A state environmental agency received a broad public records request from a nonprofit organization seeking documents related to a recent assessment on ethylene oxide. The agency responded the next day, asking the organization to clarify whether it wanted confidential information, which would require a formal opinion from the state attorney general and could delay production. The requester promptly confirmed it sought all responsive records, including any considered confidential but subject to disclosure under the public records law. The agency believed many documents were exempt under a deliberative-process exception and, within what it believed to be the deadline, sent a request to the attorney general for a ruling. The attorney general later determined that the agency had missed the ten-business-day deadline by two days, so the information was presumed public unless there was a compelling reason to withhold it.The agency then provided additional evidence that it was closed on July 5 due to the Independence Day holiday, that its request was timely mailed, and that it had sought clarification from the requester. Nonetheless, the Attorney General declined to reconsider. The agency filed a declaratory judgment action in district court, and the nonprofit intervened, seeking to compel disclosure. The Office of the Attorney General later conceded its original calculation was mistaken, but the district court granted summary judgment for the nonprofit, ordering disclosure of over 6,000 pages. The Court of Appeals for the Third District of Texas affirmed, holding the request for a ruling was untimely and rejecting the agency’s arguments about deadlines and clarifications.The Supreme Court of Texas held that the ten-business-day deadline for the agency’s request was reset by its timely, good-faith request for narrowing or clarification, and that the agency established timely submission of its request under the mailbox rule. It reversed the judgments below and remanded for further proceedings to determine if the deliberative-process privilege protects the records. View "TEXAS COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY v. PAXTON" on Justia Law

This case arose after the City of Davenport settled three harassment claims with city employees for approximately $1.9 million. The settlements were publicly approved by the city council in December 2023, but there were allegations suggesting that the agreements were reached before the November 2023 city election and were intentionally announced afterward. The Iowa Auditor of State initiated a reaudit focusing on these settlements and issued a subpoena to the City requesting documents, including minutes and recordings of closed city council sessions. The City provided some documents but withheld others, citing attorney–client privilege and the attorney work-product privilege, and sought to modify the subpoena in Scott County District Court.The Iowa District Court for Scott County reviewed the matter and initially ordered the City to produce the closed-session materials for in camera review to determine if they constituted attorney work product. In a subsequent order, the court held that while the Auditor could not access attorney work product, Iowa law did permit access to attorney–client privileged communications, as the statutory exceptions did not explicitly include such privilege. The court planned an evidentiary hearing to clarify relevance but confirmed its intent to review the materials in camera, potentially granting the Auditor access to attorney–client privileged communications.The Supreme Court of Iowa reviewed the case on interlocutory appeal. The Court held that the attorney–client privilege is a longstanding protection under Iowa law and is not displaced by the statutory provisions governing the Auditor’s subpoena power, which do not expressly override the privilege. The Court concluded that the attorney–client privilege limits the Auditor’s access to materials, just as it does for other investigative bodies. The Supreme Court of Iowa reversed the district court’s ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "City of Davenport v. Office of Auditor of State of Iowa" on Justia Law

A school board in Iowa held two closed sessions in 2022 involving its then-superintendent. The first session was conducted at the superintendent’s request to evaluate his professional competency, following concerns raised by board members about conversations at a prior association meeting that some interpreted as attempts at undue influence in board leadership decisions. The board discussed these ethical concerns and whether to seek legal advice, before continuing the evaluation with the superintendent present. Later, after the superintendent left the district, the board held another closed session to discuss the possible filing of an ethics complaint against him, focusing on both the earlier conversations and an unrelated alleged disclosure of confidential information.The Iowa District Court for Woodbury County found that the first closed session violated the Iowa Open Meetings Act because the initial discussion was not directly related to the superintendent’s evaluation, but rather to a potential investigation and complaint. The court found no violation regarding the second session, reasoning that the records discussed were confidential and thus justified a closed meeting. For the first session, the court imposed statutory damages and attorney fees against one board member, while finding the other members acted in good faith.The Supreme Court of Iowa reviewed the case, considering whether the discussions in each session were permissible under the exceptions to the Iowa Open Meetings Act. The court concluded that the first session’s discussion of ethical concerns was directly related to evaluating the superintendent’s professional competency and thus fell within the statutory exception. Regarding the second session, the court held that the board's discussion of draft complaints intended for submission to a regulatory body qualified as review of confidential records, also justifying a closed session. The Supreme Court of Iowa reversed the district court’s finding of a violation and attorney fee award for the first meeting, and affirmed the decision for the second meeting. View "Gausman v. Sioux City Community School District" on Justia Law

