In May 2020, Koballa died of COVID-19. Hudak, the executrix of Koballa’s estate, sued, asserting negligence and related state-law claims against Elmcroft, an assisted-living facility. Elmcroft removed the case to federal court under the general removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1441(a), and the federal-officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1), based on arguments it made under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (PREP), 42 U.S.C. 247d-6d.The district court found that the PREP Act did not provide grounds for removal under either removal statute and remanded the case to state court for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Hudak does not allege that Elmcroft engaged in willful misconduct in the administration or use of a covered COVID-19 countermeasure, so the PREP Act does not “provide[] the exclusive cause of action for the claims” and does not completely preempt Hudak’s state-law claims. Hudak’s state-law claims do not arise under federal law and could not be removed. Elmcroft is not a "federal officer"; it operated a facility that came under significant federal regulation as part of the federal government’s COVID-19 response but did not have an agreement with the federal government, did not produce a good or perform a service on behalf of the government, and has not shown that the federal government exercised control over its operations to such a degree that the government acted as Elmcroft’s superior. View "Hudak v. Elmcroft of Sagamore Hills" on Justia Law

This case arose out of a qui tam action against Prime Healthcare Services—Encino Hospital, LLC (Encino Hospital) and others to impose civil penalties for violation of the Insurance Fraud Prevention Act (IFPA), Insurance Code section 1871 et seq. The State of California and relator (Plaintiffs) appealed from a judgment entered after a bench trial in which the court found insufficient evidence to support their allegations that Defendants engaged in insurance fraud by billing insurers for services performed in a detox center for which they had no appropriate license, and by employing a referral agency to steer patients to the center.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the judgment. The court explained that, CDI alleged that Encino Hospital misrepresented to insurers that it was properly licensed to provide detox services when it was not. The trial court found no evidence suggesting that Defendants presented a false claim to any insurer. The court agreed, reasoning that no authority of which it is aware or to which it has been directed obligates Encino Hospital to hold any license other than its license as a general acute care hospital. Because Encino Hospital needed no separate license or approval, and no evidence showed it concealed any provider, the CDI’s cause of action for false claims failed for lack of a predicate. View "State of Cal. v. Encino Hospital Medical Center" on Justia Law

Thirteen states sued the Treasury Secretary and related officials to challenge a tax offset provision in the American Rescue Plan Act, a coronavirus stimulus package passed by Congress in 2021. That offset provision prohibits states from using Rescue Plan funds “to either directly or indirectly offset a reduction in [their] net tax revenue” that results from a change in law that “reduces any tax.” The States argued that this “tax mandate” exceeds Congress’s authority under the Constitution. The district court agreed and permanently enjoined enforcement of the offset provision. The Secretary appealed.   At issue was whether the States’ challenge presents a justiciable controversy and if so, whether the offset provision is unconstitutional. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that the district court answered both questions correctly. The court explained that all four elements weigh in favor of granting a permanent injunction. The district court did not misapply the law nor base its determination on clearly erroneous facts. It did not abuse its discretion. We also agree with the district court that the permanent injunction fully redresses the States’ harm in this case—declaratory relief is unnecessary. The court reiterated, however, that the permanent injunction applies only to Section 802(c)(2)(A), which is severable from the remaining provisions of the Act. View "State of West Virginia, et al v. U.S. Department of the Treasury, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, six individuals employed by the County of Imperial, and the three unions representing them (the Imperial County Sheriff’s Association (ICSA), the Imperial County Firefighter’s Association (ICFA), and the Imperial County Probation and Corrections Peace Officers’ Association (PCPOA)), brought a class action lawsuit against the County of Imperial, the Imperial County Employees’ Retirement System, and the System’s Board alleging that the defendants were systematically miscalculating employee pension contributions. After two years of failed mediation, plaintiffs moved for class certification under Code of Civil Procedure section 382. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the conflicting interests of two primary groups of employees, those hired before the effective date of the Public Employee Pension Reform Act and those hired after, precluded the court from certifying a class. The court found that because the employees hired before PEPRA took effect were entitled to an enhanced pension benefit unavailable to those hired after, the two groups’ interests were antagonistic and the community of interest among the proposed class members required for certification could not be met. The trial court also concluded the proposed class representatives had failed to show they could adequately represent the class. On appeal, plaintiffs contended insufficient evidence supported the trial court’s finding that there was an inherent conflict among the class members that precluded class certification and that the court’s legal reasoning on this factor was flawed. The plaintiffs also argued they should have been given an opportunity to show they could adequately represent the interests of the class. The Court of Appeal disagreed with the trial court’s reasoning concerning the community of interest among the proposed class, and agreed with plaintiffs they should be provided an opportunity to demonstrate their adequacy. Accordingly, the order denying class certification was reversed and the matter remanded to the trial court with directions to allow the proposed class representatives to file supplemental declarations addressing their adequacy to serve in this role. Thereafter, if the trial court approves of the class representatives, the court was directed to grant plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, including the creation of the subclasses identified by the Court. View "Imperial County Sheriff's Assn. v. County of Imperial" on Justia Law

