In 2018, Michigan's Legislature received initiative petitions proposing the Improved Workforce Opportunity Wage Act and the Earned Sick Time Act. The Legislature adopted these initiatives without changes, preventing them from appearing on the ballot. However, during the lame duck session after the election, the Legislature significantly amended both laws, effectively nullifying their original intent.The plaintiffs challenged these amendments in the Court of Claims, arguing they were unconstitutional under Article 2, § 9 of the Michigan Constitution. The Court of Claims agreed, ruling that the Legislature could not adopt and then amend an initiative in the same session. The court declared the amendments void and reinstated the original initiatives. The state appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the decision, holding that the Legislature could amend an initiative in the same session since the Constitution did not explicitly prohibit it.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that Article 2, § 9 provides the Legislature with only three options upon receiving a valid initiative petition: adopt it without change, reject it, or propose an alternative to be voted on alongside the original. The Court ruled that adopting and then amending an initiative in the same session violated the people's right to propose and enact laws through the initiative process. Consequently, the amendments were declared unconstitutional. The Court ordered that the original initiatives would go into effect 205 days after the opinion's publication, with adjustments for inflation and a revised schedule for minimum wage increases. The Court of Appeals' judgment was reversed. View "Mothering Justice v. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the issuance of medical marijuana dispensary licenses in the city of Warren. In 2019, the Warren City Council adopted an ordinance to regulate these licenses, which involved a Review Committee scoring and ranking applications. The Review Committee held 16 closed meetings to review 65 applications and made recommendations to the city council, which then approved the top 15 applicants without further discussion. Plaintiffs, who were denied licenses, sued, alleging violations of the Open Meetings Act (OMA) and due process.The Macomb Circuit Court found that the Review Committee violated the OMA and invalidated the licenses issued by the city council. The court held that the Review Committee was a public body subject to the OMA and that the city council's approval process was flawed. Defendants and intervening defendants appealed, and the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that the Review Committee was not a public body under the OMA because it only had an advisory role, and the city council retained final decision-making authority. The appellate court also upheld the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' due process claims.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that the Review Committee was a public body subject to the OMA because it effectively decided which applicants would receive licenses by scoring and ranking them, and the city council merely adopted these recommendations without independent consideration. The court emphasized that the actual operation of the Review Committee, rather than just the language of the ordinance, determined its status as a public body. The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals to consider whether the open meetings held by the Review Committee cured the OMA violations and to address other preserved issues. View "Pinebrook Warren LLC v. City Of Warren" on Justia Law

