High Plains Power, a cooperatively owned utility in central Wyoming, proposed a tariff revision to the Wyoming Public Service Commission (PSC) in August 2022. The revision aimed to change the compensation rate for customer-generators—members who generate electricity through small net metering systems—from a retail rate credit to an avoided cost rate, which is lower. Powder River Basin Resource Council and Wyoming Outdoor Council opposed this change, arguing it would unfairly reduce compensation for customer-generators.The PSC held a hearing in May 2023, where both parties presented evidence and testimony. The PSC approved the tariff revision on a two-to-one vote, with Chairman Throne dissenting. The appellants then petitioned the district court for review, which certified the case to the Wyoming Supreme Court.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and found that the PSC misinterpreted the relevant statute and failed to perform its ratemaking function. The court held that the PSC erred in presuming that the avoided cost rate was a just and reasonable rate for monthly compensation under Wyoming Statute § 37-16-103(a)(iii). The court emphasized that the statute does not specify the value of monthly credits or compensation, leaving it to the PSC to determine through its ratemaking process. The court concluded that the PSC did not evaluate the evidence or consider whether the proposed change served the public interest. Consequently, the Wyoming Supreme Court reversed the PSC's decision. View "Powder River Basin Resource Council v. Wyoming Public Service Commission" on Justia Law

Eight rural electric cooperatives (RECs) sought judicial review after the Kansas Board of Tax Appeals (BOTA) denied their property valuation challenges for the 2019 and 2020 tax years. The RECs argued that the valuation methodology used by the Kansas Department of Revenue's Property Valuation Division (PVD) violated the requirement for "generally accepted appraisal procedures" under K.S.A. 79-5a04. The RECs elected to go to district court for a trial de novo, which allows for an evidentiary hearing where issues of law and fact are determined anew.The Shawnee County District Court agreed with the RECs, concluding that PVD's valuation methodology violated K.S.A. 79-5a04. The court found that the methodology resulted in non-uniform and unequal valuations of the RECs' properties, thus inflating their property values and taxes. The district court ordered PVD to adjust its methodology to account for the RECs' treatment of margin stabilization adjustments (MSAs) in their net operating income (NOI).On appeal, the Kansas Supreme Court reviewed whether the district court exceeded its scope of judicial review by considering issues not raised before BOTA. The Supreme Court held that a trial de novo under K.S.A. 2023 Supp. 74-2426(c)(4)(B) does not expand a district court's scope of judicial review beyond what is permitted by K.S.A. 77-617. The court determined that the RECs had only raised a constitutional issue regarding uniform and equal taxation before BOTA, not a statutory compliance issue under K.S.A. 79-5a04. Therefore, the district court exceeded its scope of review by deciding on the statutory issue.The Kansas Supreme Court reversed the district court's judgment, holding that the district court improperly expanded its scope of review by addressing the statutory compliance issue that was not litigated before BOTA. View "FreeState Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law

A former employee of Credit Suisse, John Doe, filed a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA) alleging that the bank failed to disclose ongoing criminal conduct to the United States, thereby avoiding additional penalties. This followed Credit Suisse's 2014 guilty plea to conspiracy charges for aiding U.S. taxpayers in filing false tax returns, which included a $1.3 billion fine. Doe claimed that Credit Suisse continued its illegal activities post-plea, thus defrauding the government.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted the government's motion to dismiss the case. The government argued that Doe's allegations did not state a valid claim under the FCA and that continuing the litigation would strain resources and interfere with ongoing obligations under the plea agreement. The district court dismissed the action without holding an in-person hearing, relying instead on written submissions from both parties.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the "hearing" requirement under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A) of the FCA can be satisfied through written submissions and does not necessitate a formal, in-person hearing. The court found that Doe did not present a colorable claim that his constitutional rights were violated by the dismissal. The court emphasized that the government has broad discretion to dismiss qui tam actions and that the district court properly considered the government's valid reasons for dismissal, including resource conservation and the protection of privileged information. The Fourth Circuit concluded that the district court's dismissal was appropriate and affirmed the judgment. View "United States ex rel. Doe v. Credit Suisse AG" on Justia Law

