The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) upholding the decision of the Wyoming Department of Transportation (WYDOT) suspending Defendant's driver's license and operating privileges pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. 31-6-102(e), holding that the OAH reasonably concluded as it did.Defendant was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. Because a breathalyzer test indicated that Defendant had a blood alcohol concentration greater than .08% the WYDOT suspended Defendant's driver's license. The OAH upheld the suspension. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that substantial evidence supported the OAH's finding that law enforcement did not interfere with Defendant's right to obtain an independent chemical test under Wyo. Stat. Ann. 31-6-102(a)(ii)(C) and 31-6-105(d). View "Flauding v. State ex rel. Wyoming Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

When a city delegates the administration of ambulance services to the surrounding county, which then assumes control, the city may not later attempt to resume administration of those services. In this case, the Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court properly applied this holding when it denied a motion for a preliminary injunction sought by the City to prohibit the County and Ventura County Emergency Medical Services Agency (VCEMSA) from contracting for ambulance services within City limits.The court concluded that there was no error in the trial court's determination that the City lacks the authority to contract for its own ambulance services under the EMS Act. In this case, the City contends it meets the criteria for Health and Safety Code section 1797.201 grandfathering because it contracted for ambulance services on June 1, 1980, as one of the signatories to the joint powers agreement (JPA). However, on that date the JPA empowered the County, not the City, to contract for and administer ambulance services. Therefore, this fact is fatal to the City's contention. Furthermore, even if the court assumed that the provision of ambulance services is a police power, the exercise of that power is subject to constitutional constraints. The court explained that the City ceased contracting for, providing, and administering ambulance services when it signed the JPA in 1971. Regardless of whether it withdraws from the JPA, it may not now resume providing those services absent the County's consent. View "City of Oxnard v. County of Ventura" on Justia Law

Gai Spann filed suit against Rashida Davis and Kyra Dixon, administrators of the City of Atlanta Municipal Court (“the Clerks”), alleging that she was wrongfully arrested and detained as a result of the Clerks’ failure to withdraw a failure-to-appear warrant after it had been cancelled by a municipal court. The Clerks raised sovereign immunity and official immunity as defenses in a motion to dismiss, but the trial court instead sua sponte raised and granted the motion based on quasi-judicial immunity, with no prior notice to the parties. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to review this case, and held the Court of Appeals erred in concluding the trial court was correct to rule sua sponte on the issue of quasi- judicial immunity, even though the defendants did not raise quasi-judicial immunity in the motion to dismiss or the answer. The appellate court's judgment was reversed and the matter remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Spann v. Davis, et al." on Justia Law

Peyton Gifford and Mollie Gabaldon (“Parents”) filed a complaint as individuals, guardians ad litem for their son, and putative class representatives, alleging that the West Ada Joint School District #2 (“West Ada”) illegally charged tuition fees for the second half-day of kindergarten instruction. The district court dismissed Parents’ complaint for lack of standing because Parents did not pay the allegedly illegal fees. On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court held that although the district court properly concluded that Parents lacked standing to pursue a claim based solely on an economic injury, it failed to consider whether Parents had standing to assert a second, discrete injury: loss of educational opportunity for their son. Accordingly, the Court concluded Parents had standing to pursue their educational claims. View "Gifford v. West Ada Joint School District #2" on Justia Law

The EEOC concluded, under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), that the Army had unlawfully discriminated against Plaskett when it failed to rehire him for a civilian position, awarded Plaskett reinstatement and backpay, and ordered the Army to pay him sanctions based on the Army’s failure to comply with discovery obligations during administrative proceedings. The Army refused to pay the sanctions award, citing sovereign immunity. Although the Army agreed to hire Plaskett and paid him backpay, Plaskett claimed that the Army owed him additional backpay and filed suit, arguing that the Army’s nondiscretionary duty to pay these sums was enforceable under the Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C. 1361, and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 706(1).The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the action for lack of jurisdiction. Regardless of whether the claim was viewed under the Mandamus Act or under the APA, Plaskett was required to plead that the Army had a clear, certain, and mandatory duty. The claim to additional backpay rested on an EEOC decision that, on its face. expressed uncertainty as to what amount of additional backpay might be due. The complaint failed to plead sufficient facts to show that a certain amount of additional backpay was now clearly owed. The ADEA did not include a sufficient waiver of the government’s immunity against monetary litigation sanctions with respect to the sanctions award. View "Plaskett v. Wormuth" on Justia Law

The grandmother of an Indian child was appointed as the child’s guardian. The Office of Children’s Services (OCS) took emergency custody of the child after the grandmother admitted using methamphetamine and the child tested positive for the drug. After working with the grandmother to address her drug use and other issues, OCS petitioned to terminate the grandmother’s guardianship. Following a hearing, the superior court found that termination of the guardianship was in the child’s best interests and removed the grandmother as guardian. The grandmother appealed, arguing that her removal violated the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and that termination of the guardianship was not in the child’s best interests. Finding no reversible error, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s removal of the grandmother as guardian. View "In the Matter of the Protective Proceedings of: Baron W." on Justia Law

