The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment upholding the Commission's nondisclosure decisions in this Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) case brought by Niskanen, seeking the names and addresses of property owners along the route of a proposed pipeline. In this case, although the Commission concluded that the property owners' privacy interests outweighed the public interest in this identifying information, and it agreed to a more limited disclosure—the property owners' initials and street names. The court agreed with the district court's finding that the Commission's proposal struck the proper balance between these competing interests. The court explained that Niskanen identifies a weighty public interest in understanding the Commission's compliance with its notice obligations, but it articulates no reason it needs the full names and addresses of landowners along a pipeline route to do so. View "Niskanen Center v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court rendered judgment dismissing Petitioner's claims regarding his civil commitment as a sexually violent predator (SVP), holding that all of Petitioner's claims failed as a matter of law.Following a trial, a jury found that Petitioner was an SVP and issued a civil commitment order placing Petitioner in outpatient treatment and setting forth certain conditions. Petitioner later brought this lawsuit against the Texas Civil Commitment Office (TCCO) and the director of the office (collectively, the State), alleging that the TCCO's cost-recovery rules were invalid. The State filed a plea to the jurisdiction asserting immunity from suit. The district court dismissed all claims against the State except Petitioner's due process and takings claims. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that all of Petitioner's claims against the State failed as a matter of law and that the State's plea to the jurisdiction should have been granted in full. View "Matzen v. McLane" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court granting Employer's motion to dismiss a petition for judicial review as untimely, holding that the district court correctly dismissed Claimant's petition for judicial review.Claimant sustained a work injury and pursued workers' compensation benefits. The workers' compensation benefits ordered Employer to pay temporary total disability benefits related to Claimant's right extremity injury but rejected Claimant's claim that she had also sustained a right shoulder occupational injury. According to Iowa Code 17A.19(3), Claimant had thirty day to file a petition for judicial review. Claimant's attorney failed to file the petition by the deadline. When the attorney realized his oversight, Claimant filed a petition for judicial review. The district court dismissed the petition as untimely. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err. View "Askvig v. Snap-On Logistics Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of a single justice of the court denying Petitioner's petition filed pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, holding that the single justice did not err or abuse her discretion in denying relief.After the registry of motor vehicles notified Petitioner that it was suspending his driver's license on the basis that his driver's license in New Hampshire had been suspended. The decision was upheld on appeal. Thereafter, Petitioner brought an action in the superior court seeking judicial review. The Board filed a motion to stay on the basis that the New Hampshire suspension was still pending. The judge allowed the motion to stay. After Petitioner unsuccessfully filed a petition for interlocutory review with a single justice of the appeals court Petitioner filed his Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 seeking relief from the trial court rulings. The single justice denied the petition. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the single justice did not err or abuse her discretion in denying relief. View "Isijola v. Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies & Bonds" on Justia Law

The City of San Diego (City) certified an environmental impact report (EIR) for the “Serra Mesa Community Plan [SMCP] Amendment Roadway Connection Project” (Project) and approved an amendment to the SMCP and the City’s General Plan to reflect the proposed roadway. Save Civita Because Sudberry Won’t (“Save Civita”) filed a combined petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief (Petition/Complaint) against the City, challenging the City’s certification of the EIR and approval of the Project. Save Civita contended that the City violated the California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”), the Planning and Zoning Law, and the public’s due-process and fair-hearing rights. The trial court denied the Petition/Complaint in its entirety and entered a judgment in favor of the City. On appeal, Save Civita raised four claims related to the City’s certification of the EIR for the Project: (1) the City violated CEQA Guidelines section 15088.5, subdivision (g) in failing to summarize revisions made in the Project’s recirculated draft EIR (RE-DEIR); (2) the Project’s final EIR (FEIR) was deficient because it failed to adequately analyze, as an alternative to the Project, a proposal to amend the MVCP to remove the planned road from that community plan; (3) the FEIR is deficient because it failed to adequately analyze the Project’s traffic impacts; and (4) the FEIR failed to adequately discuss the Project’s inconsistency with the General Plan’s goal of creating pedestrian-friendly communities. In addition to its EIR / CEQA claims, Save Civita maintains that the Project will have a deleterious effect on the pedestrian-friendly Civita community and that the City therefore violated the Planning and Zoning law in concluding that the Project is consistent with the City’s General Plan. Finally, Save Civita maintains that the City acted in a quasi-adjudicatory capacity in certifying the FEIR and approving the Project and that a City Council member violated the public’s procedural due process rights by improperly advocating for the Project prior to its approval. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of the City in its entirety. View "Save Civita Because Sudberry Won't v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