The case involves the Michigan Farm Bureau and other agricultural entities challenging new conditions imposed by the Department of Environment, Great Lakes, and Energy (EGLE) in a 2020 general permit for Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations (CAFOs). The new conditions included stricter limits on phosphorus application, setback requirements, and a presumptive ban on waste application during certain months. The plaintiffs argued that these conditions exceeded EGLE’s statutory authority, were contrary to state and federal law, lacked factual justification, were arbitrary and capricious, unconstitutional, and invalid due to procedural failures under the Michigan Administrative Procedures Act (APA).Initially, the plaintiffs sought a contested-case hearing to challenge the permit but then filed for declaratory judgment in the Court of Claims. EGLE moved for summary disposition, arguing that the plaintiffs had not exhausted administrative remedies. The Court of Claims agreed, dismissing the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision but held that the plaintiffs could seek a declaratory judgment under MCL 24.264, provided they first requested a declaratory ruling from EGLE, which they had not done.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the 2020 general permit and its discretionary conditions were not "rules" under the APA because EGLE lacked the statutory authority to issue rules related to NPDES permits for CAFOs. Consequently, the Court of Claims lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under MCL 24.264. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals but vacated its holding that the discretionary conditions were rules. The Court emphasized that EGLE must genuinely evaluate the necessity of discretionary conditions in individual cases and that these conditions do not have the force and effect of law. View "Michigan Farm Bureau v. Dept. Of Environment Great Lakes And Energy" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the constitutionality of "release time" provisions in a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the City of Phoenix and the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Local 2384. These provisions allow certain employees to be released from their regular duties, while still being paid by the City, to perform union activities. The plaintiffs, who are non-union employees, argued that these provisions violate their free-speech, free-association, and right-to-work rights, as well as the Gift Clause of the Arizona Constitution.The Superior Court in Maricopa County granted summary judgment in favor of the City and the Union, finding that the release time provisions did not violate the plaintiffs' constitutional rights because the City, not the employees, paid for the release time. The court also found that the provisions did not violate the Gift Clause, as they served a public purpose and were supported by adequate consideration. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision, agreeing that the provisions did not violate the plaintiffs' rights and were supported by adequate consideration.The Arizona Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the release time provisions do not violate the free-speech, free-association, or right-to-work rights of the plaintiffs because the City pays for the release time. However, the Court found that the provisions violate the Gift Clause of the Arizona Constitution. The Court determined that the release time provisions do not provide adequate consideration to the City, as the benefits to the City are negligible compared to the substantial costs. Consequently, the Court vacated the Court of Appeals' opinion, reversed the Superior Court's decision, and remanded the case for the entry of judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on the Gift Clause claim. View "GILMORE v. GALLEGO" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, current or retired public school superintendents and administrators, filed a lawsuit against the Office of Retirement Services (ORS) alleging that ORS violated the Public School Employees Retirement Act by using salary schedules it created to determine their retirement allowances. The plaintiffs, who worked under personal employment contracts rather than collective bargaining agreements (CBAs), argued that the Retirement Act did not authorize ORS to create these normal salary increase (NSI) schedules and apply them to their pension calculations.The Court of Claims granted summary disposition in favor of the defendants on all claims except for a violation of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). After cross-motions for summary disposition, the Court of Claims also ruled in favor of the defendants on the APA claim. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that ORS lacked statutory authority to create NSI schedules and that MCL 38.1303a(3)(f) did not apply to employees under personal employment contracts. The Michigan Supreme Court affirmed the lack of authority for ORS to create NSI schedules but reversed the Court of Appeals' interpretation of MCL 38.1303a(3)(f), remanding the case for further proceedings.The Michigan Supreme Court held that the term "normal salary schedule" is a written document established by statute or approved by a reporting unit’s governing body, indicating the time and sequence of compensation, and applying to a generally applicable job classification rather than a specific employee. The Court clarified that this term is not limited to CBAs and applies to public school employees regardless of their employment contract type. The case was remanded to the Court of Claims to determine whether the plaintiffs were subject to a normal salary schedule as defined. View "Batista v. Office Of Retirement Services" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between Judge Kerry L. Burman, the Glendive City Judge, and Mayor Deb Dion of Glendive, Montana. Judge Burman petitioned for a writ of mandamus to reinstate Mary York to her position as Clerk of Glendive City Court after Mayor Dion terminated York's employment. The termination occurred following a disagreement over the justification for York's attendance at a training conference. York was terminated without notice and escorted out of the court, leaving unfinished work and causing operational disruptions.The District Court initially ordered York's interim reinstatement pending further review. Judge Burman argued that Mayor Dion's actions violated state statute, the court's holding in Carlson v. City of Bozeman, and the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. Respondents contended that Mayor Dion had the statutory authority to terminate York, who was still in her probationary period, and that the court's operations were not significantly impaired.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court determined that the matter was more appropriately characterized as an application for a writ of prohibition rather than mandamus. The court found that Mayor Dion's actions disrupted the court's operations and violated § 3-1-111, MCA, which grants courts the authority to control their ministerial officers. The court held that the executive's authority to hire or fire employees must be exercised in a manner that does not impair the court's ability to conduct its business.The Supreme Court of Montana granted the petition for a writ of prohibition, arresting Mayor Dion's action of terminating York's employment. The court emphasized the need for coordination between branches of government to avoid such disruptions. View "Burman v. City of Glendive" on Justia Law

The North Central Montana Regional Water Authority (the Authority) was created in 2000 through an interlocal agreement among several municipalities and county water and sewer districts. The Town of Kevin, a small municipality with fewer than 175 residents, did not sign the original agreement but signed several later documents attempting to join the Authority. The Town later sought to sever ties with the Authority, which resisted these attempts. On May 29, 2020, the Town sued the Authority, seeking a declaratory judgment under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act (UDJA) that it was not, and never had been, a member of the Authority, and also sought attorney fees.The Twelfth Judicial District Court held a bench trial and issued an order on November 10, 2022, declaring that the Town was not a member of the Authority and granting other relief. Subsequently, the Town filed a motion for attorney fees under the UDJA. On March 30, 2023, the District Court found that equitable factors supported awarding attorney fees to the Town, noting the significant disparity in resources between the Town and the Authority. The Authority appealed this order.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court affirmed the District Court's decision, holding that the UDJA provides a legal basis for awarding attorney fees between governmental entities when appropriate. The court found that the parties were not similarly situated, as the Town had significantly fewer resources compared to the Authority. The court also applied the "tangible parameters test" and concluded that the Authority possessed what the Town sought, it was necessary for the Town to seek a declaration, and the declaratory relief was necessary to change the status quo. Therefore, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney fees to the Town. The Supreme Court affirmed the award of attorney fees to the Town. View "Town of Kevin v. North Central Montana Regional Water Authority" on Justia Law

