After a motor vehicle accident in Norfolk, Connecticut, downed electrical wires from a utility pole owned by an electric supplier trapped the vehicle’s occupants. First responders waited about an hour before the utility’s specialist confirmed the wires were de-energized, delaying rescue. The Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (PURA) investigated the supplier’s response, conducted a hearing in which the supplier participated, and ultimately found the response imprudent. PURA ordered the supplier to adopt a thirty-minute target response time for certain life-threatening situations, among other directives.The electric supplier appealed PURA’s decision to the Superior Court, arguing that the investigation and hearing constituted a “contested case” under Connecticut’s Uniform Administrative Procedure Act, which would entitle it to judicial review. The Superior Court rejected this argument, finding that the statutes and regulations cited by the supplier did not require PURA to hold a hearing in these circumstances, and therefore the proceeding did not qualify as a contested case. The court dismissed the supplier’s administrative appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.On further appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s dismissal. The Supreme Court held that the proceeding was not a contested case because no state statute or regulation required PURA to determine the supplier’s legal rights, duties, or privileges after an opportunity for a hearing in this context. The Court explained that references to statutes requiring hearings in other circumstances did not convert the proceeding into a contested case when the relevant factual predicates were absent. The holding also clarified that PURA’s decision to hold a hearing voluntarily, or to follow contested case procedures, did not create contested case status where no such hearing was legally mandated. Thus, PURA’s determinations and orders in this investigation were not subject to judicial review under the contested case provisions. View "Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority" on Justia Law

In this case, Montgomery County, Maryland, enacted amendments to its County Code in 2021 and 2022 regulating firearms. The amendments expanded the definition of “place of public assembly,” prohibited the possession of firearms (including “ghost guns”) in or within 100 yards of such places, and removed exceptions for state-issued handgun permit holders. The amendments also imposed new restrictions concerning minors’ access to firearms and regulated ghost guns and their components. The petitioners, two businesses and eight individuals, claimed these provisions were preempted by state law, not a valid local law, and amounted to an unconstitutional taking.After removal to federal court and a partial remand, the Circuit Court for Montgomery County ruled in favor of the challengers, finding the county’s provisions preempted by state law, not a local law, and an unconstitutional taking, and issued declaratory and injunctive relief. The Appellate Court of Maryland remanded for further analysis of preemption and takings issues, particularly concerning the expansion of “place of public assembly.”The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case, holding that new issues may only be properly added by amending the complaint, not through summary judgment motions. The Court determined that Criminal Law § 4-209(b)(1) authorizes charter counties to regulate firearms in limited contexts (with respect to minors, law enforcement, and within 100 yards of certain public places), and that this authority was not abrogated by other state preemption statutes. The Court found Montgomery County’s regulation valid for parks, places of worship, schools, libraries, courthouses, legislative assemblies, recreational and multipurpose exhibition facilities, and polling places, but invalid for hospitals, health centers, long-term care, childcare facilities, government buildings as broadly defined, and generalized gatherings. The Court also clarified the scope of local regulation regarding minors and found no unconstitutional taking occurred. The judgment of the Appellate Court was vacated and remanded with instructions for further proceedings consistent with these holdings. View "Engage Armament v. Montgomery Cnty." on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between an Arizona municipal corporation and a water conservation district, both of which are public entities. In 2002, the two parties entered into a long-term agreement for the sale and delivery of water, with specific provisions regarding termination. In 2018, the water district notified the city that it considered the agreement terminated and ceased performance, while the city maintained that the contract remained valid and that the district’s actions constituted breach and anticipatory breach. Over the subsequent years, the city repeatedly requested water delivery under the agreement, and the district consistently refused, reiterating its position that the agreement was no longer in effect. In 2022, after further unsuccessful attempts to enforce the contract, the city formally notified the district of a breach and then initiated legal action seeking specific performance and declaratory relief.The Superior Court in Maricopa County denied the district’s motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment in favor of the city. The court found the city’s claims were subject to the one-year limitation period under A.R.S. § 12-821 but concluded the claims were timely because each refusal to deliver water constituted a new breach. The court also declared the agreement valid and enforceable. The district appealed, and the Arizona Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the statute of limitations in § 12-821 applied to the city’s claims and thus barred them.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed the effect of § 12-821 on the common law nullum tempus doctrine, which exempts the state from statutes of limitation when acting as plaintiff. The Court held that § 12-821 does not expressly abrogate the nullum tempus doctrine for lawsuits between public entities and that the one-year limitation does not apply in such cases. Accordingly, the Court vacated the court of appeals’ opinion, reversed the superior court’s judgment as to timeliness, and remanded with instructions to grant summary judgment for the city, declaring the agreement valid and enforceable. View "CHANDLER v. ROOSEVELT" on Justia Law

