The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the decision of the Commonwealth Court confirming certain modifications to a recovery plan for the City of Chester under the Municipalities Financial Recovery Act, commonly known as Act 47. The case arose from the City of Chester's financial distress, which led to the appointment of a receiver. The receiver sought to modify the existing recovery plan due to the City’s challenges and the failure of local officials to cooperate with his efforts. The City objected to several initiatives in the modified plan, arguing they unlawfully deprived its elected officials of their authority to govern on behalf of the residents. The Supreme Court held that the modifications were necessary to achieve financial stability in the City and were not arbitrary, capricious, or wholly inadequate to alleviate the City's fiscal emergency. The court emphasized that the financial health of the municipality was paramount and that local officials must accept the measures necessary for recovery, whether they like it or not. View "Dept of Comm and Econ Dev v. City of Chester" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed a lower court's ruling in a case involving Sarah Felts, who had been blocked on Twitter by Lewis E. Reed, the then-President of the St. Louis Board of Aldermen. Felts sued Reed in his official capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights had been violated. The district court ruled in favor of Felts, granting her declaratory relief, nominal damages, costs, and attorney’s fees. On appeal, the Board’s new President, Megan E. Green, challenged the district court's ruling.The court held that the act of blocking Felts on Twitter constituted a final municipal policy decision in the area of the City’s business associated with the office of the President of the Board of Aldermen. It also held that Reed administered the account under color of law as an official government account, and that blocking Felts violated her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court further concluded that Reed, as the President of the Board of Aldermen, had the authority to establish the final social media policy for his office and that his decision to block Felts was a deliberate choice of a guiding principle and procedure to silence online critics. Therefore, the City of St. Louis was held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court affirmed the district court's judgment granting Felts declaratory relief and nominal damages. View "Felts v. Green" on Justia Law

In this case, the Idaho State Athletic Commission and the Idaho Division of Occupational and Professional Licenses sought a declaratory ruling that provisions of the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act (APA) requiring legislative approval of pending administrative fee rules violated the Idaho Constitution. They also sought a Writ of Mandamus directing the Office of the Administrative Rules Coordinator to publish the Athletic Commission’s 2022 administrative rules in the Idaho Administrative Code. The Idaho Supreme Court held that it had jurisdiction to consider the case, but dismissed the petition for a declaration of unconstitutionality and denied the petition for a Writ of Mandamus. The court concluded that the APA requirement for legislative approval of pending administrative rules did not violate the Idaho Constitution's separation of powers, enactment, presentment, or administrative rules provisions. In reaching this conclusion, the court emphasized that administrative rulemaking authority was a legislative delegation, not a constitutional power, and that the legislature was free to modify the process by which administrative rules were enacted. View "Idaho State Athletic Commission v. Office of the Administrative Rules Coordinator" on Justia Law

John Wilson, the plaintiff-appellant, made several requests under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the defendant-appellee, to release records concerning him. Dissatisfied with the FBI's response, Wilson filed a suit in the Southern District of New York, alleging that the FBI failed to conduct an adequate search. The District Court ruled in favor of Wilson, partially granting his motion for summary judgment by ordering the FBI to conduct a search of an additional database. However, the search did not yield any new disclosures to Wilson. Subsequently, Wilson filed a motion seeking attorneys’ fees and costs under FOIA's fee-shifting provision, arguing that he was a substantially prevailing party. The District Court denied his motion, applying the criteria set by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in a previous case, Pietrangelo v. United States Army. Wilson appealed this decision.On appeal, the Second Circuit Court affirmed the decision of the District Court, concluding that the District Court correctly applied the Pietrangelo factors and did not abuse its discretion in ruling that those factors weighed against an award of attorneys’ fees and costs. The Second Circuit Court found that the public benefit derived from Wilson's case was minimal, Wilson's interest in the records was personal rather than public, and the FBI had a reasonable basis for withholding the requested information. As such, it concluded that the District Court did not err in denying Wilson's motion for attorneys’ fees and costs. View "Wilson v. Federal Bureau of Investigation" on Justia Law

