The issue this case presented for appellate review centered on the air pollution controls on certain coal-fired power plants in Utah that contributed to regional haze. This haze impaired visibility in national parks and wilderness areas across the United States (known as Class I areas). Following Congress’s direction in the Clean Air Act (the CAA or Act) to regulate regional haze, EPA promulgated the Regional Haze Rule to restore natural background visibility conditions in Class I areas by the year 2064. To comply with the CAA’s regional haze requirements, states with Class I areas, or states releasing emissions that may affect visibility in those areas, had to implement the best available retrofit technology (BART) on certain existing sources of air pollution or, alternatively, adopt measures that achieved greater reasonable progress towards improving visibility than BART. The Act required each state to develop a state implementation plan (SIP) for mitigating emissions that contribute to regional haze. The EPA then reviewed the SIP to determine if it satisfied the Act. EPA twice disapproved Utah’s SIPs addressing visibility-impairing emissions at power plants operated by Respondent-Intervenor PacifiCorp. Eventually, EPA approved Utah’s July 2019 revised SIP. In the Final Rule, EPA endorsed Utah’s decision to adopt an alternative measure instead of BART to control for visibility-impairing emissions at the power plants. Petitioners Heal Utah, National Parks Conservation Association, Sierra Club, and Utah Physicians sought review of the Final Rule. According to Petitioners, EPA abused its discretion by approving Utah’s revised SIP because Utah’s alternative measure did not satisfy the CAA’s national visibility goals. They also argued EPA failed to respond to certain comments Petitioners submitted during the rulemaking process. Finding no abuse of discretion, the Tenth Circuit denied the petition for review. View "Heal Utah, et al. v. EPA, et al." on Justia Law

For over four decades, immigration judges employed by the Executive Office for Immigration Review have collectively bargained through a certified union. Four years ago, that office asked the Federal Labor Relations Authority to determine that immigration judges are management officials barred from inclusion in a bargaining unit. The Authority agreed. Following an unsuccessful reconsideration motion, and with a second reconsideration motion still pending before the Authority, the union petitioned this court for review of both the Authority’s initial decision and its decision denying reconsideration. The union contends that, in issuing those decisions, the Authority violated the union’s substantive and procedural due process rights.   The DC Circuit dismissed the petition. The court explained that the Union’s petition for review was incurably premature—including with respect to the Initial Order—even though the Union’s second reconsideration motion sought reconsideration of only the First Reconsideration Order, not the Initial Order. The court wrote that a contrary conclusion would disserve the central purpose of the incurable prematurity doctrine. “There is good reason to prohibit any litigant from pressing its cause concurrently upon both the judicial and the administrative fronts: a favorable decision from the agency might yet obviate the need for review by the court.” And here, as in Tennessee Gas, a favorable agency decision on the second reconsideration motion pending before it could have obviated the need for judicial review of both the order initially denying reconsideration and the underlying order. View "National Association of Immigration Judges v. FLRA" on Justia Law

Petitioner Fairless Energy, LLC (Fairless Energy) contends that it pays too much for the transportation of natural gas to fuel its electric power generating plant located in Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania (the Fairless plant). In these consolidated petitions for review of orders of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (the Commission), Fairless Energy maintains that the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously, and contrary to reasoned decision-making, when it exercised primary jurisdiction over Fairless Energy’s natural gas transportation rate dispute with intervenor Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Company, LLC (Transco), and determined that the appropriate rate was the incremental rate for pipeline expansion under Transco’s Tariff.   The DC Circuit denied the petitions for review. The court held that Fairless Energy fails to demonstrate that either the Commission’s exercise of primary jurisdiction over the Transco-Fairless Energy natural gas transportation rate dispute or its decision regarding the appropriate rate was arbitrary and capricious. The court explained that the Commission reasonably started its evaluation with the 2018 Agreement’s Exhibit C and determined that it unambiguously “did not establish a negotiated rate” because it stated “None” in the location for the specification of a negotiated rate. After reaching this decision, the Commission was appropriately able to decline to consider extrinsic evidence. View "Fairless Energy, LLC v. FERC" on Justia Law

The Environmental Protection Agency extended the deadline for compliance with a revised national drinking water regulation, which in turn extended the deadline for states to enforce conforming revisions to their own regulations. Five states seek to challenge the federal extension, which they say will cause them various harms.   The DC Circuit dismissed the petition for review for lack of Article III standing. The court explained that the states’ uncertainty also is not redressable in this litigation. Their harm is not knowing what future obligations they will face, making it difficult to plan. But the Delay Rule gives the states more time to hedge their bets. Setting it aside would worsen any problem of regulatory uncertainty, taking as a given EPA’s unreviewable decision to consider changes to the Revision Rule. View "State of Arizona v. EPA" on Justia Law

The Protect Illinois Communities Act restricts firearms and related items that the Act defines as “an assault weapon, assault weapon attachment, .50 caliber rifle, or .50 caliber cartridge” (assault weapons), 720 ILCS 5/24-1.9(b), and “large capacity ammunition feeding device[s],” section 24-1.10(b)). Certain restrictions do not apply to law enforcement agencies and individuals who complete firearms training as part of their employment in law enforcement, corrections, the military, and private security (trained professionals), and individuals who possessed assault weapons or LCMs (large capacity magazines) before the restrictions became effective.The circuit court of Macon County entered declaratory judgment, finding that the restrictions facially violated the Illinois Constitution because the exemptions deny the “law-abiding public” equal protection and constitute special legislation. On appeal, opponents of the law alleged for the first time that, regardless of the exemptions, the restrictions violate the second amendment to the U.S. Constitution and violated the three-reading requirement of the Illinois Constitution.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The exemptions neither deny equal protection nor constitute special legislation because plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged that they are similarly situated to and treated differently from the exempt classes. The plaintiffs expressly waived in the circuit court any independent claim that the restrictions impermissibly infringe the Second Amendment and are jurisdictionally barred from renewing their three-readings claim. View "Caulkins v. Pritzker" on Justia Law