A woman was struck and injured by a bus in Bangor, Maine. The bus was operated as part of a public transit system known as the Community Connector, which serves several municipalities and the University of Maine. The City of Bangor oversees daily operations of the Community Connector, but the precise extent of involvement by the neighboring towns and cities is disputed. It is also unclear whether the bus that struck the plaintiff was running on a Community Connector route or a Bangor-only route; the buses for both services look the same.The plaintiff filed a complaint in the Penobscot County Superior Court against the City of Bangor, the Community Connector, and several neighboring towns and cities, alleging negligence and asserting that the Community Connector operated as a joint venture among the defendants. The municipalities moved for summary judgment, arguing they were immune from suit under the Maine Tort Claims Act. The Superior Court denied summary judgment, holding that the municipalities had not established that there were no material disputes of fact regarding their involvement or possible joint venture status. The court also denied a motion for reconsideration.On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court considered whether the municipalities were entitled to immunity as a matter of law. The Court found that key factual questions remained unresolved, including whether the municipalities exercised direct control over the bus or its driver and the nature of their participation in the Community Connector. Because these factual disputes must be resolved by the trial court before determining the applicability of immunity, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court dismissed the appeal as interlocutory, leaving the issue of immunity to be addressed after further factual development in the trial court. View "Fisher v. Town of Hampden" on Justia Law

A sign operator installed two advertising signs near Interstate 85 in Atlanta in 1993, after obtaining permits under the city’s 1982 sign code. These permits were renewed several times. In 2015, after the Supreme Court’s decision in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, the city amended its sign code, removing several content-based provisions but allowing lawful, nonconforming signs to remain. When the sign operator later sought to upgrade the signs, the city approved the changes, but private parties challenged the decision. The Superior Court of Fulton County found that the original permits were unlawful under the 1982 code, making the signs illegal. The city then ordered removal of the signs and issued citations when the order was not followed.The sign operator, joined by the property owner and its president, sued the City of Atlanta in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, seeking a declaration that the 1982 sign code was unconstitutional under the First Amendment and seeking to enjoin its enforcement. The district court initially dismissed some claims for lack of jurisdiction, then reconsidered and ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, concluding that the code was content-based and subject to strict scrutiny, which the city had not attempted to satisfy.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiffs only had standing to challenge the provision of the 1982 code that applied to their signs—section 16-28.019(7)—rather than the entire code. The court further held that this provision, which distinguished between on-premises and off-premises signs, was content-neutral under the Supreme Court’s decision in City of Austin v. Reagan National Advertising of Austin, LLC. The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and injunction and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether the provision meets the applicable intermediate scrutiny standard. View "Anderson v. City of Atlanta, Georgia" on Justia Law

A company that had previously operated a federal warehouse under contract with the government challenged the government’s decision to override an automatic statutory stay that halted performance of a newly awarded contract to a competitor. After the incumbent’s contract expired, the government solicited new bids and awarded the contract to another company. The incumbent protested this decision to the Government Accountability Office, which triggered an automatic stay under the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) that prevented the new contractor from beginning performance. A few weeks into the stay period, however, the government determined that urgent and compelling circumstances warranted overriding the stay, and it allowed the new contractor to begin work.The incumbent then filed suit in the United States Court of Federal Claims, contending that the government’s override was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. The Court of Federal Claims ruled in favor of the incumbent, issuing a declaratory judgment that the override was arbitrary and capricious. The court found that in the context of a CICA stay, the protestor was not required to prove the traditional four equitable factors for injunctive relief, since Congress had provided for an automatic stay mechanism.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the government argued that the case was moot after the override was withdrawn, but the Federal Circuit found the dispute to be capable of repetition yet evading review. On the merits, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Court of Federal Claims, holding that a protestor seeking to set aside a CICA stay override need only show that the agency’s action was arbitrary and capricious, and is not required to satisfy the four-factor test for equitable relief. The judgment was affirmed and costs were awarded to the protestor. View "LIFE SCIENCE LOGISTICS, LLC v. US " on Justia Law

Two Dartmouth College students were arrested in Hanover, New Hampshire, prompting Valley News to file a Right-to-Know request to obtain their arrest records. After months of email exchanges between the Town of Hanover, Valley News, and the students’ attorney, Hanover decided not to release the records, citing ongoing criminal prosecution despite the students’ attorney assenting to disclosure. Hanover based its refusal on exemptions derived from prior case law, specifically the Murray exemptions, which mirror certain provisions of the federal Freedom of Information Act regarding law enforcement records.Hanover initiated an action for declaratory judgment in the Superior Court, seeking a ruling on whether it was legally required to release the arrest records in light of the pending prosecutions. Valley News counterclaimed, seeking an order for disclosure with redactions. The Superior Court ordered Hanover to disclose the records and awarded Valley News attorney’s fees and costs. Upon Hanover’s motion to reconsider, the court upheld the disclosure order but reversed the award of fees and costs, reasoning that Hanover had made a good faith effort in navigating unsettled law. Neither party appealed this order. After Hanover released the records, Valley News moved to reopen the case for an award of attorney’s fees and costs, which the Superior Court denied, finding Hanover neither knew nor should have known its conduct violated the Right-to-Know Law.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. It held that Valley News’s motion was timely and that, under the Right-to-Know Law, Hanover knew or should have known that at least some of the records, especially publicly available information, were not exempt from disclosure. The court found that the lawsuit was necessary to enforce compliance and that Hanover’s blanket denial was improper. The court reversed the Superior Court’s denial of attorney’s fees and costs and remanded for an award to Valley News. View "Town of Hanover v. Valley News" on Justia Law