A nonprofit organization focused on election integrity requested that Hawaii’s State Elections Office provide a statewide list of registered voters, citing a provision in the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA) that allows for public inspection of certain election records. Hawaii’s State Elections Office declined to provide the statewide list and recommended that the organization seek separate county-level lists from each of the four County Clerks, as the Office does not maintain or distribute such a combined list. After receiving this response, the organization sought injunctive and declaratory relief in federal court, arguing that the NVRA entitled it to the statewide voter list.The United States District Court for the District of Hawaii dismissed the action, holding that the organization’s claim was not ripe because it had not first requested the information from the counties. The court found there was no Article III jurisdiction, as the organization had not suffered a concrete injury and could still pursue county-level records. The district court allowed time for the organization to amend its complaint if its claims became ripe, but the organization declined, maintaining that the NVRA required disclosure by the State. Final judgment was entered, and the organization appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the organization did have standing, as the denial of information requested under the NVRA constitutes a sufficient injury for Article III purposes. The appellate court also found the claim to be ripe, as the State had made clear it would not provide the requested information. However, on the merits, the Ninth Circuit held that the NVRA does not require disclosure of a statewide voter list, as such a list is not a record “concerning the implementation” of list-maintenance programs under the statute. The court therefore affirmed dismissal, but on the merits, and remanded with instructions to dismiss the claim with prejudice. View "PUBLIC INTEREST LEGAL FOUNDATION, INC. V. NAGO" on Justia Law

An employee of a Texas electric utility company testified before a legislative committee about technical problems with the company's new smart meters, attributing fire hazards to the meters and referencing specific service calls. He was also the chief spokesperson for the union representing workers at the company, and he testified the day after unsuccessful collective bargaining negotiations. In his testimony, he identified himself as both an employee and a union representative, but did not mention the ongoing labor dispute or the negotiations. After learning of his remarks, the company terminated his employment, citing a violation of its policy against providing misleading information to public officials.An administrative law judge found that the employee’s testimony was protected under federal labor law, specifically section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, which protects concerted activities for mutual aid or collective bargaining. The National Labor Relations Board agreed, concluding the company had committed unfair labor practices and ordering reinstatement and back pay. On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit previously found the testimony was not “maliciously untrue” but remanded for the Board to determine whether the employee’s speech sufficiently indicated it was connected to an ongoing labor dispute. On remand, the Board again found the discharge unlawful, reasoning that the context and the employee’s identification as a union representative sufficiently communicated the labor dispute connection.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the employee’s statements were not protected because they did not disclose a connection to an ongoing labor dispute, as required by Supreme Court precedent. The court found the Board’s analysis legally erroneous and unsupported by substantial evidence. It therefore granted the company's petition for review, denied enforcement of the Board’s order, and vacated the finding of an unfair labor practice. View "Oncor Electric Delivery Company LLC v. NLRB" on Justia Law

A longtime Speaker of the Illinois House of Representatives was prosecuted in federal court for engaging in extensive bribery schemes. The first involved a major utility company, Commonwealth Edison (ComEd), which, facing financial difficulties, funneled more than $3 million to the defendant’s political associates through intermediaries and sham contracts in exchange for the defendant’s legislative support of ComEd’s agenda over several years. The government presented evidence that these payments resulted in concrete legislative actions by the defendant that benefitted ComEd, including support for specific bills and regulatory changes. The second scheme involved the defendant’s agreement to recommend a Chicago alderman for a state board appointment in exchange for business referrals and benefits to the defendant’s family.Following a lengthy trial in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, the jury convicted the defendant on several counts, including conspiracy, federal-program bribery, honest-services wire fraud, and Travel Act violations. The jury acquitted him on some counts and was deadlocked on others. The district court denied the defendant’s motions for acquittal and for a new trial, then imposed a sentence of imprisonment and a substantial fine.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and the adequacy of the jury instructions. The Court of Appeals held that sufficient evidence supported each conviction and found no prejudicial error in the jury instructions, including those related to the definition of “official act,” “corruptly,” and the intent elements of bribery. The court also concluded that any potential instructional error regarding state law bribery under the Travel Act was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The convictions and sentence were affirmed. View "USA v. Madigan" on Justia Law

