After the Department of the Interior amended regulations in 2016, the American Petroleum Institute (API) challenged several of the regulations that governed the calculation of royalties for oil and natural gas produced on federal lands. The district court rejected these challenges at summary judgment, and API appealed. Because API did not show that the agency acted arbitrarily and capriciously in enacting the challenged provisions of the 2016 regulations, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. View "American Petroleum, et al. v. U.S. Department of Interior, et al." on Justia Law

Several collections of residents near Jefferson Parish Landfill sued the landfill’s owner (Jefferson Parish) and its operators (four companies). This mandamus action arises out of the Eastern District of Louisiana’s case management of two of those lawsuits: the Ictech-Bendeck class action and the Addison mass action. The Ictech-Bendeck class action plaintiffs seek damages on a state-law nuisance theory under Louisiana Civil Code articles 667, 668, and 669. The Addison mass action plaintiffs seek damages from the same defendants, although they plead claims for both nuisance and negligence. The district court granted in part and denied in part Petitioners’ motion for summary judgment against some of the Addison plaintiffs. Then on April 17 the district court adopted a new case management order drafted by the parties that scheduled a September 2023 trial for several of the Addison plaintiffs.   The Fifth Circuit denied Petitioners' petition for mandamus relief. The court explained that mandamus is an extraordinary form of relief saved for the rare case in which there has been a “usurpation of judicial power” or a “clear abuse of discretion.” The court explained that mandamus relief is not for testing novel legal theories. The court wrote that Petitioners’ theory is not merely new; it is also wrong. Rule 23 establishes a mechanism for plaintiffs to pursue their claims as a class. It does not cause the filing of a putative class action to universally estop all separate but related actions from proceeding to the merits until the class-certification process concludes in the putative class action, after years of motions practice. View "In Re Jefferson Parish" on Justia Law

This original proceeding involves a protracted legal battle between several rural telephone companies and the Public Utilities Commission (“Commission”). Petitioners are telephone corporations that provide telephone service in rural areas. After the Rural Telephone Bank (“RTB”) had just dissolved and redeemed all shares of stock it had issued. Many telephone companies, including Petitioners, owned RTB stock. The Commission had clarified in a 2006 decision that all gains on the sale of public utility company assets that were never in rate base accrue to company shareholders. Relying on this decision, the companies that never had stock in rate base so stated in the application and did not disclose any of their redemption proceeds. The Commission penalized the companies in the amount of $2,752,000 for violating Rule 1.1. The companies challenged the decision in an administrative appeal, but the Commission denied rehearing.   The Fifth Appellate District annulled penalty decision and the decision denying rehearing. The court agreed that Petitioners lacked fair notice of their obligation to disclose their redemption proceeds in the 2007 application. The court explained that Petitioners’ redemption proceed amounts were irrelevant to a ratemaking determination because Petitioners’ shares were never in rate base. All gains or losses on the redemption accrued to Petitioners’ shareholders, not the ratepayers. No other allocation was legally allowed. The Commission should have instructed Petitioners to disclose their redemption proceeds in the Application if that is what the Commission wanted from Petitioners. But the Commission did not give fair notice to Petitioners of this disclosure requirement and penalized them for essentially failing to intuit the disclosure requirement. View "Kerman Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Commission" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was brutally beaten by three Maryland corrections officers because they believed he had taken part in an assault on another officer. He sued their warden along with the officers who attacked him and their direct supervisors. A federal jury awarded Plaintiff $700,000. The warden appealed. He argued that this case should never have proceeded to trial because Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before suing. He also believes the district court should have found that the evidence failed to support the jury’s verdict and that he was entitled to qualified immunity.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court. The court held that Plaintiff was not required to exhaust because no administrative remedies were available, the evidence supports the jury’s verdict, and the warden was not entitled to qualified immunity based on the facts found by the jury. The court explained that this case was properly tried before a jury because inmates cannot receive any relief through Maryland’s administrative grievance proceedings when the Intelligence and Investigative Division is investigating the subject matter of the grievance. And the jury’s role in trials is enshrined in the Seventh Amendment for good reason. Resolving factual disputes, weighing the evidence, and determining whom to believe is within its province. When a jury performs these functions, the court will not disturb its conclusions based on a cold record unless those conclusions lack evidentiary support. Here, the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s conclusions. And based on how the jury resolved these issues, the warden’s conduct violated clearly established law. View "Kevin Younger v. Tyrone Crowder" on Justia Law

