In this case, the Nebraska Supreme Court reversed the lower court's denial of summary judgment, determining that the Lincoln Public Schools (LPS), a political subdivision, retained immunity from an employee's wrongful discharge claim under the discretionary function exemption of the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act (PSTCA). The plaintiff, Lynne Simpson, claimed LPS wrongfully terminated her in retaliation for her filing a workers' compensation claim. LPS asserted sovereign immunity and immunity under the PSTCA, arguing that its decision to terminate Simpson's employment was a discretionary act.The Nebraska Supreme Court held that employment and termination decisions generally involve a judgment of the kind that the discretionary function exemption is designed to shield. The court found that LPS's decision to terminate Simpson's employment involved an element of judgment, as LPS had to balance information about Simpson's performance against information about her criminal history and honesty issues. Therefore, the court concluded that LPS was entitled to immunity under the discretionary function exemption and remanded the case with directions to dismiss. The court did not rule on LPS's claim that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction due to the exclusivity provisions of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, as it had already found that LPS was immune from suit. View "Simpson v. Lincoln Public Schools" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) could withhold records relating to a criminal investigation based on Exemption 7(A) of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). This exemption allows federal agencies to withhold records if their release could reasonably be expected to interfere with law enforcement proceedings.In the case, Mark Zaid, an attorney, requested records related to the FBI's criminal investigation into one of his clients, Zackary Sanders, who had been charged with production and possession of child pornography. The FBI refused to release the requested records, citing Exemption 7(A) of FOIA. Zaid then sued the FBI to release the records, but the district court found the records were exempt from disclosure.The appeals court agreed with the district court's decision, stating that the disclosure of these records could reasonably be expected to interfere with ongoing or future investigations and prosecutions of child pornography cases. The court also noted that forcing the FBI to disclose information exchanged between law enforcement agencies could make those agencies hesitant to share information in the future, which would harm FBI investigations. The court also dismissed Zaid's arguments that cited two decisions from the Middle District of Florida, stating those decisions were not binding on the district court or the appeals court. View "Zaid v. Department of Justice" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Maryland held that the State's duty to preserve scientific identification evidence, such as DNA, is limited to specific crimes specified in the Criminal Procedure Article ("CP") § 8-201(j)(1)(ii) and does not extend to all crimes for which a person may petition for DNA testing. The Court ruled that the preservation obligation does not apply to the inchoate (or incomplete) offenses of those crimes listed under the same section of the law. The Court also found that the State's duty to preserve evidence does not extend to attempted murder.The case involved Darrell Eugene Matthews who had been convicted of attempted murder and was seeking post-conviction DNA testing of a glove found at the crime scene. The glove had been destroyed according to the police department's evidence retention policy after Matthews's first petition for DNA testing. The Court held that the circuit court correctly denied Matthews's second petition for post-conviction DNA testing because the State was not required to preserve evidence related to Matthews's attempted murder conviction for the duration of his sentence. The Court also found that the evidence Matthews sought to test had been destroyed in line with the police department's evidence retention policy. View "Matthews v. State" on Justia Law

In this appeal, a married couple, both visually impaired, sued Colony Insurance Company to recover for the injuries they suffered when the wife fell down a restaurant's stairs. The couple had previously sued the restaurant and its owner for negligence in a New Hampshire state court, resulting in a default judgment against the defendants.The couple then sought to collect the judgment amount from Colony, the restaurant's insurer, arguing that the insurer was obligated to pay under the restaurant's liability insurance policy. Colony denied the couple's claim, stating that it was not notified of the lawsuit against the restaurant "as soon as practicable," as required by the insurance policy. The couple contended that the insurance policy was compulsory under a City of Manchester ordinance, therefore the insurer could not deny the claim based on a breach of the notice provision in the policy.The District Court granted summary judgment to Colony, ruling that the insured had breached the insurance contract by failing to provide timely notice and that the compulsory insurance doctrine, which generally limits an insurer's defenses against an injured party's claim, did