Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4, to sue an agency of the United States, a plaintiff must serve the agency and the United States. Service to the United States is delivered to the U.S. Attorney for the district where the action is brought and the U.S. Attorney General . Rule 4 provides 90 days to complete service, and instructs that “[i]f a defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint is filed, the court ... must dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant or order that service be made within a specified time.” In these consolidated cases, federal employees seeking to sue federal agencies for discrimination, failed to properly serve the United States. Each district court declined to grant an extension of time to effectuate service. The cases were dismissed without prejudice, but the limitations period had expired.The D.C. Circuit affirmed. When a plaintiff has otherwise not demonstrated good cause for failing to effectuate service, the running of the statute of limitations does not require a district court to extend the time for service of process, nor does it require appellate review under a heightened standard. Neither plaintiff demonstrated good cause, and dismissal of these complaints under Rule 4(m) was within the broad discretion of the district court. View "Stephenson v. Buttigieg" on Justia Law

Sexton reported to Redford Charter Township to begin five days with the work-release program. Cernuto and Dunn were the program supervisors. Sexton was the only woman among approximately five participants. Township policy prohibited supervisors from driving alone with female probationers but Cernuto insisted that Sexton ride with Dunn in the truck. During those rides, Dunn made sexual comments and threats. Dunn later assaulted Sexton. Dunn explained to her that Cernuto had gotten him the supervisor job and that neither “told on” the other. Sexton reported the incidents to the Michigan State Police within weeks. Dunn initially denied the allegations but later told the police that he and Sexton had consensually kissed. Dunn pleaded no contest to criminal sexual conduct. The Township fired both men.Sexton sued Cernuto, Dunn, and the Township, alleging constitutional (42 U.S.C. 1983) and state-law tort claims. On interlocutory appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of Cernuto’s summary judgment motion for qualified immunity. There is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Cernuto facilitated the assaults; an active participant in a constitutional violation can be held liable under section 1983. The restrictions on Sexton’s physical movement while in the work program were sufficient to create a special relationship between Cernuto and Sexton, giving him a duty to protect her. Sexton’s right to be free from sexual assault was clearly established. View "Sexton v. Cernuto" on Justia Law

Winn-Dixie sells Bacardi’s Bombay Gin in its stores. According to Bombay’s marketing and labeling, the gin contains ten “hand-selected botanicals from exotic locations around the world,” including “grains of paradise.” Marrache filed a class action under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA) and for unjust enrichment, alleging that the inclusion of grains of paradise violated Florida Statute 562.455.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. FDUTPA’s safe harbor provision exempts acts or practices required or specifically permitted by federal law. Under the Food Additives Amendment to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, the FDA had expressly identified grains of paradise as a substance “generally recognized as safe.” In addition, the complaint did not sufficiently allege any actual damages resulting from the purported unfair or deceptive act. Marrache’s amended complaint made no allegations of actual damages, but rather, alleged that he and the other class members were injured by purchasing an illegal product that he claimed was worthless. Marrache did not, however, allege that he could not or did not drink the gin, that he sought a refund of or complained about the Bombay, or that he suffered any side effect, health issue, or harm from the grains of paradise. View "Marrache v. Bacardi U.S.A., Inc." on Justia Law

The Hospitals filed suit to enjoin the OPTN's new policy, which significantly changes the method for allocating donated kidneys to kidney transplant patients, as unlawful under the Transplant Act and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the Hospitals' motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. Examining the district court's balancing of the Dataphase factors, the court concluded that the district court did not err in concluding that the Hospitals failed to show that their procedural APA claim is likely to succeed on the merits. The court also agreed with the district court that the Hospitals failed to demonstrate that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that adoption of the Fixed Circle Policy was arbitrary and capricious agency action. Furthermore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the Hospitals' one-year delay refuted their allegations of irreparable harm, and the balance of the equities and public interest weigh in favor of denying the requested preliminary injunction. View "Adventist Health System v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services" on Justia Law

Delaware’s Unclaimed Property Law (UPL), Del. Code tit. 12 section 1101, allows the state to escheat certain types of unclaimed property held by businesses chartered in the state, if the particular business holding the property is not the owner of it, and if there has been no contact with the owner for a specified period of time. Delaware initiated an audit of Siemens, which is incorporated under Delaware law. After a near-decade-long audit process, Siemens sued the state, challenging the constitutionality of the audit and arguing that Delaware’s actions conflict with federal common law limiting the scope of any state’s escheatment authority.The district court dismissed most of Siemens’s claims and denied its motion for a preliminary injunction on the sole surviving claim, which alleged a violation of procedural due process. The Third Circuit vacated. The district court erred in concluding that Siemens failed to show irreparable harm based on its procedural due process claim, and in dismissing Siemens’s federal preemption claim as unripe. In considering the audit, the district court paid insufficient heed to a holder’s payment obligations with respect to interest and penalties under the statute and the consequences of not meeting those obligations. The court affirmed the dismissal of Siemens’s expedited-audit procedural due process claim. View "Siemens USA Holdings Inc. v. Geisenberger" on Justia Law

