Airbnb, Inc. and Airbnb Payments, Inc. (collectively Airbnb) is an online marketplace that connects owners of short-term rentals (STRs) with renters seeking accommodations for 30 days or less. Among Airbnb’s many rental listings are properties within California’s coastal zone. The Coastal Protection Alliance (CPA) brought an action against Airbnb for violations of the Coastal Act, alleging that STRs in the coastal zone are “developments” that require a coastal development permit (CDP) and that Airbnb was directly and vicariously liable for allowing STR owners to list and rent unpermitted STRs on its website. CPA appealed from a judgment following an order granting Airbnb’s demurrer without leave to amend.   The Second Appellate District affirmed, holding that t STRs are not per se developments under the Coastal Act. The court explained that a development does not occur merely because a residence is used as an STR. Whether using a residence as an STR is a “change in the density or intensity of the use of land,” and thus, a development under the Coastal Act depends on the permissible scope of the residence’s existing use. Here, CPA’s sweeping interpretation of development to include every STR would circumvent the specifically tailored zoning ordinances in the LCPs throughout the coastal zone. Interpreting the Coastal Act in this way is neither reasonable nor consistent with the Act’s acknowledged reliance on “local government and local land use planning procedures and enforcement” in carrying out the Act’s goals. View "Coastal Protection Alliance v. Airbnb" on Justia Law

This case involves rules adopted by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to implement the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA). Congress enacted PURPA to encourage the development of a new class of independent, non-utility-owned energy producers known as “Qualifying Facilities,” or “QFs.” PURPA tasks FERC with promulgating rules to implement the statute. In 2020, FERC revised its rules to alter which facilities qualify for PURPA’s benefits and how those facilities are compensated. The new rules make it more difficult to qualify for treatment as a QF, and they also make QF status less advantageous.The Ninth Circuit granted in part and denied in part a petition for review brought by the Solar Energy Industries Association and several environmental organizations challenging Orders 872 and 872-A (collectively, “Order 872”). The panel rejected Petitioners’ argument that Order 872 as a whole is inconsistent with PURPA’s directive that FERC “encourage” the development of QFs. Applying the two-step framework of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), the panel held that (1) PURPA on its face gives FERC broad discretion to evaluate which rules are necessary to encourage QFs and which are not, and (2) FERC’s interpretation was not unreasonable. Next, the panel rejected Petitioners’ challenges to four specific provisions of Order 872. First, the panel held that the modified Site Rule—which modified the rules for determining when facilities are deemed to be located at the same or separate sites—survives Chevron, is not arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and is not unlawfully retroactive. View "SEIA V. FERC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decision of the Commissioner of the Department of Inland Fisheries and Wildlife to revoke or suspend Appellant's hunting license for three years and his guide license for one year, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below.Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the Commissioner’s interpretation of the statute mandating revocation of Appellant's hunting license for one year was correct, and her action revoking Appellant's hunting license for one year was supported by substantial evidence; (2) Appellant did not overcome the presumption of constitutionality to demonstrate that the statute governing hunting license revocation and suspension was constitutionally vague; and (3) the Legislature acted within constitutional bounds in delegating authority to the Commissioner to establish standards of competency for licensed guides. View "Wood v. Dep't of Inland Fisheries & Wildlife" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying the writ of mandamus sought by Stephen Harris to order the Industrial Commission of Ohio to reverse its decision denying Harris's request for scheduled-loss compensation for the permanent partial loss of sight of both eyes, holding that there were no grounds for the writ.After the Commission denied Harris's request for scheduled-loss compensation a district hearing officer determined that the medical evidence failed to establish that Harris had sustained any loss of vision in either eye as a result of the industrial injury. Harris filed a mandamus action requesting an order directing the Commission to reverse its decision. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that some evidence existed to support the Commission's decision. View "State ex rel. Harris v. Industrial Comm'n" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied a writ of mandamus brought under Ohio's Public Records Act, Ohio Rev. Code 149.43, by Harry Barr, an inmate at the Grafton Correctional Institution (GCII), seeking to compel the warden's assistant at GCI to produce the job description for, and the certification or license held by, Jennifer Whitten, a GCI employee, holding that Barr was not entitled to the writ.In addition to the writ of mandamus, Barr sought statutory damages and also filed a complaint for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a preliminary injunction and other motions. The Supreme Court dismissed Barr's complaint for a TRO and a preliminary injunction, granted Barr's motion to amend the evidence and deemed the record supplemented, granted his motion to withdraw his motion for an order pursuant to S.Ct.Prac.R.4.01(A), and denied the writ of mandamus and his request for statutory damages, holding that Barr was entitled to some relief. View "State ex rel. Barr v. Wesson" on Justia Law

