Several individuals facing involuntary civil commitment under Washington’s Involuntary Treatment Act were entitled to appointed counsel. The King County Department of Public Defense (DPD) was responsible for providing this representation. During the spring and summer of 2024, DPD’s attorneys assigned to these cases reached their annual caseload limits, which are set by state standards. Despite having sufficient funding, DPD was unable to recruit additional attorneys and therefore notified the court when it could not assign counsel to new cases without exceeding the limits. When the court ordered DPD to provide counsel, DPD complied. The King County Executive was also ordered by the trial court to provide counsel, although in King County, only DPD has that authority.The King County Superior Court held an evidentiary hearing and subsequently issued orders requiring both DPD and the King County Executive to provide counsel to respondents. The court’s amended orders clarified that the decision of which attorney to appoint, and how to allocate caseloads, rested with DPD and the Executive, not with the court. Both DPD and the King County Executive sought review in the Washington Supreme Court. The Executive argued it should not be included in the orders due to the county’s charter, which provides DPD with exclusive authority and independence. DPD argued the orders effectively required it to violate mandatory caseload limits.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington held that the caseload limits for public defenders in the Standards for Indigent Defense are mandatory and that courts lack authority to order attorneys or agencies to violate these limits. However, the court found that the trial court did not actually order DPD to violate the caseload limits, as it left the method of compliance to DPD. The court reversed the orders as they applied to the King County Executive but affirmed the orders requiring DPD to provide counsel. View "In re Det. of M.E." on Justia Law

Douglas Hodge and Timothy Shane, both parolees, challenged the procedures used by the Kentucky Parole Board to revoke parole. Hodge’s parole was revoked after he failed to report his new address and absconded, following difficulties with his living arrangements and subsequent lack of communication with his parole officer. Shane was revoked after being caught driving under the influence and violating a condition prohibiting alcohol use. In each case, the final evidentiary hearing was conducted by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), not the Parole Board itself, with both parolees represented by counsel and able to present evidence and witnesses.For Hodge, the Kenton Circuit Court dismissed his petition, finding the two-hearing process and the Board’s review complied with Morrissey v. Brewer, and the Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed, holding due process was satisfied and the Board did not abuse its discretion. Hodge sought discretionary review in the Supreme Court of Kentucky. Shane’s claim was denied by the Franklin Circuit Court, which concluded the Board could delegate the final hearing to an ALJ. The Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed, holding statutory and constitutional requirements mandate the Parole Board itself conduct final revocation hearings, but found Shane’s appeal moot due to his release, applying the public interest exception.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed both cases to resolve conflicting appellate rulings. It held that the Kentucky Parole Board is authorized to delegate the conduct of final parole revocation hearings to ALJs, provided the Board retains the ultimate decision-making authority. However, the Court determined that due process is not fully satisfied unless parolees have an avenue, such as the ability to file exceptions to the ALJ’s findings, to present arguments directly to the Board. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals in Hodge’s case and affirmed the appellate decision in Shane’s case. View "HODGE V. KENTUCKY PAROLE BOARD" on Justia Law

An individual submitted a candidate filing form to appear on the ballot for Douglas County sheriff in the May 2026 primary election. Alongside his filing, he provided a letter from the director of the Nebraska Law Enforcement Training Center certifying that he possessed an “inactive” Nebraska law enforcement officer certificate. His certificate had been active from 1984 to 2009 but was inactive at the time of filing. The Douglas County Republican Party objected to his candidacy, arguing that Nebraska law required a candidate to hold an “active” certificate. The objection was supported by a memorandum and legislative materials suggesting legislative intent to require active certification.The Douglas County election commissioner reviewed the objection and determined that the candidate did not meet the requirements to run for sheriff, based on the inactive status of his law enforcement certificate. The candidate then filed an emergency application for special proceedings with the Nebraska Supreme Court, seeking to overturn the commissioner’s decision and compel his placement on the ballot. The Republican Party intervened, asserting that legislative history and statutory context supported the requirement of an active certificate.The Supreme Court of Nebraska heard the case as a special, summary proceeding under state election law. The court held that the relevant statute required only that a candidate “possess a law enforcement officer certificate,” and made no distinction between active and inactive status. The court found the statutory text to be unambiguous and declined to consider legislative history or administrative regulations. Accordingly, the court concluded that possession of an inactive certificate satisfied the statutory qualifications for candidacy. The judgment ordered that the candidate’s name appear on the ballot for the sheriff’s office. View "Martinez v. Jensen" on Justia Law

