The 2006 Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act, 120 Stat. 3198, directed the Postal Regulatory Commission (PRC) to establish a rate-making system to govern the prices set by the U.S. Postal Service for its market-dominant products. The Act forbids rates from increasing faster than the rate of inflation. PRC was required to assess after 10 years whether the system had achieved nine objectives; if not, then PRC could modify the rate-making system or adopt an alternative one. In 2017, PRC found that the existing rate-making system was deficient and had not maintained the Postal Service’s financial stability. After extensive review, it adopted a new system in 2020, which retains the price cap generally but allows above-inflation rate increases to target specific costs, 85 Fed. Reg. 81,124 (Order 5763).The D.C. Circuit rejected a challenge to Order 5763. PCR acted within its authority under the Accountability Act, and its predictive judgments and economic conclusions satisfy the Administrative Procedure Act’s requirement of reasoned decision-making. The Act's terms permit PCR to either make minor changes to the rate-making system or replace it altogether, including with a system inconsistent with the price cap. View "National Postal Policy Council v. Postal Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, plaintiffs Michael and Crystal Haytasingh appealed a judgment entered in favor of the City of San Diego and Ashley Marino, a City lifeguard. Plaintiffs sued the City after an incident at Mission Beach in 2013: Michael was surfing and defendant Marino was operating a City-owned personal watercraft. Although the parties offered different versions of what occurred that day, the plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that Marino was operating her personal watercraft parallel to Haytasingh, inside the surf line, when she made an abrupt left turn in front of him. In order to avoid an imminent collision with Marino, Haytasingh dove off of his surfboard and struck his head on the ocean floor. Haytasingh suffered serious injuries, including a neck fracture. Plaintiffs alleged that Marino was negligent in her operation of the personal watercraft. Prior to trial, the trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment of plaintiffs’ negligence cause of action, determining that Government Code section 831.7 provided complete immunity to the defendants on plaintiffs’ negligence cause of action. After the trial court granted summary adjudication as to plaintiffs’ claim of ordinary negligence, plaintiffs amended their complaint to allege they were entitled to relief pursuant to two statutory exceptions to the statutory immunity provided for in section 831.7: (1) that Marino’s conduct constituted an “act of gross negligence” that was “the proximate cause of injury;” and (2) that the City failed to “guard or warn of a known dangerous condition or of another hazardous recreational activity known to the public entity…that is not reasonable assumed by the participant as inherently a part of the hazardous recreational activity out of which the damage or injury arose.” A jury ultimately found in favor of defendants. While the Court of Appeal determined the trial court did not err in finding section 831.7 provided defendants with complete immunity with respect to plaintiffs’ ordinary negligence claim, the trial court did err, however, in determining that Harbors and Navigation Code section 655.2’s five mile per hour speed limit did not apply to City lifeguards, and in instructing the jury that all employees of governmental agencies acting within their official capacities were exempt from the City’s five mile per hour speed limit for water vessels that are within 1,000 feet of a beach under San Diego Municipal Code section 63.20.15. The Court concluded this error was prejudicial. Judgment was therefore reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Haytasingh v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

Martinez regularly crosses a Beverly Hills alley to get to her satellite office. The alley, paved with asphalt, has a concrete drainage channel (swale) running down its center. Martinez was walking through the alley when the front edge of her flip-flop hit the swale; the asphalt, normally flush against the swale, had worn away, creating a divot, 1.75 inches deep. The divot had been there since “at least 2014.” The city is aware that people sometimes walk in its alleys, but alleys are used by heavy commercial trucks and equipment, which degrades asphalt. Every two years, the city inspects streets and alleys for purposes of prioritizing resurfacing; it will inspect potential hazards in response to user calls. The city had not inspected the alley at issue since 2009 and received no complaints with respect to the divot.The court of appeal affirmed the summary judgment rejection of Martinez’s suit. Under Government Code 835.2, a public entity is charged with constructive notice of a dangerous condition only if that condition was sufficiently obvious that the entity acted negligently in not discovering and repairing it. Because alleys, unlike sidewalks, are primarily used for purposes other than walking, and because the cost of inspecting alleys with the same vigilance as inspecting sidewalks would be astronomical relative to the benefit of doing so, what is an obvious defect in the condition of an alley is not the same as for a sidewalk. The divot was not an obvious defect. View "Martinez v. City of Beverly Hills" on Justia Law

