The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the Title III court confirming a plan of adjustment that permitted the discharge of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico from its obligation to pay Plaintiff the entire amount of a settlement it had entered into with the Commonwealth regarding the Commonwealth's milk regulation scheme, holding that there was no error.Plaintiff and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico litigated for years their dispute over the Commonwealth's milk regulation scheme. The dispute was resolved by settlement, after which the Commonwealth entered Title III proceedings to adjust the Commonwealth's sovereign debt. Under the plan of adjustment, the Commonwealth was no longer obligated to pay Plaintiff the full amount specified in the parties' settlement. Plaintiff subsequently brought this action challenging that decision. The Title III court discharged the Commonwealth from its obligation to pay Plaintiff the full amount specified in the settlement and overruled Plaintiff's objections to the Plan. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiff's arguments on appeal failed. View "Financial Oversight & Management Bd. for P.R. v. Cooperativa de Ahorro y Credito" on Justia Law

Over 20 years ago, taxpayers sued Kentucky and Sunrise, a religiously affiliated organization, for alleged violations of the Establishment Clause by paying for religious services that Sunrise allegedly imposed on children in state custody. The Sixth Circuit remanded the approval of a 2013 settlement. In 2015, the parties replaced monitoring provisions that mentioned Sunrise with general language about “any Agency.” The Third Circuit held, for the third time, that the plaintiffs had standing to bring their Establishment Clause claim but that the 2015 Amendment required new regulations or modifications to existing regulations for implementation, which meant the Amendment violated Kentucky law. In 2021 Kentucky and the plaintiffs jointly moved to dismiss the case with prejudice. Kentucky agreed to pursue new regulations in good faith; certain provisions of the Agreement would not take effect unless those regulations were adopted. The Settling Parties did “not” seek to have the court retain jurisdiction for enforcement, nor to incorporate the Agreement in the order of dismissal.Noting that the motion was filed by “the parties to the sole remaining claim,” the Establishment Clause claim against Kentucky, the district court dismissed the case. The court refused to address the terms of the 2021 Agreement, which was not properly before it. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. “Sunrise no doubt is frustrated to find itself unable to vindicate the legality of its program” but federal courts do not decide constitutional issues in the abstract. View "Pedreira v. Sunrise Children's Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Two organizations, one individual, one business (collectively “Private Plaintiffs”) and seventeen states (“the States”) sued the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (“ATF”) for overstepping its statutory authority and for violating federal law in promulgating the “Definition of ‘Frame or Receiver’ and Identification of Firearms” (“Final Rule”). Plaintiffs appealed the district court’s denial of a motion for a preliminary injunction.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiffs have not clearly shown how the Final Rule will prevent them from engaging in constitutionally protected conduct. Regarding the business plaintiff in this case, we are left unsure what behavior it wishes to engage in, as an LLC, that is protected by the Second Amendment. Plaintiffs also argued they will suffer economic harm without a preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs asserted generally that compliance costs and uncertainty surrounding the validity and scope of the Final Rule will be costly to businesses and lead to fewer sales of firearms. However, Plaintiffs do not explain the economic harm in definite enough terms to show the extent of any harm is “actual and not theoretical.” The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding Plaintiffs have not met their burden. View "Morehouse Enterprises, LLC v. Bureau of ATF" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court denying Appellants' Me. R. Civ,. P. 80B petition for review of government action and affirming the decision of the Portland Planning Board to approve 37 Montreal LLC's application to construct a multi-unit residential building, holding that the Planning Board did not err in approving the application.On appeal, Appellants argued that the proposed development failed to meet the City of Portland's Code of Ordinance's height, setback, and design-review requirements, and therefore, the Planning Board erred in approving the application. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment below and remanded the matter to the Planning Board for findings of fact, holding that judicial review was impossible because the Planning Board's decision did not contain any of the required findings. View "Murray v. City of Portland" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court awarding attorney fees to the Human Rights Defense Center (HRDC) based on the court's ruling after an evidentiary hearing that the Maine County Commissioners Association Self-Funded Risk Management Pool (Risk Pool) had refused in bad faith to comply with HRDC's lawful request for records, holding that the Risk Pool's response constituted a bad faith refusal.HRDC submitted to the Risk Pool a request for records pursuant to the Maine Freedom of Access Act (FOAA), Me. Rev. Stat. 1, 400-414. The Risk Pool never denied or explicitly refused to comply with HRDC's request. Pursuant to FOAA's appeal procedure, HRDC filed a complaint against, among others, the Risk Pool. The Risk Pool filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that HRDC had failed to meet the FOAA requirement that the appeal be filed within thirty calendar days of the agency's "refusal, denial, or failure" to comply with the FOAA request. The motion was denied, and the court entered judgment in favor of HRDC. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) HRDC's complaint was timely filed; and (2) the court did not err in awarding attorney fees based on the finding that the Risk Pool acted in bad faith in responding to HRDC's FOAA request. View "Human Rights Defense Center v. Maine County Commissioners Ass'n Self-Funded Risk Management Pool" on Justia Law