A group of individuals who were victims of a Ponzi scheme obtained a default judgment for fraud against two corporations involved in the scheme. Unable to collect on this judgment, they each applied to the California Secretary of State for restitution from the Victims of Corporate Fraud Compensation Fund, which compensates victims when a corporation’s fraud leads to uncollectible judgments. The Secretary denied their claims, arguing primarily that the underlying fraud lawsuit had been filed after the statute of limitations had expired, making the judgment invalid for purposes of fund payment.The victims challenged the Secretary’s denial by filing a verified petition in the Superior Court of Orange County, seeking an order compelling payment from the fund. The Secretary maintained that the statute of limitations barred the underlying fraud claim, but the trial court disagreed. The court held that because the defendant corporations had defaulted and thus waived the statute of limitations defense in the original lawsuit, the Secretary could not raise that defense in the current proceeding. The trial court ordered payment from the fund to the victims in the amounts awarded in the underlying default judgment.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed in part and reversed in part. The appellate court clarified that under the statutory scheme, neither the Secretary nor the trial court may relitigate the merits of the underlying fraud claim, including whether it was time-barred. The court held that the trial court’s inquiry is limited to whether the claimant submitted a valid payment claim under the specific statutory requirements; it cannot revisit defenses such as the statute of limitations. However, the court found error in the trial court’s failure to cap payments at $50,000 per claimant as required by statute, and remanded the case for correction of this aspect of the order. View "Dion v. Weber" on Justia Law

Amazon Services, LLC operated the online marketplace Amazon.com, which allowed third-party merchants to sell products to South Carolina residents. In 2016, although Amazon Services collected and remitted sales tax for products it and its affiliates sold, it did not do so for sales made by third-party merchants. After an audit, the South Carolina Department of Revenue assessed Amazon Services for $12,490,502.15 in unpaid sales taxes, penalties, and interest, claiming that Amazon Services was legally required to collect and remit sales taxes on third-party merchant sales due to the company's significant involvement in those transactions.Amazon Services contested the assessment before the South Carolina Administrative Law Court, which upheld the Department of Revenue’s determination, finding Amazon Services was “engaged in the business of selling” under the South Carolina Sales and Use Tax Act and thus responsible for remitting the tax. Amazon Services appealed, and the South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the Administrative Law Court’s ruling, agreeing with the interpretation that Amazon Services’ role in third-party sales triggered the statutory obligation to collect and remit sales tax.The Supreme Court of South Carolina granted certiorari and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that, under the plain language of subsection 12-36-910(A) of the South Carolina Sales and Use Tax Act, Amazon Services was “engaged in the business of selling” due to its comprehensive control and involvement in third-party transactions and was therefore required to remit sales tax on those sales. The Court also held that this application did not violate due process, as the relevant statutory provisions were in effect prior to the challenged assessment, and clarified that its holding was not based on interpreting tax statutes broadly but on ordinary statutory interpretation principles. View "Amazon Services v. SCDOR" on Justia Law

A property owner on West Point Island sought to extend an existing dock into Barnegat Bay. The owner obtained permits from both the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) and the Army Corps of Engineers, and received a tidelands license from the Tidelands Resource Council (TRC). After the extension was completed, it was found to be slightly south of the permitted location, prompting the owner to seek a modified permit and license for the as-built dock. The adjacent property owner objected, arguing the extension created navigational hazards and interfered with their own dock’s use.The TRC held public hearings, considered testimony and written submissions, and ultimately approved the modified license, finding the extension complied with applicable rules and did not interfere with navigation or the rights of the objecting neighbor. The DEP approved the decision. The neighbor appealed to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, arguing that the TRC lacked authority to set or modify pierhead lines through individual license proceedings and that such lines must be established uniformly around islands in advance under Section 19 of the Tidelands Act. The Appellate Division affirmed the TRC’s decision, finding it was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, and holding that the TRC was permitted to establish or modify pierhead lines in connection with individual licenses.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and held that the Tidelands Act authorizes the TRC to set or modify pierhead lines in the context of reviewing individual tidelands license applications, rather than requiring the TRC to establish uniform pierhead lines around all islands prospectively. The Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s judgment, concluding that the TRC did not exceed its statutory authority in issuing the licenses at issue. View "In the Matter of Jibsail Family Limited Partnership" on Justia Law

Several insurance companies participate in Indiana’s Assigned Risk Plan, a statutory system designed to ensure workers’ compensation coverage for employers unable to obtain insurance in the voluntary market. One participating insurer, Technology Insurance Company, provided coverage under this system. After handling a significant workers’ compensation claim and settling for over $2 million, the company sought reimbursement from the Indiana Compensation Rating Bureau, as provided in their agreements. The Bureau denied reimbursement, alleging the company had acted fraudulently. The company followed the dispute-resolution procedures required by contract, ultimately securing a favorable ruling from an administrative law judge, who ordered full reimbursement. The company then sought additional relief—attorneys’ fees, interest, and expenses—from the agency, but received no response despite repeated requests.After payment of the principal settlement amount but no fees or interest, the company sought judicial review in the Marion Superior Court, which found the Department of Insurance’s failure to rule was arbitrary and contrary to law. The trial court ordered the Bureau to pay fees, interest, and expenses. The Bureau appealed, and the Indiana Court of Appeals reversed, holding the company’s claims for fees were not governed by the parties’ agreements and must be presented anew to the Bureau.The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer, vacating the appellate court’s decision. The Court held that the company was required to exhaust administrative remedies, as set out in the Assigned Risk Plan and related agreements, but found the company had done so by pursuing its claims through the prescribed channels. The Court further held that the company was entitled to prejudgment interest, attorneys’ fees, and expenses under the contracts, and that these collateral claims could properly be added in the judicial review proceedings without further agency exhaustion. The judgment for the company was affirmed and the case remanded to the trial court for calculation and award of appropriate fees, interest, and expenses. View "Indiana Compensation Rating Bureau v. Technology Insurance Company" on Justia Law