Chaudhary arrived in the U.S. from Pakistan in 2007-2008. She married Ramzan while in Pakistan. They have three children together. Ramzan also has a daughter from a different marriage. In 2012, Chaudhary divorced Ramzan. She moved to West Chicago (White Oak address). Chaudhary received Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) benefits for herself and her three children. He separately received benefits for himself and his daughter. Under separate accounts, Chaudhary and Ramzan received SNAP benefits from May 2015-December 2017, both listing the White Oak address as their SNAP benefits mailing address. In 2019, the Department of Human Services investigated Chaudhary under the Illinois Public Aid Code (305 ILCS 5/12-4.4) and determined that she received overpayments totaling $21,821. The Department began an overpayment collection process. Chaudhary filed an agency appeal. The ALJ and the Secretary of Human Services upheld the determination.The circuit court reversed. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Chaudhary, as a SNAP recipient, having been previously approved and awarded SNAP benefits, was not required to prove the absence of an overpayment. The Department’s evidence was not sufficiently authenticated and does not support the determination that Ramzan resided at White Oak during the overpayment period. The Secretary’s credibility determination was unreasonable and not supported by the record. View "Chaudhary v. Department of Human Services" on Justia Law

A 1998 Chicago ordinance includes procedures, penalties, and fees that apply to vehicle owners when a vehicle has been impounded because of its use in certain municipal code offenses. Within 15 days of the impoundment, an owner may request a preliminary hearing, at which an administrative law officer determines whether there is probable cause to believe the vehicle was used in an enumerated offense. If the officer finds probable cause, the owner may regain possession of the vehicle by paying the administrative penalty applicable to the municipal code offense, plus towing and storage fees. If probable cause is lacking, the vehicle is returned to the owner; no penalty or fees are owed. An administrative penalty constitutes a debt that may be enforced as a judgment.Illinois Vehicle Code, section 11-207 provides that while local authorities can adopt additional traffic regulations, “no local authority shall enact or enforce any ordinance rule or regulation in conflict with the provisions of this Chapter unless expressly authorized herein.” Home rule units, such as Chicago, cannot adopt inconsistent local police regulations. In 2012, the Vehicle Code was amended to authorize municipalities to “provide by ordinance procedures for the release of properly impounded vehicles” and to impose “a reasonable administrative fee related to … administrative and processing costs.”The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of a purported class action challenging the ordinance. A home rule unit’s imposition of penalties does not interfere with and is not inconsistent with state efforts to allow municipalities to recoup the remedial costs incurred by an impoundment. The imposition of the penalty is a valid exercise of Chicago’s home rule authority and does not constitute a criminal penalty for purposes of double jeopardy. View "Lintzeris v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

