the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission granted Algonquin a certificate of public convenience and necessity that allowed it and the owner of the neighboring Maritimes & Northeast pipeline to undertake a series of upgrades. Those upgrades are known collectively as the Atlantic Bridge Project (“Project”). As part of the Project, Algonquin planned to build a new compressor station in Weymouth, Massachusetts. The compressor station would pressurize gas traveling north towards Maine. The Town of Weymouth, as well as several residents and environmental groups, petitioned this court to overturn the Commission’s certification decision for the Project. This court found no relevant error in the Commission’s decision and denied the petition. The entities sought review of two orders that followed the Commission’s issuance of the certificate of public convenience and necessity.   The DC Circuit dismissed the petitions. The court explained that to construe the Commission’s denial of rehearing as a reviewable new “order,” that would not change anything. That is because the statute strictly requires that every single “order” we review be accompanied by an “application to the Commission for rehearing.” The court further wrote that the denial of rehearing is not a reviewable order, so the Fore River Residents may not obtain judicial review under 15 U.S.C. Section 717r(b). And even if it were a reviewable order, their petition would be jurisdictionally deficient because they failed to request rehearing of it. View "Fore River Residents Against the Compressor Station v. FERC" on Justia Law

Appellant and her d her family sued Sudan, seeking compensation for a terrorist attack on their family. The question on appeal is whether we have jurisdiction. Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, a state sponsor of terrorism may be sued for personal injury arising from acts of terrorism. But in 2020, Congress enacted the Sudan Claims Resolution Act, which stripped the federal courts of jurisdiction to hear most terrorism-related claims against Sudan. Appellants argued that the Act’s jurisdiction-stripping provision is unconstitutional and therefore, that their claims against Sudan may be heard in federal court. The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the Supreme Court has long held that citizens have a constitutional right to access the courts. The court wrote that Appellants challenged Congress’ restoration of Sudan’s sovereign immunity, but these claims simply do not implicate the right to access the courts. Moreover, Appellants’ claims are in tension with the government’s power to establish inferior courts and espouse the claims of its citizens. However, the court modified the district court’s judgment to be a dismissal without prejudice. View "Chava Mark v. Republic of the Sudan" on Justia Law

This case concerns how PJM, the manager of a large, multi-state electrical grid, prices the flow of electricity to utilities in times of congestion. Such congestion arises when energy is scarce in a particular location on the grid due to, for example, extreme weather conditions or a fire at a transmission station. That scarcity causes the dispatch of more expensive generation and can trigger the Transmission Constraint Penalty Factor (“Penalty Factor”) when such alternative generation is unavailable. The Penalty Factor imposes an upper bound on the costs PJM will incur to control a transmission constraint, and it is designed to send transparent price signals to the market and incentivize investment that will resolve the congestion and prevent it from recurring. Petitioner Citadel FNGE Ltd. is an energy trading firm. It challenged the Commission’s suspension of the Penalty Factor as arbitrary and capricious.   The DC Circuit denied the petitions. The court explained that substantial evidence supported the Commission’s decision that the Penalty Factor, as applied to the unique Northern Neck circumstances, could not work as designed because it increased costs without incentivizing supply or demand responses. Because application of the Penalty Factor increased costs for consumers without a commensurate benefit, the Commission reasonably found that its application in this context was unjust and unreasonable. View "Citadel FNGE Ltd. v. FERC" on Justia Law

Under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, review of orders issued by the Environmental Protection Agency after a “public hearing” lies exclusively in the courts of appeals. 7 U.S.C. Section 136n(b). For orders issued without a public hearing, review lies in the district courts. Petitioners in this case challenged EPA orders regulating the use of a pesticide named dicamba.   The DC Circuit dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. The court explained that the 2020 Registrations unconditionally approve the dicamba products, whereas the previous orders had granted conditional registrations. And EPA needed to make additional findings to issue an unconditional registration, including that use of the products would “not generally cause unreasonable adverse effects on the environment.” For those reasons, the 2020 and 2022 Registrations, unlike the actions in Costle and National Family Farm Coalition, did not follow a “public hearing” within the meaning of 7 U.S.C. Section 136n(b). View "American Soybean Association v. Michael Regan" on Justia Law