not apply. The couple appealed the decision, but the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the District Court's ruling.The Appeals Court held that, as a matter of law, the lack of timely notice constituted a breach of the insurance contract, thereby releasing Colony from payment. The court also agreed with the District Court's conclusion that the compulsory insurance doctrine did not apply to the case. The court noted that the doctrine has largely been applied in the context of automobile liability insurance and found no persuasive reason to extend it to this case. View "Jespersen v. Colony Insurance Company" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Louisiana was asked to decide if the Council of the City of New Orleans ("Council") had the legal standing to institute a lawsuit against various parties, including the Mayor of New Orleans, relating to the assets of the Edward Wisner Trust. The Council had challenged a 2020 agreement, which it alleged illegally disposed of public property and modified the trust without its oversight or input. The issue arose when the defendants filed an exception of lack of procedural capacity, arguing that the Council did not have the authority to institute the lawsuit. The trial court denied the exception, but the Court of Appeal reversed the decision, leading to an appeal to the Supreme Court.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal, holding that the Council did have the procedural capacity to bring the lawsuit. The court based its decision on its interpretation of the Home Rule Charter of the City of New Orleans ("HRC"), which indicated that the Council, as an independent entity distinct from the executive branch, had the legal capacity to function independently and to institute suits as necessary for the protection of the city's rights and interests. The court also considered the longstanding custom of the Council participating in litigation both as plaintiff and defendant. Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded that the Council had the legal standing to bring the lawsuit, and remanded the case to the Court of Appeal for further proceedings. View "THE COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF NEW ORLEANS VS. EDWARD WISNER DONATION" on Justia Law

In this appeal before the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the plaintiff, Kelly Chavez, had been denied supplemental security income due to her various mental and physical impairments. The administrative law judge (ALJ) at a hearing found that Chavez could perform jobs that existed in significant numbers in the economy. This decision was affirmed by the district court, leading to this appeal. Chavez contended that the vocational expert's testimony, which the ALJ relied on, did not provide substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's decision.The vocational expert, Sarah Holmes, testified that a person with Chavez's age, background, and ability could perform several light exertion jobs, such as cleaner, office helper, and storage rental clerk. She used a software program, Job Browser Pro, to estimate the number of jobs, which uses data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.Chavez's main argument was that Holmes did not explain Job Browser Pro's underlying formula, thereby rendering her testimony unreliable. However, the court held that Holmes's testimony provided substantial evidence for the ALJ's finding. The court highlighted that Holmes used a generally accepted source of job numbers, provided a straightforward overview of how the source worked, offered to provide additional information about the source's underlying formula, and identified jobs commonly found in the national economy. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Chavez v. O'Malley" on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiff, Kellie Farris, called 911 alleging that another woman had damaged her car. However, responding sheriff's deputies ended up arresting Farris instead. Farris alleged that during her arrest and subsequent transportation to jail, the deputies used excessive force. She also claimed that she was suicidal and that the deputies' actions were unreasonable given her state of mind.In response, the deputies argued that they had probable cause for Farris's arrest based on corroborated eyewitness testimony and physical evidence in Farris's car. They further contended that Farris's suicidal behavior justified the level of force used to restrain and control her.On reviewing the case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit agreed with the lower court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court found that the deputies had probable cause for Farris's arrest and that the force used was minimal and reasonably necessary given Farris's behavior. The court also rejected Farris's claim that the county had an unconstitutional policy of inadequately training its deputies, finding no evidence of deliberate indifference or a pattern of excessive force.The court noted that states may pass laws or prison policies that protect detainees' privacy or liberty more than the Constitution demands, but Farris failed to show how this was relevant to her Fourth Amendment claim.In conclusion, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, ruling in favor of the deputies and the county on all counts. View "Farris v. Oakland County" on Justia Law

