At issue in this case is the triggering event for the statute of limitations on childhood sexual abuse actions. Timothy Jones’ estate (Estate) brought negligence and wrongful death claims against the State of Washington. Timothy was born to Jaqueline Jones in 1990. In 2003, Jacqueline lost her home to foreclosure, and Timothy moved in with Price Nick Miller Jr., a family friend. A month later, the Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF) was alerted that Miller was paying too much attention to children who were not his own. After investigating the report, DCYF removed Timothy from Miller’s home based on this inappropriate behavior. In November 2003, Timothy was placed in foster care and DCYF filed a dependency petition. Timothy’s dependency case was dismissed in 2006. Later that year, Timothy told a counselor that Miller had abused him sexually, physically, and emotionally from 1998 to 2006. In 2008, Miller pleaded guilty to second degree child rape connected to his abuse of Timothy and second degree child molestation related to another child. In 2007 or 2008, Jacqueline sued Miller on Timothy’s behalf. The attorney did not advise Timothy or his mother that there may be a lawsuit against the State or that the State may be liable for allowing Miller’s abuse to occur. Sometime in mid-2017, and prompted by a news story about childhood sexual abuse, Timothy and a romantic parter Jimmy Acevedo discussed whether Timothy may have a claim against the State. Acevedo recommended that Timothy consult a lawyer. In fall 2017, Timothy contacted a firm that began investigating Timothy’s case. In June 2018, Timothy committed suicide. Jacqueline was appointed personal representative of Timothy’s estate and filed claims for negligence, negligent investigation, and wrongful death against the State. On cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court concluded the statute of limitations for negligence claims begins when a victim recognizes the causal connection between the intentional abuse and their injuries. The court granted summary judgment for the State and dismissed the Estate’s claims as time barred. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Washington Supreme Court reversed, finding no evidence was presented that Timothy made the causal connection between that alleged act and his injuries until August or September 2017, and the Estate filed its claims on March 12, 2020, within RCW 4.16.340(1)(c)’s three-year time period. View "Wolf v. Washington" on Justia Law

In this action, the Wahkiakum School District (WSD) alleged the State of Washington “fail[ed] to amply fund the [WSD]’s needed facilities [and] infrastructure.” WSD argued that this failure violated the Washington Constitution, article IX, section 1. The complaint explained the impact of this lack of ample funding for facilities and infrastructure: “The [WSD] is a poor, rural school district located along the banks of the Columbia River. It has less than 500 students. Approximately 57% of its students are low income. It has less than 3500 registered voters. And the per capita income of its voters is approximately $29,000.” Specifically, the WSD requested that the State pay the cost of rebuilding its elementary, middle, and high schools; it estimated more than $50 million in construction costs. The State moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim (CR 12(b)(6)) and for lack of jurisdiction (CR 12(b)(1)). In support of its motion, the State argued, “[F]unding for school construction and other capital expenditures is governed by entirely different constitutional and statutory provisions that primarily look to local school districts themselves, with the State providing funding assistance. As such, WSD fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted . . . .” It also argued that the court could not award monetary damages because the legislature has not created a private right of action and monetary damages would violate separation of powers principles. The WSD conceded that it failed to file a tort claim form and thus that its claim for monetary damages was barred. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss with prejudice. After review, the Washington Supreme Court concluded the constitution did not include capital construction costs within the category of “education” costs for which the State alone must make “ample provision.” The Court thus affirmed the trial court's decision to grant the motion to dismiss. View "Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. No. 200 v. Washington" on Justia Law

Appellant North West Neighborhood Association challenged a district court’s decision upholding Boise City Council’s approval of three interrelated land use applications. The Idaho Supreme Court agreed with Appellant that Boise City Council failed to provide a reasoned statement explaining its approval of the applications as required by section 67-6535(2) of the Local Land Use Planning Act. The Court remanded this matter to the district court with instructions to set aside Boise City Council’s actions and remand to the Council for the adoption of a reasoned statement. View "NW Neighborhood Assoc v. City of Boise" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing this complaint brought by Appellant requesting a writ of mandamus to compel the City of Mentor to commence appropriation proceedings for an alleged taking of Appellant's property, holding that the court of appeals did not err in granting the City's motion to dismiss.Appellant brought this complaint alleging that the decision of the City to deny a permit that would allow him to place a houseboat on a pond that he owned constituted a taking of his property. The court of appeals granted the City's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, holding (1) Appellant had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law and was not entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel the City to commence appropriation proceedings; and (2) the court of appeals lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Appellant's remaining claims. View "State ex rel. Duncan v. Mentor" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals granting in part and denying in part a writ of mandamus, affirmed the court's award of statutory damages and court costs, and reversed the award of attorney fees, holding that the court of appeals erred in determining that the City of Cleveland acted in bad faith in this case.Cleveland Association of Rescue Employees and its president (collectively, the Union) submitted two public records requests to the City, which denied the requests. The Union then filed a complaint for writ of mandamus to compel production of the records and also sought statutory damages and attorney fees for the City's alleged violation of Ohio Rev. Code 149.43(B). The Union later notified the court of appeals that the City had sufficiently produced the requested records and sought summary judgment with respect to statutory damages and attorney fees. The court of appeals awarded the Union statutory damages of $1,000 and attorney fees of $4,672. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the City's refusal to accept a certified-mail service of the complaint was not a legitimate basis on which to award attorney fees. View "State ex rel. Cleveland Ass'n of Rescue Employees v. City of Cleveland" on Justia Law

