In this case, Cathy McKitrick, an investigative journalist, sought access to certain records under the Government Records Access and Management Act (GRAMA). The Ogden City Records Review Board ordered the city to release redacted versions of the records. Kerry Gibson, the subject of the records, petitioned the district court to prevent their release. McKitrick intervened in the proceedings and moved to dismiss Gibson's petition for lack of standing. The Supreme Court of the State of Utah held that Gibson lacked standing. Before the district court dismissed the case, McKitrick moved for an award of attorney fees and litigation costs, which was denied by the district court. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah reversed the district court’s interpretation of the fee provision but did not hold that McKitrick was entitled to a fee award. Because the district court did not consider substantive aspects of the fee provision, the Supreme Court remanded the case for it to do so. View "McKitrick v. Gibson" on Justia Law

In South Dakota, McLane Western, Inc. and McLane Minnesota, Inc., South Dakota-licensed wholesalers of tobacco products, purchased Other Tobacco Products (OTP) from U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Brands, Inc. (UST Sales), who in turn purchased the products from U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Manufacturing Company, LLC (UST Manufacturing), a federally licensed tobacco manufacturer. McLane brought the OTP into South Dakota and paid the state's 35% tobacco tax. They calculated the tobacco tax they owed using the amount they paid to UST Sales for the OTP, a price higher than what UST Sales paid UST Manufacturing for the same OTP. McLane later submitted numerous refund requests to the South Dakota Department of Revenue, arguing that they overpaid their tax obligations as their tax should have been based on the price UST Sales paid UST Manufacturing.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota agreed that McLane overpaid its tobacco tax as it was based on the higher price it paid to UST Sales instead of the price at which UST Manufacturing sold tobacco products to UST Sales. However, the court also concluded that McLane was not entitled to a refund for the overpaid amounts. The court reasoned that although McLane overpaid its advance tax obligation, it fully recovered the advance tax it paid from the dealers to whom it subsequently sold the OTP. The dealers then recovered that tax from the consumers who purchased the OTP. Thus, McLane was made whole by its resale of the OTP and is not entitled to any refund. The court affirmed the Department’s denial of McLane’s request for a refund. View "Mclane Western, Inc. v. South Dakota Department Of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho ruled on a dispute between TCR, LLC, a developer, and Teton County. The developer had sought to record a condominium plat for a planned unit development, but the County refused to do so, arguing that the developer had not submitted final site plans, architectural designs, or landscape drawings for review. The developer filed suit, alleging breach of contract and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to compel the County to record the condominium plat. The district court granted the developer's motion for summary judgment on its declaratory and injunctive relief claim and denied the County's motion for summary judgment on the same claim. The court also denied all motions to reconsider. The Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the district court's decision in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that the County's refusal to record the condominium plat violated the Idaho Condominium Property Act and that the County did not have a valid reason for its refusal. The court also found that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the County on the developer's breach of contract claim, concluding that genuine issues of material fact remained. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "TCR, LLC v. Teton County" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the lower court's judgment dismissing a negligence claim filed by GSN Capital, LLC and Dave Zortman against the Shoshone City & Rural Fire District. GSN's sawmill property was destroyed by a wildfire, and they argued that the Fire District was negligent in not calling for additional aid, not deploying fire units to protect their property, and not performing a mitigation and salvage operation to save part of their property. However, the court concluded that the Fire District did not owe GSN a duty in tort for any of the challenged decisions. The court found that the Fire District did not have custody or control over GSN's property and did not owe a duty to protect individual properties within its territory. The court also held that the Fire District did not undertake any firefighting efforts for GSN until after the fire was contained, and thus did not assume a duty to GSN. View "GSN Capital, LLC v. Shoshone City & Rural Fire District" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit dismissed an appeal by police officer Rudy Guillen, who was seeking qualified immunity in a lawsuit brought against him by Akeem Bagley. Bagley had sued Guillen under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging excessive force, unlawful arrest, and illegal detention in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The lawsuit stemmed from an incident in which Guillen had pulled Bagley over for a minor traffic violation and subsequently tased him. The district court had granted Guillen qualified immunity as to Bagley’s unlawful arrest and illegal detention claims, but denied it as to Bagley’s excessive force claim.On appeal, the court held that at the time of the conduct in question, it was clearly established that an officer may not use force on a suspect who is complying with his commands. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Bagley, the court found that Bagley had presented sufficient evidence of excessive force to defeat qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "Bagley v. Guillen" on Justia Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Young Israel of Tampa, Inc., an Orthodox Jewish synagogue, sued the Hillsborough Area Regional Transit Authority (HART) for rejecting its proposed advertisement for a Chanukah on Ice event. The synagogue argued that HART’s policy, which prohibited advertisements that “primarily promote a religious faith or religious organization,” violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Young Israel on two grounds: 1) HART’s policy violated the First Amendment because it discriminated on the basis of viewpoint, and 2) even if the policy was viewpoint neutral, it was unreasonable because it lacked objective and workable standards and was inconsistently and haphazardly applied. The court subsequently issued a permanent injunction against HART, prohibiting it from rejecting any advertisement on the ground that it primarily promotes a religious faith or religious organization, including any future policies.On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, but on narrower grounds. The appellate court concluded that HART's policy was unreasonable under the Supreme Court's decision in Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky because it failed to define key terms, lacked any official guidance, and vested too much discretion in those who applied it. The court declined to address the question of whether the policy constituted impermissible viewpoint discrimination. However, the court concluded that the permanent injunction issued by the district court needed to be revised to apply only to HART’s current policy, rather than any future policies, and remanded the case to the district court for that purpose. View "Young Israel of Tampa, Inc. v. Hillsborough Area Regional Transit Authority" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied a motion filed by the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to transfer a case brought by the state of West Virginia to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia or to dismiss it due to improper venue. The case pertains to the EPA's disapproval of West Virginia's State Implementation Plan (SIP), which the state had submitted as part of its obligation under the Clean Air Act to address the emission of gases contributing to the formation of ground-level ozone. The EPA had disapproved West Virginia's SIP because it found that the plan did not sufficiently reduce ozone-forming emissions that were adversely affecting air quality in downwind states. The Fourth Circuit court also granted the state of West Virginia's motion to stay the EPA's final action pending the outcome of its petition for review. The court's decision on venue was based on its interpretation of the Clean Air Act, which stipulates that the venue for review of EPA actions depends on whether the action is nationally applicable or locally or regionally applicable. The court concluded that the EPA's disapproval of West Virginia's SIP was based on circumstances particular to West Virginia and therefore was locally or regionally applicable. View "State of West Virginia v. EPA" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ruled in a case brought by the State of Missouri against several Chinese entities, including the government of the People's Republic of China, the Wuhan Institute of Virology, and others. Missouri accused the defendants of negligence in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic, alleging that they allowed the virus to spread worldwide, engaged in a campaign to keep other countries from learning about the virus, and hoarded personal protective equipment (PPE). The court decided that most of Missouri's claims were blocked by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, which generally protects foreign states from lawsuits in U.S. courts. However, the court allowed one claim to proceed: the allegation that China hoarded PPE while the rest of the world was unaware of the extent of the virus. The court held that this claim fell under the "commercial activity" exception of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, as it involved alleged anti-competitive behavior that had a direct effect in the United States. The case was remanded for further proceedings on this claim. View "The State of Missouri v. The Peoples Republic of China" on Justia Law