During a prolonged standoff in Las Vegas, New Mexico, Alejandro Alirez shot Cristal Cervantes and her grandfather inside their home while livestreaming the incident on Facebook. Law enforcement officers from multiple agencies responded after being alerted that Alirez, believed to be armed and mentally ill, was acting erratically at the residence. Upon the deputies’ arrival and their attempt to make contact, gunshots were fired almost immediately, with Cristal and her grandfather ultimately killed during the ordeal. Law enforcement officers established a perimeter and called for tactical support, but Cristal was found unresponsive after Alirez surrendered hours later.The plaintiffs, including Cristal’s personal representative and her mother, brought suit against various law enforcement agencies and officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and New Mexico state law, alleging failure to intervene and negligence. The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico granted summary judgment for all defendants, concluding that qualified immunity barred the § 1983 claims and that the plaintiffs could not prevail on their state-law claims, including negligent investigation, negligent training, and loss of consortium.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Tenth Circuit held that the law enforcement officers did not affirmatively act to create or increase the danger to Cristal, a necessary element for liability under the substantive due process “danger-creation” exception, and thus the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. Additionally, the court found that the officers’ inability to intervene was caused by the immediate deadly threat posed by Alirez, precluding liability under New Mexico law for negligent investigation or related torts. The disposition of the case was affirmed in favor of the defendants. View "Salcido v. City of Las Vegas" on Justia Law

A healthcare provider operating as a covered entity under the federal Section 340B Drug Pricing Program purchased pharmaceuticals from several drug manufacturers. The provider alleged that these manufacturers engaged in a fraudulent scheme by knowingly charging prices for drugs that exceeded the statutory ceiling, resulting in inflated reimbursement claims submitted to Medicaid, Medicare, and other government-funded programs. The provider did not seek compensation for its own overcharges, but instead brought a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA), seeking to recover losses on behalf of the federal and state governments.The United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed the complaint with prejudice. It reasoned that, under the Supreme Court’s holding in Astra USA, Inc. v. Santa Clara County, Section 340B does not confer a private right of action for covered entities to sue drug manufacturers over pricing disputes; such claims must instead be pursued through the Section 340B Administrative Dispute Resolution process. The district court concluded that the provider’s FCA claims were essentially attempts to enforce Section 340B and should therefore be barred.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court held that the provider’s FCA claims were not barred by the absence of a private right of action under Section 340B or by the Astra decision, because the action was brought to remediate fraud against the government and not to recover personal losses or enforce Section 340B directly. The court further found that the provider had plausibly pleaded falsity under the FCA. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case for further proceedings. View "ADVENTIST HEALTH SYSTEM OF WEST V. ABBVIE INC." on Justia Law

A foreign service officer with the Department of State alleged that her employee evaluation review for 2016 contained false and prejudicial statements, which she claimed delayed her eligibility for tenure. After her administrative grievance was denied, she appealed to the Foreign Service Grievance Board. The Board conditionally dismissed her appeal, contingent on the Department providing certain corrective actions. Over the following years, the officer and the Department exchanged multiple motions regarding the completeness of the relief provided and attorney’s fees. Ultimately, the Board found that the Department had provided the promised relief, denied her motion for attorney’s fees on the grounds she was not a prevailing party, and closed the case, barring further filings.Subsequently, the officer filed a five-count complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, challenging several Board orders as arbitrary and seeking attorney’s fees, costs, and other relief. The district court dismissed counts I through IV as time-barred, holding that the 180-day statute of limitations began when the Board closed the case and was only paused during reconsideration proceedings, making her claims untimely. The court also dismissed count V for lack of jurisdiction, finding no right under Board rules to file further motions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the timely motion for reconsideration rendered the underlying Board order nonfinal for purposes of judicial review and reset the statute of limitations. Therefore, the officer’s claims in counts I through IV were timely. However, the appellate court affirmed dismissal of count V, concluding she failed to state a claim because the Board’s regulations did not guarantee her the right to additional filings or attorney’s fees. The decision was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings on counts I through IV. View "Simmons v. Rubio" on Justia Law