Arthur Miles was sentenced to a total of 300 months’ imprisonment following two separate federal convictions. After his first sentencing in October 2022, Miles was housed at the Marion County Jail in Indiana for fifteen months—some of this time was before and some after his second federal sentencing. During his time at the county jail, Miles worked as an orderly. He later argued that under the First Step Act of 2018 (“FSA”), he was entitled to earn time credits for this work, which could reduce his sentence, because his federal sentence had commenced and the work was equivalent to an evidence-based recidivism reduction (“EBRR”) program.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts reviewed Miles’s habeas petition after a magistrate judge recommended denying the Bureau of Prisons’ (BOP) motion to dismiss. The magistrate judge found that BOP regulations preventing prisoners from earning FSA credits until they arrived at a federal facility conflicted with the FSA’s language. The district court, however, rejected this recommendation and dismissed Miles’s petition, holding that the BOP’s rules did not violate the FSA.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the BOP’s regulation, which delayed the accrual of FSA time credits until a prisoner’s arrival at a federal facility, was invalid because it conflicted with the statutory definition of when a sentence commences. The court further held that a risk and needs assessment is not a prerequisite for earning FSA credits, and that prisoners may earn credits for qualifying programming—such as work as an orderly—performed after sentencing even while housed in non-federal facilities. The court vacated the dismissal of Miles’s habeas petition and remanded for further proceedings to determine his entitlement to credits for his time at the county jail. View "Miles v. Bowers" on Justia Law

A local air quality management district initiated legal action against an engineering company, its chief executive officer, and a related business, alleging they committed statutory and regulatory violations connected to their agricultural service operations. The district claimed that the defendants failed to correct their conduct after being issued several notices of violation for operating equipment without proper permits and failing to comply with emission controls. The defendants, in response, asserted that the notices were based on an internal district policy that had not been properly adopted through the required public rulemaking procedures.The defendants filed a cross-complaint in the Superior Court of Yolo County seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. They argued that the district relied on a “secret” policy (Policy 24) not properly promulgated under statutory procedures, which unfairly deprived them of certain agricultural exemptions. The district responded with an anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) motion under section 425.16, asserting that the cross-complaint targeted protected regulatory and legal activities, including the investigation, issuance of notices, and initiation of litigation. The trial court denied the anti-SLAPP motion, finding that the cross-complaint was a challenge to the validity of the underlying policy, not to the enforcement actions themselves.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed whether the cross-complaint arose from activities protected under the anti-SLAPP statute. The court held that the causes of action in the cross-complaint were directed at the validity of the district’s internal policy rather than at the district’s protected enforcement activities. Therefore, the anti-SLAPP statute did not apply. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s order denying the anti-SLAPP motion and awarded costs on appeal to the defendants. View "People ex rel. Yolo-Solano Air Quality Management Dist." on Justia Law

Devon Energy Production Company, L.P. was engaged in gas production from two New Mexico units under a federal lease, which required payment of royalties to the federal government. State officials, acting under federal authority, audited Devon Energy’s operations and disallowed certain deductions related to the treatment and transportation of natural gas over a four-year period. The charges for these services were bundled, making it difficult to separate deductible from non-deductible costs. A related Devon entity had previously resolved a similar dispute with the government through a settlement agreement, which established formulas for calculating allowable deductions.The Office of Natural Resources Revenue, a federal agency, reviewed Devon Energy’s objections to the audit and upheld the disallowance, ordering payment of the contested royalties or further documentation. Devon Energy sought review in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, arguing that the agency acted arbitrarily and capriciously by not considering the prior settlement agreement. The district court affirmed the agency’s decision, reasoning that the agreement did not cover all disputed royalties.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case de novo, applying the arbitrary-and-capricious standard. The Tenth Circuit found that the agency erred by failing to consider the prior settlement agreement, which may have had significant legal and factual implications for the calculation of deductions. The court also found that the record was insufficient to support the government’s alternative arguments for affirmance, such as the identity of the contracting entity and the expiration of the agreement’s terms. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for the district court to determine the appropriate remedy—whether vacatur of the agency’s decision or a remand to the agency is warranted. View "Devon Energy Production Company v. DOI" on Justia Law

A company operating a landfill in California suspected that neighboring state facilities were contributing hazardous waste, complicating its efforts to clean up groundwater contamination. The company alleged that activities at several state-run institutions bordering its landfill—including a correctional facility and a health care center—involved the use and disposal of hazardous substances that were leaching into the groundwater. In response, the company entered into an agreement allowing it to collect data from these state facilities, which it then used to support its claim that hazardous waste generation at those sites was undermining its remediation efforts.The company brought a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) against the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and the Director of the California Department of General Services. The lawsuit alleged that, by virtue of their official positions, these state officials controlled the generation and management of hazardous waste at the implicated facilities. The district court dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, concluding that the officials’ general supervisory roles were insufficient to establish the “fairly direct” connection to the alleged violations required for an exception to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity under the doctrine established in Ex parte Young.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court held that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a “fairly direct” connection between the named officials and the alleged RCRA violations. The court clarified that general supervisory authority or oversight of state agencies does not, by itself, subject state officials to suit under Ex parte Young; a more specific connection to the alleged unlawful conduct is required. Thus, the action against these particular officials could not proceed. View "FORWARD, INC. V. MACOMBER" on Justia Law