Mother appealed a trial court’s determination that C.C. was a child in need of care or supervision (CHINS). She argued that the court erred in admitting certain hearsay statements by C.C. concerning alleged sexual abuse by mother’s boyfriend. The Vermont Supreme Court did not reach mother’s arguments because, even excluding this evidence, the court’s decision was amply supported by its remaining findings. Therefore, judgment was affirmed. View "In re C.C." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the order of the superior court judge allowing the State police's motion for summary judgment and denying Plaintiff's request for back pay under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 30, 59 (the Perry Law), holding that Plaintiff was not entitled to back pay or other relief under the terms of the Perry Law.Perry Law mandates back pay for a State employee who has been indicted on criminal charges due to job-related misconduct and, consequently, suspended from his position without pay if the charges are subsequently terminated without a finding or verdict of guilty. At issue was whether Plaintiff, who had been suspended from his position without pay pursuant to article 6.2 of the State police rules and regulations, was entitled to back pay under the Perry Law. The Supreme Judicial Court held (1) when the colonel of the State police opted to suspend Plaintiff, he had discretion to choose whether to invoke the Perry Law or to proceed under article 6.2, which is unique to the State police; and (2) because the colonel decided to suspend Plaintiff in accordance with article 6.2 Plaintiff was not entitled to relief under the Perry Law. View "Perez v. Dep't of State Police" on Justia Law

Pursuant to Mississippi Code Sections 61-9-1 to -9 (Rev. 2022) the City of Jackson passed an ordinance on August 6, 2019, to incorporate land in Rankin County that surrounded what was known as the Jackson-Medgar Wiley Evers International Airport. Rankin County, the City of Pearl and the City of Flowood appealed the ordinance; the trial court declared the ordinance void because Jackson had failed to obtain the consent and approval of the Rankin County Board of Supervisors before passing the ordinance. Jackson appealed to the Mississippi Supreme Court claiming that the trial court erred by finding that approval of the Rankin County Board of Supervisors was required. The Supreme Court found the ordinance void and affirmed the circuit court's judgment. View "City of Jackson v. Cities of Pearl & Flowood, & Rankin County, Mississippi" on Justia Law

This case concerned the removal of two commissioners of the Canton Municipal Utilities Commission (CMU Commission) by the City of Canton Board of Aldermen (the Board). The Mayor of Canton vetoed a resolution of the Board issuing notice and an opportunity to be heard to the commissioners. The Board claimed to override the veto by a vote of two-thirds of the majority of members, although in actuality it failed for lack of the requisite majority. It then proceeded with a hearing and ultimately removed the commissioners from their appointed positions. The decision of the Board was appealed. The circuit court reversed the decision to remove the commissioners, finding that the Board failed to override the Mayor’s veto and that the actions taken to remove the commissioners following the failure to override the veto were void as a matter of law. The Board appealed to the Mississippi Supreme Court, claiming the commissioners’ notice of appeal contained fatal jurisdictional errors, notice and an opportunity to be heard were not required for the removal to be effective and the Board properly overrode the Mayor’s veto. After a careful review of the law, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment. View "City of Canton Board of Aldermen v. Slaughter, et al." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court concluding that a rule promulgated by the National Marine Fisheries Services (the Agency) requiring vessels fishing for herring on certain fishing trips to carry monitors on board was a permissible exercise of agency authority, holding that the rule was a permissible exercise of the Agency's authority and was otherwise lawful.Plaintiffs, owners of two fishing vessels that harvest herring brought this action asserting, among other things, that they were disproportionately burdened by carrying monitors and that the Agency's monitor rule was arbitrary and capricious. The district court granted summary judgment for the Agency. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the challenged rule was authorized by Congress and immune to Plaintiffs' various procedural and substantive challenges. View "Relentless Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court dismissing Appellants' complaint alleging that the Arkansas Medical Marijuana Commission had granted a marijuana cultivation license to a corporate entity that had been dissolved, holding that the circuit court correctly dismissed this appeal on the merits.Appellants, existing cultivation license holders, challenged the Commission's decision to allegedly grant a license to a dissolved corporate entity, arguing that the circuit court erred by holding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and wrongly held that Appellants lacked standing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court (1) erred by not finding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and that Appellants lacked standing; but (2) properly dismissed the complaint because it failed to allege facts sufficient to mount the State's sovereign immunity defense. View "Osage Creek Cultivation, LLC v. Ark. Dep't of Finance & Administration" on Justia Law

