In the case at hand, the defendant, Christopher Condron, was convicted of wire fraud and conspiracy to defraud the United States by obtaining payment for false claims. He had been involved in submitting applications to the United States Department of the Treasury for grant money in connection with supposed renewable energy projects. The applications were submitted on behalf of four different companies, which were created under the name of his then-girlfriend, Jessica Metivier.Condron appealed his conviction on three main grounds: 1) He argued that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction on all counts. 2) He claimed that the government's argument and evidence at trial constructively amended, or at least prejudicially varied from, one of the wire fraud counts. 3) He contended that the district court abused its discretion when it limited his cross-examination of a key government witness.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit rejected all three arguments and affirmed Condron's conviction. It found that there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction, that the government did not constructively amend or prejudicially vary from the indictment, and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting Condron's cross-examination of a key government witness. View "US v. Condron" on Justia Law

Three shareholders of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac sued the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) and the Department of the Treasury, alleging harm from the unconstitutional removal restriction of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008. Their claims were based on the premise that if President Trump had been able to remove the FHFA Director without restrictions, he would have ended a provision that, in the event of liquidation, allowed the Treasury to recover its full preference before any other shareholder. The district court dismissed the shareholders' claims, finding that they did not sufficiently demonstrate any harm.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court noted that to challenge agency action, a party must not only show that the removal restriction is unconstitutional but also that the provision caused or would cause them harm. The court found that the shareholders' assertions did not satisfy this standard. They relied heavily on a post-presidency letter from President Trump expressing his desire to have removed the FHFA Director during his presidency. The court determined that this letter did not meet the criteria of a "public statement expressing displeasure" as outlined by the Supreme Court in Collins v. Yellen. Furthermore, the court found the shareholders' circumstantial evidence of harm speculative and insufficient to state a claim for relief. Therefore, the court affirmed the dismissal of the claims. View "Bhatti v. Fed. Housing Finance Agency" on Justia Law

This appeal originates from a dispute between Alameda Health System (AHS) and Alameda County Employees’ Retirement Association (ACERA), concerning the method employed by ACERA to calculate the annual contributions that participating employers must make towards unfunded liabilities. This system was intended to ensure the ability to finance the pensions promised to employees. AHS is one of seven public entities that are part of ACERA's retirement system.Since 1948, ACERA has used the “Percentage of Payroll” method to calculate annual contributions for unfunded liabilities among its participating employers. This common approach pools actuarial risk to reduce volatility in contribution rates, simplify contribution calculations, and ensure timely funding for the retirement system. AHS raised concerns about this method in 2015, suggesting an alternative approach, the “Percentage of Liability” method, could result in AHS paying $12 million less in contributions each year.AHS requested that ACERA change its methodology and retrospectively reallocate contributions made of “approximately $65 million.” ACERA's Board unanimously voted to deny AHS's requests after consideration and consultation. AHS subsequently filed a petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory relief challenging ACERA’s decisions. In 2022, the court granted ACERA's motion for summary judgment and AHS appealed. The appeals court affirmed the judgment, finding no abuse of discretion by ACERA or the lower court. View "Alameda Health System v. Alameda County Employees' Retirement Association" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to the United States Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) denial of a whistleblower award. The petitioner, John Meisel, reported his suspicions about his former tenant's involvement in a Ponzi scheme, which he read about in a newspaper, to the SEC. After the SEC's successful enforcement action against the scheme's perpetrators, Meisel applied for a whistleblower award. The SEC denied his application, reasoning that Meisel's information did not contribute to the enforcement action. Furthermore, his assistance to a court-appointed receiver, who was tasked with recovering funds related to the scheme, did not qualify him for an award as the receiver was not a representative of the Commission. Meisel appealed the denial, claiming it was arbitrary and unsupported by substantial evidence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied Meisel’s petition for review. The court held that the SEC's denial of the whistleblower award was neither arbitrary nor capricious, nor was it unsupported by substantial evidence. The court found that the SEC had not used Meisel’s information in its enforcement action, and therefore, his information did not lead to its success. The court also held that Meisel's assistance to the receiver did not qualify him for an award because the receiver was an independent court officer, not a representative of the SEC. Lastly, the court determined that Meisel could not qualify for an award in any related actions because he did not qualify for an award in the covered action. View "Meisel v. Securities and Exchange Commission" on Justia Law