A settlement agreement generally ends a legal dispute. Here, it was just the beginning. In August 2015, the State of California settled a dispute with a plaintiff class of inmates over alleged constitutional violations. Eight years later, the dispute continues. In settlement, the State agreed to stop housing inmates in solitary confinement for long-term or indefinite periods based on gang affiliation. The inmates’ counsel would monitor the state’s compliance for two years. The settlement agreement and monitoring period could be extended for twelve months if the inmates demonstrated continuing constitutional violations that were either alleged in their complaint or resulted from the agreement’s reforms. The twice successfully extended the settlement agreement before the district court.   The Ninth Circuit reversed in part, vacated in part, and dismissed in part the district court’s extensions of the settlement agreement. The panel reversed the district court’s order granting the first twelve-month extension of the settlement agreement. First, the panel held that there was no basis for extending the agreement based on the inmates’ claim that the CDCR regularly mischaracterizes the confidential information used in disciplinary hearings and fails to verify the reliability of that information. Next, the panel held that there was no basis for extending the agreement based on the inmates’ claim that CDCR unconstitutionally validates inmates as gang affiliates and fails to tell the parole board that old gang validations are flawed or unreliable. The claim was not included in, or sufficiently related to, the complaint. View "TODD ASHKER, ET AL V. GAVIN NEWSOM, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was severely injured at work when a tank filled with compressed air exploded. Plaintiff brought common-law claims for strict liability and negligence against Tyco Fire Products, LP (“Tyco”), which sold the tank to Plaintiff’s employer. Tyco moved for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiff’s claims are preempted under the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act of 1975 (“HMTA”), 49 U.S.C. Section 5125(b)(1). The district court held that the claims are preempted and granted Tyco summary judgment.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the HMTA expressly preempts nonfederal laws “about” certain subjects related to the transportation of hazardous materials in commerce. The court explained that as relevant here, the HMTA preempts state laws that are (1) “about . . . the . . . marking” of a “container . . . that is represented, marked, certified, or sold as qualified for use in transporting hazardous material in commerce,” and (2) “not substantively the same as a provision” of the HMTA or a regulation promulgated thereunder. Both requirements are satisfied here. First, the court explained that the tank was “marked . . . as qualified for use in transporting hazardous material,” and Plaintiff’s common-law claims are “about” the “marking” of Tyco’s tank. Second, the court wrote that Plaintiff’s common-law claims cannot be deemed “substantively the same” because they would impose duties beyond the HMTA and associated regulations. The HMTA thus expressly preempts Plaintiff’s common-law claims. View "Buono v. Tyco Fire Prods., LP" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and her deceased husband, brought claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act against the United States alleging that a U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs hospital negligently failed to diagnose her husband with lung cancer. Prior to trial, the government conceded that the hospital’s ten-month failure to diagnose her husband was a departure from the standard of care. Following a two-day bench trial, the district court entered judgment and awarded $975,233.75 in damages to Plaintiff, including $850,000 for pain and suffering and $50,000 for loss of consortium.   On appeal, Plaintiff argued: (1) the district court erred in failing to adequately explain its factual findings and methodology for arriving at its awards as required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a); and (2) the district court’s awards for pain and suffering and loss of consortium were based on legal errors.   The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment. The court first clarified that the appropriate standard of review for assessing a district court’s FTCA damages award governed by New York law is whether the award “deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation,” as articulated under New York Civil Practice Law and Rules Section 5501(c). The court nonetheless found Plaintiff’s challenges to the district court’s damages awards to be unpersuasive. The district court’s explanation for the awards in its factual findings and conclusions of law, as well as in its denial of the motion to amend or alter the judgment as to these awards, satisfied the requirements of Rule 52. View "Gonzalez v. United States" on Justia Law

A.R. (Father) appealed the juvenile court’s dispositional order adjudging his son a dependent of the court and removing the child from his custody. The court also ordered reunification services for Father. Father’s one-year-old son, Andres R., came to DPSS’s attention in May 2022, when D.P. (Mother) called law enforcement to report domestic violence. Months later, the child was deemed a dependent of the court based on a social worker's findings of the child's living environment and interviews with his siblings and his mother. On appeal, Father challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the court’s jurisdictional finding and the removal order. He also argued that the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) failed to comply with state law implementing the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) . Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "In re Andres R." on Justia Law

Allstates, a full-service industrial general contractor, employs people throughout the country, subject to the Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) Act. Allstates must comply with Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) workplace safety standards. It has been the subject of enforcement actions, including a $10,000 fine for a 2019 catwalk injury. In a facial challenge to the OSH Act, Allstates argued that, because the only textual constraint on setting workplace-safety standards is that they be “reasonably necessary or appropriate,” 29 U.S.C. 652(8), OSHA does not have the constitutional authority to set those standards and employers do not have a duty to comply with OSHA’s standards. Allstates sought a permanent nationwide injunction. The district court granted the government summary judgment, reasoning that the “reasonably necessary or appropriate” standard provided an “intelligible principle” to satisfy the nondelegation doctrine because the Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld similar delegations.The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding OSHA’s delegation constitutional. The Act provides an overarching framework to guide OSHA’s discretion, and the Act’s standards comfortably fall within limits previously upheld by the Supreme Court. “To require more would be to insist on a degree of exactitude which not only lacks legal necessity but which does not comport with the requirements of the administrative process.” View "Allstates Refractory Contractors, LLC v. Su" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Bradley Weiss and Cathleen Shea appealed a superior court order granting defendant Town of Sunapee's (Town) motion to dismiss. The trial court determined that, because plaintiffs failed to request a second rehearing from the Town’s Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA), the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over their appeal. The New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed and remanded: pursuant to RSA 677:3, plaintiffs perfected their appeal to the superior court from the ZBA’s April 1 denial by timely moving for rehearing. View "Weiss, et al. v. Town of Sunapee" on Justia Law