Pickens County, South Carolina sought a contested case hearing in the administrative law court (ALC) to challenge a landfill permit modification issued to MRR Pickens, LLC (MRR) by the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC). The ALC dismissed the County's challenge, finding the County failed to timely request DHEC to conduct a final review of the decision to issue the permit modification. The court of appeals reversed and remanded to the ALC for further proceedings. After review, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals in part, vacated in part, and remanded to the ALC for further proceedings. The Court affirmed the court of appeals' rejection of MRR and DHEC's argument that the County's actual notice of the Permit Modification in December 2015 and January 2016 triggered the fifteen-day limitations period set forth in subsection S.C. Code Ann. sec. 44-1-60(E)(2). Because the ALC found the County's request for final review untimely under subsection 44-1-60(E)(2), the ALC did not rule upon the issue of whether DHEC properly classified the Permit Modification as a minor modification. The court of appeals correctly reversed the ALC on this point when it held the ALC should have determined whether DHEC properly classified the Permit Modification before ruling upon the statutory timeliness of the County's challenge. The ALC expressly refused to make any findings as to whether the County was entitled to notice and as to whether the Permit Modification was major or minor. While the Supreme Court held the ALC erred in not deciding whether the modification was major or minor, it was not for the court of appeals to make these findings of fact; therefore, the Court vacated this portion of the court of appeals' opinion. The Supreme Court also vacated other portions of the opinion that could be construed to make factual findings. The ALC must determine on remand whether DHEC properly classified the Permit Modification as a minor modification. Only after resolving that question can the ALC determine whether the County's request for a contested case hearing was untimely under subsection 44-1-60(E)(2). View "Pickens County v. SCDHEC" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals filed by Greenville County, South Carolina, the issue central to the cases involved a zoning dispute between the County and Greenville Bistro, LLC, d/b/a Bucks Racks & Ribs. Greenville Bistro filed suit against the County to enjoin the County from enforcing an ordinance to deny Greenville Bistro's desired method of operating Bucks Racks & Ribs. Citing other ordinances, the County counterclaimed and moved to enjoin Greenville Bistro from operating Bucks as a sexually oriented business. Both appeals concerned the legality of Greenville Bistro operating Bucks as a restaurant with the added feature of scantily clad exotic dancers. The circuit court granted Greenville Bistro's motion for a temporary injunction, and the County appealed. While the County's appeal was pending, another circuit court denied the County's motion for temporary injunctive relief, ruling that in light of the County's appeal it did not have jurisdiction to consider the County's motion. The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed both rulings, dissolved the injunction granted to Greenville Bistro, and held the County was entitled to injunctive relief. The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Greenville Bistro, LLC. v. Greenville County" on Justia Law

In 2012, then-Vice President Joseph Biden donated his Senatorial papers to the University of Delaware. The donation was made pursuant to a gift agreement that placed certain restrictions on the University’s ability to make the Senatorial Papers publicly available. In April 2020, Judicial Watch, Inc. and The Daily Caller News Foundation (“DCNF”) (collectively, “Appellants”) submitted requests under the Delaware Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) to access the Papers and any records relevant to or discussing the Papers. The University denied both requests, stating that the Papers were not subject to FOIA because the Papers did not meet the definition of “public records” and because the full Board of Trustees never discussed the Papers. Appellants then filed separate petitions with the Office of the Attorney General of the State of Delaware challenging the University’s denial of their requests. The Deputy Attorney General issued individual opinions to Judicial Watch and DCNF concluding that the University had not violated FOIA because the records Appellants requested were not subject to FOIA. Appellants appealed to the Superior Court, which affirmed the Deputy Attorney General’s opinions. Appellants appealed the Superior Court’s ruling to the Delaware Supreme Court. Having reviewed the briefs, the record on appeal, and after oral argument, the Supreme Court concluded the Superior Court properly interpreted the definition of “public record,” and did not erroneously shift the burden of proof to the Appellants. However, the Court concluded the University failed to carry its burden of justifying its denial of the Appellants’ FOIA requests, based on the record. Furthermore, the Court granted the Superior Court leave to reconsider the request for fees and costs, to the extent it deemed that necessary. Thus, judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Judicial Watch, Inc. v. University of Delaware" on Justia Law

The DC Circuit denied a petition for review challenging FERC's two orders regarding a utility company, Entergy Services, and a subset of sales at issue called the Grand Gulf Sales. The Louisiana Commission alleges that FERC's exclusion of the Grand Gulf Sales from the damage calculation was an irrational change of position. The court found no merit in this contention, explaining that the allegations regarding the Grand Gulf Sales do not concern Section 30.03 of the System Agreement because those sales were always treated as Joint Account Sales and therefore never treated as part of Entergy Arkansas's native load.The Louisiana Commission also alleged that the Grand Gulf Sales—despite being accounted for as Joint Account Sales—still violated the System Agreement. The court concluded that FERC reasonably concluded that the two complaints at issue alleged different violations of the System Agreement and therefore that the 2009 Complaint did not preserve the allegations in the 2019 Complaint for purposes of the 2015 Settlement Agreement waiver provisions. In this case, neither Section G(1) or G(2) saves the allegations in the 2019 Complaint from being barred by the 2015 Settlement Agreement. Finally, even if the Louisiana Commission's mutual mistake argument was not waived, FERC reasonably determined on the merits that the Louisiana Commission presented no evidence that any initial shared impression about the Grand Gulf Sales was a material fact that formed the basis of the 2015 Settlement Agreement. View "Louisiana Public Service Commission v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs American Civil Liberties Union of New Hampshire (ACLU) and the Concord Monitor, appealed a superior court order which ruled that portions of a contract between an equipment vendor and defendant City of Concord, for the purchase of “covert communications equipment,” were exempt from disclosure under the Right-to-Know Law. Plaintiffs argued the City failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that redacted portions of the contract were exempt from disclosure, and that the trial court erred when it held an ex parte in camera hearing, during which the City presented evidence supporting exemption. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded the superior court did not err when it conducted the hearing, and that it properly determined that most of the redacted information was exempt from disclosure. However, the Court also concluded that it erred by not disclosing one provision of the agreement. That provision was ordered disclosed on remand. View "American Civil Liberties Union of New Hampshire & a. v. City of Concord" on Justia Law

