The Supreme Court of Louisiana was asked to decide if the Council of the City of New Orleans ("Council") had the legal standing to institute a lawsuit against various parties, including the Mayor of New Orleans, relating to the assets of the Edward Wisner Trust. The Council had challenged a 2020 agreement, which it alleged illegally disposed of public property and modified the trust without its oversight or input. The issue arose when the defendants filed an exception of lack of procedural capacity, arguing that the Council did not have the authority to institute the lawsuit. The trial court denied the exception, but the Court of Appeal reversed the decision, leading to an appeal to the Supreme Court.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal, holding that the Council did have the procedural capacity to bring the lawsuit. The court based its decision on its interpretation of the Home Rule Charter of the City of New Orleans ("HRC"), which indicated that the Council, as an independent entity distinct from the executive branch, had the legal capacity to function independently and to institute suits as necessary for the protection of the city's rights and interests. The court also considered the longstanding custom of the Council participating in litigation both as plaintiff and defendant. Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded that the Council had the legal standing to bring the lawsuit, and remanded the case to the Court of Appeal for further proceedings. View "THE COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF NEW ORLEANS VS. EDWARD WISNER DONATION" on Justia Law

In this appeal before the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the plaintiff, Kelly Chavez, had been denied supplemental security income due to her various mental and physical impairments. The administrative law judge (ALJ) at a hearing found that Chavez could perform jobs that existed in significant numbers in the economy. This decision was affirmed by the district court, leading to this appeal. Chavez contended that the vocational expert's testimony, which the ALJ relied on, did not provide substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's decision.The vocational expert, Sarah Holmes, testified that a person with Chavez's age, background, and ability could perform several light exertion jobs, such as cleaner, office helper, and storage rental clerk. She used a software program, Job Browser Pro, to estimate the number of jobs, which uses data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.Chavez's main argument was that Holmes did not explain Job Browser Pro's underlying formula, thereby rendering her testimony unreliable. However, the court held that Holmes's testimony provided substantial evidence for the ALJ's finding. The court highlighted that Holmes used a generally accepted source of job numbers, provided a straightforward overview of how the source worked, offered to provide additional information about the source's underlying formula, and identified jobs commonly found in the national economy. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Chavez v. O'Malley" on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiff, Kellie Farris, called 911 alleging that another woman had damaged her car. However, responding sheriff's deputies ended up arresting Farris instead. Farris alleged that during her arrest and subsequent transportation to jail, the deputies used excessive force. She also claimed that she was suicidal and that the deputies' actions were unreasonable given her state of mind.In response, the deputies argued that they had probable cause for Farris's arrest based on corroborated eyewitness testimony and physical evidence in Farris's car. They further contended that Farris's suicidal behavior justified the level of force used to restrain and control her.On reviewing the case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit agreed with the lower court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court found that the deputies had probable cause for Farris's arrest and that the force used was minimal and reasonably necessary given Farris's behavior. The court also rejected Farris's claim that the county had an unconstitutional policy of inadequately training its deputies, finding no evidence of deliberate indifference or a pattern of excessive force.The court noted that states may pass laws or prison policies that protect detainees' privacy or liberty more than the Constitution demands, but Farris failed to show how this was relevant to her Fourth Amendment claim.In conclusion, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, ruling in favor of the deputies and the county on all counts. View "Farris v. Oakland County" on Justia Law

