The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court affirming the decision of the Belfast Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) to issue five permits to Nordic Aquafarms in connection with a proposed land-based salmon aquaculture preoject, holding that the ZBA erred as a matter of law in determining that Upstream Watch did not have standing to appeal.In dismissing the appeal, the ZBA determined that Upstream, a not-for-profit corporation dedicated to the restoration of Maine mid-coast rivers and streams, had not demonstrated a particularized injury sufficient to establish standing. The superior court dismissed Upstream's complaint for judicial review, ruling that the ZBA correctly found that Upstream had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies because it did not file a cognizable appeal with the ZBA. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment below and remanded the case, holding that, as a matter of law, the administrative record sufficiently demonstrated that Upstream had standing to appeal to the ZBA. View "Upstream Watch v. City of Belfast" on Justia Law

Leander Williams pled guilty to non-violent third- and fourth-degree drug offenses. His primary parole eligibility date was approximately eight months after the New Jersey Earn Your Way Out Act (EYWO Act) became effective. During his prison sentence, Williams successfully completed multiple alcohol and drug rehabilitation programs, including an 87-day Alcoholics Anonymous program and a residential program in the "Bo Robinson" for 187 days. After the Bo Robinson program and while remaining in the custody of the Department of Corrections, Williams resided at the Harbor Residential Community Release Program for 90 days for further rehabilitation. Approximately one month before his primary parole eligibility date, a panel of the Parole Board certified that Williams met the “criteria for administrative parole release” under the EYWO Act, which entitled him to automatic administrative parole release. The panel imposed 21 general parole conditions and the “special” condition that Williams participate in an RTP for a minimum term of 180 days. Williams administratively appealed to the Parole Board, arguing that N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59 precluded the panel from requiring an RTP as a condition of his administrative parole release under the EYWO Act. The panel upheld the imposition of residential treatment but recommended that the Board reduce his mandated “term” of 180 days to 90 days. Williams appealed, and the Appellate Division affirmed the Parole Board’s determination. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed, finding that the Parole Board could not mandate participation in an RTP for inmates administratively paroled under the EYWO Act. "Although N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59 generally authorizes the Parole Board to impose parole conditions on adult inmates who have been administratively released under the EYWO Act, an RTP is not among the conditions that can be imposed in that setting." View "Williams v. New Jersey State Parole Board" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court modified the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's petition for a writ of mandamus seeking an order directing Appellees to produce unreacted invoices for certain legal services under the Public Records Act, Ohio Pub. Rec. Ohio Rev. Code 149.43, holding that the writ should have been denied.Appellant sought unreacted invoices for legal services provided to the Rootstown Township Board of Trustees by two entities. Appellant was provided with the invoices but redacted portions of them that contained information protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege. Appellant then filed his petition for a writ of mandamus. The court of appeals dismissed the petition, concluding that the information sought by Appellant was protected from disclosure under the attorney-client privilege. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for an in camera inspection of the invoices. After an in camera inspection, the court of appeals dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court modified the judgment in part by denying, rather than dismissing, the petition, holding that the redacted invoices contained information protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege. View "State ex rel. Ames v. Baker, Dublikar, Beck, Wiley & Mathews" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals granting a writ of mandamus ordering the Ohio Fair Plan Underwriting (OFP) to provide documents in response to a public records request brought by Fair Housing Opportunities of Northwest Ohio (Fair Housing) and denying Fair Housing statutory damages and attorney fees, holding that there was no error.After OFP provided information it argued was partially responsive to Fair Housing's public records request Fair Housing brought this action seeking a writ of mandamus ordering OFP to provide records responsive to the request. Fair Housing further sought statutory damages and attorney fees awards. The court of appeals found that OFP was a public office subject to the Public Records Act and granted a writ of mandamus. The court, however, denied statutory damages and attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) OFP was subject to the Act; and (2) Fair Housing was not entitled to awards of statutory damages or attorney fees. View "State ex rel. Fair Housing Opportunities of Northwest Ohio v. Ohio Fair Plan" on Justia Law

Seven years ago, the Fifth Circuit court vacated d, as arbitrary and capricious, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s (“FERC”) cost allocation scheme for electrical grid improvements in the WestConnect region, which covers utility service to much of the American West. On remand, FERC was instructed to provide a more complete justification for its orders. The petition under review asserts that the reasons FERC gave on remand remain insufficient.   The Fifth Circuit granted the petition and reversed the orders. The court explained that FERC’s orders violate the Federal Power Act as a matter of law and, alternatively, the agency has again inadequately explained its actions. The cost causation principle that binds FERC does not authorize it to force its regulated jurisdictional utilities to assume the costs of providing service to non-jurisdictional utilities. The court explained that FERC’s compliance orders cannot “satisfy its statutory mandate—except by ignoring the benefits the non-jurisdictional utilities would receive.” View "El Paso Electric v. FERC" on Justia Law

