In 2014 the Los Angeles City Council passed a resolution directing various City departments and officials to prepare and execute the necessary approvals and agreements to convey the property to Childhelp in exchange for Childhelp’s agreement to continue using the property to provide services for victims of child abuse. Ultimately, however, the City decided not to transfer the property to Childhelp. Childhelp filed this action against the City for, among other things, declaratory relief, writ of mandate, and promissory estoppel, and the City filed an unlawful detainer action against Childhelp. After the trial court consolidated the two actions, the court granted the City’s motion for summary adjudication on Childhelp’s cause of action for promissory estoppel, sustained without leave to amend the City’s demurrer to Childhelp’s causes of action for declaratory relief and writ of mandate, and granted the City’s motion for summary judgment on its unlawful detainer complaint. Childhelp appealed the ensuing judgment.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that Childhelp had occupied the property for almost 30 years and had an expectation it would eventually own the property. The 2014 resolution certainly suggested the City was seriously considering selling the property to Childhelp. But it was undisputed the parties never completed the transaction in accordance with the City Charter. While Childhelp cites cases reciting general principles of promissory estoppel, it does not cite any cases where the plaintiff successfully invoked promissory estoppel against a municipality in these circumstances. The trial court did not err in granting the City’s motion for summary adjudication on Childhelp’s promissory estoppel cause of action. View "Childhelp, Inc. v. City of L.A." on Justia Law

After years of what the Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) viewed as unsatisfactory teaching performance by a certificated teacher, LAUSD served the teacher with a Notice of Intent to Dismiss and a Statement of Charges, which included notice that the employee was suspended without pay. The teacher brought and prevailed on a motion for immediate reversal of suspension (MIRS) and thus received pay during the pendency of the dismissal proceedings. LAUSD ultimately prevailed in those proceedings. LAUSD then sought a writ of administrative mandamus in the superior court seeking to set aside the order granting the MIRS and to recoup the salary payments it had made to the teacher during the pendency of the proceedings. The trial court denied the writ, holding that the MIRS order is not reviewable. The court also ruled (1) LAUSD cannot recover the payments to the teacher under its cause of action for money had and received and (2) LAUSD’s cause of action for declaratory judgment is derivative of its other claims. The trial court entered judgment against LAUSD in favor of the teacher.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that LAUSD has failed to show that in adding the MIRS procedure, the Legislature intended school districts to be able to recover payments to subsequently dismissed employees. The court wrote that if LAUSD believed such recovery should be permitted through judicial review of MIRS orders or otherwise, it should address the Legislature. View "L.A. Unified School Dist. v. Office of Admin. Hearings" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court denying Defendants' motion to dismiss the underlying case or, in the alternative, to compel arbitration under section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), holding that Defendants were not entitled to reversal.Plaintiffs, who distributed Defendants' baked goods along routes in Massachusetts, brought this action alleging that Defendants misclassified them as independent contractors and seeking unpaid wages, overtime compensation, and other damages. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, to compel arbitration under the FAA. The district court denied the motion, concluding that Plaintiffs fell within the FAA's section 1 exemption from the FAA's purview "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) two of Defendants' arguments were waived; and (2) Defendants were not entitled to relief on the merits of their remaining arguments. View "Canales v. CK Sales Co., LLC" on Justia Law

The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the continuing validity of the doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity, adopted in Knapper v. Connick, 681 So. 2d 944 (1996). This case presented the issue of whether Louisiana law recognized a cause of action for claims asserted against an assistant district attorney (“ADA”), who, during the plea and sentencing phase of a prosecution, misrepresents, either directly or by omission, a victim’s preference as to the sentence to be imposed upon a defendant, and thereafter, attempts to conceal this alleged misconduct. A secondary question concerned whether a cause of action could be maintained against the district attorney (“DA”) who employed the ADA, under a theory of vicarious liability or for employment-related claims. The Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding in Knapper and further found that, under the circumstances of this case, both the ADA and the DA were entitled to immunity. The Court thus found that the lower courts erred in overruling the defendants’ peremptory exception of no cause of action. View "Jameson v. Montgomery, et al." on Justia Law

On August 4, 2014, Appellant Donna Javitz became the Director of Human Resources for Luzerne County, Pennsylvania. Her union-related responsibilities included participating in investigatory meetings for disciplinary matters involving union employees. In March 2015, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (“AFSCME” or “Union”) filed an unfair labor practice charge (“ULP Charge”) with the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board against Luzerne County, raising allegations concerning Javitz’s conduct in two investigatory meetings. Paula Schnelly, an administrative assistant in the appellate division of the Luzerne County’s District Attorney’s Office and Union president, attended the investigatory meetings referenced in the ULP Charge as a representative for the Union members. Attached to the ULP Charge were documents in support of the allegations, among them were what appeared to Javitz to be transcripts of the investigatory meetings at issue. The highly detailed nature of the documents, as well as Javitz’s recollection that Schnelly did not take notes during investigatory meetings, gave rise to a suspicion on Javitz’s part that Schnelly recorded the investigatory meeting in violation of the Wiretap Act. Javitz took her concern to the Director of Administrative Services, David Parsnik. Together they took the matter to the Luzerne County District Attorney. The District Attorney stated that she would refer the matter to the Attorney General’s Office to investigate, as Schnelly’s employment in the District Attorney’s office created a conflict of interest. Javitz contended, she learned the County Manager, Robert Lawton, instructed the District Attorney to drop the matter. In October 2015, the Union and County settled the ULP Charge. A week later, Javitz was terminated from her position. Javitz filed suit in federal district court, naming Luzerne County, Lawton, and Parsnik as defendants. Her complaint raised federal and state claims, including a claim under the Whistleblower Law. The issue this case presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court related to the standard that a plaintiff must meet in order to establish a prima facie claim under Pennsylvania’s Whistleblower Law and whether the Commonwealth Court erred in its application of that standard. The Court concluded that the Commonwealth Court did so err. Its order was vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Javitz v. Luzerne Co., et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court concluding that "repowering" a wind plant, or replacing a substantial proportion of its parts, does not change the analysis for valuing wind plants for property tax purposes under Iowa Code 427B.26, holding that the district court did not err.Story County Wind, LLC (SCW) owned a wind energy conversion property. In 2019, a repowering project began for the wind plants. Because the Story County Assessor continued to value and assess the wind plants as before, in 2021, SCW filed a protest seeking to modify the assessment. The Board declined to modify the assessment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under section 427B.26, repowering a wind plant by replacing component parts does not charge the plants' valuation for property tax purposes. View "Story County Wind, LLC v. Story County Bd. of Review" on Justia Law