This appeal arose out of the tragic rape and murder of Rachel Russell, perpetrated by her grandson, Sidney DeAvila. DeAvila suffered from severe mental illness, and at the time of the murder he was on parole. Russell’s son, plaintiff Steven Russell, brought an action against the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Department), alleging the Department’s parole agents had a special relationship with Russell, and they failed to warn her of DeAvila’s dangerous propensities. A jury agreed, and ultimately awarded plaintiff $4.5 million in noneconomic damages, which the trial court reduced to $2.7 million. The Department appealed, arguing it had no duty to warn Russell of DeAvila’s dangerous propensities and, even if it did have a duty to warn, it was immune from that liability. Plaintiff claimed on cross-appeal that the trial court erred in reducing the judgment and imposing sanctions against trial counsel. The Court of Appeal was "compelled to agree" with the Department, that because the facts presented were not sufficient to establish that there was a special relationship between the agents and Russell, no duty to warn arose. Accordingly, judgment was reversed. View "Russell v. Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation" on Justia Law

Mancini Law Group sent a commercial Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request (5 ILCS 140/1) to the Schaumburg Police Department seeking disclosure of all traffic accident reports for all motor vehicle accidents that occurred within the Village between June 30, 2017, and July 13, 2017. The Department provided redacted accident reports, asserting that FOIA section 7(1)(b) exempted driver’s license numbers, personal telephone numbers, home addresses, and personal license plates; the Department relied upon section 7(1)(c) in redacting dates of birth and policy account numbers. The names of drivers and witnesses were unredacted.The circuit court held that the Department had established that the information at issue was exempt and rejected Mancini’s argument that the Department was precluded from asserting that the information was exempt because it voluntarily provided unredacted traffic accident reports to LexisNexis, a third-party vendor approved by the state for assisting the Department with its Illinois Vehicle Code mandatory reporting obligations.The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The Department is not precluded from asserting that the redacted information is exempt under sections 7(1)(b) and 7(1)(c). An Illinois public body does not have the ability to waive an individual’s interest in his personal or private information that is contained in a document subject to a FOIA request. it is irrelevant whether the Department could have chosen to fulfill its mandatory reporting obligations in a different way. View "Mancini Law Group, P.C. v. Schaumburg Police Department" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decision of the appellate division of the Workers' Compensation Board affirming the decision of an administrative law judge (ALJ) granting Plaintiff's petition for award of compensation, holding that an employee is not required to give notice of his occupational disease claim to his former employer's insurer when the employer no longer exists.Nearly twenty years after retiring from his employment Plaintiff underwent surgery for lung cancer and was later diagnosed with asbestosis. Plaintiff filed five petitions for award of compensation, each alleging a different date of injury and naming and different employer and insurer pairing. The ALJ (1) found that Plaintiff's last injurious exposure to asbestos occurred when he was working for Auburn Sheet Metal, which was insured by Maine Employers' Mutual Insurance Company (MEMIC) but no longer existed, and (2) granted Plaintiff's petition for an award of compensation. The appellate division concluded that Plaintiff was not required to provide notice to MEMIC. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate division did not err in concluding that the workers' compensation statute does not impose on an injured employee whose employer no longer exists the duty to give notice to the insurer. View "Desgrosseilliers v. Auburn Sheet Metal" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the order of the Board vacating an order of the administrative law judge (ALJ) and remanding the claim back to him to enter an award terminating Michael O'Bryan's benefits at age seventy, holding that the court of appeals did not err.O'Bryan received a work-related injury at age sixty-five, leading to his disability. The ALJ found O'Bryan to be permanently totally disabled and awarded him benefits that would continue as long as he remained disabled. On appeal, the Board held that newly-amended version of Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.730(4) applied to O'Bryan's benefits and that they should terminate when he reached the age of seventy. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the statute was constitutional. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that O'Bryan's challenges to the amendment to section 342.730(4) were unavailing. View "O'Bryan v. Zip Express" on Justia Law

Mission Peak filed suit against the State Water Resources Control Board, alleging that it violated the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) by granting a small domestic use registration to Christopher and Teresa George without first conducting an environmental review.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision sustaining the board's demurrer without leave to amend, concluding that the registration was exempt from CEQA as a ministerial act, rather than a discretionary act. In this case, Mission Peak points to no statute that grants the board authority to place conditions on the Georges' registration to lessen its environmental effects; the only conditions the board may impose are general conditions applicable to all registrations; registration is automatically deemed complete, and the registrant obtains the right to take and use the specified amount of water, when the board receives a substantially compliant registration form along with the registration fee; the board determines whether a registration is compliant essentially by applying a checklist of fixed criteria; and the registration is effective as of the date of the form and remains so until and unless the water right is forfeited, abandoned, or revoked. View "Mission Peak Conservancy v. State Water Resources Control Board" on Justia Law