In this class action, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's judgment that certain sanitation fees constituted an illegal exaction and that the City of Fort Smith was unjustly enriched because the class paid money expecting to receive recycling services, holding that the circuit court clearly erred.Plaintiff, on behalf of the citizens and taxpayers of Fort Smith (class), brought this action against the City after discovering that Fort Smith was dumping almost all of its recyclables in a landfill, claiming that Fort Smith's collection of monthly sanitation charges, including recycling fees, was an illegal exaction and that the City had been unjustly enriched. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed the action, holding (1) because Fort Smith used the sanitation fee to collect and dispose of sanitation, the circuit court's finding that the fee was an illegal exaction was clearly erroneous; and (2) the damages evidence Plaintiff presented was not a valid measure of restitution. View "City of Fort Smith v. Merriott" on Justia Law

North Dakota Attorney General Drew Wrigley, on behalf of the State of North Dakota (“the State”), sought a supervisory writ to vacate a district court’s order granting a preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-31-12. The injunction was granted in Access Indep. Health Servs., Inc., et al. v. Wrigley, et al., Burleigh Co. Court No. 2022-CV- 01608. The State argued the district court abused its discretion in granting the injunction because Access Independent Health Services, Inc., d/b/a Red River Women’s Clinic (“RRWC”) and the other plaintiffs failed to prove: (1) they had a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) they would suffer irreparable injury; (3) there would be harm to other interested parties; and (4) the effect on the public interest weighed in favor of granting a preliminary injunction. The North Dakota Supreme Court found that while the regulation of abortion was within the authority of the legislature under the North Dakota Constitution, RRWC demonstrated likely success on the merits that there was a fundamental right to an abortion in the limited instances of life-saving and health-preserving circumstances, and the statute was not narrowly tailored to satisfy strict scrutiny. The Court granted the requested review, denied the relief requested in the petition, and left in place the order granting a preliminary injunction. View "Wrigley v. Romanick, et al." on Justia Law

In this case challenging the constitutionality of administrative rules governing access to Mauna Kea's summit under Haw. Const. art XII, 7, the Supreme Court answered questions reserved by the Circuit Court of the Third Circuit by holding (1) in a challenge to the constitutionality of administrative rules based on a violation of Haw. Const. art. XII, 7, the burden of proof does not shift to the government agency defendant and instead remains with the challenging party; and (2) the framework set forth in Ka Pa'akai O Ka'Aina v. Land Use Comm'n, 7 P.3d 1068 (Haw. 2000), applies to challenges to the constitutionality of an administrative rule based on an alleged violation of article XII, section 7, in addition to contested case hearings. View "Flores-Case 'Ohana v. University of Haw." on Justia Law

In November of 2020, the people of Georgia, through the results of a ballot question posed in the general election, amended the State Constitution to allow for a specific waiver of sovereign immunity. This new waiver allowed citizens to sue the State for declaratory relief ("Paragraph V"). To the extent that citizens obtain a favorable ruling on their claim for declaratory relief, they could then also seek injunctive relief to “enforce [the court’s] judgment.” To take advantage of this new waiver of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, however, the Constitution provided that such actions had to be brought “exclusively” against the State. When a plaintiff’s suit violated this exclusivity provision, the Constitution required the suit be dismissed. In the underlying appeal, the plaintiffs’ suit named a defendant for whom a waiver was not provided by Paragraph V. Accordingly, the Constitution required the suit to be dismissed. The Georgia Supreme Court therefore vacated the trial court’s grant of an interlocutory injunction, reversed the denial of the State’s motion to dismiss, and remanded this case with direction that it be dismissed. View "Georgia, et al. v. Sass Group, LLC et al." on Justia Law