This case involves a minor plaintiff, identified as S.W., who suffered severe injuries inflicted by her father's girlfriend. The State of Montana's Department of Public Health and Human Services was sued based on claims that it negligently failed to remove S.W. from her father's home prior to the injuries. The District Court ruled that the state's child abuse investigation was negligent and had led to S.W.'s injuries. A jury awarded S.W. over $16 million in damages.Several issues were raised on appeal, including whether the District Court was correct in deciding that the state's immunity provision did not cover the State, but only individual persons, whether the state was negligent as a matter of law, and whether the assault on S.W. was foreseeable.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana held that the District Court was correct in its interpretation that the state's immunity provision did not extend to the State. However, the Supreme Court found that the District Court erred in its summary judgment that the State was negligent as a matter of law and that the assault on S.W. was foreseeable as a matter of law. The Court ruled that these issues contained material factual disputes that should be left to a jury. The Supreme Court also held that the District Court abused its discretion by imposing a disproportionate sanction on the State for spoliation of evidence. The judgment was reversed, the jury’s verdict was vacated, and the case was remanded for a new trial. View "S. W. v. State" on Justia Law

In this case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the plaintiff, Lebene Konan, alleged that the United States Postal Service (USPS) employees intentionally withheld her mail for two years. Konan, who is African American, owned two properties in Texas that she rented out to tenants. She claimed that USPS employees, Jason Rojas and Raymond Drake, deliberately failed to deliver mail to these residences because they didn't like the idea of a black person owning those properties.Konan filed a lawsuit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and also alleged violations of her equal protection rights. The district court dismissed her claims due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. Konan appealed the decision.The Appeals Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. It ruled that the district court erred in dismissing Konan's FTCA claim, finding that the postal-matter exception to the FTCA's immunity waiver did not apply to intentional acts such as those alleged. The court ruled that Konan's claims did not constitute a "loss," "miscarriage," or "negligent transmission" of mail, which are covered by the exception, as they involved intentional non-delivery of mail.However, the court agreed with the district court's dismissal of Konan's equal protection claims. The court held that Konan did not provide sufficient facts to support her assertion that the USPS employees continued to deliver mail to similarly situated white property owners while denying her mail delivery. It also held that her claims were barred by the intracorporate-conspiracy doctrine, which precludes conspiracy claims against multiple defendants employed by the same governmental entity. Therefore, the court affirmed the dismissal of Konan's equal protection claims. View "Konan v. USPS" on Justia Law

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled on a case involving the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) and a group of trusts associated with the National Collegiate Student Loan Trust. The central questions in the case were whether the trusts were "covered persons" under the Consumer Financial Protection Act (CFPA), and whether the CFPB was required to ratify the underlying action.The CFPB had initiated enforcement proceedings against the trusts for alleged violations related to servicing and collecting student loans, which the trusts had contracted out to third parties. The trusts argued that they were not "covered persons" under the CFPA and that the CFPB's action was untimely because it was initiated when the CFPB director was unconstitutionally insulated from presidential removal and ratified after the statute of limitations had expired.The Third Circuit held that the trusts were indeed "covered persons" under the CFPA because they were engaged in offering or providing a consumer financial product or service. The court also held that the CFPB was not required to ratify the action before the statute of limitations had run, following the Supreme Court's decision in Collins v. Yellen. The court concluded that there was no indication that the unconstitutional limitation on the President's authority to remove the CFPB Director harmed the Trusts, and thus no need for ratification. Therefore, the case was affirmed and remanded to the lower court for further proceedings with these determinations in mind. View "Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. National Collegiate Master Student Loan Trust" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed a lower court's ruling regarding a veteran, Bruce Hay, who was convicted of ten counts of stealing government property and six counts of wire fraud. The case centered around Hay's alleged exaggeration of his disability to gain benefits from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). The VA conducted a six-year investigation, even installing a pole camera that recorded Hay's daily activities outside his house for 68 days.Hay appealed his conviction on three grounds: insufficient evidence supporting his conviction, violation of his Fourth Amendment rights by the VA's installation of the pole camera, and wrongful admission of evidence by the district judge. The court rejected all three arguments.First, the court ruled that Hay's fraudulent acquisition of government property constituted "stealing" under 18 U.S.C. § 641 and that sufficient evidence was presented at trial to support his conviction for stealing government property and wire fraud.Second, the court held that the use of the pole camera did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment as it only captured his activities in public view.Lastly, the court rejected Hay's claim that evidence post-dating the charging period was improperly admitted, finding that the district court acted within its discretion.In conclusion, the court affirmed the district court's denial of a judgment of acquittal and the admission of contested evidence. View "United States v. Hay" on Justia Law