In 2015, the Department of Transportation (“PennDOT”) began constructing a diamond interchange and installing a drainage system on property abutting Interstate 70 (“I-70”) in Washington County, Pennsylvania. The property’s owner, Appellant Donald Bindas, petitioned for the appointment of a board of viewers, seeking compensation for this encumbrance upon his land. PennDOT asserted that its predecessor, the Department of Highways (“DOH”), had secured a highway easement for the land in question in 1958. Both the trial court and the Commonwealth Court agreed, dismissing Bindas’ suit. Upon its review of the statutory authority that PennDOT invoked, as well as the record, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that DOH’s failure to comply with the requirements of 36 P.S. § 670-210 rendered that easement invalid. Accordingly, the Court vacated the Commonwealth Court’s order, and remanded with the instruction that PennDOT’s preliminary objections be overruled. View "Bindas. v. PennDOT" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's consideration was whether the Commonwealth Court abused its discretion when, sua sponte, it issued a remand to the Office of Open Records (“OOR”) for additional fact-finding after that court already had determined that the agency subject to the record request failed to meet its burden of proving that an exception to disclosure requirements applied. To this the Court concluded that such an abuse of discretion occurred, and accordingly judgment was reversed. The Court remanded this matter to the Commonwealth Court for further proceedings. View "PA State Police v. ACLU of PA" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court judge granting summary judgment in favor of BSC Companies, Inc., BSC Group, Inc., and the companies' president (collectively, BSC) in this action brought by BSC's former employees alleging claims under the Prevailing Wage Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, 26-27H, holding that the contracts at issue were not governed by the Act, and BSC was not required to pay its employees a prevailing wage pursuant to the contracts.At issue were two professional engineering services contracts awarded by the Department of Transportation (MassDOT) to BSC. The contracts were not competitively bid and were not awarded to the lowest bidder, unlike contracts for public works construction projects governed by the Act. Further, the contracts did not specify that BSC's employees would be paid at least a prevailing wage determined by the Department of Labor Standards. The superior court judge granted summary judgment to BSC. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs were not entitled to a prevailing wage for their work under the professional services contracts. View "Metcalf v. BSC Group, Inc." on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the order of the immigration judge (IJ) denying Petitioner's application for asylum and withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(1)(A), 1231(b)(3)(A), as well as relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), holding that there was no error below.Petitioner, a native and citizen of El Salvador, was charged with removability under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), and filed an application for asylum and withholding of removal. An immigration judge (IJ) found her removable and directed El Salvador as the country for removal. The BIA affirmed. The First Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review, holding (1) sufficient evidence supported the IJ's factual findings, and the BIA committed no errors of law in its ruling; and (2) Petitioner waived her claim regarding the BIA's denial of CAT relief. View "Montoya-Lopez v. Garland" on Justia Law

Appellant M.F. and her husband, J.F., were the paternal grandparents (PGPs) of R.F. and B.F. In 2021, the juvenile court terminated parental rights to the children and selected adoption as the children’s permanent plans. In Welf. & Inst. Code § 366.26 reports for each child, respondent Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) recommended that the court designate the PGPs as the children’s “prospective adoptive parents” (PAPs). But at a hearing for B.F., counsel raised a concern about J.F.’s alcohol abuse; J.F. later tested positive for methamphetamines and amphetamines. In March 2022, DPSS removed the children from the PGPs’ home on an emergency basis. DPSS then filed a Judicial Council form JV-324 for each child, stating that the removals were “due to methamphetamine used by [J.F].” Together with the notice forms (JV-324), DPSS filed a form JV-326 for each child, stating that M.F. was given notice of the removals “orally, in person” on March 11. The proofs of notice (forms JV-326) did not show that M.F. was given: (1) copies of the notices of emergency removal DPSS filed on March 11; (2) blank copies of forms JV-325 (objection to removal); or (3) blank copies of forms JV- 321 (request for prospective adoptive parent designation). M.F. went to the courthouse to ask whether she could “do anything,” and she was told she could file an objection to removal on form JV-325. On March 25, M.F. filed a form JV-325 for each child, requesting a hearing on the removals, and claiming the children would suffer harm the longer they were separated from M.F.’s family. The juvenile court never set a hearing on the removals. On September 1, 2022, M.F., through an attorney, filed a section 388 petition for each child, asking the court to return the children to her care and claiming she was never notified of her right to file objections to, and request a hearing on, the removals.The court denied the petitions, without a hearing, on grounds: (1) M.F. was provided with notice of the removals on March 11; (2) thus, M.F.’s objections were untimely filed; and (3) a hearing on the removals was discretionary, not mandatory, pursuant to section 366.26(n)(3). M.F. appealed. The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded with orders to the juvenile court to hold a noticed hearing on the children’s March 11, 2022 removals. View "In re R.F." on Justia Law