The 1996 E-Rate program (Schools and Libraries Universal Service Support program, Telecommunications Act 110 Stat. 56), is intended to keep telecommunications services affordable for schools and libraries in rural and economically disadvantaged areas. The program subsidizes services and requires providers to charge these customers rates less than or equal to the lowest rates they charge to similarly situated customers. Heath brought a qui tam action under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729, alleging that Wisconsin Bell charged schools and libraries more than was allowed under the program, causing the federal government to pay more than it should have. The district court granted Wisconsin Bell summary judgment.The Seventh Circuit reversed. While Heath’s briefing and evidence focused more on which party bore the burden of proving violations than on identifying specific violations in his voluminous exhibits and lengthy expert report, Heath identified enough specific evidence of discriminatory pricing to allow a reasonable jury to find that Wisconsin Bell, acting with the required scienter, charged specific schools and libraries more than it charged similarly situated customers. It is reasonable to infer that government funds were involved and that if the government knew of actual overcharges, it would not approve claims. View "Heath v. Wisconsin Bell, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff HNHPC, Inc., appealed a judgment entered in favor of Defendants the Department of Cannabis Control (the Department) and Nicole Elliott. The complaint alleged the Department failed to perform its mandatory duties and/or failed to properly perform discretionary duties under the Medicinal and Adult-Use Cannabis Regulation and Safety Act (MAUCRSA). Plaintiff contended the court erred by taking judicial notice of certain documents and by sustaining defendants' demurrer. In sustaining defendants’ demurrer, the court took judicial notice of two government contracts with a contractor to design the track and trace system and the Department’s budget request for the 2021-2022 fiscal year. Relying on these documents, the court found the Department had complied with its ministerial duties under Bus. & Prof. Code section 26067. Assuming, without deciding, that the trial court properly took judicial notice of the documents, the Court of Appeal found the complaint still stated a claim for a writ of mandate and injunctive relief because the judicially noticed documents did not contradict the complaint's allegations. Because the complaint adequately pleaded facts to state a cause of action for a writ of mandate and for injunctive relief, the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment. View "HNHPC v. Dept. of Cannabis Control" on Justia Law

Robert Goff appealed an order denying his request for costs and attorney’s fees relating to the Department of Transportation’s suspension of Goff’s driving privileges. In December 2021, Fargo police officers arrested Goff in an apartment parking lot for being in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. A driveway used to access the parking lot included a sign reading “private property, private drive.” Goff requested an administrative hearing, arguing an ordinance, Fargo Municipal Code § 8-1011, limited the public’s right to access property marked as private without written permission from the owner. The owner of the property, John Goff, testified the parking lot was for tenant parking only. John Goff testified that deliverers and visitors are prohibited from going past the sign to access the parking lot. The hearing officer concluded the ordinance prohibited the public from parking in the private parking lot, but did not limit the public’s right to access the lot. The hearing officer found the public had a right of access to the private lot for vehicular use. The Department suspended Goff’s driving privileges for 91 days, and the district court affirmed. The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed, concluding the hearing officer misinterpreted the ordinance. The case was then remanded for a determination of whether the Department acted without substantial justification requiring an award of costs and attorney’s fees to Goff under N.D.C.C. § 28-32-50(1). On remand, Goff argued he was entitled to costs and attorney’s fees because the Department’s action against him was not substantially justified. Goff claimed a reasonable person would not believe the public had a right to access the private parking lot in light of signage on the property and Fargo Municipal Code § 8-1011. The district court decided the Department acted with substantial justification, and denied Goff ’s request for costs and attorney’s fees. To this, the Supreme Court disagreed, finding the district court abused its discretion in deciding the Department’s proceeding against Goff was substantially justified. The case was remanded for a determination of Goff's reasonable attorney's fees. View "Goff v. NDDOT" on Justia Law

Andrew Hennessey appealed a district court order dismissing with prejudice his action against the Milnor School District (“District”). The District employed Hennessey as a teacher for the 2021-2022 school year. In October 2021, the District placed Hennessey on paid administrative leave for immoral conduct and conduct unbecoming his position. The District requested Hennessey sign a resignation letter, which would have immediately terminated his employment, salary, and benefits. He declined to sign the resignation letter and requested an administrative hearing. The District then converted Hennessey’s leave from paid to unpaid leave and recommended his dismissal for cause. Hennessey subsequently signed a severance agreement providing him salary through October 2021 and insurance benefits through December 2021, and waiving his rights to challenge the dismissal. He later learned through an open records request that the District’s legal counsel had advised the District in an email, in part, to convert his leave to unpaid to have “some leverage over this guy.” In December 2022, Hennessey filed this action seeking to rescind the agreement’s release and waiver section to allow him to challenge his dismissal. He claimed the District exerted undue financial pressure on him to secure the waiver of his rights to an administrative hearing and to challenge his termination in district court when it converted his paid leave to unpaid leave. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, finding Hennessey failed to allege facts sufficient to support rescinding a contract for undue influence under N.D.C.C. § 9-09-02. View "Hennessey v. Milnor School District" on Justia Law

The Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“DOCR”) petitioned the North Dakota Supreme Court to exercise its original supervisory jurisdiction to direct the Honorable Judge Stacy Louser (hereinafter “district court”) to amend a portion of a criminal judgment imposing probation as part of a sentence for a class B misdemeanor and requiring the DOCR to supervise the probation. The DOCR argued it does not have statutory authority to supervise probation when the underlying charge was a class B misdemeanor. The DOCR requested the criminal judgment be amended to relieve the DOCR from the obligation to supervise the probation. Without deciding whether the district court has the authority to require a defendant to be supervised by the DOCR as part of a sentence imposed for a class B misdemeanor, the Supreme Court concluded the DOCR did have the authority to provide the supervision and declined to exercise supervisory jurisdiction. View "DOCR v. Louser, et al." on Justia Law