In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to deny absolute and qualified immunity to two social workers, Gloria Vazquez and Mirta Johnson, in a case brought against them by Sydney Rieman and her child, K.B. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by (1) failing to provide them with notice of a juvenile detention hearing where the County’s Child and Family Services sought custody of K.B., and (2) providing false information to the Juvenile Court about why Ms. Rieman was not noticed for the hearing.The court rejected the defendants' claim that they were entitled to absolute immunity for actions taken in their quasi-prosecutorial role as social workers. The court determined that the failure to provide notice of the hearing and the provision of false information to the Juvenile Court were not similar to discretionary decisions about whether to prosecute. Therefore, absolute immunity did not apply.The court also held that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity from suit for failing to provide notice of the hearing and for providing false information to the Juvenile Court. The court affirmed that Ms. Rieman had a due process right to such notice and that this right was clearly established. It was also clear that providing false information to the court constituted judicial deception. The court concluded that a reasonable social worker in the defendants' position would have understood that their actions were violating the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. View "RIEMAN V. VAZQUEZ" on Justia Law

The case arose from a drug trafficking operation led by Keith White in an Indiana prison. White, along with others, was indicted for conspiracy to distribute heroin after three inmates died of drug overdoses. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced under enhanced penalties due to his criminal history, which included two felony convictions for cocaine dealing. This was his second appeal challenging his sentence.White argued that his status as a career offender under the Sentencing Guidelines was improperly determined based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Kisor v. Wilkie. He contended that the guideline’s definition of a “controlled substance offense” unambiguously excluded inchoate offenses, such as conspiracy, and thus the application note expanding this definition deserved no deference.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit disagreed. It noted that the Supreme Court’s decision in Kisor did not unsettle Stinson v. United States, which provided that commentary in the Guidelines interpreting or explaining a guideline is authoritative unless it violates the Constitution, a federal statute, or is inconsistent with the guideline. Thus, the court deferred to the Sentencing Commission’s interpretation of the career-offender guideline.Additionally, the court rejected White's argument that the “major questions doctrine” invalidated the application note. The court concluded that the application note was not a “transformative expansion” of the Sentencing Commission’s authority, and, therefore, the doctrine did not apply. The court affirmed the judgment. View "USA v. White" on Justia Law

The case involves two Chinese-owned companies, Hikvision USA, Inc. and Dahua Technology USA Inc., that manufacture video cameras and video-surveillance equipment. They challenged an order by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) that implemented the Secure Equipment Act (SEA), which prevented the marketing or sale in the U.S. of their products listed on the “Covered List,” a list of communications equipment considered a threat to U.S. national security.The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the SEA ratified the composition of the Covered List and left no room for the petitioners to challenge the placement of their products on that list under a predecessor statute. However, the court agreed with the petitioners that the FCC’s definition of “critical infrastructure” was overly broad.The court concluded that the FCC's order prohibiting the authorization of petitioners' equipment for sale and marketing in the U.S. for use in the physical security surveillance of critical infrastructure was upheld. However, the portions of the FCC’s order defining “critical infrastructure” were vacated, and the case was remanded to the Commission to align its definition and justification for it with the statutory text of the National Defense Authorization Act. View "Hikvision USA, Inc. v. FCC" on Justia Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the defendant, Jyoti Agrawal, was convicted of three financial crimes. Agrawal had obtained over $1.5 million in federal and state grants to research and develop a scanning electron microscope. However, she forged a letter in her company’s application to the Department of Energy, and later lied about how the funds were spent. She diverted a portion of the grant funds for personal expenses, including her MBA. The district court found that Agrawal's conduct caused a loss of $1,548,255, which was used to calculate her sentencing guidelines range. She was also ordered to pay restitution of the same amount.On appeal, Agrawal challenged the district court’s evidentiary and instructional rulings at trial, its