Blythe and Danny were the parents of three-year-old Gene. Blythe had two other children, Gene’s half siblings, with a man named Timothy. Timothy has custody of those other children; they lived with him and his parents, Robert and Vivian. In January 2021, the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) filed a non-emergency petition to adjudicate Gene a child in need of aid due to concerns about Blythe’s and Danny’s mental health and substance abuse. Later that month OCS removed Gene from his parents and placed him with Robert and Vivian. Robert and Vivian considered themselves Gene’s grandparents, though they were not related to him by blood or marriage. When OCS decides to transfer a child in its custody from one out-of-home placement to another, a party may seek judicial review of that decision. According to statute, the superior court shall deny the proposed transfer if the party “prove[s] by clear and convincing evidence that the transfer would be contrary to the best interests of the child.” OCS argued that in some circumstances the party challenging a proposed transfer must also show it was an abuse of discretion, such as when OCS seeks to transfer the child to a statutorily preferred placement or due to licensing concerns with the existing placement. Because there was no basis in statutory text or legislative history to supplant the standard of review chosen by the legislature with a standard more deferential to OCS, the Alaska Supreme Court declined to do so. And because the Court mistakenly applied abuse of discretion review in State, Department of Health & Social Services, Office of Children’s Services v. Zander B., 474 P.3d 1153 (Alaska 2020), it overruled that decision to the extent it was inconsistent with the opinion here. View "Blythe P. v. Alaska, DHSS, OCS" on Justia Law

The Clean Air Act gives the EPA the authority to establish national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) for certain pollutants. To achieve, maintain, and enforce those standards, every state develops a State Implementation Plan (SIP), which the EPA reviews and, after public notice and comment, approves or disapproves. Upon approval, a SIP—and all the state regulations it includes—becomes enforceable in federal court. If the EPA determines that its prior approval of a SIP was in error, the EPA can revise the plan using the Clean Air Act’s error-correction provision, 42 U.S.C. 7410(k)(6). For almost 50 years, Ohio’s SIP included an air nuisance rule (ANR) that made unlawful the emission of various substances in a manner or amount that endangered public health, safety, or welfare, or caused unreasonable injury or damage to property. In 2020, the EPA proposed removing the ANR from Ohio’s SIP using the Act’s error-correction provision.After public comment, the EPA finalized the removal of the ANR from Ohio’s SIP on the grounds that the state had not relied on the rule to implement, maintain, or enforce any NAAQS. Objectors argued that the EPA improperly invoked section 7410(k)(6) and acted arbitrarily. The Sixth Circuit remanded without vacatur. The objectors established that vacatur of the EPA’s decision is sufficiently likely to redress injuries to their asserted physical, recreational, and aesthetic interests, and have established standing; they also established standing based on their asserted procedural injury. View "Sierra Club v. United States Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission granted a license to Interim Storage Partners to store spent nuclear fuel near the New Mexico border. New Mexico challenged the grant of this license, invoking the Administrative Procedure Act, and the National Environmental Policy Act. The Commission moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Objecting to the motion, New Mexico invoked jurisdiction under the combination of the Hobbs Act, and the Atomic Energy Act. The Tenth Circuit determined these statutes could combine to trigger jurisdiction only when the petitioner was an aggrieved party in the licensing proceeding. This limitation applied here because New Mexico didn’t participate in the licensing proceeding or qualify as an aggrieved party. "New Mexico just commented to the Commission about its draft environmental impact statement. Commenting on the environmental impact statement didn’t create status as an aggrieved party, so jurisdiction isn’t triggered under the combination of the Hobbs Act and Atomic Energy Act." The Court found the Nuclear Waste Policy Act governed the establishment of a federal repository for permanent, not temporary storage by private parties like Interim Storage. And even when an agency acts ultra vires, the Court lacked jurisdiction when the petitioner had other available remedies: New Mexico had other available remedies by seeking intervention in the Commission’s proceedings. So the Commission’s motion to dismiss the petition was granted for lack of jurisdiction. View "Balderas, et al. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, et al." on Justia Law

