The Supreme Court vacated the order of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) dismissing Appellant's appeal in this workers' compensation case for lack of a final, appealable order, holding that the ICA erred when it dismissed this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.These consolidated cases consisted of the decision of the Director of the Department of Labor and Industrial Relations (DCD) determining that Appellant sustained compensable work-related injuries but denying her claim for compensation relating to her alleged neck injury and sleep disorder. Following years of proceedings before the Labor and Industrial Relations Appeals Board (LIRAB) and DCD, the LIRAB issued several orders, including an order granting Employer/Insurer's two motions to compel and denying Appellant's motion for partial summary judgment. The ICA dismissed Appellant's appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the ICA had jurisdiction to review the LIRAB's order granting the motions to compel and denying partial summary judgment as to the order compelling Appellant to undergo an independent medical examination. View "Suzuki v. American Healthways, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) appealed from a judgment granting Plaintiff’s petition for writ of mandate (judgment). DMV contends the issues presented on appeal are whether the trial court erred in overturning the suspension of Plaintiff’s driver’s license (1) “by applying [former] Government Code section 11440.30.   The Fifth Appellate District affirmed the “Judgment Granting Petition For Writ Of Mandate And Awarding Costs And Attorney Fees To Petitioner” and remanded the cause to the court below, with directions to modify the judgment to provide that the matter shall thereafter be remanded to the DMV for further proceedings. The court concluded that former Government Code section 11440.30 was applicable to Plaintiff’s DMV driver’s license suspension hearing. Said former statute is fully consistent with other relevant statutes, including, without limitation, Vehicle Code sections 14100 through 14112 and Government Code section 11501. Further, the court concluded that both CCR section 115.07 and former Government Code section 11440.30 were mandatory and not merely directory. Moreover, substantial evidence supports an implied finding that Plaintiff was prejudiced by DMV’s failure to adhere to former government code section 11440.30. View "Ramirez v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court held that the single justice of the county court neither erred nor abused his discretion by denying, without a hearing, Petitioner's petition for relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, holding that the single justice neither erred nor abused his discretion by denying extraordinary relief.In 1985, Petitioner was convicted of aggravated rape and other offenses. In 2005, the Sex Offender Registration Board issued a decision ordering Petitioner to register as a level three sex offender, thereafter denying Petitioner's motion for relief from the registration requirement. In this petition, Petitioner brought, among other claims, constitutional challenges to both federal and state sex offender registration laws. The single justice denied relief. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the single justice did not abuse his discretion in finding that no exceptional circumstances were present in this case warranting extraordinary relief. View "Rancourt v. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the judgment of the superior court against Plaintiffs and directed the court to enter a judgment declaring the "public comment policy" of the town of Southborough unconstitutional,holding that the town's public comment policy violated rights protected by articles nineteen and sixteen of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.At issue was the policy of the board of selectmen of Southborough that outlines the public comment portion of its meetings where town residents may address the board ("public comment policy"). Plaintiffs argued, among other claims, that the policy violated their constitutionally-protected right under article nineteen "to assemble, speak in a peaceable manner, and petition...town leaders for redress." The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the superior court's decision rejecting the argument that the town's public comment policy was unconstitutional, in violation of articles nineteen and sixteen, holding that the town's civil restraints on the content of speech at a public comment session in a public meeting were forbidden under both articles nineteen and sixteen. View "Barron v. Kolenda" on Justia Law

In three separate cases consolidated for appeal, a trial court found defendants incompetent to stand trial and ordered them be committed to the California Department of State Hospitals (DSH) for competency treatment. When DSH failed to admit the defendants in a timely manner, the trial court issued orders to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed, and it directed DSH to admit each defendant by a particular deadline. When the defendants were not admitted by that deadline, the trial court issued sanctions of $1,000 for each day past the deadline that the defendants were not admitted, for a total of $91,000. Although only one of the sanctions orders stated sanctions were imposed pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 177.5, the parties proceeded on the assumption that sanctions were imposed pursuant to that section in all three cases. DSH all three sanctions orders, arguing: (1) the trial court erred in concluding DSH lacked good cause or substantial justification for failing to admit defendants by the court-ordered deadline; (2) the written orders imposing sanctions fail to specify the conduct or circumstances justifying the order in sufficient detail; and (3) the amount of sanctions imposed in each case exceeds the $1,500 limit provided in section 177.5. The Court of Appeal interpreted section 177.5 as allowing sanctions of up to $1,500 for each separate violation of a court order. The Court reversed judgment and remanded for the trial court to determine in the first instance whether DSH committed separate acts of violating a court order on each day that it failed to admit the defendants past the court-ordered deadline, or whether its failure to admit the defendants could only be considered one act of violating a court order. "If the trial court determines DSH committed separate acts of violating a court order, its written order imposing sanctions 'shall be in writing and shall recite in detail the conduct or circumstances justifying' that determination." View "California v. Edwards, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff applied for and was denied disability benefits from the Social Security Administration (“SSA”). Plaintiff appealed the decision to the District of Minnesota, arguing in part that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) who oversaw the case lacked authority because SSA Acting Commissioner Nancy Berryhill was not properly serving as Acting Commissioner when she ratified the ALJ’s appointment. The district court agreed.   