In this case, Officer Ashton Lambert struck and killed Gregory Graham with his police cruiser while responding to a call. Graham's estate sued Lambert, the City of Fayetteville, and the Fayetteville Police Department, alleging negligence, gross negligence, and wrongful death.The trial court denied the City and Lambert's motions for summary judgment, arguing that governmental and public officer immunity barred the estate's claims. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision, leading to an appeal to the Supreme Court of North Carolina.The Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeals had improperly analyzed the summary judgment order. The Court of Appeals had focused on the sufficiency of the estate's complaint, rather than the presence of a genuine factual dispute. This was incorrect, as the court should have asked whether the evidence raised a genuine factual dispute on the existence and extent of the City’s waiver of immunity.The Supreme Court also found that the estate's claim that section 20-145 waived the city's governmental immunity failed as a matter of law. The statute, which exempts police officers from speed limits when chasing or apprehending criminal absconders, does not shield officers for their gross negligence. However, the statute does not contain clear language withdrawing immunity from a discrete government body.The court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to analyze whether there was a genuine issue of material fact on whether the City waived governmental immunity by purchasing liability insurance. The court also clarified that section 20-145 does not waive the City’s governmental immunity for its officers’ grossly negligent driving. The Estate’s claim against the City remains intact unless otherwise waived by the purchase of liability insurance. View "Est. of Graham v. Lambert" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of North Carolina ruled on a case involving Halikierra Community Services LLC (Halikierra), a provider of home personal care services to Medicaid beneficiaries and the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). DHHS had placed Halikierra on Medicaid reimbursement prepayment review following several overbilling complaints, leading to several post-payment audits. The audits revealed that Halikierra had erroneously received excess Medicaid reimbursement funds on multiple occasions and found suspicious reimbursement claims.Halikierra filed a lawsuit against DHHS, alleging that the decision to place them on prepayment review violated their substantive due process and equal protection rights under the North Carolina Constitution. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of DHHS, leading to an appeal from Halikierra.The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that summary judgment was properly entered against Halikierra. The Court found that Halikierra’s evidentiary forecast failed to disclose any genuine issues of material fact in support of its claims. The Court concluded that DHHS's actions were not arbitrary or capricious, as the prepayment review was rationally related to a legitimate government interest, namely combating Medicaid fraud and ensuring that claims meet the requirements of federal and state laws and regulations. The Court also found no evidence of unequal treatment of Halikierra compared to other Medicaid providers. View "Halikierra Cmty. Servs. LLC v. N.C. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit was tasked with evaluating a previous decision by the Postal Regulatory Commission (PRC) regarding cost allocation between the United States Postal Service's (USPS) market-dominant and competitive products. United Parcel Service (UPS), a competitor of the USPS, challenged the PRC's formula for allocating institutional costs.The USPS offers both market-dominant products, like standard mail (where it holds a near-monopoly), and competitive products, like package delivery (where it competes with private companies like UPS). The PRC's task is to ensure that the USPS's competitive products cover an "appropriate share" of institutional costs. In 2020, the court had remanded the PRC's Order that adopted a formula for this "appropriate share", and asked the PRC to better explain its reasoning.On remand, the PRC revised its analysis but maintained the same formula. The court of appeals concluded that the PRC had adequately addressed the previous issues identified and reasonably exercised its statutory discretion in adopting the formula. Consequently, UPS's petition for review was denied.The court found that the PRC's interpretation of the distinction between costs attributable to competitive products and costs uniquely or disproportionately associated with competitive products was reasonable. It also found the PRC's decision to not include attributable costs directly in the appropriate share to be reasonable, to avoid double-counting. The court rejected UPS's claim that the PRC was required to allocate all of the USPS's institutional costs between market-dominant and competitive products, and it also found that the PRC had adequately considered competitive products' market conditions. Lastly, the court upheld the PRC's proposed formula for setting the appropriate share. View "United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Postal Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law