the Biden Administration issued an executive order that re-established an interagency working group (“Working Group”) to formulate guidance on the “social cost of greenhouse gases.” That order directed the Working Group to publish dollar estimates quantifying changes in carbon, methane, and nitrous oxide emissions (collectively, “greenhouse gases”) for consideration by federal agencies when policymaking. Working Group has since published “Interim Estimates” based largely on the findings of its predecessor working group. The Plaintiffs-States (“Plaintiffs”) challenge E.O. 13990 and the Interim Estimates as procedurally invalid, arbitrary and capricious, inconsistent with various agency-specific statutes, and ultra vires. They obtained a preliminary injunction in the district court. Defendants appealed, and the Fifth Circuit panel stayed the injunction.   The Fifth Circuit dismissed this action because Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden to prove standing. Plaintiffs’ allegations of “injury in fact” rely on a chain of hypotheticals: federal agencies may (or may not) premise their actions on the Interim Estimates in a manner that may (or may not) burden the States. Such injuries do not flow from the Interim Estimates but instead from potential future regulations, i.e., final rules that are subject to their own legislated avenues of scrutiny, dialogue, and judicial review on an appropriately developed record. View "State of Louisiana v. Biden" on Justia Law

The Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) program requires gasoline and diesel fuel refiners, blenders, and importers to ensure that a certain portion of their annual transportation fuel production consists of renewable fuels, 42 U.S.C. 7545(o)). United, a small Pennsylvania refinery, has periodically received hardship exemptions from those requirements, including in the 2017 and 2018 compliance years. In 2019, United sought an exemption. Rather than accepting United's data at face value—as in previous years—EPA asked how United had accounted for the financial benefit of its 2018 RFS exemption. United's amended financial statement explained that revenue from selling its renewable fuel credits (RINS) generated in a particular year was included in net revenues for that year, even if the RINs actually were sold in a later calendar year. United’s amended figures showed a three-year refining margin that was higher than the margin in United’s original submission and higher than the industry average. The Department of Energy (DOE) evaluated United’s submission and initially recommended that United not receive an exemption. DOE later changed its recommendation to account for the effects of COVID-19 and suggested a 50 percent exemption for 2019.EPA denied United any exemption, declining to consider events “that did not emerge until 2020, the year after the petition in question.” The Third Circuit denied a petition for review, rejecting United’s argument that EPA arbitrarily relied on an “accounting trick” that artificially inflated United’s running average net refining margin. View "United Refining Co v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

Respondent Braden's Folly, LLC owned two small, contiguous, developed coastal properties on the northeast end of Folly Beach, South Carolina. The City of Folly Beach amended an ordinance to require certain contiguous properties under common ownership to be merged into a single, larger property. The ordinance did not impact the existing uses of Braden's Folly's contiguous lots. Nevertheless, Braden's Folly challenged the merger ordinance, claiming it had planned to sell one of the developed properties, and that the merger ordinance interfered with its investment-backed expectation under the test announced in Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). Folly Beach denied the claim of an unconstitutional regulatory taking. Pursuant to cross-motions for summary judgment, the circuit court agreed with Braden's Folly, finding the merger ordinance effected an as-applied taking of Braden's Folly's beachfront property. Folly Beach appealed the judgment in favor of Braden's Folly. Underlying the South Carolina Supreme Court's application of the Penn Central factors was the "distinct fragility" of Folly Beach's coastline, which was subject to such extreme erosion that the General Assembly exempted Folly Beach from parts of the South Carolina Beachfront Management Act. This exemption gave the city the authority to act in the State's stead in protecting the beach there. One of Braden's Folly's properties was contributing to worsening erosion rates on Folly Beach and, along with similarly situated properties, was threatening the existence of the entire beach in that area of the state. The Court concluded Braden's Folly had not suffered a taking under the Penn Central test. Therefore, the judgment was reversed and the case remanded for entry of judgment in favor of Folly Beach. View "Braden's Folly, LLC v. City of Folly Beach" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review of a final order of removal issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing Petitioner's appeal of the decision of the immigration judge (IJ) concluding that Petitioner's Brazilian conviction constituted both an aggravated felony and a particularly serious crime rendering him ineligible for asylum, withholding of removal, cancellation of removal, and voluntary departure, holding that there was no error of law.On appeal, Petitioner argued that his Brazilian conviction was in absentia and that both the IJ and BIA erred in determining that the conviction was valid for immigration purposes, thus barring him from obtaining the relief he sought. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the Brazilian conviction was not in absentia; (2) there was no evidence to support Petitioner's claim that his foreign conviction was a travesty of justice; and (3) substantial evidence supported the IJ's conclusion that Petitioner's conviction was not politically motivated. View "Andrade-Prado, Jr. v. Garland" on Justia Law