The Eighth Circuit reversed. The court found that Berryhill was properly serving as Acting Commissioner when she ratified the appointment. Plaintiff argued the district court’s decision can be affirmed because Berryhill was never directed to serve by the president. In essence, he argued the 2016 succession memo became null and void when administrations changed in 2017. The court concluded that this argument fails. The general rule is that presidential orders without specific time limitations carry over from administration to administration. Plaintiff provides no authority indicating succession orders are any different from other presidential orders. The text of the FVRA likewise does not change the default position that presidential orders, including succession memos under the FVRA, carry over from one administration to the next. View "Brian Dahle v. Kilolo Kijakazi" on Justia Law

Theopalis Gregory, a former City of Wilmington Council President and Delaware lawyer, was convicted by jury for official misconduct. The charges stemmed from a $40,000 discretionary grant Gregory earmarked for his non-profit organization before leaving office. He personally received at least $15,000 of the grant after he left office. On appeal, Gregory argued the jury instructions were flawed because the trial judge did not define for the jury “official functions,” a necessary element of an official-misconduct conviction. He also argued that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his conviction because he was not performing official functions when he earmarked funds for his nonprofit. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed Gregory’s conviction: Gregory did not object to the jury instructions, and the trial judge did not plainly err when he instructed the jury using the words of the statute. Further, the Court was satisfied that the jury had more than sufficient evidence to find that Gregory was performing official functions when he earmarked the $40,000. View "Gregory v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Plaintiff asked the Foreign Service Grievance Board to review the Foreign Service’s decision to deny her tenure. While the Board was considering her grievances, Plaintiff asked the Board to grant “interim relief.” That relief would have let Plaintiff keep working for the Foreign Service until her case was decided. But the Board refused to grant it. So Plaintiff filed suit, claiming that the Board should have given her relief. After Plainitff in lost in the district court and appealed to this court, the Board reached final decisions on her grievances. 
 The DC Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to dismiss Plaintiff’s backpay claim, and the court dismissed Plaintiff’s appeal of her interim-relief claims as moot. The court explained backpay is not an available remedy on judicial review of the Board’s orders. Nothing in the Foreign Service Act authorizes a court to issue backpay. Plus, under the Act, judicial review is adjudicated “in accordance with the standards set forth in [the Administrative Procedure Act].” Here, the Board found no merit to four of Plaintiff’s grievances. As for the fifth grievance, the Board held that Plaintiff’s claim had merit, but it still denied her backpay. And because Plaintiff has not petitioned for judicial review of the Board’s decision to deny backpay in that grievance, the court wrote it cannot direct the Board to reconsider it. View "Julie Beberman v. Antony Blinken" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied this petition filed by LaRon Gregory seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the City of Toledo to provide public records and awarded statutory damages, holding that Gregory was not entitled to a writ of mandamus.Gregory send a public records request to the Toledo police department requesting certain records and asking certain questions. At the time Gregory filed his mandamus complaint the City had not responded to his records request, but by the time he filed his merit brief, the City had responded, largely satisfying his records request. The Supreme Court denied Gregory's demand for a writ of mandamus in part as moot and in part on the merits and held that Gregory was entitled to an award of $400 in statutory damages. View "State ex rel. Gregory v. Toledo" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court denying Defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint brought by Plaintiff for injuries he sustained in the course and scope of his employment with Defendant, holding that the circuit court erred in denying the motion to dismiss.Plaintiff severely injured his left leg while he was employment at a pipeline construction project and received workers' compensation benefits for his injury. Plaintiff brought this complaint alleging negligence, vicarious liability, and negligent hiring, retention, and supervision. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for failing to state a claim on the ground that it was entitled to workers' compensation immunity. The circuit court denied the petition. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the common law tort claims alleged in Plaintiff's complaint fell within the scope of immunity afforded by West Virginia's Workers' Compensation Act, W. Va. Code 23-2-1 et seq. View "Precision Pipeline, LLC v. Weese" on Justia Law