Heritage Hunter Knoll, LLC (Heritage), appeals the circuit court’s dismissal of its appeal for a lack of jurisdiction. The Lamar County Board of Supervisors (Board) amended the Unauthorized Dumping and Litter Ordinance (waste ordinance) to discontinue the county’s garbage collection service to multifamily residences, duplex developments, apartment complexes, and commercial properties. Notably, the amendment advised that “[a]ny citizen who [wa]s affected or aggrieved by this Ordinance may apply to the Lamar County Board of Supervisors (at its regularly scheduled meetings) for a Variance to the terms, provisions and applications of this Ordinance.” Heritage, a limited liability company, owned three properties in Lamar County: Hunter Lane, Heritage Cove, and Knoll Cutoff. Heritage received notice of the Board’s amendment to the waste ordinance by letter dated July 23, 2018. In August 2018, the Board passed a second, clarifying amendment to the waste ordinance. In September 2018, the Board approved Heritage’s variance request for the Knoll Cutoff property, but it denied the variance requests for Hunter Lane and Heritage Cove. Heritage did not appeal the Board’s amendment to the waste ordinance or the Board’s denial of its variance requests. In January 2019, the county implemented the amended waste ordinance. On February 1, 2019, Heritage filed suit in federal court claiming that the Board’s amendment to the waste ordinance was unlawful and that it violated Heritage’s constitutional rights. The Mississippi Supreme Court determined Heritage’s appeal was untimely as to the amendment to the waste ordinance but timely as to the Board’s denial of Heritage’s variance requests. The circuit court’s judgment of dismissal was affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part. View "Heritage Hunter Knoll, LLC v. Lamar County, Mississippi" on Justia Law

WinRed, a “conduit” political action committee (PAC), centralizes donations to Republican-affiliated candidates and committees. WinRed helps them set up a WinRed.com webpage where donors contribute. WinRed collects and distributes the earmarked contributions. WinRed.com’s technical and maintenance services are at least partly performed by a separate entity, WinRed Technical Services, LLC (WRTS). The relationship between WinRed and WRTS is not clear, but the Eighth Circuit accepts WinRed’s affidavit that it operates exclusively in the domain of federal elections. The district court dismissed WinRed, Inc.’s request for a declaratory judgment and preliminary injunction preventing the Attorneys General from (1) investigating WinRed’s activities with respect to contributions; and (2) bringing a deceptive-practice action against it for those activities.”   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that WinRed gives two reasons to look beyond the statutory text. Neither succeeds. The court held that WinRed errs from the start by attacking a disclaimer mandate where none exists. Minnesota’s consumer-protection law prohibits deceptive practices, and federal law does not preempt Minnesota’s enforcing it against WinRed. Because an enforceable state law underlies General Ellison’s investigation, the investigation may proceed. View "WinRed, Inc. v. Keith Ellison" on Justia Law