In this case, petitioners Montanans Securing Reproductive Rights and Samuel Dickman, M.D., sought a declaratory judgment on original jurisdiction against the Montana Attorney General and the Montana Secretary of State. The petitioners argued that the Attorney General wrongly determined that their proposed ballot issue was legally insufficient, had no authority to attach a fiscal statement to the ballot issue, and that their ballot statements complied with Montana Code Annotated sections 13-27-212 and -213.The Supreme Court of Montana held that the Attorney General did err in concluding that the proposed ballot issue was legally insufficient, as it did not violate the separate-vote requirement of Article XIV, Section 11, of the Montana Constitution. The proposal effects a single change to the Montana Constitution on a single subject: the right to make decisions about one's own pregnancy, including the right to abortion.The court also found that the Attorney General exceeded his authority by appending a fiscal statement to the proposed ballot issue because the budget director's fiscal note did not indicate that the issue would have a fiscal impact.Finally, the court declined to rule on the compliance of the petitioners’ ballot statements with Montana Code Annotated sections 13-27-212 and -213, directing the Attorney General to prepare a ballot statement in line with statutory requirements and forward it to the Montana Secretary of State.The court essentially concluded that the proposed ballot issue was legally sufficient and did not require separate votes for its multiple components, as they were all closely related to the central issue of reproductive rights. The court also confirmed that the Attorney General had overstepped his authority by attaching a fiscal statement to the ballot issue. View "Montanans Securing Reproductive Rights v. Knudsen" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Ilya Kovalchuk, was driving his vehicle when off-duty police officer Matthew Ward began driving erratically behind him, ordered him to pull over, and held Kovalchuk at gunpoint without any justification. Kovalchuk filed a lawsuit against Ward and the City of Decherd, Tennessee, alleging that Ward violated his Fourth Amendment rights and that the City’s failure to investigate Ward’s background before hiring him led to Kovalchuk’s injuries. The district court dismissed the claims against the City, finding that Kovalchuk failed to adequately plead allegations supporting municipal liability.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court determined that in order to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must allege facts that, if accepted as true, are sufficient to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. The court found that Kovalchuk did not plausibly allege that the City of Decherd was deliberately indifferent to a known or obvious consequence of its decision to hire Ward. According to the court, Kovalchuk's allegations of "issues," "concerns about [Ward’s] demeanor and professionalism," and his "fail[ure] to complete [a] training program" were insufficient to establish a causal link between Ward's hiring and Kovalchuk's injury. The court further stated that a plaintiff cannot use discovery to bridge the gap between a deficient pleading and the possibility that a claim might survive upon further investigation. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Kovalchuk's claims against the City of Decherd. View "Kovalchuk v. City of Decherd" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the convictions of three South Carolina law enforcement officers who were found guilty of various abuses of power. The trio, Sheriff George Underwood, Chief Deputy Robert Sprouse, and Lieutenant Johnny Neal, were convicted on multiple counts, including financial corruption, civil rights violations, and conspiracy.Underwood used his position as sheriff to enrich himself through illegal means, including forcing deputies to perform work on his personal property while on public payroll. He also orchestrated a scheme with Neal to skim money from the extra compensation meant for deputies at drunk-driver checkpoints. Additionally, Underwood and Sprouse misused county money for personal travel expenses.The court also found that Underwood abused his authority by targeting enforcement against opponents and refusing to investigate offenses reported against friends and supporters. Notably, Underwood unlawfully arrested a citizen for recording a car accident scene, which led to a violation of the citizen's civil rights.After the Federal Bureau of Investigation uncovered the corruption, Sprouse and Neal conspired to lie and fabricate documents to cover up their misconduct. The jury convicted the defendants on various counts, and the appeals court affirmed those convictions. The court also ruled that the district court's calculation of restitution for the losses sustained was reasonable. View "United States v. Underwood" on Justia Law