In 2018, City of Montpelier voters approved a proposed amendment to the city’s charter that would allow noncitizens to vote in its local elections. The Legislature authorized the amendment in 2021, overriding the Governor’s veto. Plaintiffs included two Montpelier residents who were United States citizens and registered to vote in Montpelier, eight Vermont voters who were United States citizens and resided in other localities in the state, the Vermont Republican Party, and the Republican National Committee. They filed a complaint in the civil division against the City and the City Clerk in his official capacity, seeking a declaratory judgment that Montpelier’s new noncitizen voting charter amendment violated Chapter II, § 42 of the Vermont Constitution, and an injunction to prevent defendants from registering noncitizens to vote in Montpelier. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded that the complaint alleged facts to establish standing at the pleadings stage for plaintiffs to bring their facial challenge to the statute. However, the Supreme Court concluded that the statute allowing noncitizens to vote in local Montpelier elections did not violate Chapter II, § 42 because that constitutional provision did not apply to local elections. The Court accordingly affirmed the trial court’s grant of the City’s motion to dismiss. View "Ferry, et al. v. City of Montpelier" on Justia Law

Father appealed a circuit court order terminating his parental rights over his minor child, G.F., on the ground that he failed to correct, within twelve months, the conditions that led to the court’s finding under RSA chapter 169-C (2022) that G.F. was neglected by G.F.’s mother. In January 2020, father did not attend mother’s adjudicatory or dispositional hearings. Mother entered into a consent agreement acknowledging that neglect occurred due to her drug use. At the dispositional hearing, the circuit court adopted a case plan and dispositional orders, which also applied to father. Father was not served with these documents. At the three-month review hearing, father's counsel received the case plan, dispositional orders and related discovery. Two days after the six-month review hearing, father was arrested for felony second degree assault and other domestic violence charges involving his then girlfriend and her minor child. He pled guilty to at least two of the charges. In September 2020, a nine-month review hearing was held. In January 2021, the trial court held the first permanency hearing in the neglect case while father was incarcerated. The trial court found father was not in compliance with dispositional orders. The trial court changed the permanency plan from reunification to adoption and specified that “DCYF is no longer required to provide reasonable efforts to facilitate reunification between [G.F.] and mother [and] father, but shall make reasonable efforts to finalize the permanency plan.” In September 2021, the circuit court held a second permanency hearing; again the court found father was not in compliance with the dispositional orders and concluded G.F. could not be safely returned to his care. DCYF filed a new petition to terminate the father’s parental rights in October 2021. In December 2021, the father was released from incarceration. In February 2022, the circuit court granted DCYF’s petition to terminate the father’s parental rights. Assuming without deciding that, during the nine months in which DCYF was ordered by the court to make reasonable efforts to reunify G.F. with his father, those efforts were reasonable, the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that DCYF failed to meet its burden because the court did not order DCYF to make such efforts for the remaining three months. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s order terminating the father’s parental rights over G.F. View "In re G.F." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying the petition and application filed by the State of Nebraska, Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) to vacate an arbitration award resulting from a labor dispute and confirming the award, holding that the district court did not err.On appeal, DHHS argued that the arbitrator exceeded his powers under DHHS' labor contract the Nebraska Association of Public Employees, Local #61 of the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees and that the district court erred in finding that the arbitrator did not exceed his powers. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) whatever insufficiency existed in the findings of fact and conclusions of law, DHHS was instrumental in bringing about that insufficiency; and (2) the district court did not err by finding that the arbitrator did not add to or modify the labor contract and concluding that the arbitrator did not exceed his powers. View "State v. Neb. Ass'n of Public Employees" on Justia Law

The California Public Employment Relations Board (Board) refused to file an unfair labor practice complaint on behalf of plaintiff Rebecca Wu, a substitute teacher representing herself in propria persona, against real party in interest Twin Rivers United Educators (Union), a teachers’ union. In her unfair practice charge filed with the Board, Wu alleged the Union breached its duty to represent her in her claim against Twin Rivers Unified School District (School District), wherein she claimed to be misclassified as a substitute teacher. The Board declined to file a complaint against the Union based on Wu’s charge because Wu, as a substitute teacher, was not entitled to union representation given that substitute teachers were excluded from representation by virtue of the collective bargaining agreement between the Union and the School District. Wu argued she had a constitutional right to union representation as a misclassified teacher and as a substitute teacher. She further argued she had a statutory right to representation by the Union that could not be circumvented by a collective bargaining agreement. The Court of Appeal disagreed with Wu that she had a constitutional or statutory right to representation by the Union as an alleged misclassified employee or as a substitute teacher. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court’s order. View "Wu v. Public Employment Relations Bd." on Justia Law