Six months after United States and global health authorities declared COVID-19 a public health emergency, the city of Seattle (City) passed an ordinance (Seattle Ordinance 126094) authorizing hazard pay for certain workers who delivered food to consumers’ homes. By that time, Governor Inslee had issued stay-at-home orders requiring Washingtonians to leave home only for the most essential of trips. Among some of the conditions in the ordinance were that food delivery network companies could not reduce workers’ compensation or otherwise limit their earning capacity as a result of the ordinance, and they were prohibited from reducing the areas of the City they served or to pass on the cost of the premium pay to customers’ charges for groceries. The Washington Food Industry Association and Maplebear Inc., d/b/a Instacart, challenged the ordinance, seeking a declaration invalidating the ordinance on statutory and state and federal constitutional grounds. The trial court dismissed the statutory claim under chapter 82.84 RCW but permitted all remaining claims to proceed. After review of the limited record, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part: (1) affirming dismissal of the 82.84 RCW claim; (2) reversing dismissal of the equal protection claim; and (3) reversing the trial court’s dismissal of the privileges and immunities claim. The Court affirmed in all other respects and remanded for further proceedings. View "Wash. Food Indus. Ass'n v. City of Seattle" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that the Department Environmental Conservation (DEC) may process renewal and modification applications when those applications seek to mine land that falls within the scope of an undisputed prior nonconforming use, thus modifying the judgment of the courts below and the DEC and remitting for further proceedings.At issue was whether the DEC was barred from processing applications, including applications for renewal and modification permits, for permits to mine in covered counties when "local zoning laws or ordinances prohibit mining uses within the area proposed to be mined" see New York Environmental Conservation Law 23-2703(3). Petitioners here sought to annul a modified permit granted to Respondent, the owner and operator of a sand and gravel mine. The applications at issue implicated some prior nonconforming uses that were undisputed and others that were disputed but not resolved. Supreme Court denied the petition, and the appellate division modified and affirmed. The Court of Appeal affirmed as modified, holding that because prior nonconforming use was not taken into account by either DEC or the courts below, remand to the DEC was required for further proceedings. View "Matter of Town of Southampton v. New York State Dep't of Environmental Conservation" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied in part and dismissed in part the order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upholding an immigration judge's (IJ) denial of Petitioners' request for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), holding that Petitioners were not entitled to relief.The IJ denied the requests for asylum and withholding of removal brought by Petitioners, a mother and daughter who were natives and citizens of Honduras, based on its finding Petitioners failed to demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution "on account of" a statutorily protected ground. Petitioners sought judicial review. The First Circuit denied the petition in part and otherwise dismissed it, holding (1) substantial evidence supported the agency's findings; and (2) Petitioners' CAT claim was not administratively exhausted. View "Barnica-Lopez v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Pennsylvania Election code stated that a voter who submits an absentee or mail-in ballot must complete, date and sign a declaration printed on the envelope in which the ballot is returned. Petitioners contended that failure to comply with this instruction rendered a ballot invalid, and they challenged guidance from the Acting Secretary of the Commonwealth that instructed county boards of elections to canvass and pre-canvass “[a]ny ballot return-envelope that is undated or dated with an incorrect date but that has been timely received by the county.” Petitioners asked the Pennsylvania Supreme Court: (1) to declare that absentee and mail-in ballots which were “undated or incorrectly dated” could not be included in the pre-canvass or canvass of votes; (2) to segregate such ballots; and (3) to direct the Acting Secretary to withdraw her guidance. For the November 8, 2022 election, the Supreme Court ordered the county boards of elections to refrain from counting any absentee or mail-in ballots that arrived in undated or incorrectly dated envelopes. The Court also directed county boards to segregate and preserve such ballots. And the Court dismissed Voter Petitioners from the case for lack of standing. The Court was evenly divided on the issue of whether failing to count undated or incorrectly dated ballots violated federal law, and accordingly issued no decision on that question. The Court issued this opinion to explain its reasoning from its November 1 per curiam order. View "Ball, et al. v. Chapman, et al." on Justia Law

Camden County, Georgia appealed a superior court's denial of its “Petition for Writ of Prohibition and Other Relief” concerning an order entered by Camden County Probate Judge Robert Sweatt, Jr., setting a special election for a referendum on whether resolutions authorizing the County’s purchase of land for a rocket launch facility should have been repealed (the “Referendum”). The County claimed the Referendum was not authorized under Subsection (b) (2) of Article IX, Section II, Paragraph I of the Georgia Constitution, which established home rule for counties (the “Home Rule Paragraph”) and that the results of the Referendum are a nullity. As a result, the County argued that the superior court erred in denying its petition for writs of prohibition and mandamus against Judge Sweatt and its petition for a judgment declaring that the Referendum was not authorized under the Constitution. After review, the Georgia Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed the superior court. View "Camden County v. Sweatt, et al." on Justia Law