This case revolves around Mr. Orville Thomas, a former U.S. Navy serviceman, who sought an earlier effective date for his post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) claim connected to his service. Thomas had initially filed a claim for "depressive mania" in 1971, after surviving a plane crash during his service, which had been denied by the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). In 2014, he requested to reopen his claim, submitting additional service department records not previously considered by the VA. While the VA granted service connection for PTSD in 2014, they denied an earlier effective date.Thomas appealed to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals, arguing the VA had overlooked certain service department records and regulations, specifically 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c), which could have potentially allowed for an earlier effective date. However, the Board agreed with the VA’s denial. Thomas further appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, arguing that the Board failed to consider all potentially relevant issues, violating its statutory duty under 38 U.S.C. § 7104(d)(1).The Veterans Court affirmed the Board's decision, arguing that Thomas did not demonstrate the relevance of his service records to his 1971 claim. Thomas appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which found that the Veterans Court applied a more stringent legal standard than required under 38 U.S.C. § 7104. It ruled that the Board must consider all "potentially applicable" regulations raised in the record, not only those proven to be relevant or favorable by the veteran.The Federal Circuit court vacated the Veterans Court’s decision and remanded the case to the Board to provide an adequate written statement of its reasons for denying Thomas's claim for an earlier effective date for his PTSD, considering all relevant regulations and records. View "Thomas v. McDonough" on Justia Law

The case at hand involves Candise Gore, who sued various individuals and governmental entities claiming she was wrongfully strip-searched at the Dorchester County Detention Center. Gore claimed against the Dorchester County Sheriff's Office, which operates the facility, for reckless infliction of emotional distress. The case was moved to the United States District Court due to the inclusion of federal law claims. The court had to decide whether the bar under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act of claims of "intentional infliction of emotional harm" applied to claims of reckless infliction of emotional distress.The court examined past South Carolina case law and the South Carolina Tort Claims Act. It noted that the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, also known as outrage, could be caused by extreme and outrageous conduct that intentionally or recklessly inflicts severe emotional distress. The court further indicated that several jurisdictions consider intentional infliction of emotional distress and reckless infliction of emotional distress as the same cause of action. Consequently, the court concluded that reckless infliction of emotional distress was a subset of intentional infliction of emotional distress and that there was no separate cause of action in South Carolina for the reckless infliction of emotional distress.However, to provide a complete response, the court also considered the definition of "loss" in the South Carolina Tort Claims Act. The court concluded that since reckless infliction of emotional distress was a subset of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the bar to recovery for the intentional infliction of emotional distress also covered any conduct by a governmental entity that might be merely reckless but yet satisfied the elements of the cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court therefore held that the bar to recovery for the intentional infliction of emotional distress applied to the subset of claims for the reckless infliction of emotional distress. View "Gore v. Dorchester County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

In an effort to curb illegal immigration, the Texas legislature passed Senate Bill 4 (S.B. 4), which amended various statutes. The new laws prohibited noncitizens from illegally entering or reentering the state and established removal procedures. However, the United States, two non-profit organizations, and the county of El Paso challenged S.B. 4, arguing that it was preempted by federal law. The district court granted a preliminary injunction, and the state of Texas appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied Texas’s motion to stay the injunction, arguing that the state had not shown it was likely to succeed on the merits of its preemption claims. The court found that the federal government has broad and exclusive power over immigration, including the entry and removal of noncitizens. The court also noted that the Texas law interfered with the federal government's foreign policy objectives and could lead to unnecessary harassment of noncitizens who federal officials determine should not be removed.Furthermore, the court concluded that S.B. 4 conflicted with federal law because it blocked the federal government's discretion to decide whether to initiate criminal proceedings or civil immigration proceedings once a noncitizen is apprehended, and because it permitted state courts to impose criminal sanctions and order removal of noncitizens without the federal government's input.In light of these findings, the court ruled that the balance of equities weighed against granting a stay. The court emphasized that any time a state is prevented from enforcing statutes enacted by its representatives, it suffers a form of irreparable injury. However, the court also noted that enforcement of S.B. 4 could lead to international friction and potentially take the United States out of compliance with its treaty obligations. Therefore, the court denied Texas's motion for a stay pending appeal. View "United States v. Texas" on Justia Law

