The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court granting summary judgment to the Department of Finance and Administration (DFA) upholding DFA's amended and corrected notices of final assessment of Appellants' tax burden for the tax years 2015 through 2017, holding that DFA failed to provide sufficient evidence to meet its prima facie burden of proof for summary judgment.Appellants sued DFA in circuit court challenging the notices of final assessment. The circuit court granted summary judgment for DFA. On appeal, Appellants argued that the evidence presented was not prima facie proof of DFA's calculation of Appellants' net taxable income. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed, holding that a material dispute of fact existed regarding the amounts of Appellants' taxable income for 2015 through 2017, and therefore, summary judgment was improper. View "Gates v. Walther" on Justia Law

In 2018, Terri Richardson Mattson (“Mattson”) and her husband filed this action against the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, and its employee, Laurie Gallegos, a certified physician assistant (“Defendants”), alleging medical malpractice and failure to obtain informed consent related to outpatient mental health services Mattson received from Defendants. As a part of those services, Gallegos prescribed Mattson Prozac (fluoxetine), an antidepressant. Roughly one month later, the day of her follow up appointment with Gallegos, Mattson woke up, took a firearm from her gun cabinet, went to the liquor store, bought a bottle of vodka, drank the entire bottle while driving to her follow up appointment, and when she arrived in the Department’s parking lot, fired the gun into her head. Mattson survived but suffered extensive injuries. Subsequently, Mattson and her husband filed this action. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants on two grounds: (1) Defendants were immune from liability under the Idaho Tort Claims Act (“ITCA”) because Mattson’s claims arose out of injuries sustained while she was receiving services from a “mental health center”; and (2) the “reckless, willful and wanton conduct” exception to immunity did not apply as a matter of law. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision that Mattson’s and her husband’s claims fell within the purview of the “mental health center, hospital or similar facility” immunity provision in Idaho Code section 6-904A(2). However, the Court reversed the district court’s decision that there was no triable jury question under the “reckless, willful and wanton conduct” exception to immunity. The Supreme Court found Mattson alleged sufficient facts at summary judgment to demonstrate that a reasonable person could find that Defendants’ acts or omissions were “reckless, willful and wanton[.]” Thus, the Court vacated the judgment and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Mattson v. IDHW" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court entering summary judgment favor of Eastern Shore Community Services Board (ESCSB) and holding that Oreze Healthcare LLC's conveyance of real property to a third party prohibited Oreze from pursuing its breach of contract claim against ESCSB, holding that ESCSB was not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.ESCSB and Oreze entered into a commercial lease agreement under which ESCSB agreed to lease the four buildings comprising an assisted living facility whose license had been suspended and to provide interim care to its residents until a permanent solution was reached. When water damaged the buildings and no remedy was reached before ESCSB terminated the lease Oreze brought this complaint for breach of contract. While the lawsuit was pending, Oreze conveyed the property to a third party by general warranty deed. The circuit court granted summary judgment for ESCSB, ruling that Oreze failed to reserve its claims in the deed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the deed did not extinguish or transfer Oreze's right to sue ESCSB for property damage arising from an alleged breach of the lease. View "Oreze Healthcare v. Eastern Shore Community Services Bd." on Justia Law