A Special Tribunal was convened to impose discipline on former Colorado Supreme Court Chief Justice Nathan Coats. The Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline recommended approval of an Amended Stipulation for Public Censure. The censure stems from a 2018 allegation against Mindy Masias, the Chief of Staff and second in command of the State Court Administrator’s Office (SCAO), for misconduct while she was employed by the SCAO. She resigned her position, but was still under consideration for a post-resignation services contract with the Court, valued at $2.6 to $2.7 million. After an anonymous letter raised significant allegations of wrongdoing by Masias, the Office of the State Auditor (OSA) opened an investigation. Undisputed evidence revealed that the Judicial Department entered into this contract with Masias before the anonymous letter was received, and Justice Coats asserted he had no knowledge of the execution of Masias’ contract at that time. Months after execution of the contract and receipt of the letter, Justice Coats learned Masias had surreptitiously recorded a conversation with former Chief Justice Rice concerning the reasons Masias was not elevated to become the State Court Administrator. Had Justice Coats exercised due diligence by obtaining and reviewing the Masias separation agreement, he could have learned about the surreptitious recording prior to execution of the services contract. The Court ultimately withdrew from the services contract. Disciplinary proceedings were started against Justice Coats for failing to “perform judicial and administrative duties competently and diligently” as required by the Colorado Code of Judicial Conduct. The Commission recommended, and the Special Tribunal adopted the recommendation that Justice Coats be publicly censured. View "Colorado v. Coats" on Justia Law

The Committee to Support the Recall of George Gascón (the Committee) filed a lawsuit against defendants Los Angeles County Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk Dean C. Logan and the Office of the Los Angeles County Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk (collectively “the Registrar”) to enforce the Committee’s rights under the Public Records Act (PRA) to examine a recall petition the Registrar certified as invalid for placement on the ballot. The trial court granted the ex parte application, ordered disclosure of various voter records, and ordered the parties to meet and confer on increased access. The court directed the disclosure of additional records. On appeal from the original injunction order and the subsequent order, the Registrar contends the trial court misinterpreted sections 7924.000 and 7924.110. The Committee filed a motion to dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction under the PRA.   The Second Appellate District dismissed the portion of the appeal purporting the challenge the injunction order and partially granted the petition for extraordinary writ. The court concluded that the exclusive means of challenging an order granting or denying disclosure of records in connection with the examination of an unsuccessful recall petition under the PRA is through section 7923.500. Here, the Registrar did not meet the requirements for the injunction order. However, the court exercised its discretion to consider the Registrar’s challenges to new directives appearing in that order as a petition for extraordinary writ. The court concluded that the order improperly commanded the Registrar to (1) authorize the use of electronic voter lists outside its examination room and (2) disclose redacted affidavits of voter registration. View "Committee to Support the Recall, etc. v. Logan" on Justia Law

Petitioners Idahoans for Open Primaries and Reclaim Idaho filed an original action to the Idaho Supreme Court, claiming that the Idaho Attorney General’s short and general ballot titles for “The Idaho Open Primaries Act” failed to comply with Idaho Code section 34-1809(2)(d) and (e). Petitioners asked the Supreme Court to declare the ballot titles deficient, certify Petitioners’ proposed short and general ballot titles to the Idaho Secretary of State, or in the alternative, retain jurisdiction of this matter and order the Attorney General to immediately prepare ballot titles consistent with Petitioners’ proposed titles and submit them to this Court for review. Petitioners also requested a writ of mandamus compelling the Secretary of State to extend the deadline for Petitioners to obtain signatures to qualify the initiative for placement on the 2024 general election ballot. After review, the Supreme Court granted certiorari review, holding that the short and general titles failed to substantially comply with Idaho Code section 34-1809. The Attorney General was ordered to provide revised, substantially compliant short and general ballot titles. The request for mandamus relief was denied. View "Idahoans for Open Primaries v. Labrador" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico on its action against the Governor of Puerto Rico seeking to block the implementation of Act 41-2022, which tightened certain labor regulations that had been loosened about five years earlier, holding that the district court did not err in nullifying the law.The Board sued to block the enforcement of Act 41-2022, which the Governor signed into law on June 20, 2022, by filing an adversary proceeding in the court overseeing Puerto Rico's bankruptcy process under Title III of the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act. The Governor moved for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The district court denied the Governor's motion and then nullified the law and any actions taken to implement it. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that there was no reason to disturb the court's order nullifying Act 41. View "Financial Oversight & Management Board for P.R. v. Hernandez-Montanez" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the circuit court denying Appellant's requests for writs of mandamus and certiorari to reverse the Clay County Board of Adjustment's decision affirming the order of the Clay County Planning Commission denying Appellant's proposed conditional use permit, holding that the circuit court erred in dismissing the writ of certiorari as untimely.In denying Appellant's requests, the circuit court determined that the petition for writ of certiorari was untimely and that a writ of mandamus was not an available remedy. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in denying the writ of mandamus; but (2) erred in determining that it did not have jurisdiction to consider the writ of certiorari. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether Appellant's petition seeking a writ of certiorari was timely filed. View "Hauck v. Clay County Commission" on Justia Law