The FTC filed suit under 15 U.S.C. 53(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA) against appellants, alleging that they had engaged in unfair or deceptive business practices in violation of 15 U.S.C. 45(a) under the collective name of "On Point." On appeal, On Point challenges the district court's preliminary injunction.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed parts of the preliminary injunction enjoining appellants from misrepresenting their services and releasing consumer information. However, while this appeal was pending, the Supreme Court held in AMG Capital Management that section 53(b) does not permit an award of equitable monetary relief such as restitution or disgorgement, leaving the asset freeze and receivership aspects of the preliminary injunction unsupported by law. Therefore, the court vacated parts of the preliminary injunction subjecting the remaining appellants at issue to the asset freeze and receivership to the extent the district court has not already provided relief. View "Federal Trade Commission v. On Point Capital Partners LLC" on Justia Law

The First Circuit dismissed one of the claims in Petitioner's petition for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing Petitioner's challenges to the denial of his asylum and withholding of removal claims and denied the others, holding that Petitioner was not entitled to relief.An immigration judge denied Petitioner's applications for asylum, withholding of removal, cancellation of removal, protection under the United Nations Convention Against Torture and voluntary departure. The BIA dismissed Petitioner's appeal. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) this Court lacked jurisdiction to consider Petitioner's first claim on appeal because Petitioner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies; (2) the BIA's decision on Petitioner's political opinion claim was supported by substantial evidence; and (3) Petitioner's withholding of removal claim failed because his asylum claim failed. View "Gomes v. Garland" on Justia Law

Defendants Yolo County and its board of supervisors (collectively, the County) adopted a revised mitigated negative declaration and issued a conditional use permit to real parties in interest to operate a bed and breakfast and commercial event facility supported by onsite crop production intended to provide visitors with an education in agricultural operations (project). A trial court found merit in three of several arguments presented to challenge the decision, specifically finding substantial evidence supported a fair argument under the California Environmental Quality Act that the project may have had a significant impact on the tricolored blackbird, the valley elderberry longhorn beetle (beetle), and the golden eagle. The trial court ordered the County to prepare an environmental impact report limited to addressing only the project’s impacts on those three species. Further, the Court ordered the project approval and related mitigation measures would remain in effect, and the project could continue to operate. Plaintiffs-appellants Farmland Protection Alliance and Yolo County Farm Bureau appealed, contending the trial court violated the Act by: (1) ordering the preparation of a limited environmental impact report, rather than a full one, despite finding substantial evidence with respect to the three species; (2) finding the fair argument test was not met as to agricultural resource impacts; and (3) allowing the project to continue to operate during the period of further environmental review. Real parties in interest cross-appealed, arguing the trial court erred in finding substantial evidence supported the significant impacts on the three species. They requested an order vacating the judgment requiring the preparation of the limited environmental impact report (even though the limited environmental impact report was already certified by the County). The Court of Appeal concluded Public Resources Code section 21168.9 did not authorize a trial court to split a project’s environmental review across two types of environmental review documents. The trial court thus erred in ordering the County to prepare a limited environmental impact report after finding the fair argument test had been met as to the three species. In the unpublished portion of the opinion, the Court concluded the trial court did not err in: (1) upholding the County’s determination that the project was consistent with the Code and the Williamson Act; and (2) finding substantial evidence supported the projects effects on the beetle. Judgment was reversed requiring the preparation of a limited impact report, and the case remanded with directions to issue a peremptory writ of mandate directing the County to set aside its decision to adopt the revised mitigated negative declaration and to prepare a full environmental impact report for the project. View "Farmland Protection Alliance v. County of Yolo" on Justia Law

Pupo first applied for supplemental security income (SSI) in June 2011, alleging that she was unable to work due to depression, body tremors, and high blood pressure. Her initial application was denied, but, in 2015, her case was remanded for further proceedings pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. 405(g). The district court affirmed the subsequent denial of Pupo’s application.The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded. The decision is not supported by substantial evidence; the ALJ erred by not addressing one of Pupo’s medical diagnoses, her incontinence when assessing her residual functional capacity and the Appeals Council erred by not considering the new medical evidence submitted by Pupo following the ALJ’s denial of her SSI claim. Pupo submitted medical records showing that she had surgery because of her stress urinary incontinence nine days before the ALJ issued his decision. The ALJ did not err in failing to consider Pupo’s borderline age situation because he did not apply the grids mechanically but instead relied on testimony due to Pupo’s non-exertional limitations. View "Pupo v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration" on Justia Law

Family Rehab brought a procedural due process claim arguing that it is entitled to third step review before recoupment of Medicare overpayments. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Family Rehab, and entered a permanent injunction barring HHS from recouping the disputed funds until the completion of third step review under 42 C.F.R. 405.1036(c)–(d).However, in reaching its decision, the district court did not have the benefit of the Fifth Circuit's decision in Sahara Health Care Inc. v. Azar, 975 F.3d 523 (5th Cir. 2020), in which the court rejected a similar due process claim under nearly identical facts. In this case, Family Rehab's claims all involve documentation issues that do not require cross-examination and credibility determinations. The court explained that Family Rehab's claims could have been resolved in the first two steps of administrative review by producing the relevant documents. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment. View "Family Rehabilitation, Inc. v. Becerra" on Justia Law