The City of Lemoore (City) appealed following a jury verdict in favor of Plaintiff, who was injured when he tripped over an uneven portion of a City sidewalk. The City asks us to declare the offending portion of the sidewalk not a “dangerous condition” under the Government Claims Act as a matter of law. The City argued the present sidewalk condition must be deemed trivial as a matter of law because of its open and obvious nature, Plaintiff’s admitted familiarity with the condition, and the absence of prior accidents there.   The Fifth Appellate District affirmed. On balance, the factors do not combine to create a risk so trivial, minor, or insignificant that the sidewalk condition must be held not dangerous as a matter of law. Although the condition was visible on approach on an inferably clear, dry day and had not harmed others or Plaintiff in his many prior jogs, reasonable minds could still differ as to its dangerousness based on the evidence of the first defect’s relatively large height and rough edge, the presence of back-to-back defects, and the partial obstruction of the pine needles and debris. The determination of the condition’s dangerousness was properly left to the jury, whose verdict we will not overturn. View "Stack v. City of Lemoore" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, residents of West Virginia, formerly owned Demcorp, LLC, which did business as “Dollar Stretcher,” a convenience store in nearby Winchester, Virginia. That store sold large quantities of cigarettes, which law enforcement agents of the Department of Homeland Security had evidence to believe was being resold in New York to avoid New York’s higher excise taxes, in violation of the Contraband Cigarette Trafficking Act. During their criminal investigation, agents, armed with warrants, seized 1,560 cartons of cigarettes from the Dollar Stretcher store, and the Department of Homeland Security then held them for several years, during which time the cigarettes passed their shelf life of one year. When the Department ultimately offered to return the cigarettes, Plaintiff refused them as they could no longer be sold and thus had no value. Plaintiffs commenced this action against the Department of Homeland Security and the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, seeking compensatory damages. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the criminal warrant served a range of obvious and stated criminal investigative purposes. Any damages action against the United States for the improper seizure and detention under such a warrant is barred by sovereign immunity. Even though the seizure of cigarettes, in this case, was authorized by both a warrant issued for criminal investigative purposes and a warrant issued for civil forfeiture — dual purposes — the court concluded that the United States is immune from suit. View "Reba Myers v. Alejandro Mayorkas" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court disagreed with the lower courts' dismissal of Appellants' complaint against Maricopa County for appeal of an administrative action and the final judgment on the County's counterclaim, holding that the plain meaning of Ariz. Rev. Stat. 12-904(A) did not bar jurisdiction.Maricopa County's Planning and Development Department fined Appellants for violations of the county zoning ordinance, and the decision was affirmed. Appellants filed a complaint against the County requesting declaratory relief and alleging due process violations. The County filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the complaint was deficient. The trial court denied the motion and allowed Appellants to file an amended complaint. Thereafter, Appellants brought an amended complaint seeking judicial review of the administrative decision. The County asserted a counterclaim seeking to enforce the fine. The trial court ruled the complaint failed to comply with Ariz. Rev. Stat. 12-904(A), and therefore, Appellants failed timely to file a "notice of appeal." The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals and reversed the trial court, holding that Appellants' complaint complied with section 12-904(A)'s three jurisdictional requirements that the timely filing's substance provide notice of the appeal, identify the decision being appealed, and state the issues argued on appeal. View "Shea v. Maricopa County" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court refused to grant a writ of mandamus directing the Delaware County Sheriff's Office (DCSO) to produce records in response to a public-records request, holding that Relator failed to prove that he was entitled to relief by clear and convincing evidence.Relator, an inmate, sent a public-records request to DCSO seeking a variety of records. Twelve days later, Relator sent a second request to DCSO seeking twelve categories of records. DCSO responded to the first request with a letter and DVD containing responsive records. Relator then commenced this action seeking a writ of mandamus ordering DCSO to provide the records identified in his second request. The Supreme Court denied the mandamus claim, holding that Relator failed to demonstrate that he was entitled to mandamus relief and that DCSO had a clear legal duty to provide that relief. The Court further denied Relator's requests for statutory damages, court costs, and attorney fees. View "State ex rel. Howson v. Delaware County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court granting summary judgment to the Montana Department of Transportation (MDT) and ruling that Kageco Orchards, LLC's requests for declaratory judgment relief and mandamus were correctly denied, holding that the district court did not err.Kageco filed suit against MDT alleging that the placement of certain mailboxes within MDT's right of way created a potential hazard and interfered with Kageco's lawful use of an approach from a highway to its property. Kageco sought a declaratory judgment and, alternatively, a writ of mandamus seeking to have the mailboxes removed and relocated. The district court granted judgment to MDT. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in determining that Kageco did not have standing to pursue its claim for declaratory relief because there was no justiciable case or controversy; and (2) did not err in denying Kageco's request for a writ of mandamus because MDT's acts were discretionary as opposed to ministerial. View "Kageco v. Mont. Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law

Respondent Oklahoma State Board of Equalization, assessed an ad valorem tax concerning on the property of Complainant Terral Telephone Company. The Company protested the assessment, and the Board moved to dismiss the protest, alleging the protest was non-compliant and untimely. The Court of Tax Review agreed and ruled that the protest did not comply with the statutes and rules necessary to invoke its jurisdiction. The Company appealed the ruling to the Oklahoma Supreme Court, which after review, affirmed the Court of Tax Review. View "Terral Telephone Co. v. Oklahoma St. Bd. of Equalization" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Granite State Trade School, LLC (GSTS) was a gas training school providing fuel gas fitting training courses and licensing exams in New Hampshire since 2007. GSTS was approved as a gas training school prior to the adoption of the current gas fitting regulatory framework. In 2020, defendant New Hampshire Mechanical Licensing Board (Board) directed GSTS to submit to an audit by producing its curriculum, instructor information, and exam materials. In response, GSTS brought suit seeking a declaration that “GSTS training and testing is grandfathered and exempt from compliance” with the audit request because its programs predated the current regulations. Alternatively, GSTS asked the trial court to find Rules Saf-Mec 308 and 610 “arbitrary and capricious” because the rules failed to protect the “integrity and security of the program education materials, and exams,” and were “overburdensome.” GSTS sought to enjoin the Board from: (1) requiring the production of proprietary materials created by GSTS; (2) terminating its training program; and (3) declining to accept certification from GSTS. The Board moved to dismiss; the trial court granted the Board’s motion. The court ruled that the plain and ordinary meaning of the language contained in Rules Saf-Mec 308 and 610 did not “relieve prior approved programs from their continuing obligations” to comply with the regulatory scheme. The trial court also ruled that Saf-Mec 610 “is a valid exercise of the state’s police power and not arbitrary or capricious” and dismissed GSTS’s claim that Saf-Mec 308 was arbitrary and capricious. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "Granite State Trade School, LLC v. New Hampshire Mechanical Licensing Board" on Justia Law