In 2018, ONEOK Arbuckle II Pipeline, LLC began construction of a natural gas liquid pipeline to transport Oklahoma production to the interstate market. The pipeline required electricity to operate a series of pump stations, including the Binger II Pump Station. The location for the proposed Binger II was in the certified territory of CKenergy Electric Cooperative, Inc., which has exclusive rights to provide electricity in the area pursuant to the Retail Electric Supplier Certified Territory Act. Relying on the large-load exception to the RESCTA, OG&E submitted a bid to provide service to the Binger II, which ONEOK accepted, and the parties contracted for service. CKenergy appealed this contract to the Oklahoma Corporation Commission asserting that it was a violation of its exclusive rights under the RESCTA. The Commission enjoined OG&E's service, concluding that the meaning of "extending its service" in section 158.25(E) limited the manner or mechanism which OG&E could use to provide service under the large-load exception. OG&E and ONEOK appealed, the Oklahoma Supreme Court retained both appeals, and consolidated the cases. The Supreme Court held that section 158.25(E) allowed OG&E to extend its service to large loads in the manner proposed. Therefore, the Commission's order enjoining OG&E was vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Okla. Gas & Electric Co. v. State ex rel. Okla. Corp. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Petitioner Cactus Canyon Quarries, Inc. (“Cactus Canyon”) appeals a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission (“Commission”). In 2020, Cactus Canyon was issued three citations by the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA).   The Fifth Circuit denied Cactus Canyon’s petition, holding that the ALJ properly interpreted Section 56.14101(a)(3) to include the low brake pressure alarm as a component of the truck’s “braking system.” Cactus Canyon contends that the alarm is not such a component because it has no effect on the braking system’s ability to stop and hold equipment. But the plain language and purpose support the inclusion of the alarm in the “braking system.” The court concluded that the braking standard unambiguously supports the Government’s interpretation. Since a “system”—by definition at the time of the standard’s passage—is composed of parts, the Section’s reference to “braking systems” extends to its related components, including those that do not simply function to stop and hold the vehicle. View "Cactus Canyon Quarries v. MSHR" on Justia Law

Defendants Southern Coal Corporation and Premium Coal Company, Inc. (collectively, “Southern Coal”) asked the Fourth Circuit to reverse a district court’s order granting a motion to compel compliance with a consent decree (the “Decree”) to which they previously acquiesced. The Decree operated to resolve allegations of approximately 23,693 Clean Water Act violations, pre-litigation, levied against Southern Coal by Plaintiffs Alabama, Kentucky, Tennessee, Virginia, and the United States of America (collectively, the “government”).   The Fourth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the district court properly found the Decree’s plain language to mandate compliance with the Clean Water Act and derivative permitting obligations. The court explained that although the plain language of the Decree clearly supports the district court’s conclusion that Southern Coal was obligated to maintain National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits—and that alone is sufficient basis to affirm—the court may also consider the circumstances surrounding the Decree and the general nature of the remedy agreed upon. Here, the underlying dispute revolved around tens of thousands of NPDES-permitting and CWA violations. It cannot reasonably be argued that, in formulating the Decree, the parties contemplated undermining its efficacy by authorizing the exact conduct that it sought to remedy. If Southern Coal intended such a backdoor to compliance, then it likely did not negotiate the Decree in “good faith” to forge an agreement that was “fair, reasonable, and in the public interest,” as it purported to do as a Decree signatory. View "US v. Southern Coal Corporation" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court affirming the determination of the Rhode Island-Sex Offender Board of Review that Petitioner posed a level II, moderate risk of reoffense, holding that the trial justice erred in upholding the Board's classification of petitioner at a level II risk to reoffend.On appeal, Petitioner argued that the trial justice erred in finding that the State presented a prima facie case sufficient to justify the Board's determination that he posed a level II, moderate risk to reoffend. The Supreme Court agreed and vacated the judgment below, holding that the evidence presented by the State was insufficient to support the Board's moderate risk classification. View "State v. Decredico" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgments of probation entered in separate superior court cases stemming from the same adjudication, holding that the State proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant had violated the terms and conditions of his probation.After a hearing, the hearing justice found that Defendant had violated the terms of his probation in two cases and removed three and a half years suspension on each sentence in those cases. On appeal, Defendant argued that the State did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he violated the terms and conditions of his probation. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the hearing justice did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in finding a violation. View "Carver v. Commissioner of Correction" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court remanded this matter to the Commissioner of Correction in this appeal from the denial of medical parole, holding that the Commissioner's decision was arbitrary and capricious because it was made without the benefit of a standardized risk assessment required by Title 501 Code Mass. Regs. 17.02.Appellant, a sixty-six-year-old man serving a life sentence without the possibility of parole in connection with his first-degree murder conviction, petitioned for medical parole under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 127, 119A arguing that he was permanently incapacitated and unlikely to return to violating the law if released. The Commissioner denied the request, determining that there was not a "significant and material" change in Plaintiff's circumstances. Plaintiff then commenced this action pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 249, 4. A superior court denied the motion, finding that the Commissioner's decision was reasonable. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that the Commissioner's decision to deny Plaintiff medical parole was erroneous because a risk assessment was not conducted on him. View "McCauley v. Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Institution, Norfolk" on Justia Law