On April 7, 2020, Matthew Wallace was hired by the Centreville Police Department, located in the Town of Centreville, Mississippi. In 2021, Wallace was dispatched with a Town of Centreville certified police officer, to a scene involving multiple juveniles riding all-terrain vehicles in the town limits. An altercation occurred; at some point during the altercation, Wallace went to the patrol unit to retrieve the police-issued pepper spray. Upon returning to the scene, Wallace released the pepper spray. Sometime following the incident, one of the juveniles and his mother filed charges against Wallace for simple assault on a minor. The issue presented for the Mississippi Supreme Court's review centered around a probable cause hearing pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 99-3-28. Before the hearing, the State petitioned the circuit court to determine whether Wallace was entitled to a probable cause hearing, alleging Wallace was not a sworn law enforcement officer. At the hearing, the circuit determined that Wallace was not a sworn law enforcement officer and, therefore, was not entitled to a probable cause hearing. Wallace moved the circuit court for a probable cause hearing for the same underlying incident. The circuit court denied the motion, finding, again, that Wallace was not a sworn law enforcement officer and, therefore, was not entitled to a probable cause hearing under Section 99-3-28. Wallace appealed. The Supreme Court held that a law enforcement officer who is not certified pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 45-6-11(3)(a) is not entitled to a probable cause hearing under Mississippi Code Section 99-3-28(1)(a)(i). Further, the Court held Wallace was not entitled to a probable cause hearing under Section 99-3-28(1)(a)(i) because he was not a law enforcement officer as defined by Mississippi Code Section 45-6-3(c). View "Wallace v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

The Communications Act of 1934 and the Telecommunications Act of 1996 were enacted to provide all Americans with universal access to telecommunications services. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) implemented that mandate by establishing the Universal Service Fund, which now comprises four program mechanisms to “help[] compensate telephone companies or other communications entities for providing access to telecommunications services at reasonable and affordable rates throughout the country, including rural, insular and high costs areas, and to public institutions,” 47 U.S.C. 254. Certain telecommunications carriers must fund these efforts; on a quarterly basis, the FCC publishes the percentage of “interstate and international end-user telecommunications revenue” that covered telecommunications carriers must contribute to the Fund’s programs (the quarterly contribution factor). The Fund is administered by the Universal Service Administrative Company (USAC).A group of consumers, a nonprofit organization, and a carrier challenged this statutory arrangement as violating the nondelegation doctrine. They also alleged that the role of a private entity in administering the Fund violates the private-nondelegation doctrine. The Sixth Circuit denied a petition for review. Section 254 sufficiently guides the FCC’s discretion; Congress provided an intelligible principle and its delegation does not violate the separation of powers. USAC is subordinate to the FCC and performs ministerial and fact-gathering functions. View "Consumers' Research v. Federal Communications Commission" on Justia Law

The Oregon Attorney General brought this action against defendants, Living Essentials, LLC and Innovation Ventures, LLC, alleging that they had made representations about their products that violated two different provisions of the Oregon Unlawful Trade Practices Act (UTPA). The trial court ruled for defendants, explaining that the relevant provisions of the UTPA required the State to prove that the misrepresentations were “material to consumer purchasing decisions,” and that the State had not done so. The Court of Appeals affirmed that decision. The Oregon Supreme Court granted the State’s petition for review to consider whether the lower courts correctly construed the statute. After such review, the Supreme Court concluded, contrary to the trial court and the Court of Appeals, that the UTPA provisions at issue contained no “material to consumer purchasing decisions” requirement. The Supreme Court also rejected defendants’ argument that, without such a requirement, the provisions facially violated the free speech provisions of the State and federal constitutions. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded to that court for further proceedings. View "State ex rel Rosenblum v. Living Essentials, LLC" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court’s review centered on whether the Washington Growth Management Hearings Board’s (“Board”) decision to dismiss a timely petition for review was arbitrary and capricious when it found that the petitioner did not substantially comply with the service requirements under WAC 242-03-230(2)(a) without considering prejudice. The City of Kenmore argued and the Court of Appeals held that the Board’s interpretation of substantial compliance derived from Your Snoqualmie Valley v. City of Snoqualmie, No. 11-3-0012 (Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hr’gs Bd. Mar. 8, 2012 (Ord. on Mots.)), was entitled to deference, that the definition did not require a finding of prejudice, and that the Board’s application of the test for substantial compliance to the facts in this case was not an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court held that the Board’s erroneous interpretation and application of the substantial compliance standard articulated in the prior Board decision constituted arbitrary and capricious action and that the petitioners substantially complied with the service requirements. View "Kenmore MHP LLC v. City Of Kenmore" on Justia Law