In this case, Officer Ashton Lambert struck and killed Gregory Graham with his police cruiser while responding to a call. Graham's estate sued Lambert, the City of Fayetteville, and the Fayetteville Police Department, alleging negligence, gross negligence, and wrongful death.The trial court denied the City and Lambert's motions for summary judgment, arguing that governmental and public officer immunity barred the estate's claims. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision, leading to an appeal to the Supreme Court of North Carolina.The Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeals had improperly analyzed the summary judgment order. The Court of Appeals had focused on the sufficiency of the estate's complaint, rather than the presence of a genuine factual dispute. This was incorrect, as the court should have asked whether the evidence raised a genuine factual dispute on the existence and extent of the City’s waiver of immunity.The Supreme Court also found that the estate's claim that section 20-145 waived the city's governmental immunity failed as a matter of law. The statute, which exempts police officers from speed limits when chasing or apprehending criminal absconders, does not shield officers for their gross negligence. However, the statute does not contain clear language withdrawing immunity from a discrete government body.The court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to analyze whether there was a genuine issue of material fact on whether the City waived governmental immunity by purchasing liability insurance. The court also clarified that section 20-145 does not waive the City’s governmental immunity for its officers’ grossly negligent driving. The Estate’s claim against the City remains intact unless otherwise waived by the purchase of liability insurance. View "Est. of Graham v. Lambert" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of North Carolina ruled on a case involving Halikierra Community Services LLC (Halikierra), a provider of home personal care services to Medicaid beneficiaries and the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). DHHS had placed Halikierra on Medicaid reimbursement prepayment review following several overbilling complaints, leading to several post-payment audits. The audits revealed that Halikierra had erroneously received excess Medicaid reimbursement funds on multiple occasions and found suspicious reimbursement claims.Halikierra filed a lawsuit against DHHS, alleging that the decision to place them on prepayment review violated their substantive due process and equal protection rights under the North Carolina Constitution. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of DHHS, leading to an appeal from Halikierra.The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that summary judgment was properly entered against Halikierra. The Court found that Halikierra’s evidentiary forecast failed to disclose any genuine issues of material fact in support of its claims. The Court concluded that DHHS's actions were not arbitrary or capricious, as the prepayment review was rationally related to a legitimate government interest, namely combating Medicaid fraud and ensuring that claims meet the requirements of federal and state laws and regulations. The Court also found no evidence of unequal treatment of Halikierra compared to other Medicaid providers. View "Halikierra Cmty. Servs. LLC v. N.C. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit was tasked with evaluating a previous decision by the Postal Regulatory Commission (PRC) regarding cost allocation between the United States Postal Service's (USPS) market-dominant and competitive products. United Parcel Service (UPS), a competitor of the USPS, challenged the PRC's formula for allocating institutional costs.The USPS offers both market-dominant products, like standard mail (where it holds a near-monopoly), and competitive products, like package delivery (where it competes with private companies like UPS). The PRC's task is to ensure that the USPS's competitive products cover an "appropriate share" of institutional costs. In 2020, the court had remanded the PRC's Order that adopted a formula for this "appropriate share", and asked the PRC to better explain its reasoning.On remand, the PRC revised its analysis but maintained the same formula. The court of appeals concluded that the PRC had adequately addressed the previous issues identified and reasonably exercised its statutory discretion in adopting the formula. Consequently, UPS's petition for review was denied.The court found that the PRC's interpretation of the distinction between costs attributable to competitive products and costs uniquely or disproportionately associated with competitive products was reasonable. It also found the PRC's decision to not include attributable costs directly in the appropriate share to be reasonable, to avoid double-counting. The court rejected UPS's claim that the PRC was required to allocate all of the USPS's institutional costs between market-dominant and competitive products, and it also found that the PRC had adequately considered competitive products' market conditions. Lastly, the court upheld the PRC's proposed formula for setting the appropriate share. View "United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Postal Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

The case in question involves a defendant, Saba Rosario Ventura, who was initially detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) after the District Court ordered his release on bail pending his criminal trial. The District Court later dismissed the indictment against Ventura, arguing that ICE had detained him in bad faith, aiming to circumvent the bail order. The case was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which previously remanded the case to the District Court to clarify whether it had found that ICE's detention of Ventura was a direct violation of a federal court order releasing him under the Bail Reform Act.On remand, the District Court reasserted its claim that ICE's detention of Ventura was pretextual and in bad faith, not for removal, but to detain him pending his criminal trial. However, the Court of Appeals disagreed, finding no substantial evidence to support the District Court's assertion. The Court of Appeals noted that the District Court's finding was based on legal arguments rather than factual evidence. It also noted that, even if ICE disagreed with the District Court's assessment of Ventura's risk of flight, it was not enough to prove that ICE's detention was pretextual.The Court of Appeals ultimately reversed the District Court's orders, concluding that the finding of ICE's pretextual and bad faith detention of Ventura was clearly erroneous, given the lack of factual evidence. View "United States v. Ventura" on Justia Law