In this case, the issue presented for the Washington Supreme Court’s review centered on whether Governor Inslee exceeded his constitutional authority to veto whole bills, “entire section[s]” of bills, and “appropriation items” when he vetoed a single sentence that appeared seven times in various portions of section 220 of ESHB 1160, the 2019 transportation appropriations bill. Section 220 appropriated moneys to the Washington State Department of Transportation (WSDOT) for public transportation-related grants. The vetoed sentence (the “fuel type condition”) barred WSDOT from considering vehicle fuel type as a factor in the grant selection process. The Supreme Court concluded the Governor did exceed his authority; the bill was a valid legislative limit on an executive agency’s expenditure of appropriated funds. The Court therefore affirmed the superior court’s ordered on summary judgment in favor of the legislature. View "Washington State Legislature v. Inslee" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court overruled Savage v. St. Aeden’s Church, 189 A. 599 (Conn. 1937), insofar as it concluded that an employee is entitled to compensation as a matter of law when, during the course of the employee's employment, he or she is injured due to an idiopathic fall onto a level floor.The Appellate Court reversed the decision of the Compensation Review Board (Board) affirming the decision of the Workers' Compensation Commissioner for the Second District (Commissioner) denying Plaintiff's application for benefits filed after she suffered a syncopal episode at her workplace, which caused her to fall backward and strike her head on the ground, concluding that, under Savage, Plaintiff's injury was compensable as a matter of law. The Supreme Court reversed after overruling the portion of Savage at issue, holding that the risk or condition must be "peculiar to the employment" for the injury to be compensable. View "Clements v. Aramark Corp." on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit held that relocation benefits provided by a railroad to its employees are exempt under the Railroad Retirement Tax Act as bona fide and necessary expenses incurred by the employee in the business of the employer, 26 U.S.C. 3231(e)(1)(iii). The court also held that, because no regulatory substantiation requirements apply, CSX is entitled to a refund. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the United States in regard to whether relocation benefits are exempt under section 3231(e)(1)(iii); reversed in part the district court's grant of summary judgment in regard to CSX's need and failure to satisfy the Accountable Plan Regulation; and remanded for the district court to calculate the amount of CSX's refund and administer the notification process. View "CSX Corp. v. United States" on Justia Law

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4, to sue an agency of the United States, a plaintiff must serve the agency and the United States. Service to the United States is delivered to the U.S. Attorney for the district where the action is brought and the U.S. Attorney General . Rule 4 provides 90 days to complete service, and instructs that “[i]f a defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint is filed, the court ... must dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant or order that service be made within a specified time.” In these consolidated cases, federal employees seeking to sue federal agencies for discrimination, failed to properly serve the United States. Each district court declined to grant an extension of time to effectuate service. The cases were dismissed without prejudice, but the limitations period had expired.The D.C. Circuit affirmed. When a plaintiff has otherwise not demonstrated good cause for failing to effectuate service, the running of the statute of limitations does not require a district court to extend the time for service of process, nor does it require appellate review under a heightened standard. Neither plaintiff demonstrated good cause, and dismissal of these complaints under Rule 4(m) was within the broad discretion of the district court. View "Stephenson v. Buttigieg" on Justia Law

Sexton reported to Redford Charter Township to begin five days with the work-release program. Cernuto and Dunn were the program supervisors. Sexton was the only woman among approximately five participants. Township policy prohibited supervisors from driving alone with female probationers but Cernuto insisted that Sexton ride with Dunn in the truck. During those rides, Dunn made sexual comments and threats. Dunn later assaulted Sexton. Dunn explained to her that Cernuto had gotten him the supervisor job and that neither “told on” the other. Sexton reported the incidents to the Michigan State Police within weeks. Dunn initially denied the allegations but later told the police that he and Sexton had consensually kissed. Dunn pleaded no contest to criminal sexual conduct. The Township fired both men.Sexton sued Cernuto, Dunn, and the Township, alleging constitutional (42 U.S.C. 1983) and state-law tort claims. On interlocutory appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of Cernuto’s summary judgment motion for qualified immunity. There is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Cernuto facilitated the assaults; an active participant in a constitutional violation can be held liable under section 1983. The restrictions on Sexton’s physical movement while in the work program were sufficient to create a special relationship between Cernuto and Sexton, giving him a duty to protect her. Sexton’s right to be free from sexual assault was clearly established. View "Sexton v. Cernuto" on Justia Law

Winn-Dixie sells Bacardi’s Bombay Gin in its stores. According to Bombay’s marketing and labeling, the gin contains ten “hand-selected botanicals from exotic locations around the world,” including “grains of paradise.” Marrache filed a class action under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA) and for unjust enrichment, alleging that the inclusion of grains of paradise violated Florida Statute 562.455.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. FDUTPA’s safe harbor provision exempts acts or practices required or specifically permitted by federal law. Under the Food Additives Amendment to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, the FDA had expressly identified grains of paradise as a substance “generally recognized as safe.” In addition, the complaint did not sufficiently allege any actual damages resulting from the purported unfair or deceptive act. Marrache’s amended complaint made no allegations of actual damages, but rather, alleged that he and the other class members were injured by purchasing an illegal product that he claimed was worthless. Marrache did not, however, allege that he could not or did not drink the gin, that he sought a refund of or complained about the Bombay, or that he suffered any side effect, health issue, or harm from the grains of paradise. View "Marrache v. Bacardi U.S.A., Inc." on Justia Law

The Hospitals filed suit to enjoin the OPTN's new policy, which significantly changes the method for allocating donated kidneys to kidney transplant patients, as unlawful under the Transplant Act and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the Hospitals' motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. Examining the district court's balancing of the Dataphase factors, the court concluded that the district court did not err in concluding that the Hospitals failed to show that their procedural APA claim is likely to succeed on the merits. The court also agreed with the district court that the Hospitals failed to demonstrate that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that adoption of the Fixed Circle Policy was arbitrary and capricious agency action. Furthermore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the Hospitals' one-year delay refuted their allegations of irreparable harm, and the balance of the equities and public interest weigh in favor of denying the requested preliminary injunction. View "Adventist Health System v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services" on Justia Law