The federal government funds certain expenses incurred by presidential candidates at specific times during their primary campaigns. Jill Stein, who ran for President in 2016, contends that a temporal limit on this funding unconstitutionally discriminates against minor-party candidates. Stein also contests an administrative ruling that she forfeited the right to document certain costs of winding down her campaign, which could have offset a repayment obligation that she owed the government.   The DC Circuit denied her petition. The court explained that FEC regulations required her to reassert the issue in her written submission for administrative review. Further, Stein argued that the Commission should be estopped from claiming forfeiture because its audit report stated that the winding down costs “estimated” for the period between September 2018 and July 2019 “will be compared to actual winding down costs and will be adjusted accordingly.” The court wrote that it does not read this statement to relieve Stein of her duty to address winding down costs in her request for administrative review, which was filed near the end of that period. The court explained that it recognizes that Stein could not predict the exact amount of future winding down costs. But she could have done much more to alert the FEC that she expected those costs to exceed the estimates in the audit report—and to do so by a substantial amount. View "Jill Stein v. FEC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court upholding the decision of the Nebraska Department of Correctional Services Appeals Board (Appeals Board) upholding the decision of the Institutional Disciplinary Committee (IDC) to sanction Appellant for drug use while in prison, holding that there was no plain error.Appellant, an inmate incarcerated under the custody of the Nebraska Department of Correctional Services (NDCS), was issued a misconduct charge for "Drug or Intoxicant Abuse" in violation of an NDCS rule. After a hearing, the IDC found that Appellant had violated the rule. The Appeals Board upheld the decision, and the district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not commit plain error in concluding that the evidence was sufficient to uphold the IDC's finding that Appellant violated the rule at issue. View "Haynes v. Neb. Dep't of Correctional Services" on Justia Law

Respondent G.W. had, in her lifetime, received a variety of mental health diagnoses, including depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, and borderline personality disorder. In May and June 2019, G.W. was arrested on a number of criminal charges, including criminal threatening and violation of a protective order, based upon her conduct towards a man with whom she previously had a romantic relationship and that man’s current partner (the complainants). G.W.’s conduct leading to her arrest included trespassing on the complainants’ property, contacting them after a protective order was in place, placing two improvised explosive devices and one incendiary device in the complainants’ vehicles, and making a bomb threat to the workplace of one of the complainants. G.W. appealed a circuit court decision ordering her involuntary admission to the Secure Psychiatric Unit (SPU) of the New Hampshire State Prison for a period of three years with a conditional discharge when and if clinically appropriate. On appeal, G.W. challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s conclusion that she met the involuntary admission standard. She also argued the court erred when it ordered that she remain in jail, where she had been detained on pending criminal charges, until a bed became available at the SPU. Finding no abuse of discretion or other reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the admission. View "In re G.W." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court making permanent a writ of mandamus ordering Attorney General Andrew Bailey to approve fiscal note summaries for eleven proposed initiative petitions Dr. Anna Fitz-James had filed with Secretary of State John Ashcroft and to forward notice of that approval to State Auditor Scott Fitzpatrick, holding that there was no error.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) nothing in Mo. Rev. Stat. 116.175 gives the Attorney General authority to question the Auditor's assessment of the fiscal impact of a proposed petition, and the Attorney General's authority extends only to reviewing the "legal content and form" of the fiscal notes and summaries prepared by the Auditor; (2) the circuit court properly found there was no defect in the legal form and content of the fiscal note summaries prepared by the Auditor concerning the proposed initiative petitions; and (3) therefore, the Attorney General's refusal to perform the duty of approving those summaries could not be justified. View "State ex rel. Fitz-James v. Bailey" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Missouri Mining Commission awarding attorney fees and expenses in favor of Fowler Land Company and the Margaret Leist Revocable Trust (collectively, Landowners) after Landowners prevailed in litigation concerning the creation of water impoundments on their property, holding that the Commission erred in awarding fees and expenses.Alternative Fuels, Inc. (AFI) leased land from Landowners, who consented to AFI's creation of water impoundments on their property, but AFI constructed additional impoundments without consent. Missouri Department of Natural Resources (DNR) initiated enforcement actions against AFI, after which AFI received approval for a permit revision. The Commission upheld the approval. The circuit court reversed. On remand, the Commission denied the permit revision application. Thereafter, Landowners filed an application for attorney fees and expenses arguing that they were the prevailing party and were entitled to attorney fees. The Commission granted the application. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Landowners' fee application was untimely, and therefore, the Commission erred in awarding Landowners attorney fees and expenses. View "State ex rel. Dep't of Natural Resources v. Fowler Land Co." on Justia Law

Miguel D. (Father) left his eight-year-old daughter, M.D., alone inside a locked apartment that had no electricity, an empty non-operable refrigerator, and no edible food. After waking up to find her father and his truck gone, M.D. climbed through a kitchen window to look for him and was found wandering the apartment complex. The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) filed a dependency petition alleging Father failed to adequately supervise and protect M.D., and willfully or negligently failed to provide her with adequate food and shelter. The juvenile court found the petition true, took jurisdiction, and removed M.D. from Father’s custody while he was offered reunification services. On appeal, Father argued the Court of Appeal had to reverse the juvenile court’s jurisdictional order because Welfare and Institutions Code section 300(b)(2) prohibited the juvenile court from assuming jurisdiction over a child “solely” due to a parent’s indigence or poverty. He further argued the Court should reverse the dispositional order because the Agency failed to demonstrate there were no reasonable means to protect M.D. without removing her from Father’s custody. Because the record did not support either contention, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "In re M.D." on Justia Law