A licensed electric supplier in Connecticut sought to withdraw its electric supplier license after previously entering into a settlement agreement with the Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (PURA) to resolve various regulatory allegations. This agreement required the supplier to voluntarily stop serving customers in Connecticut for six years but did not expressly require the withdrawal of the license itself. Around the same period, PURA completed a cost-allocation proceeding related to the redesign of residential billing formats, and ordered the supplier to pay an allocated assessment of approximately $179,000. The supplier then moved to withdraw its license, asserting it had no further obligations, but PURA denied the motion without prejudice and directed payment of the assessment before considering license relinquishment.The supplier filed an administrative appeal in the Superior Court for the judicial district of New Britain, challenging PURA’s denial of its withdrawal motion. The supplier argued that the ruling was an appealable final decision in a contested case, or in the alternative, a declaratory ruling. The Superior Court granted PURA’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the denial was not a final decision in a contested case because no statute or regulation required PURA to provide a hearing on motions to withdraw a license. The court also declined to treat the supplier's complaint as a declaratory judgment action.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed whether the denial of the motion to withdraw was appealable as either a final decision in a contested case or a declaratory ruling. The court held that the supplier had waived its declaratory ruling argument by taking the opposite position in the trial court. The court further held that PURA was not statutorily required to provide a hearing on a motion to withdraw a license, so the matter was not a contested case. The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Clearview Electric, Inc. v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority" on Justia Law

A county board created a port authority in 2003 to encourage economic development, administering a business park on contaminated land formerly operated by a lumber company. In 2022, the port authority entered into agreements with a private company to clean up and potentially develop the property, culminating in the sale of 105 acres for $1.6 million, with a credit for cleanup costs. The plaintiff alleged that between May 2022 and April 2025, the port authority failed to provide adequate public notice of its meetings or opportunities for public participation regarding the land transactions, in violation of Montana’s open meeting and right to participate laws.The Nineteenth Judicial District Court, Lincoln County, reviewed a motion for a preliminary injunction, which sought to halt any actions pursuant to the port authority’s decisions during the contested period and to void the land sale and related contracts. The District Court denied the injunction, reasoning that the relief sought would not merely enforce open meeting laws but would invalidate completed transactions and disrupt the property’s new ownership and development. The court found that the plaintiff had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits, particularly given the significant passage of time and changes to the property. The court did not resolve contested factual issues about notice or participation, nor did it make any final rulings on the underlying claims.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the District Court manifestly abused its discretion in denying the preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the District Court did not abuse its discretion because the plaintiff failed to establish all required elements for preliminary injunctive relief. The Supreme Court emphasized that the lower court had not decided the merits of the open meeting law claims and left those questions for future proceedings. View "Torgison v. Lincoln County" on Justia Law

Two individuals who are transgender women, one living in Montana and the other in Alaska, challenged recent Montana laws and administrative policies that restrict the ability to amend the sex designation on birth certificates and driver's licenses. These state actions, enacted in response to legislative changes, allow amendments to these documents only in limited circumstances such as clerical errors, not to reflect a person’s gender identity. The plaintiffs argued that these restrictions forced them to carry identification that does not match their gender identity, resulting in concrete harms such as disclosure of their transgender status during routine activities and difficulties in verifying their identity.The case was filed in the First Judicial District Court of Lewis and Clark County. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging violations of equal protection, right to privacy, and prohibition against compelled speech under the Montana Constitution, as well as violations of the Montana Administrative Procedure Act. The District Court found that the plaintiffs had standing, demonstrated concrete and particularized injuries, and satisfied all four factors required for a preliminary injunction. The court concluded that the policies likely violated Montana’s Equal Protection Clause by discriminating against transgender individuals on the basis of sex, and that the plaintiffs were likely to suffer irreparable harm without relief. The District Court preliminarily enjoined enforcement of the challenged state policies as applied to amending birth certificates and driver’s licenses.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the plaintiffs had standing and whether the District Court manifestly abused its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s order. It held that the plaintiffs had standing and that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the state policies likely constitute unconstitutional sex discrimination under Article II, Section 4 of the Montana Constitution, warranting preliminary injunctive relief. View "Kalarchik v. State" on Justia Law