In November 2021, the Secretary of Health and Human Services issued an interim rule that requires facilities that provide health care to Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries to ensure that their staff, unless exempt for medical or religious reasons, are fully vaccinated against COVID-19, 86 Fed. Reg. 61,555. Under the rule, covered staff must request an exemption or receive their first dose of a two-dose vaccine or a single-dose vaccine by December 6, 2021. Florida unsuccessfully sought a preliminary injunction to bar the interim rule’s enforcement.The Eleventh Circuit upheld the denial of the motion, first deciding not to apply the mootness doctrine and to exercise jurisdiction despite another district court’s issuance of a nationwide injunction. Florida failed to demonstrate a substantial likelihood that it will prevail on the merits, that it will suffer irreparable injury absent an injunction, or that the balance of the equities favors an injunction. The Secretary has express statutory authority to require facilities voluntarily participating in the Medicare or Medicaid programs to meet health and safety standards to protect patients. The Secretary provided a detailed explanation for why there was good cause for dispensing with the notice-and-comment requirement. Ample evidence supports the Secretary’s determination that facility staff vaccination will provide important protection for patients. View "State of Florida v. Department of Health and Human Services" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Regional's declaratory judgment claims alleging that defendants' procedures in suspending Regional's Medicare payments and forcing it out of business without notice, a hearing, or an opportunity to appeal violated its Fifth Amendment rights to procedural and substantive due process. The court concluded that no actual controversy exists between Regional and defendants within the meaning of the Declaratory Judgment Act. The court explained that, having abandoned any claim for damages, Regional seeks nothing more than a judicial pronouncement that its constitutional rights were violated. Therefore, the possibility of Regional re-establishing a business that is certified to receive Medicare reimbursements, again submitting documentation insufficient to meet Medicare requirements for billed services, and again having Medicare payments suspended is too conjectural or hypothetical to pose a real and immediate threat of injury sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction in federal court. View "Regional Home Health Care, Inc. v. Becerra" on Justia Law

Allco Renewable Energy Limited appealed a Public Utility Commission (PUC) order which found that Allco had begun “site preparation for . . . an electric generation facility” without first obtaining a certificate of public good (CPG) in violation of 30 V.S.A. 248(a)(2)(A). The PUC enjoined Allco from any further site preparation unless certain criteria were satisfied and explained that, following another hearing, it would determine a civil penalty for Allco’s violation under 30 V.S.A. 30(a). On appeal, Allco challenged the PUC’s injunction order. Because there was not yet a final appealable order, the Vermont Supreme Court dismissed this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "In re Allco Renewable Energy Limited et al." on Justia Law

The Second Circuit denied a petition for review challenging an FCC order removing the Solicited Fax Rule from the Code of Federal Regulations. The order was issued in response to the D.C. Circuit's decision holding that the Solicited Fax Rule was unlawful, and vacating a 2014 order of the FCC that affirmed the validity of the Rule. The court concluded that it is bound by the D.C. Circuit's decision and that the agency did not err by repealing the Rule following the D.C. Circuit's ruling. Pursuant to the Hobbs Act's channeling mechanism, the court explained that the D.C. Circuit became the sole forum for addressing the validity of the Rule. Therefore, once the D.C. Circuit invalidated the 2014 Order and the Rule, that holding became binding in effect on every circuit in which the regulation's validity is challenged. Accordingly, the FCC was bound to comply with the D.C. Circuit's mandate and could not pursue a policy of nonacquiescence. View "Gorss Motels, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that Corpus Christi pharmacist John McNeill, who participated in a Medicaid drug program run by the Texas Health and Human Services Commission, was entitled to an administrative contested case hearing as to his challenge to the results of a program audit by the Commission.After the Commission audited McNeill, the auditor determined that McNeill had been overpaid by $69,911. McNeill requested a hearing, after which the Commission issued a final notice that reduced the overpayment amount to $64,549. McNeill thrice requested a contested case hearing before the State Office of Administrative Hearings. The Commission denied each request. McNeill sued the Commission, its commissioner, and its inspector general, seeking a declaration that he was entitled to a contested case hearing. The trial court granted the Commission's plea to the jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity and dismissed the complaint. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) McNeill's appeal was timely; and (2) the Commission's inspector general acted ultra vires in failing to perform her ministerial duty to provide McNeill a contested-case hearing under Tex. Gov't Code 531.1201, and the inspector general was not entitled to sovereign immunity. View "Phillips v. McNeill" on Justia Law