On August 12, 2018, Rachel Sender suffered injuries in a bicycle accident on a bike path in Forest Park, St. Louis. Sender claimed her injuries were due to a defect on the path, and she notified the City of St. Louis of her injury, as per section 82.210. This statute states that a claimant should provide the mayor of the city with notice within 90 days of an injury occurring due to a defect in any city property listed in the statute. The City of St. Louis responded that Sender's notice was inadequate as it did not sufficiently identify the location of the incident. After the 90-day statutory period, Sender provided further information to the City. The City moved to dismiss Sender's claims based on the insufficiency of the notice, which was allowed by the circuit court.Sender appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of Missouri. The court first had to decide whether the bike path is considered a "thoroughfare" as per section 82.210. It concluded that the bike path was a thoroughfare because it was a publicly maintained exterior improvement facilitating pedestrian traffic. As such, Sender was required to provide notice of her claim to the City.The court then had to determine whether Sender's notice was sufficient. However, Sender did not provide any record of the evidentiary hearing held by the circuit court to determine the sufficiency of the notice. The Supreme Court thus affirmed the circuit court's decision to dismiss Sender's claims, as it could not review the sufficiency of the notice without the transcript of the hearing. View "Sender v. City of St. Louis" on Justia Law

In an appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County, five minors, aged between one and fourteen years, challenged the juvenile court's decision to order reunification services for their parents, identified as A.B. (mother) and A.S. (father). The minors were adjudged dependent children due to ongoing domestic violence and substance abuse in their home. The court had to interpret and apply the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13), which allows a court to bypass reunification services for parents with a history of extensive, abusive, and chronic use of drugs or alcohol who have resisted prior court-ordered treatment in the three years prior to the filing of the petition.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fifth Appellate District concluded that the juvenile court had misapplied the law when it decided it could not deny reunification services to the parents while they were participating in treatment. The court emphasized that the statute requires proof of the parent’s resistance during the three years preceding the petition, regardless of their engagement in treatment at the time of the disposition hearing.The court reversed the juvenile court's dispositional order providing reunification services to the parents for all five children and remanded the case for a new disposition hearing based on the family's present circumstances. This decision was made despite subsequent events that rendered the case potentially moot, as the court deemed the issue of statutory interpretation important. View "In re L.B." on Justia Law