Driftwood LNG and Driftwood Pipeline (jointly “Driftwood”) want to convert natural gas produced in the United States into liquefied natural gas (“LNG”) for export to international markets. That undertaking involves building an LNG production and export terminal and a pipeline that will connect to existing interstate pipeline systems; the terminal would be located on the Calcasieu River in Louisiana. Numerous federal and state agencies are involved in the approval and permitting process for projects such as Driftwood’s. One of those agencies— the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (“the Corps”)—granted Driftwood one of the requisite permits. Petitioners Healthy Gulf and Sierra Club petition for review of that permit, alleging that the Corps’s decision violated the governing statute and was arbitrary and capricious.   The Fifth Circuit denied the petition. The court explained that the record reveals thorough analysis and cooperation by the Corps and other agencies and a lucid explanation of why the Corps was permitting a departure from the default hierarchy. The court wrote that the approval process spanned several years and involved detailed analysis by (and often the cooperation of) FERC, the Corps, the EPA, the National Marine Fisheries Services, the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, and LDEQ, among others. The administrative record is over 24,000 pages and provides more than enough insight into the agencies’ deliberations. Moreover, the court explained that both the Corps and the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources (which issued Driftwood a Coastal Use permit) imposed conditions on Driftwood to ensure that it did not dredge and use contaminated material. View "Healthy Gulf v. US Army Corps of Eng" on Justia Law

Plaintiff fell while stepping from a dock to a boat. He sued his employer—a yacht club in Long Beach—under federal admiralty law. The trial court sustained the club’s final demurrer to the second amended complaint. The court ruled there was no admiralty jurisdiction.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the court’s ruling without deciding about admiralty jurisdiction. The court explained that Congress in 1984 specified employees covered by state workers’ compensation law working at a “club” are covered by state workers’ compensation law and not federal law if they are eligible for state workers’ compensation. The court wrote that Plaintiff concedes the yacht club is a “club.” Federal law thus makes California state workers’ compensation law paramount, which means Plaintiff’s exclusive remedy is workers’ compensation. The court wrote that a core part of the state workers’ compensation bargain is that injured workers get speedy and predictable relief irrespective of fault. In return, workers are barred from suing their employers in tort. Thus, the trial court correctly dismissed Plaintiff’s tort suit against his employer. View "Ranger v. Alamitos Bay Yacht Club" on Justia Law

This lawsuit arose from an investigation into whether Appellant Kristine McCreery abused or neglected her fifteen-year-old son, B.M. McCreery filed a complaint against two physicians who reported the alleged abuse, the detective who investigated the reports, the deputy prosecutor who filed the Child Protection Act (“CPA”) action, and the social worker for the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare who submitted an investigatory report and testified in the CPA case (collectively “defendants” or “Respondents”), alleging they had violated her constitutional rights and Idaho’s false reporting statutes when they took actions to separate her from B.M. for over fifteen months. The district court dismissed McCreery’s claims with prejudice after finding Respondents were immune from liability and that the allegations in McCreery’s complaint failed to state any valid claim upon which relief could be granted. McCreery moved to amend her complaint, which the district court denied. McCreery appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court, arguing that the district court erroneously dismissed her claims. The Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed. View "McCreery v. King, M.D., et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied as moot Mark Griffin's request for a writ of mandamus and also denied Griffin's request for statutory damages, holding that Griffin's request for a writ of mandamus was moot.Griffin, an inmate at the Toledo Correctional Institution, submitted a public-records request to Allan Szoke, a warden's assistant at the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction. Griffin later brought this action seeking a writ of mandamus compelling production of the records and an award of statutory damages. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding (1) because Griffin had received the requested records, his request for a writ of mandamus was moot; and (2) Griffin was not entitled to statutory damages because he did not clearly and convincingly show that Szoke denied his public-records request or otherwise failed to fulfill his duties under the Public Records Act. View "State ex rel. Griffin v. Szoke" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court in this tax appeal, holding that the district court erred by concluding that Mont. Code Ann. 15-30-2119, the NOL statute, operates as a dollar-for-dollar offset provision that indirectly taxes out-of-state income.At issue was the decision of the Department of Revenue to deny nonresident taxpayers Franklin and Janet Tiegs a carryover net operating loss (NOL) deduction on their 2014 and 2015 Montana income tax returns. The Montana Tax Appeal Board upheld the Department's decision, but the district court reversed, concluding that Mont. Code Ann. 15-30-2119 was unconstitutional because it authorized taxation of non-Montana income. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court (1) erred by holding that the general use of out-of-state income within the Montana income tax framework violated Mont. Code Ann. 15-30-2102 and federal constitutional principles; and (2) erred by concluding that section 15-30-2119 constitutes impermissible taxation of income outside of Montana's jurisdictional reach. View "Tiegs v. State, Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law