The case involves a petition by Inhance Technologies, L.L.C. against orders issued by the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Inhance, a company that has been fluorinating plastic containers since 1983, was charged by the EPA for violating a Significant New Use Rule regarding long-chain perfluoroalkyls (PFAS) due to the presence of PFAS in an insecticide stored in a container fluorinated by Inhance. PFAS are long-lasting chemicals found in various products and have been linked to several health issues. The EPA issued two orders under Section 5 of the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), prohibiting Inhance from manufacturing or processing PFAS during its fluorination process. Inhance claimed that if the orders were enforced, they would shutdown their fluorination process and bankrupt the company.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled in favor of Inhance, stating that the EPA exceeded its statutory authority by issuing the orders. The court held that Inhance's decades-old fluorination process could not be deemed a "significant new use" under Section 5 of TSCA. The court vacated the EPA's orders and noted that the EPA could regulate Inhance's fluorination process under Section 6 of TSCA, which requires a cost-benefit analysis for ongoing uses. The court's ruling was based on the interpretation of the term "new" in TSCA, the statutory framework, and the requirement for agencies to provide fair notice of their rules. View "Inhance Technologies v. EPA" on Justia Law

In a case heard by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company and other cigarette manufacturers and retailers challenged the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) new warning-label requirement for cigarette packages and advertisements, citing violations of the First Amendment, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and the requirements of the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (TCA). The district court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs based on their First Amendment claim, without addressing the remaining claims.The FDA appealed, and the appellate court reversed the district court's decision. The court held that the warnings were both factual and uncontroversial, thus qualifying for scrutiny under the standard set by the Supreme Court in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Council of Supreme Court of Ohio. In that case, the Supreme Court held that the government could constitutionally require advertisers to disclose purely factual and uncontroversial information, provided the requirements are reasonably related to a substantial government interest and not unjustified or unduly burdensome.Applying the Zauderer standard, the court determined that the FDA's warnings were justified by the government's interest in promoting greater public understanding of the negative health consequences of smoking and were not unduly burdensome. As such, the court concluded that the warnings did not violate the First Amendment. The court remanded the case back to the district court for consideration of the remaining claims under the APA. View "R J Reynolds Tobacco v. FDA" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed a district court's grant of summary judgment, based on qualified immunity, in favor of government attorneys Michael Spindler-Krage and Thomas Canan. The plaintiff, Michael Davitt, had brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Spindler-Krage and Canan, alleging they violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when they advised police that Davitt could be removed from his hotel room without eviction proceedings.During the COVID-19 pandemic, Olmsted County, Minnesota, arranged temporary, non-communal housing for elderly and vulnerable homeless individuals. Davitt, who was 69 years old and homeless, was moved into a Super 8 hotel room. When the county stopped paying for his room, Davitt refused to leave, citing a Minnesota governor's executive order temporarily prohibiting evictions. Spindler-Krage and Canan, after reviewing the relevant state law, the executive order, and the Agreement for Hotel Guests, advised the police that Davitt was a hotel guest, not a tenant protected by the executive order.In granting Spindler-Krage and Canan summary judgment based on qualified immunity, the district court found that no case law, statute, or other legal authority clearly established that Davitt was a tenant with a constitutionally protected right to his hotel room. The court also found that the advice provided to the police was objectively reasonable. The Court of Appeals agreed, ruling that Spindler-Krage and Canan did not violate Davitt’s clearly established rights and were thus entitled to qualified immunity. View "Davitt v. Krage" on Justia Law