David Bronner, secretary-treasurer of the Public Education Employees' Health Insurance Plan ("PEEHIP"), and individual members of the Board of Control of PEEHIP ("the PEEHIP Board"), the remaining defendants in this action (collectively, "defendants"), appealed the grant of summary judgment entered in favor of the plaintiffs and members of a purported class, who were all active public-education employees and PEEHIP participants married to other active public-education employees and PEEHIP participants and who had dependent children. Before October 1, 2010, all public-education employees participating in PEEHIP earned a monthly "allocation" or benefit, which could be used to obtain certain coverage alternatives under PEEHIP. In May 2010, the PEEHIP Board voted to eliminate "the combining allocation program" and to phase in a new premium rate structure ("the 2010 policy"), which required a public-education employee married to another public-education employee to gradually begin paying the same monthly premiums for family hospital-medical coverage that other PEEHIP participants were required to pay. In May 2014, the original named plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals, filed a purported class action against the defendants, among others, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983. In their complaint, the original named plaintiffs sought a judgment declaring that the 2010 policy was unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution because, they claimed, the 2010 policy denied them and the members of the purported class a benefit for the payment of insurance accorded every other PEEHIP participant. The original named plaintiffs sought an order enjoining the defendants from denying them and the members of the purported class the use of that benefit, which, they claimed, would permit them and the members of the purported class to obtain family coverage at no cost. The defendants thereafter moved for a summary judgment, which the trial court denied. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed, finding nothing to indicate that the defendants intended to single out the public-education plaintiffs for disparate treatment under the 2010 policy. Accordingly, the Court concluded the 2010 policy was neither arbitrary nor discriminatory and that it did not violate either the Equal Protection Clause or the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. View "Bronner, et al. v. Barlow et al." on Justia Law

The issue this case presented centered on the aftermath of an Indian tribal casino’s unsuccessful suit in tribal court against appellant James Acres following a contract dispute. After dismissal of the tribal case, Acres filed his own suit in state court against two officials of the casino, the casino’s attorneys, a tribal court judge, the clerk of the tribal court, and various other individuals and entities. He alleged, among other things, that the parties he sued (collectively, respondents) wrongfully conspired to file the lawsuit against him in tribal court. He then sought monetary relief from respondents as redress for this alleged conduct. The trial court, however, found Acres’s claims against all respondents barred by sovereign immunity and, as to the tribal judge and several others, also barred by judicial or quasi-judicial immunity. On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed in part. Because Acres’s suit, if successful, would bind only the individual respondents, and not the tribe or its casino, the Court found those respondents were not entitled to sovereign immunity. But, as to those respondents who asserted personal immunity from suit (e.g., judicial immunity), the Court agreed those respondents, with one exception, were immune from suit. View "Acres v. Marston" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's reversal of the order of the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) affirming the Division of Motor Vehicles' revocation of Joshua Derechin's driver's license but reversed the court's award of cost and attorneys fees, holding that the circumstances did not support an award of costs and fees.In reversing and rescinding Derechin's license revocation and dismissing the case with prejudice, the circuit court concluded that Derechin had been prejudiced by OAH's nearly four-year delay in issuing a final order. The court then awarded Derechin costs and attorney fees for "overall delay" of the proceedings. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the circuit court (1) properly concluded that Derechin had been actually and substantially prejudiced by the long post-hearing delay; and (2) erred in awarding costs and attorneys fees for both the pre-hearing and post-hearing delays. View "Frazier v. Derechin" on Justia Law

There have been multiple cases that purported to (at least partially) adjudicate and reserve water rights of various parties throughout the Yakima River Drainage Basin (the Basin). The underlying litigation began in 1977 when the Washington State Department of Ecology filed a general water rights adjudication for all waters contained within the Basin. The Yakima County Superior Court divided the Basin into multiple distinct subbasins and issued conditional final orders (CFOs) for each subbasin at various points within the litigation. The superior court issued its final decree in May 2019, incorporating all of the prior CFOs as necessary. Multiple parties appealed the final decree, and, after briefing, the Court of Appeals certified the case to the Washington Supreme Court. The appeal could be categorized as three separate appeals, each seeking to modify the trial court's final decree (or the incorporations of the CFOs within). Although each distinct appeal was unrelated as to the disputed issues, some parties had an interest in more than one appeal. Further, all three appeals were tied together by variations on one common procedural gatekeeping issue: the appealability of CFOs and how that related to an appeal of the final decree. Overall, the Supreme Court reversed the superior court in part and affirmed in part. View "Dep't of Ecology v. Acquavella" on Justia Law