The court case involves Ferrellgas, L.P., which was appealing against an order enforcing a subpoena issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The subpoena was part of an EEOC investigation into a discrimination charge filed by an employee, alleging that Ferrellgas had engaged in discriminatory hiring, pay, and termination practices.Ferrellgas contended that the subpoena was improperly served, was facially invalid due to procedural errors, was overly broad, and would impose an undue burden. Ferrellgas also argued that the subpoena sought information on hiring practices, which was irrelevant to the specific discrimination charge. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected all of Ferrellgas's arguments.The Court found that the subpoena was served properly, despite Ferrellgas's claims to the contrary. It also ruled that the procedural errors in the subpoena were harmless and did not preclude its enforcement. The Court concluded that the subpoena was not overly broad, as the information sought could shed light on the alleged discriminatory practices. The Court also held that Ferrellgas failed to demonstrate that complying with the subpoena would impose an undue burden.In conclusion, the Court affirmed the district court's order enforcing the EEOC's subpoena, deciding that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in doing so. View "EEOC v. Ferrellgas, L.P." on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Robert Conway, appealed a decision by the district court that upheld the denial of his social security benefits by an administrative law judge (ALJ). The ALJ had found that Conway could perform "medium work" based on the testimony of a vocational expert. Under Terry v. Saul, the term "medium work" was presumed to imply a six-hour standing and walking limitation.However, Conway argued that this presumption was rebutted during the cross-examination of the vocational expert. When asked if someone could perform medium work if they were only able to be on their feet for six hours maximum, the expert responded that the three sample occupations provided would not be possible and it would be difficult to provide substitute unskilled, medium occupations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed with Conway, finding that the vocational expert's significantly different responses revealed that the expert did not understand the ALJ’s hypothetical to impliedly include a six-hour standing and walking limitation. As such, the expert’s response to the ALJ’s question had no evidentiary value to support the ALJ’s finding that Conway could perform jobs in the national economy. The court concluded that the error was not harmless and reversed the district court’s judgment, remanding the case to the Commissioner of Social Security for further proceedings. View "CONWAY V. O'MALLEY" on Justia Law

In a case certified by the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming, the Supreme Court of Wyoming was tasked with two questions regarding the duty of care owed by law enforcement officers to suspects while conducting an investigation.The first question asked whether a law enforcement officer acting within the scope of their duties owed a duty of care to the suspect(s) in a criminal investigation to conduct that investigation in a non-negligent manner. The court affirmed that law enforcement officers indeed owe such a duty, consistent with existing precedent.The second question asked whether, if a duty of care is owed, the law enforcement officer is entitled to assert qualified immunity under Wyoming law. The court affirmed that law enforcement officers are entitled to assert qualified immunity. Qualified immunity protects officers who act in good faith and whose actions are reasonable under the circumstances, and it serves important policy purposes, such as protecting law enforcement from the risk of being liable for mistakes made in the performance of their duties.The specific facts of the case involved a law enforcement officer who had received a tip about a suspected marijuana growing operation and subsequently initiated an investigation. The suspect, Deborah Palm-Egle, later filed a civil action against the officer and other parties, alleging a variety of tort claims. View "Palm-Egle v. Briggs" on Justia Law