Congress enacted Sec. 254 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which established the Universal Service Fund (USF) and entrusted its administration to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). The FCC relies on a private entity, the Universal Service Administrative Company (“USAC”), to aid it in its administration of the USF. USAC proposals are approved by the FCC either expressly or after fourteen days of agency inaction.USAC submitted its 2022 first quarter projections to the FCC on November 2, 2021. The FCC published these projections for notice andcomment in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act. On November 19, 2021, Petitioners submitted comments challenging the constitutionality of the USF and the FCC’s reliance on USAC. The FCC approved USAC’s proposal on December 27, 2021. In response, Petitioners filed this petition on January 5, 2022.On appeal, Petitioners assert that: (1) the Hobbs Act is not a jurisdictional bar to their constitutional claims; (2) Section 254 violates the nondelegation doctrine because Congress failed to supply the FCC with an intelligible principle; and (3) the FCC’s relationship with USAC violates the private nondelegation doctrine because the FCC does not adequately subordinate USAC in its administration of the USF.Finding that the Hobbs Act did not bar Petitioners' claims, the Fifth Circuit reached and rejected the claims on their merits. The Fifth Circuit held that Sec. 254 does not violate the non-delegation doctrine or the private non-delegation doctrine. View "Consumers' Research v. FCC" on Justia Law

The Food and Drug Administration denied Petitioner R.J. Reynolds Vapor Company’s (“RJRV”) application to market menthol-flavored e-cigarettes. Petitioners so ughta stay pending review of the denial order on the merits. RJRV petitioned the FDA for a stay, which was denied. RJRV and three other companies then petitioned the Fifth Circuit for review and moved to stay the Denial Order.   The Fifth Circuit entered a full stay pending resolution of RJRV’s petition on the merits. The court explained that the FDA’s disregard for the principles of fair notice and consideration of reliance interests is exacerbated by its failure to consider alternatives to denial. When an agency changes course, as the FDA did here, it must take into account “alternatives that are within the ambit of the existing policy.” Here, the court wrote, the FDA gave RJRV no such opportunity for its menthol PMTA. Further, the court explained that the FDA did not adequately address RJRV’s evidence that substantial health benefits would accrue to adult and youth cigarette smokers alike who switched to menthol Vuse, while popularity among youth would remain low overall. Moreover, the court found that RJRV has adduced evidence that the FDA has effectively banned all non-tobacco-flavored e-cigarettes, pursuant to its new and secret heightened evidentiary standard, without affording affected persons any notice or the opportunity for public comment. The court also held that given RJRV’s uncontested allegations and legal arguments, RJRV has met its burden of showing irreparable harm if denied a stay pending appeal. View "R.J. Reynolds v. FDA" on Justia Law

At issue here was the 2015 “public health goal” (PHG) defendant Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment (OEHHA) set for the contaminant perchlorate, a chemical found in rocket fuel. After OEHHA set the PHG for perchlorate at 1 part per billion (ppb), plaintiff California Manufacturers & Technology Association (CMTA) filed a petition for a writ of mandate ordering OEHHA to withdraw the PHG. The trial court denied the petition. On appeal, CMTA argued: (1) OEHHA violated the statutory mandate in arriving at the PHG; and (2) the PHG was void based on the common law conflict of interest doctrine because its author, Dr. Craig Steinmaus, had a conflict of interest. The Court of Appeal concluded OEHHA complied with the statutory requirements under Health & Safety Code section 116365 (c)(1)(A), and that the common law conflict of interest doctrine did not apply here. View "California Manufacturers etc. v. Off. of Environmental Health etc." on Justia Law

This case arose from a car accident in which respondenr Miriam Gonzalez Carmona ran a red light and hit petitioner Kylie Hanson’s car. At the time, Carmona was driving home from an out of town work training, driving a car owned by her employer, Southeast Washington Office of Aging and Long Term Care (SEW ALTC). Hanson filed a complaint against Carmona individually and the SEW ALTC Advisory Council (Advisory Council), under a theory of vicarious liability alleging Carmona was acting within the scope of her employment at the time of the accident. The Advisory Council and Carmona moved for summary judgment because Hanson did not comply with RCW 4.96.020(4)’s presuit notice requirement to sue a government entity or its employees for tortious conduct and the statute of limitations had run. Hanson then amended her complaint to remove all references to the Advisory Council and the allegations that Carmona was acting in the scope of employment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Advisory Council, but it allowed the case to proceed forward against Carmona in her individual capacity. The Court of Appeals reversed. After review, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, but on different grounds. The Supreme Court held that RCW 4.96.020(4) applied when an employee is acting within the scope of employment but is sued in their individual capacity. "The plain language of the statute encompasses acts within the scope of employment and the government entity, not the employee, is bound by any judgment, even if not technically sued. Accordingly, the legislature can require presuit notices for employee acts committed within the scope of employment." View "Hanson v. Carmona" on Justia Law