This case was before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit where the City of Huntington and Cabell County Commission (plaintiffs) brought a suit against AmerisourceBergen Drug Corporation, Cardinal Health, Inc., and McKesson Corporation (defendants), three distributors of opioids. The plaintiffs alleged that these companies perpetuated the opioid epidemic by repeatedly shipping excessive quantities of opioids to pharmacies, thus creating a public nuisance under West Virginia common law. The district court ruled in favor of the distributors, holding that West Virginia’s common law of public nuisance did not cover the plaintiffs’ claims.After a bench trial in 2021, the district court held that the common law of public nuisance in West Virginia did not extend to the sale, distribution, and manufacture of opioids. The court found that the application of public nuisance law to the sale, marketing, and distribution of products would invite litigation against any product with a known risk of harm, regardless of the benefits conferred on the public from proper use of the product. The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ proposed remedy, a 15-year “Abatement Plan” developed by an expert in opioid abatement intervention. The court held that this relief did not qualify as an abatement as it did not restrict the defendants' conduct or their distribution of opioids but generally proposed programs and services to address the harms caused by opioid abuse and addiction.The plaintiffs appealed the decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which certified the following question to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia: Under West Virginia’s common law, can conditions caused by the distribution of a controlled substance constitute a public nuisance and, if so, what are the elements of such a public nuisance claim? View "City of Huntington v. Amerisourcebergen Drug Corporation" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over the ownership of mineral royalty interests in land in McKenzie County, North Dakota. The plaintiff, Petro-Hunt, L.L.C., operates several oil and gas wells on pooled spacing units, which include land owned by the defendant, Greggory Tank. Tank argued that Petro-Hunt had wrongly distributed less than the full well revenues due to him and other defendants based on five assignments executed in 1937.The Supreme Court of North Dakota upheld the district court's decision, concluding that the court correctly determined that the five 1937 assignments burdened Tank’s southwest quarter mineral interest in the subject property. The court further concluded that Tank was not entitled to an accounting under N.D.C.C. § 38-08-09.4(3) and failed to establish that Petro-Hunt was a fiduciary. The court also concluded that Tank did not provide any basis for holding a fiduciary duty exists under the facts and circumstances of this case.The court rejected Tank's argument that he has a statutory right to an accounting under N.D.C.C. § 38-08-08(1) and N.D.C.C. § 38-08-09.4(3), stating that these provisions do not apply to this case. The court further noted that Tank did not demonstrate the Industrial Commission unitized his interests under sections 38-08-09.1 through 38-08-09.16. Therefore, N.D.C.C. § 38-08-09.4(3) and its accounting requirements for a unitized area do not apply in this case.The court's decision affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Petro-Hunt v. Tank" on Justia Law

In 2018, Steven Laurent Montgomery Jr. was sentenced to 18 years in prison, including two one-year enhancements for prior prison sentences, after pleading no contest to several violent felonies. Later, under Senate Bill No. 483, which invalidated most prison priors imposed before January 1, 2020, Montgomery became eligible for resentencing. Although the court struck the prison priors, it did not hold a resentencing hearing.This matter before the Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Three was to correct this oversight. The court agreed with the Attorney General's concession of error, reversed the trial court's order striking the prison priors, and remanded the case for a resentencing hearing under section 1172.75.The court also addressed a disagreement between the parties about the power of the prosecutor to withdraw from the plea bargain if the resentencing resulted in further sentence reductions. The court sided with Montgomery, concluding that the legislature intended to limit the prosecutor's ability to withdraw from the plea bargain due to sentence reductions at the resentencing hearing. The court's interpretation was based on the text and legislative history of Senate Bill No. 483, which indicated an intent to reduce or preserve sentences while limiting the prosecutor's ability to rescind plea agreements. View "People v. Montgomery" on Justia Law