksdale Public Utilities Authority (CPU) for reporting inefficiency and incompetence. Johnson later added claims for First Amendment retaliation and breach of contract.The district court held that the procedural requirements of the MTCA applied to Johnson’s MWPA claim, and because the court concluded he didn’t comply with them, it dismissed his claim. The district court also concluded that Johnson’s First Amendment retaliation and breach-of-contract claims were time-barred because the three-year statute of limitations for these claims ran after Johnson filed his first complaint but before he amended to add these claims—and neither claim relates back. Johnson appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was unable to make a reliable Erie guess as to whether the MTCA’s procedural requirements apply to MWPA claims because it lacked clear guidance from Mississippi courts on how the two statutes interrelate. Therefore, the court certified this question to the Supreme Court of Mississippi: When a plaintiff brings a claim against the government and its employees for tortious conduct under the MWPA, is that claim subject to the procedural requirements of the MTCA? View "Johnson v. Miller" on Justia Law

The case involves Vanda Pharmaceuticals, a drug manufacturer, and the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS). Vanda challenged a 2020 regulation by CMS that expanded the definition of a "line extension" drug under the Medicaid Drug Rebate Program. This program requires drug manufacturers to reimburse Medicaid if they increase their prices faster than inflation. A "line extension" drug, which is a new formulation of an existing drug, can also be liable for price increases of the original drug. Vanda argued that the regulation expanded the definition of a line extension beyond what the Medicaid statute permitted.Previously, the district court granted summary judgment to CMS, disagreeing with Vanda's argument. The court held that the agency's regulation was within the bounds of the Medicaid statute.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the agency's definitions of "line extension" and "new formulation" were within the Medicaid statute's ambit. It also held that the agency's interpretation of the oral-solid-dosage-form requirement was not contrary to law. The court rejected Vanda's argument that the agency's rulemaking process was arbitrary and capricious, finding that the agency had reasonably considered the relevant issues and explained its decision. View "Vanda Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a workers' compensation claim filed by Dale Brooks, an employee of Benore Logistics Systems, Inc. Brooks claimed that he suffered a work-related repetitive trauma injury to his back due to the nature of his job as a "switcher" truck operator, which involved moving semitruck trailers and ocean freight containers to various points in a shipping yard. He substantiated his claim with medical evidence and testimony. However, his employer commissioned an ergonomics report that concluded his injury was statistically unlikely to have been caused by his work activities.The single commissioner ruled in Brooks's favor, but an appellate panel of the Workers' Compensation Commission relied on the ergonomics report, reversed the single commissioner, and denied Brooks's claim. The appellate panel concluded that Brooks's job was not repetitive and that it was statistically unlikely that his back injury was caused by his work duties. The court of appeals reversed this decision, holding that the appellate panel did not have the authority to determine whether Brooks's job was repetitive and that any reliance on the ergonomics report was impermissible.The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the decision of the court of appeals as modified. The court agreed that the appellate panel erred in its reliance on the ergonomics report to deny Brooks's claim. The court held that while the Commission does have the authority to determine whether an employee's job is repetitive, the appellate panel's decision that Brooks's job was not repetitive was unsupported by the substantial evidence in the record. Furthermore, the court ruled that any reliance on an ergonomics report in a work-related repetitive trauma injury case is contrary to the rule of law and constituted reversible error by the appellate panel. The court remanded the matter to the Commission for it to calculate the benefits to which Brooks is entitled. View "Brooks v. Benore Logistics System, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves T.S. (Mother) and A.A. (Father) who appealed the termination of their parental rights to their minor children (D.A., L.A., and F.A.) by the Montana Second Judicial District Court. The Child and Family Services Division of the Montana Department of Health and Human Services (Department) became involved with the family in August 2019 when two of the children were found wandering the streets unsupervised. The Department had previously been involved with the family due to allegations of child abuse or neglect. In August 2019, the Department removed the children from the parents' care and placed them in a protective kinship placement. The parents were given treatment plans to follow for potential reunification with their children.Despite multiple extensions to complete their treatment plans, neither parent had successfully completed all requirements by January 2022. As a result, the Department transitioned to court-ordered guardianships as the new permanency plan for the children. In March 2022, the Department petitioned for termination of parental rights due to the parents' failure to complete their treatment plans and their inability to provide adequate parental care. The District Court issued judgments terminating the parents' respective parental rights.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the District Court's findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence and that the parents had failed to demonstrate that any material District Court finding of fact was clearly erroneous. The court also held that the District Court did not terminate the parents' respective parental rights without clear and convincing evidence that the Department made reasonable family preservation and reunification efforts. The court concluded that the District Court correctly terminated the parents' respective parental rights under § 41-3-609(1)(f), MCA. View "In re F.A." on Justia Law

A group of Indian nationals, legally present in the United States on employment-based visas, filed a lawsuit against the Secretary of State and the Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). The plaintiffs were seeking permanent residency and challenged the defendants' approach to distributing immigrant visas. They argued that the defendants' policies of deferring adjudication of their applications until a visa number becomes available violated the statute governing adjustment of status for nonimmigrants. They sought injunctive and declaratory relief under the Administrative Procedure Act and the federal Declaratory Judgment Act.The plaintiffs had initially moved for a preliminary injunction in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, but their motion was denied. They appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.The Fifth Circuit, however, found that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the case. The court cited the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which strips federal courts of jurisdiction to address many challenges brought in the context of immigration proceedings. The court concluded that the INA's jurisdiction-stripping provisions precluded it from hearing the plaintiffs' challenge. The court vacated the district court's decision and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss it for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. View "Cheejati v. Blinken" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between CP Anchorage Hotel 2, LLC, doing business as Hilton Anchorage, and Unite Here! Local 878, AFL-CIO, a union representing the hotel's housekeepers. The conflict arose in 2018 when the hotel underwent substantial renovations, including replacing old bathtub showers with walk-in, glass-walled showers in about half of the guest rooms. After the renovations, the hotel required the housekeepers to meet the same room-cleaning quotas as before, despite the housekeepers' claims that the rooms were now harder to clean and required different skills and equipment. The hotel also threatened to discipline housekeepers who failed to meet these quotas. The union filed an unfair labor practice charge with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), arguing that the hotel's unilateral actions affected bargaining unit employees.The NLRB found that the hotel had committed unfair labor practices by failing to provide the union with requested information relevant to bargaining, unilaterally changing its housekeepers' duties by increasing the work required per room but maintaining the same room-cleaning quota, and threatening its housekeepers with discipline if they failed to comply with the increased workload requirements. The NLRB ordered the hotel to rescind the unlawful changes to the housekeepers' working conditions and to compensate the housekeepers for any loss of earnings due to the hotel's unlawful conduct.The hotel petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review, arguing that decisions like the renovation decision did not require bargaining with a union. The court disagreed, finding that the hotel had an obligation to give the union a meaningful opportunity to bargain over the changes to the housekeepers' duties. The court denied the hotel's petition for review and granted the NLRB's cross-application for enforcement of its order. View "CP Anchorage Hotel 2, LLC v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law