In September 2019, Kathryn Abbott was assisting her child on a slide at Vivaldi Park in Henderson when she slipped and fractured her leg in multiple places. Abbott and her husband, Andrew Dodgson-Field, sued the City of Henderson, alleging negligence arising from premises liability and loss of consortium, respectively. The City of Henderson claimed immunity under Nevada's recreational use statute, NRS 41.510, and moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion, finding the City of Henderson immune from suit.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that NRS 41.510's protections can apply to any premises, superseding a previous ruling that limited the statute's application to "rural, semi-rural, or nonresidential" property. The court determined that Abbott was engaged in a "recreational activity" as defined by the statute when she was injured, as walking and assisting a child playing on a playground is similar to the enumerated activities listed in the statute. The court also concluded that Abbott failed to present evidence to establish a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether the City of Henderson willfully or maliciously failed to guard or warn against a dangerous condition. Therefore, the City of Henderson was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and the district court correctly granted summary judgment in its favor. View "Abbott v. City of Henderson" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada considered whether the Nevada State Engineer had the authority to combine multiple existing hydrographic basins into one "superbasin" for the purposes of water administration and management based on a shared source of water. The State Engineer had combined seven basins into one superbasin, the Lower White River Flow System (LWRFS), after determining that the waters of these basins were interconnected such that withdrawals from one basin affected the amount of water in the other basins. The State Engineer also found that the previously granted appropriations of water exceeded the rate of recharge in the LWRFS. Various entities who owned water rights throughout the new superbasin challenged the State Engineer's decision, claiming that he lacked the authority to manage surface waters and groundwater jointly and that his decision violated their due process rights.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada held that the State Engineer indeed had the authority to manage surface waters and groundwater conjunctively and to jointly administer multiple basins. The court also found that the State Engineer did not violate the rights holders' due process rights because they received notice and had an opportunity to be heard. The court reversed the lower court's decision that had granted the rights holders' petitions for judicial review and remanded the matter back to the lower court for further proceedings to determine whether substantial evidence supported the State Engineer's factual determinations. View "Sullivan v. Lincoln County Water District" on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiff, Desiree Martinez, sued Channon High, a City of Clovis police officer, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Officer High violated her due process rights by disclosing her confidential domestic violence report to her abuser, Kyle Pennington, who was also a Clovis police officer. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of qualified immunity to Officer High.The appellate court held that while Officer High did violate Ms. Martinez's due process rights under the state-created danger doctrine by disclosing her confidential domestic violence report to Mr. Pennington, the right was not clearly established at the time of the violation. The court explained that state actors are generally not liable for failing to prevent the acts of private parties, but an exception applies where the state affirmatively places the plaintiff in danger by acting with deliberate indifference to a known or obvious danger. In this case, Officer High's disclosure of Ms. Martinez's confidential report to Pennington, whom she knew was an alleged abuser, placed Ms. Martinez in actual, foreseeable danger. However, it was not clearly established in 2013 that Officer High’s actions violated Ms. Martinez’s substantive due process rights. The court clarified that going forward, an officer would be liable under the state-created danger doctrine when the officer discloses a victim’s confidential report to a violent perpetrator in a manner that increases the risk of retaliation against the victim. View "MARTINEZ V. HIGH" on Justia Law

In this case, Pedro Barriga, an auto detailer at Precision Auto Body, LLC, quit his job due to a dispute with a coworker over the placement of a cooling fan and a perceived favoritism shown by his supervisor towards his coworker. Barriga then applied for unemployment benefits from the Arizona Department of Economic Security (“ADES”), claiming he quit due to an intolerable work situation. The ADES initially denied his benefits, but an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) reversed this decision. Precision Auto Body appealed to the ADES Appellate Services Administration Appeals Board, which reversed the ALJ's decision, finding that the working conditions at Precision did not rise to the level of an intolerable work situation.Barriga appealed to the Arizona Court of Appeals, which vacated the Appeals Board’s decision, interpreting the factors in Arizona's regulation R6-3-50515(C)(2) as non-exhaustive and remanding the case back to the Appeals Board.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona, however, disagreed with the Court of Appeals, vacating its opinion and affirming the Appeals Board’s decision. The court held that while the factors in R6-3-50515(C)(2) meant to determine whether a workplace situation is intolerable are not exhaustive, Barriga failed to present evidence of any unbearable condition to establish an intolerable work situation. A dispute over a cooler placement, while unpleasant, was not intolerable. The court also found that Barriga did not adequately attempt to adjust his grievance before leaving his employment. The court also concluded that Barriga waived his claim that he quit because of a health condition by failing to sufficiently raise this issue at earlier stages of the proceedings. View "BARRIGA v ADES/PRECISION" on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court, State of Wyoming, the Petitioners, Kenneth Carson and Anna Leigh Anderson, parents of two children living in a remote family ranch in Wyoming, sought to compel the Albany County School District Board of Trustees, the Superintendent of Schools for Albany County, and the Superintendent of Public Instruction for the State of Wyoming (collectively, Respondents) to establish a rural school, named "The Buckle School," on their ranch. The proposal for this school was initially approved by the Albany County School District Board of Trustees and the Director of the State Construction Department. However, the State Superintendent of Public Instruction later denied the approval, citing the cost-effectiveness of the proposed school and the availability of virtual education options for the children.The Petitioners then filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the district court, which was dismissed. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court, State of Wyoming, affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the Petitioners failed to demonstrate that the Respondents had a ministerial duty to form the school. A ministerial duty is a duty that is absolute, clear, and indisputable, involving merely execution of a specific duty arising from fixed and designated facts. The court found that the relevant statutes provided the Respondents with discretionary judgment, not a ministerial duty to approve or deny the formation of a rural school. The court further noted that the Petitioners had not shown that they had requested or were denied any transportation or maintenance payments, which the relevant statutes provide for in lieu of establishing a school. Therefore, the court concluded that the Petitioners had failed to state a claim upon which mandamus relief could be granted. View "Carson v. Albany County School District #1 Board of Trustees" on Justia Law

In a dispute arising from a contract for refurbishing an elementary school, the Supreme Court of Louisiana ruled that no unfair trade practices claim could be stated against the State of Louisiana, Department of Education, Recovery School District (the “State”). The plaintiff, Advanced Environmental Consulting, Inc. (“AEC”), had subcontracted to perform asbestos abatement services for Law Industries, LLC, the general contractor. When the State terminated the contract due to unsatisfactory asbestos remediation progress, AEC amended its answer to Law Industries' breach of contract suit to include a claim of unfair trade practices under the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act (“LUTPA”). The State had objected to this claim, arguing that AEC had no cause of action and that the claim was perempted (time-barred). The Supreme Court of Louisiana held that AEC had failed to state a valid LUTPA cause of action against the State. It concluded that the State's actions were in furtherance of its governmental function of providing safe educational facilities for schoolchildren. The State, in this case, was a consumer of construction services, not a participant in "trade or commerce" as defined in the LUTPA, and was therefore not subject to a LUTPA claim. The court remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with its ruling. View "LAW INDUSTRIES, LLC VS. STATE" on Justia Law