A group of Doctors sued the FDA and the Department of Health and Human Services (together, the “Agencies”), claiming an FDA ad intended to deter people from off-label use of ivermectin to treat COVID-19. Each Doctor says that FDA’s messaging interfered with their own individual medical practice.The Doctors argue that FDA’s ad and similar public statements violated FDA’s enabling act (“Act”) and the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). The district court held that sovereign immunity protects the Agencies and the Officials, and it dismissed the suit. The Fifth Circuit reversed.The Fifth Circuit held that the Doctors can use the APA to bypass sovereign immunity and assert their ultra vires claims against the Agencies and the Officials. The ad was plausibly agency action, because it publicly announced the general principle that consumers should not use ivermectin to treat the coronavirus, and the Doctors fall within the Act’s zone of interests.The Doctors’ pure APA claim cannot go forward because the ad does not determine legal rights and thus lacks the finality. However, the Fifth Circuit held that the Doctors’ first theory was enough to allow this suit to proceed. View "Apter v. Dept of Health & Human Svc" on Justia Law

In this zoning dispute involving the interplay between the public's interest in the future of a private airport in Prince George's County and the financial interests of its owner, the Supreme Court held that the amended zoning ordinance allowing the airport to develop higher-density housing did not violate Maryland's uniformity requirement, Md. Code Ann., Land Use 22-201(b)(2)(i).When the airport's owners began experiencing financial difficulties they sought to redevelop the site, which had been limited by the zoning ordnance to low-density, single-family detached housing, for non-airport use. The County Council amended the zoning ordinance to allow for higher-density housing to incentivize the airport's redevelopment. Plaintiffs brought suit. The circuit court concluded that the ordinance did not violate uniformity, but the appellate court reversed, finding that the ordinance violated uniformity because it was tailored so narrowly as to afford favorable development opportunities to only the airport property. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the ordinance was adopted to further a valid public purpose and did not discriminate against similarly situated properties, thus surviving the uniformity challenge. View "Prince George's County v. Concerned Citizens" on Justia Law

A nine-year-old girl took her own life after a classmate repeatedly delivered racist insults to her. The girl's mother and grandmother sought to hold the school system and several school officials accountable for her death. The family filed a lawsuit asserting claims arising under federal and state law against the school system and the school officials. The district court granted summary judgment to the school system and its officials, concluding that the family failed to satisfy various elements of their federal statutory claims and that qualified immunity barred at least one of the claims. The court concluded that the state law claims failed on immunity grounds. The family appealed.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Although the response of the school system and its officials was "truly discouraging," the standard for relief in cases of student-on-student harassment was not met. The court explained that a reasonable jury could not find that DCS acted with deliberate indifference, that it intentionally discriminated against the girl, or that Defendants' actions were arbitrary or conscience-shocking. Thus, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to the defendants on the family's Title IX, Title VI, equal protection, and substantive due process claims. View "Jasmine Adams, et al v. Demopolis City Schools, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a practicing attorney, sued a municipal court judge, a prosecutor, and the City of St. Helens, Oregon, in state court. After Defendants removed the case to federal court, Plaintiff moved to remand to state court, claiming that, although his complaint referenced federal law, it was poorly drafted, and he did not intend to bring federal claims. The district court severed and remanded the state-only claims and dismissed the retained claims with prejudice. On appeal, Plaintiff filed an informal pro se brief and argued that he should have been granted leave to amend his complaint to exclude any mention of a federal claim and to seek a remand to state court.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel held that, although there is a good reason for awarding leeway to pro se parties who presumably are unskilled in the law and more prone to make pleading errors, that logic does not apply to practicing attorneys. The panel determined that his attempt to backtrack seemed aimed at robbing the government of its removal option and ensuring another bite at the apple in state court. The panel held that a sophisticated attorney like Plaintiff should not be allowed to jettison his own complaint when it is beneficial yet avoid the consequences of that renunciation. The panel held that because Plaintiff facially alleged a violation of his federal rights, the district court had federal question jurisdiction. In view of the immunity of the government defendants, the complaint could not be saved by amendment, and therefore the district court’s dismissal without leave to amend was proper. View "JAMES HUFFMAN V. AMY LINDGREN, ET AL" on Justia Law

Q Link Wireless LLC (Q Link) petitioned the New Mexico Public Regulation Commission (Commission) for designation as an eligible telecommunications carrier (ETC). The designation would have made Q Link eligible to access certain federal funds for providing telecommunications services to underserved communities in New Mexico. Following lengthy and protracted proceedings before the Commission’s hearing examiner, Q Link filed a motion to withdraw its petition. The hearing examiner filed an Order Recommending Dismissal of Proceeding with Prejudice (Recommended Decision). The recommendation was to dismiss the petition and to ban Q Link from ever again filing a petition to obtain an ETC designation. The Commission adopted the Recommended Decision in full. Q Link appealed, and the New Mexico Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the Commission lacked express or implied statutory authority to ban Q Link from ever again seeking an ETC designation. View "Q Link Wireless LLC v. N.M. Pub. Regulation Comm'n" on Justia Law