Robert Decker, a federal inmate, requested electronic access to the full, daily editions of the Federal Register from his prison law library. The Bureau of Prisons (BOP) denied his request, prompting Decker to file a pro se lawsuit under the Administrative Procedure Act. He claimed that the denial violated his First Amendment rights to receive information and petition the government. The BOP argued that its policy was justified by the need to conserve limited resources.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois granted summary judgment in favor of the BOP. The court applied the framework from Turner v. Safley, concluding that the BOP’s policy was reasonably related to its legitimate penological interest in conserving resources. The district court also denied Decker’s motions for the recruitment of counsel, finding that he was competent to litigate his case despite the challenges of incarceration.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, agreeing that the BOP’s policy was reasonably related to its legitimate interest in conserving resources. The court noted that the BOP provided access to documents pertaining to the Bureau and the U.S. Parole Commission and allowed inmates to receive print copies of the Federal Register through the mail. The court found that Decker had alternative means to exercise his First Amendment rights, although they were less convenient. The court also upheld the district court’s denial of Decker’s motions for the recruitment of counsel, concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion.In summary, the Seventh Circuit held that the BOP’s policy of providing limited electronic access to the Federal Register was constitutionally valid under Turner v. Safley and that the district court did not err in denying Decker’s request for appointed counsel. View "Decker v. Sireveld" on Justia Law

Jo Ann Macrina, the former Commissioner of the Department of Watershed Management for the City of Atlanta, was charged with taking bribes from a contractor, Lohrasb “Jeff” Jafari. Macrina made several decisions that favored Jafari’s company in the bidding process for a city contract. After the contract was awarded, Macrina received $10,000 in cash, a diamond ring, and other perks from Jafari. She also went to work for Jafari’s company shortly after leaving her city position. Macrina later contacted the FBI to report possible corruption, but during interviews, she admitted to receiving gifts from Jafari, which she later retracted.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia admitted portions of a recorded conversation between Macrina and federal agents, as well as the City of Atlanta’s Code of Ethics, over Macrina’s objections. The court also declined to give Macrina’s proposed jury instruction that any payments received after an official act were a gratuity and not a bribe. The jury convicted Macrina of bribery and conspiracy to commit bribery, and she was sentenced to 54 months in prison.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decisions. The appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the recorded conversation and the Code of Ethics, as both were relevant to proving Macrina’s corrupt intent. The court also found that the district court’s refusal to give Macrina’s proposed jury instruction was not an abuse of discretion, as the instruction misstated the law by failing to acknowledge that a payment received after an official act can still be considered a bribe if there was an agreement to accept the payment before the act was completed. View "USA v. Macrina" on Justia Law

In this case, a private insurance company, TIG Insurance Company, sought to enforce two judgments against the Republic of Argentina. The dispute centers on whether Argentina, as the successor to a state-owned Argentine company, Caja Nacional de Ahorro y Seguro, is liable under reinsurance contracts that Caja entered into with TIG in 1979. TIG alleged that Caja failed to pay as promised under these contracts, leading to arbitral awards and subsequent judgments in TIG's favor.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially ruled in favor of Argentina, finding that Argentina's property was immune from execution under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) because it was not used for commercial activity at the time the writ would issue. The court also held that the Illinois district court lacked jurisdiction over Argentina for the 2018 judgment and that TIG needed to amend the 2001 judgment in Illinois to name Argentina before seeking enforcement in D.C. TIG appealed these decisions.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that two FSIA exceptions—the arbitration and waiver exceptions—might apply. The court held that an agreement could be "made by" a sovereign if it legally binds that sovereign to arbitrate, even if the sovereign was not an original signatory. The court also found that implied waiver does not require evidence of subjective intent but can be based on objective actions, such as agreeing to arbitration or a choice-of-law clause. The court vacated the district court's decisions and remanded for further analysis and factfinding on these issues.The appellate court affirmed the denial of TIG's request for jurisdictional discovery and precluded TIG from advancing an alter ego theory or arguing that Argentina failed to raise its immunity in a responsive pleading. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's instructions. View "TIG Insurance Company v. Republic of Argentina" on Justia Law