Judith Maureen Henry was mistakenly arrested on a warrant intended for another woman with the same name who had skipped parole in Pennsylvania. The warrant included Henry's home address and driver’s license photo. Henry was detained for over two weeks, despite her repeated claims of innocence and requests for fingerprint comparison. She was eventually released after Pennsylvania officials confirmed her fingerprints did not match those of the actual parole violator.The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey reviewed the case and denied a motion to dismiss filed by six deputy United States Marshals. The Marshals argued for qualified immunity, claimed that Henry could not pursue her claims under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, and contended that her complaint failed to state a claim. The District Court rejected these arguments, citing a need for further factual development.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the District Court’s decision. The Third Circuit held that Henry’s claims presented a new context under Bivens, as her arrest was based on a valid warrant and her mistaken-identity arrest was constitutionally valid. The court found that the Marshals’ actions did not violate the Fourth Amendment and that Henry’s other claims, including those for failure to investigate her innocence and failure to present her to a magistrate, also presented a new context. The court concluded that separation of powers concerns precluded extending Bivens to this new context. Additionally, Henry’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act were dismissed, as she failed to provide sufficient factual allegations of discriminatory animus and the Westfall Act barred her NJCRA claim. The Third Circuit remanded the case for dismissal of Henry’s claims against the Marshals. View "Henry v. Essex County" on Justia Law

Mendocino Railway, a California corporation, owns and operates a railroad line known as the "Skunk Train" between Fort Bragg and Willits, California. The City of Fort Bragg and the California Coastal Commission sought to regulate the use and maintenance of the Railway's properties within the City, which the Railway resisted, claiming federal preemption under the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (ICCTA). The City filed a state court action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to compel the Railway to comply with local regulations. The Railway argued that federal law preempted these local regulations. Subsequently, the Railway filed a federal lawsuit seeking a declaration that the City's and Commission's regulatory actions were preempted by federal law and an injunction to prevent interference with its operations.The Mendocino County Superior Court overruled the Railway's demurrer, which argued that federal law preempted all local regulations. The Railway's subsequent petitions to the California Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court were unsuccessful. The Railway then filed an answer in the state court, asserting federal preemption as an affirmative defense. Meanwhile, the Commission intervened in the state court action, seeking a declaration that the Coastal Act and local coastal program applied to the Railway's activities and were not preempted by federal law. The Railway also attempted to remove the state action to federal court, but the district court remanded it back to state court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court's dismissal of the Railway's federal lawsuit under the Colorado River doctrine, which allows federal courts to abstain from exercising jurisdiction in favor of parallel state court proceedings. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal, finding that the state court proceedings were sufficiently parallel to the federal action and that considerations of avoiding piecemeal litigation, forum shopping, and the order in which the forums obtained jurisdiction supported the dismissal. The court held that the state court could adequately protect the Railway's rights and that the federal preemption issue could be resolved in the state court proceedings. View "MENDOCINO RAILWAY V. AINSWORTH" on Justia Law

Cody Hart filed a petition to recall Skagit County Prosecuting Attorney Richard A. Weyrich, Skagit County Auditor Sandra F. Perkins, and Skagit County Sheriff Donald L. McDermott. Hart alleged that the officials vacated their offices by failing to file their official bonds before their new term began on January 1, 2023, among other charges. The petition was certified and transmitted by the Skagit County auditor, and Deputy Solicitor General Karl Smith was appointed to prepare the ballot synopses. The Skagit County Superior Court found the charges legally and factually insufficient to support a recall and denied Hart’s motion to amend the ballot synopses.The Skagit County Superior Court approved the ballot synopses but found the charges against all three officials legally and factually insufficient. The court determined that the officials had obtained their bonds before the new term began, and their failure to file the bonds on time did not demonstrate intent to violate the law. Additionally, the court found that the officials' actions did not constitute misfeasance, malfeasance, or a violation of their oath of office. Hart then appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of Washington.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The court held that the charges were legally and factually insufficient, as Hart failed to show intent to violate the law or willful failure to secure a bond. The court also found that the officials' actions did not amount to misfeasance, malfeasance, or a violation of their oath of office. The court concluded that the officials' prior bonds were sufficient until their new bonds were filed, and their actions did not warrant removal from office. The court denied Hart’s various motions, including those for expedited declaratory judgment and recusal of the Chief Justice. View "In re Recall of Weyrich" on Justia Law

The case involves two groups of plaintiffs challenging several provisions in a 2022 manual issued by the Secretary of State, which provided instructions for election challengers and poll watchers. The plaintiffs argued that the provisions conflicted with the Michigan Election Law or required formal rulemaking under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). The Court of Claims consolidated the cases and ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on several points, finding that certain provisions of the manual were invalid under Michigan law.The Court of Claims found that the manual's requirements for election-challenger credentials, the communication restrictions between challengers and election inspectors, the categorization of challenges as permissible or impermissible, and the prohibition of electronic devices in absent voter ballot processing facilities violated the Michigan Election Law. The court ordered the Secretary of State to either rescind or revise the manual to comply with its opinion. The defendants appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and issued a mixed ruling. The court held that the Secretary of State has the authority to require a uniform form for election-challenger credentials and that this requirement does not conflict with the Michigan Election Law. The court also upheld the manual's communication restrictions, except for the requirement that challengers at absent voter ballot processing facilities must raise issues to a challenger liaison who is not an election inspector. The court found that the categorization of challenges as permissible or impermissible was generally lawful but invalidated the provision allowing a challenger liaison to deem a challenge impermissible based on their assessment of its validity. The court declared the challenge to the prohibition of electronic devices moot due to subsequent statutory amendments and vacated the lower court's opinions on that issue. View "O'Halloran v. Secretary of State" on Justia Law