estimate of the amount of loss from her fraud, and its decision to find her personal property forfeitable due to the fraud. However, the Court of Appeals found that the alleged evidentiary and instructional errors were harmless, the district court properly refused to offset its loss amount by her project expenses, and the court properly subjected her personal property to forfeiture because she commingled that property with grant funds.Furthermore, the court rejected Agrawal's challenges to her sentence, including her claim that the court identified an incorrect guidelines range, miscalculated the restitution amounts, and entered an illegal forfeiture judgment. The court affirmed the lower court's decision. View "United States v. Agrawal" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed a decision by the Maryland Public Service Commission ("Commission") that approved a rate increase for the Washington Gas and Light Company ("Washington Gas"). The rate increase came after the Commission approved the acquisition of Washington Gas by AltaGas Limited ("AltaGas"). The Commission had imposed conditions on the merger, including a condition that required Washington Gas customer rates to reflect "merger-related savings" of "not less than $800,000 per year over the five years" following the merger’s closing. The Office of People’s Counsel ("OPC") objected to the Commission's interpretation of this condition and the approved rate increase.The court held that the appropriate standard of review for the Commission’s interpretation of its own prior order is the arbitrary or capricious standard. Using this standard, the court found that the Commission’s interpretation of the merger-related savings condition was not arbitrary or capricious. The court determined that the Commission had reasonably explained the inclusion of the condition in the merger order and OPC had not shown that this explanation was arbitrary or capricious. Therefore, the court affirmed the Commission's decision to approve the rate increase for Washington Gas. View "Petition of the Off. Of People's Counsel" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled on a case involving a plaintiff, Joann Ford, and a healthcare provider, Sandhills Medical Foundation, Inc. Ford, a former patient of Sandhills, alleged negligence, breach of implied contract, invasion of privacy, and breach of confidentiality against Sandhills for failure to protect her personally identifying information (PII). Her PII was stolen from Sandhills' third-party computer system in a cyberattack after she had ceased being a patient.The district court had previously granted Sandhills immunity from the suit, concluding that the theft of Ford's PII arose out of Sandhills' performance of “medical, surgical, dental, or related functions,” as per 42 U.S.C. § 233(a), thus substituting the United States as the defendant. However, the Fourth Circuit Court disagreed with the lower court's interpretation of § 233(a).The appellate court determined that data security does not fall under a “related function” within the meaning of the statute. The court emphasized that § 233(a) immunity applies when alleged damages arise from the provision of healthcare, which was not the case here. Ford’s injury did not arise from Sandhills’ provision of healthcare, but from a data security breach that occurred at least a year after she ceased being a patient at Sandhills.Therefore, the court concluded that Sandhills was not immune from the suit under § 233(a) and that the United States could not be substituted as the defendant. The case was vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ford v. Sandhills Medical Foundation, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves the death of Andrew Dawson Bell, who committed suicide while detained at the Washington County Detention Center (WCDC) in Fayetteville, Arkansas. Bell's mother, Judy Lynn Smith-Dandridge, filed a lawsuit against several Fayetteville Police Department officers, WCDC employees, nurses, and Washington County itself, alleging that they were deliberately indifferent to Bell's serious medical needs, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, Arkansas Code Ann. § 16-123-105. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants, and Smith-Dandridge appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.Bell had a history of mental illness and substance abuse. On the day he died, Bell had called the police several times, reporting hallucinations of people trying to break into his apartment. Officers responded but found no evidence of a break-in. They arrested Bell for terroristic threats, disorderly conduct, and carrying a weapon. When Bell was processed into WCDC, he informed the intake officers of his mental health history, including a history of suicidal ideation. Despite this, he was placed in the general population.The main issue on appeal was whether the police officers and WCDC personnel had knowledge of Bell's substantial risk of suicide and deliberately disregarded it. Smith-Dandridge argued that the officers’ interactions with Bell and their review of his arrest history established they had the requisite knowledge to establish deliberate indifference. However, the court found that while Bell's behavior put the officers on notice of signs of mental illness, it did not make it obvious to them that Bell had a substantial risk of suicide. Similarly, the court found that the WCDC personnel's inaction to prevent Bell's suicide did not constitute criminal recklessness.The court also dismissed Smith-Dandridge's claim that Washington County was deliberately indifferent in its failure to train jail staff. The court found that Smith-Dandridge failed to show that the alleged deficient training caused WCDC personnel to be deliberately indifferent to Bell's substantial risk of suicide. As such, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of all defendants. View "Smith-Dandridge v. Geanolous" on Justia Law

