The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirming the order of the circuit court granting the motion for summary judgment filed by the Hawai'i Criminal Justice Data Center (HCJDC) and dismissing Phillip Barker's action seeking to require the HCJDC to expunge his arrest record, holding that the ICA gravely erred.Barker, who was convicted of disorderly conduct as a violation, applied for expungement of his arrest, asserting that because Haw. Rev. Stat. 701-107(7) provides that a violation does not constitute a crime, he was entitled to expungement pursuant to Haw. Rev. Stat. 831-3.2. The HCJDC denied the application, concluding that Barker had been convicted of a "crime" within the meaning of section 831-3.2(a). The circuit court denied Barker's request for an order requiring the HCJDC to expunge his arrest record. The ICA affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgments below, holding that under the plain language of Haw. Rev. Stat. 701-107(7) and §§ 831-3.2(a), a person arrested for or charged with a crime, including a petty misdemeanor, but convicted of a violation is eligible for expungement because a “violation” is not a “crime.” View "Barker v. Young" on Justia Law

For years, the High Lonesome Ranch restricted access to two roads by locking a gate. But in 2015, during a county meeting, the Garfield County Commission directed the Ranch to remove the locked gate after concluding that the two disputed roads were subject to public rights-of-way. The Ranch refused and filed a declaratory-judgment action in Colorado state court opposing the County’s position. At first, the County asked the state court to dismiss the case for failure to name the U.S. Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) as a party. But rather than dismissing, the state court ordered the Ranch to join the United States (BLM) as a necessary party, and the Ranch did so. The United States removed the case to federal district court. In October 2020, after a five-day bench trial, the district court ruled that the entire lengths of the two disputed roads were subject to public rights-of-way. On appeal—and for the first time—the Ranch contended that various procedural shortcomings deprived the district court of subject-matter jurisdiction. It also challenged the district court’s rights-of-way rulings. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s adverse-use ruling, but reversed its Colorado R.S. 2477 ruling and remanded for the court to reconsider that ruling under recent circuit authority governing acceptance of R.S. 2477 rights. The Court also remanded for the district court to determine the locations and widths of the rights-of-way by survey. View "High Lonesome Ranch v. Board of County Commissioner, et al." on Justia Law

The Northern Arapaho Tribe and the Indian Health Service (IHS) entered into a contract under the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act for the Tribe to operate a federal healthcare program. Under the contract, the Tribe provided healthcare services to Indians and other eligible beneficiaries. In exchange, the Tribe was entitled to receive reimbursements from IHS for certain categories of expenditures, including “contract support costs.” The contract anticipates that the Tribe will bill third-party insurers such as Medicare, Medicaid, and private insurers. The Tribe contended that overhead costs associated with setting up and administering this third-party billing infrastructure, as well as the administrative costs associated with recirculating the third-party revenue it received, qualified as reimbursable contract support costs under the Self-Determination Act and the Tribe’s agreement with the IHS. But when the Tribe attempted to collect those reimbursements, IHS disagreed and refused to pay. Contending it had been shortchanged, the Tribe sued the government. The district court, agreeing with the government’s reading of the Self-Determination Act and the contract, granted the government’s motion to dismiss. A divided panel of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals voted to reverse (for different reasons). Under either of the jurists' interpretations, the administrative expenditures associated with collecting and expending revenue obtained from third-party insurers qualified as reimbursable contract support costs. View "Northern Arapaho Tribe v. Becerra, et al." on Justia Law

In 2019, plaintiff John Dewey Institute, Inc. (“JDI”) submitted a charter school application to the Douglas County Colorado School Board. Section 22-30.5-108 (“section 108”) of the Charter Schools Act created a four-step procedure in which a charter school applicant may potentially twice appeal an adverse decision of a local board of education to the State Board. The parties agreed that section 108 precluded judicial review of State Board decisions rendered after a second appeal under section 108(3)(d). They disagreed, however, as to whether this appeal-preclusion language also barred judicial review of final decisions of the State Board rendered after a first appeal under section 108(3)(a)—a scenario in which the State Board has affirmed the local board’s decision to deny a charter school application, thus rendering a second appeal unnecessary. Applying the plain language of section 108 and the statutory scheme as a whole, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that section 108(3)(d)’s appeal-preclusion language applied to all final decisions of the State Board rendered under section 108, including when, as here, the State Board affirmed the local board’s denial of a charter school application during an initial appeal, thereby ending the matter and rendering a second appeal unnecessary. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' ruling declaring that final decisions of the State Board rendered after a first appeal were subject to judicial review. This matter was remanded with instructions that the case be returned to the district court for the dismissal of JDI’s claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Colorado State Board of Education v. Brannberg" on Justia Law

The 2020 Horseracing Safety and Integrity Act created a national framework to regulate thoroughbred horseracing, replacing several state regulatory authorities with a private corporation, the Horseracing Authority, the Act’s primary rule-maker. The Authority was not subordinate to the relevant public agency, the Federal Trade Commission, in critical ways. In 2022, the Fifth Circuit declared the Act unconstitutional because it gave “a private entity the last word” on federal law. Congress amended the Act to give the Federal Trade Commission discretion to “abrogate, add to, and modify” any rules that bind the industry, 15 U.S.C. 3053(e).The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a suit filed by Oklahoma, West Virginia, Louisiana, their racing commissions, and other entities that made the same claims as the Fifth Circuit case. While the challenges are not moot, the Authority is now subordinate to the FTC, which has “pervasive” oversight and control of the Authority’s enforcement activities, just as it does in the rulemaking context. The court rejected a “commandeering” challenge to a provision that requires state authorities to “cooperate and share information” with the Authority or federal agencies for lack of standing and rejected claims that the Act was coercive or punitive. View "State of Oklahoma v. United States" on Justia Law