Appellant the Law Offices of Crystal Moroney (“Moroney”) is a law firm that principally provides legal advice and services to clients seeking to collect debt. As the agency charged with regulating this industry, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) served on Moroney a civil investigative demand (“CID”) for documents, which it subsequently petitioned to enforce in the district court. While that petition was pending, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020), holding that the provision that protected the Director of the CFPB from removal other than for cause was an unconstitutional limitation on the President’s removal power. The CFPB filed a notice to ratify the CID and the enforcement action against Moroney. The district court granted the CFPB’s petition to enforce the CID. On appeal, Moroney argues that the CID cannot be enforced.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court held that the CID was not void ab initio because the CFPB Director was validly appointed, that the CFPB’s funding structure is not constitutionally infirm under either the Appropriations Clause or the nondelegation doctrine and that the CID served on Moroney is not an unduly burdensome administrative subpoena. The court explained that under the nondelegation doctrine’s lenient standard, Congress has plainly provided an intelligible principle to guide the CFPB in setting and spending its budget. Therefore, the court concluded that the CFPB’s funding structure is proper under the nondelegation doctrine. View "CFPB v. Law Offs. of Crystal Moroney" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the Workers' Compensation Board affirming an administrative law judge's finding that Claimant's total knee replacement was compensable, holding that Claimant was not entitled to relief on his claims of error.Claimant injured his knee while at work and received workers' compensation benefits. Claimant continued to experience knee pain after surgery and ultimately underwent a total knee replacement. Employer filed a medical fee dispute, and an ALJ found that the total knee replacement was compensable. The Board and court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the ALJ had sufficient evidence to conclude that Claimant's total knee replacement was reasonable and necessary and was within his discretion to make inferences. View "Perry County Bd. of Education v. Campbell" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Residents' claims against the Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County, holding that the circuit court erred in dismissing Residents' complaint.Residents brought this action seeking declaratory relief and to enjoin the Board from adopting an updated zoning ordinance via electronic meeting. In the alternatively, if the Board adopted the ordinance via an electronic meeting, Residents sought a declaration that any action by the Board or approval concerning the ordinance was void ab initio. The circuit court denied relief, finding, among other things, that Residents' claims were moot and that the Board had the authority to adopt the ordinance in an electronic meeting. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court erred in concluding that the Board's adoption of the ordinance mooted Residents' declaratory judgment claim; (2) the circuit court erred in dismissing Residents' complaint as premature; and (3) the Board adopted the ordinance in a manner that violated the open meeting provisions of the Virginia Freedom of Information Act, Va. Code 2.2-3700 et seq. View "Berry v. Bd. of Supervisors" on Justia Law

The Pueblo of Jemez filed a quiet title action against the United States relating to lands comprising the Valles Caldera National Preserve (“Valles Caldera”), which the United States purchased from private landowners in 2000. In an earlier appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the district court’s ruling dismissing the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Court reversed and remanded, finding that an 1860 federal grant of title to private landowners would not extinguish the Jemez Pueblo’s claimed aboriginal title. Upon remand, the Jemez Pueblo could establish that it once and still had aboriginal title to the lands at issue. After a twenty-one-day trial, the district court ruled that the Jemez Pueblo failed to establish ever having aboriginal title to the entire lands of the Valles Caldera, failing to show that it ever used the entire claimed land to the exclusion of other Indian groups. The Jemez Pueblo moved for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). But rather than seek reconsideration of its complaint’s QTA claim to the entire Valles Caldera, the Jemez Pueblo shrunk its QTA claim into claims of title to four discrete subareas within the Valles Caldera: (1) Banco Bonito, (2) the Paramount Shrine Lands, (3) Valle San Antonio, and (4) the Redondo Meadows. The district court declined to reconsider all but Banco Bonito, on grounds that the Jemez Pueblo hadn’t earlier provided the government notice of these claims. Even so, being thorough, the court later considered and rejected those three claims on the merits. Of the issues raised by the Jemez Pueblo on appeal, we primarily address its challenge to the district court’s ruling that the Jemez Pueblo lost aboriginal title to Banco Bonito. The Tenth Circuit concluded the district court erroneously interpreted "Jemez I" in ruling that the Jemez Pueblo lost aboriginal title to Banco Bonito. So in accordance with longstanding Supreme Court precedent, and by the district court’s findings, the Court held the Jemez Pueblo still had aboriginal title to Banco Bonito. The Court reversed in part the denial of the Jemez Pueblo’s motion for reconsideration, and vacated in part and remanded with instructions to the district court. The Court affirmed in all other respects. View "Pueblo of Jemez v. United States, et al." on Justia Law

Military-Veterans Advocacy (MVA) filed suit under 38 U.S.C. 502, seeking review and revision of certain instructions and practices set forth in the Veterans Affairs Adjudication Procedures Manual (M21-1 Manual), which provides guidance and instructions to the administrators of veterans’ benefits and claims, by interpreting and coordinating the application of statutes, regulations, policies, and judicial decisions. The M21-1 Manual “limits VA staff discretion, and, as a practical matter, impacts veteran benefits eligibility for an entire class of veterans.”The Federal Circuit dismissed challenges to presumptions and procedures concerning Vietnam-era exposure to the Agent Orange defoliant. MVA waived its challenge to the “Thailand Rules.” The VA’s interpretation of the “Blue Water Navy Rule” of 2019 did not unduly narrow the presumption of exposure and service connection as applied to shipboard service. MVA’s challenge to the “Airspace Rule” is barred by the six-year limit provided in section 2401(a) because the rule has been in full force and effect since 1993. Even if the time bar did not apply, Congress has consistently preserved the high-altitude exception to the presumption of exposure since its adoption in 1993. View "Military-Veterans Advocacy Inc. v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals in this employment action, holding that a civil service merit board does not act arbitrarily or capriciously by declining to allow an employee who is challenging his termination for just cause to inquire about more lenient discipline imposed on other employees.Plaintiff, a Shelby County Fire Department employee, participated in an altercation involving a firearm at a political rally and was subsequently investigated. Due to the altercation and Plaintiff's dishonesty during the investigation, Plaintiff was fired. Plaintiff appealed, requesting that the Shelby County Civil Service Merit Board ask questions about discipline imposed on other fire department employees. The Board affirmed. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case, ruling that the Board arbitrarily and unreasonably excluded questions about other discipline. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Board's decision to decline to consider evidence of discipline imposed on other employees was nor arbitrary or capricious. View "Moss v. Shelby County Civil Service Merit Bd." on Justia Law