The case involves two separate petitions for review of decisions made by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to grant extensions of time for the completion of natural gas pipeline projects. The petitioners are Sierra Club and Public Citizen, and the respondents are FERC and the project developers, National Fuel Gas Supply Corporation, Empire Pipeline Inc., Cheniere Corpus Christi Pipeline L.P, and Corpus Christi Liquefaction LLC.The petitions primarily contend that FERC was overly generous in finding "good cause" to grant extensions for the completion of the pipeline projects. The petitioners argue that due to changes in circumstances, such as the introduction of New York's 2019 Climate Act, FERC was obliged to reconsider its original findings of market need for the projects.The court upheld FERC's decisions, finding that it exercised its broad discretion reasonably in both cases. It concluded that FERC's determinations of "good cause" were supported by the record, including National Fuel's litigation over water-quality certification and Cheniere's disrupted investment decision due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The court also found that FERC appropriately decided not to reevaluate its prior findings of market need for the pipeline projects. The court ruled that the petitioners' proposed stricter approach to assessing extension requests was unsupported by the Natural Gas Act and the Administrative Procedure Act. Therefore, the petitions for review were denied. View "Sierra Club v. FERC" on Justia Law

A medical malpractice lawsuit was filed by Dwan and Aaron Bray, individually and on behalf of their minor child, against Dr. Timothy J. Thress and various other medical entities. The suit, which was initially filed in state court, related to alleged negligence in Dwan Bray's prenatal care and the subsequent birth of their child. However, Thress was employed by a federally funded health center during his treatment of Bray. Under the Federally Supported Health Centers Assistance Act (FSHCAA), the lawsuit was removed to federal court and the United States was substituted as the defendant.The U.S. government moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the Federal Tort Claims Act’s (FTCA) administrative exhaustion requirement. The plaintiffs countered by moving to remand the action to state court, arguing that the FSHCAA did not apply. The district court denied both of plaintiffs’ motions, finding the FSHCAA applicable and any attempt to amend plaintiffs’ complaint futile. The district court dismissed plaintiffs’ FTCA claim without prejudice and remanded plaintiffs’ claims against the remaining defendants to state court. The plaintiffs appealed the district court’s denial of their motion to remand and its dismissal of their FTCA claim.The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decisions. It held that Thress's conduct was covered by the FSHCAA, and that the plaintiffs' attempts to amend their complaint were futile since they had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies under the FTCA before instituting the lawsuit. View "Bray v. Bon Secours Mercy Health, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Mississippi was asked to decide whether the Mississippi State Department of Health (MSDH) was required to admit evidence of a concurrent Certificate of Need (CON) application during the CON hearing for another healthcare facility. The MSDH had simultaneously considered two CON applications, one from Encompass Health Rehabilitation Hospital and one from Baptist Memorial Rehabilitation Hospital, for the same category of services. The MSDH did not admit the Baptist application or certificate, and the chancery court reversed the decision solely on this issue.The Supreme Court of Mississippi ruled that the chancery court was in error, and that the MSDH's decision on relevance or its decision not to reopen a closed hearing was not reversible error. The Supreme Court found that the MSDH did not abuse its discretion or violate due process in determining that the Baptist CON application was not relevant to the Encompass' CON application proceedings.The Supreme Court vacated the chancery court’s decision and remanded the case to the chancery court for a decision on the merits of Methodist’s appeal. The chancery court had failed to address the substance of Methodist’s appeal regarding the granting of a CON to Encompass, and the issue was not squarely before the Supreme Court. View "Encompass Health Rehabilitation Hospital of Flowood, LLC v. Mississippi Methodist Hospital and Rehabilitation Center, Inc." on Justia Law