The case involves the environmental review of commercial aquarium fishing permits in Hawai‘i. In 2017, the Hawai‘i Supreme Court ruled that the permitting process for commercial aquarium collection must undergo environmental review under the Hawai‘i Environmental Policy Act (HEPA). Following this ruling, the Environmental Court voided all existing permits and enjoined the Department of Land and Natural Resources (DLNR) from issuing new permits without completing HEPA review. The Pet Industry Joint Advisory Council (PIJAC) then prepared an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) to continue commercial aquarium fishing in the West Hawai‘i Reef Fishery Management Area (WHRFMA).The Board of Land and Natural Resources (BLNR) initially rejected the EIS, citing fourteen reasons. PIJAC revised the EIS and, after a public comment period, submitted it again. BLNR's vote on the revised EIS resulted in a 3-3 tie, leading to the EIS being "deemed accepted" by operation of law. Plaintiffs sued BLNR in the Environmental Court for the First Circuit, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The court ruled against the plaintiffs, finding that the EIS adequately disclosed facts for the agency to make an informed decision. Plaintiffs appealed, and the State cross-appealed the denial of its motion to dismiss.The Hawai‘i Supreme Court held that the State is a proper defendant in the case and should defend the EIS. The court also determined that the "rule of reason" should be used in conjunction with HEPA’s content requirements to evaluate an EIS. The court found that the EIS was legally sufficient as it met HEPA’s content requirements and provided enough information for BLNR to make an informed decision. Consequently, the court affirmed the Environmental Court’s denial of the State’s motion to dismiss and its grant of summary judgment for PIJAC. View "Kaupiko v. Board of Land and Natural Resources" on Justia Law

An attorney, Daniel Crowe, challenged the requirement to join the Oregon State Bar (OSB), arguing it infringed on his First Amendment right to freedom of association. Crowe objected to statements published by OSB in its magazine, which he felt misrepresented his views. OSB refunded Crowe a portion of his dues used for the publication but did not satisfy his concerns, leading him to file a lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon initially dismissed Crowe's claims, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals partially reversed this decision, allowing the freedom of association claim to proceed. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment for OSB, holding that the bar's activities were germane to its regulatory purpose and did not violate Crowe's rights. Crowe appealed again.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that OSB is an arm of the state entitled to sovereign immunity, dismissing claims against OSB and for retrospective relief against its officers. However, the court found that Crowe demonstrated an infringement on his freedom of association because OSB's statements in its magazine could reasonably be imputed to its members, including Crowe, and were not related to the bar's regulatory purpose. The court concluded that this infringement did not survive exacting scrutiny.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment regarding Crowe's freedom of association claim for prospective equitable relief against individual OSB officers and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "CROWE V. OREGON STATE BAR" on Justia Law

Thomas Smith, a veteran, sought specially adapted housing (SAH) benefits from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to build a home spa for his service-connected low back disability. Before receiving a response, he constructed the spa. His initial request was denied, and he did not appeal. Later, he sought reimbursement for the spa's construction costs, which was also denied by the VA and the Board of Veterans’ Appeals. Smith appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims but died before the case was decided. His daughter, Karen Hicks, sought to substitute herself in the appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims denied Hicks's motion for substitution, stating she was not entitled to pursue her father's claim. The court found that Hicks had not obtained a determination from the VA that she was an eligible accrued-benefits claimant, a prerequisite for substitution under the court's precedent in Breedlove v. Shinseki.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. Hicks argued that the Veterans Court should have made the determination of her eligibility for substitution without requiring a VA determination. She also contended that she should be allowed to pursue the claim under 38 C.F.R. § 36.4406, which governs SAH benefits, and under the equitable doctrine of nunc pro tunc. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Veterans Court's decision, holding that the court did not err in requiring a VA determination for substitution eligibility and that Hicks did not meet the regulatory requirements for reimbursement. The court also upheld the application of the nunc pro tunc doctrine, which did not apply as Smith died before the case was submitted for decision. View "SMITH v. MCDONOUGH " on Justia Law