Jennifer Dell Peach sued, among others, Lester Thomas asserting claims arising from a multivehicle accident that took place after Thomas, a State trooper with the Alabama Law Enforcement Agency, allegedly blocked both lanes of a highway to perform traffic stops of speeding drivers. Thomas moved for a summary judgment, arguing, among other things, that he was entitled to State-agent immunity. The trial court denied that motion. Thomas petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to enter a summary judgment in his favor on the ground of State-agent immunity. The Supreme Court determined that based solely on the arguments and evidence presented to the trial court, Thomas did not establish a clear legal right to an order granting his motion for a summary judgment based on State-agent immunity. Therefore, Thomas's petition for the writ of mandamus was denied. View "Ex parte Lester Lee Thomas." on Justia Law

Southern California Edison Company (Edison), an investor-owned public utility, filed a complaint in eminent domain to condemn an easement across a landowner’s property for the purpose of accessing and maintaining existing power transmission lines. Edison also filed a motion for order of prejudgment possession under the quick-take provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 1255.410.1 The trial court granted the motion. The landowners filed a petition for writ of mandate requesting the court vacate the order granting Edison prejudgment possession.   The Fifth Appellate District vacated the order of prejudgment possession and directed the trial court to conduct further proceedings on the motion. Because the maintenance of power transmission lines is a matter of urgency, the court issued a peremptory writ in the first instance. The court explained a trial court evaluating a quick-take motion in the absence of a timely opposition shall grant the motion “if the court finds each of the following: (A) The plaintiff is entitled to take the property by eminent domain (B) The plaintiff deposited pursuant to Article 1 an amount that satisfies the requirements of that article.”   Here, the trial court did not make express findings. Among other things, the court did not expressly find that it was necessary for the access easement to be 16 feet wide, that the 16-foot-wide access easement was compatible with the least private injury, or that it was necessary for Edison to have the right to move guy wires and anchors, crossarms, and other physical fixtures onto the property. View "Robinson v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The International Organization of Masters, Mates & Pilots, ILA, AFL-CIO (“the Union” or “IOM”), has been the lawful bargaining agent for the Licensed Deck Officers (“LDOs”) on four container ships that carry goods between ports in California and Hawaii. The Pasha Group purchased the ships, and its wholly owned subsidiary, Sunrise Operations, LLC (“Sunrise”), now operates the vessels and is the most recent successor employer of the LDOs. The Union filed unfair labor practice (“ulp”) charges with the National Labor Relations Board (“Board” or “NLRB”). The Board’s General Counsel then filed a complaint alleging that Sunrise had violated sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA” or “Act”), when it failed to provide information to the Union and declined to participate in arbitration proceedings in Maryland.   The DC Circuit granted the petition for review, vacated the Board’s decision, and remanded the case for reconsideration. The court held that it is clear that the majority opinion for the Board purports to decide the case without regard to the parties’ principal claims presented to the ALJ, and it rests on a position that was never advanced by Sunrise either before the ALJ or in its exceptions to the Board. Sunrise never argued that the disposition of this case should turn on the employer’s subjective beliefs about whether the LDOs were supervisors. Thus, the court found that the Board’s holding, in this case, lacks support in the record, defies established law, and creates a new rule without reasoned justification. It thus fails substantial evidence review and is arbitrary and capricious for want of reasoned decision-making. View "International Organization of Masters, Mates & Pilots, ILA, AFL-CIO v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Schwab Multimedia received a construction permit from the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). But Schwab never built its station. Though the FCC granted Schwab’s first three requests for more time, it denied Schwab’s fourth. Schwab appealed the FCC’s decision, claiming that it was arbitrary and capricious.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court held that the FCC based its denial of Schwab’s tolling request on three underlying determinations, and those determinations were reasonable. First, the FCC reasonably found that Schwab had no construction site. Indeed, Schwab admitted as much. It told the Media Bureau that the landlord of the original site had “rescinded [its] verbal agreement . . . to use the site.” And it offered no evidence to suggest that it had since secured the landlord’s permission. Second, it was reasonable for the FCC to conclude that site loss was the real reason Schwab could not build. Third, the FCC reasonably held that site loss is not a legitimate basis for tolling. Further, Schwab produced no evidence to show that good cause would support a waiver. View "Levine/Schwab Partnership v. FCC" on Justia Law

Flyers Rights and its current president have taken aim at the small size of airline seats. In their view, small seats slow emergency evacuations and cause medical problems like blood clots. They have petitioned for a writ of mandamus ordering the FAA “to commence rulemaking to establish minimum seat size and spacing requirements for commercial aircraft and to issue a final rule by a date certain.”   The DC Circuit denied Flyers Rights’ petition. The court held that Flyers Rights lacks a clear and indisputable right to relief. That’s because the FAA Reauthorization Act speaks only of seat-size regulations that “are necessary for the safety of passengers,” and on the record before the court, the necessity of those regulations is neither clear nor indisputable. View "In re: Flyers Rights Education Fund, Inc." on Justia Law